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ABSTRACT
PROMOTING GENDER AND BUILDING PEACE: EVOLVING NORMS 
AND INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES
Renata Avelar Giannini 
Old Dominion University, 2013 
Director: Dr. Regina Karp
The United Nations (UN) has incorporated a strong gender perspective into its 
peacekeeping operations (PKO) based on a renewed focus on women's rights and 
participation in peace processes. These efforts are part of a complex organizational 
learning process in which women's central role in peace processes and the increasing 
efforts to respond to conflict-related sexual violence have become a central component of
9>
the organization's strategy to build a lasting peace. The underlying logic is that it is only 
after an equitable society is founded and when the other half o f the population's voice has 
been included in the political life of the state that peace can genuinely be accomplished.
Nonetheless, the UN's impact on the ground is difficult to measure and remains 
limited. While member states have unanimously endorsed these policies aimed at 
reducing gender inequalities and embedded them in the organization’s resolutions and 
peace operations mandates, the equal status of women promoted in these policies is in 
direct contrast with women’s status within a majority of the member countries. This 
dissertation argues that the UN's renewed focus on gender as a means to build a lasting 
peace has had limited results due to member states' inability or unwillingness to adopt 
gender approaches themselves, along with other factors such as the persistence of 
patriarch-based and weak institutions in intervened societies, volatile security 
environments and lack of resources.
In order to assess this argument, the UN's organizational learning process will be 
evaluated through an analysis of how gender-sensitive practices were incorporated to 
peace processes at headquarters, member states and mission levels. For this purpose, an 
analysis of the UN's normative framework (resolutions, guidelines, training modules, etc) 
and states’ compliance will be carried out along with an evaluation of the advances for 
the implementation of these renewed practices in two case studies: United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) and the United 
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).
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The UN Security Council “stresses that sexual violence, when used or 
commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians or 
as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, 
can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict and may impede 
the restoration of international peace and security, affirms in this regard 
that effective steps to prevent and respond to such acts of sexual violence 
can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and 
security (...)”’
“Sexual Violence as a tool of war can become a way o f life: once 
entrenched in the fabric of civilian society it lingers long after guns have 
fallen silent.”2
This project began when, as a consultant, I had the opportunity to spend 
approximately 75 days in Haiti and in the Democratic Republic of Congo analyzing the 
UN's advances and limitations in peacekeeping practices. The distance between the 
political discourse, the UN's documents and the reality found in the field became my 
main area of interest. As 1 researched the contributions of Latin American peacekeepers 
to promote and implement a gender approach to UN peace operations, I had the 
opportunity to interact with practitioners from various backgrounds and experience the 
challenges encountered by those deployed in mission areas and entrusted with the 
responsibility of applying the UN's missions' mandates.
1 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1820", June 19, 2008, http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/391/44/PDF/N0839144.pdf?OpenElement.
2 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f  the Secretary General on the Implementation o f  Resolutions 
1820 and 1888", November 24 ,2010 , http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27- 
4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/WPS%20S%202010%20604.pdf.
The task of evaluating how well the UN's gender mandate is being implemented 
and interpreted by different contingents became not only challenging, but also dependent 
on a creative process through which the researcher attempts -  sometimes after strenuous 
efforts -  to fit apparently random actions with the norms created at headquarter levels. 
The gap between the “bubble” and the “field” is quite impressive and can be perceived in 
the way norms are put in practice and, most importantly, through the UN staff s 
pragmatic view of what is ideal and can actually be done as opposed to the glimmering 
texts of the resolutions. Lack o f personnel, resources and even understanding regarding 
these norms are commonplace, reflecting some of the inner problems in UN actions in the 
field. Interestingly, however, is the fact that “lacking” has become such a major feature of 
UN peacekeeping practices, and rather than being perceived as a major failure, it is 
normal.
This realization troubled me. Not only did there seem to be a gap between 
discourse and reality on the ground, but this gap was widely accepted as a feature of 
peace efforts. At the same time, scholarly work presented yet another disconnect. With 
the exception of few authors, most analyses about UN peacekeeping actions qualify them 
as major failures. Even though it is true that most UN peace missions have indeed fallen 
short in successfully fulfilling their mandates and transforming host nations, the 
parameters of analysis used by scholars, politicians and practitioners from civil society 
organizations and international organizations seem to be different.
UN documents, missions' mandates and guidelines provide an ideal normative 
framework largely associated with Western “recipes” of success. As argued by Roland 
Paris, international interventions have focused on bringing democracy and re-building the
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economic life under liberal premises.3 While these seem logical and appropriate, little 
consideration is seriously undertaken in regard to the effects of these policies on 
intervened societies. What is worse, these western based ideals seem unattainable and 
sound almost like a joke for many of those carrying out their functions in the field.
At the same time, however, setting “aspirational goals” rather than “just attainable 
goals” may facilitate the spread and diffusion of norms that have been successful in other 
societies, and possibly over time these war-torn nations can indeed work as fully 
functional democracies that are concerned with human rights, gender equality and the 
well-being of their citizens. In fact, we know little, if  nothing, o f what would be the 
consequences of setting less “glimmering” goals. Would the international community be 
able to act more pragmatically and thus more effectively? Or would that create an even 
more dysfunctional organization whose aim is less than peace, thus rendering its 
performance even poorer?
Most of the literature dealing with the UN’s gender approach to peacekeeping 
points to a gap between the UN’s aspirational goals and their actual performance in 
relation to those goals. While these analyses are important because they are constantly 
reminding us of how far the international community is from successfully fulfilling its 
mandates, they do not provide useful tools for those in the field aiming to do their best 
with what is available.
The departing point of this dissertation was this mismatch between the reality in 
the field, the political discourse and the academic analysis. Even though all of these 
conversations deal with the same issues, they seem to have different parameters of
3 Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge, U.K.; New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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evaluation and often do not complement each other. While small successes are 
considered great victories by practitioners in the field, they are seen as irrelevant for 
scholars in the comfort of their lives in developed countries, and as political propaganda 
for politicians aiming to foster their nations' own interests or organizational success.
My intent was thus to bring these worlds together. Mostly, the scholars' and the 
practitioners' world, both of which I have experienced intensively over the past five 
years. As a scholar with limited experience as a practitioner, I would like to provide 
theoretical and conceptual tools that can actually be understood and used by practitioners 
aiming to improve the efficacy of their actions in the field. At the same time, as a 
practitioner, I would like to use my academic background to provide scholars with basic 
parameters to recognize the work done in the field in accordance with what is possible 
and attainable.
For this purpose, I chose the gender approaches to peace operations as a starting 
point to bridge these different worlds. Since 2000, the UN has adopted a normative 
framework that increasingly connects “gender considerations” as a central component of 
peace efforts. This framework was carefully crafted in what became known as “Women, 
Peace and Security Resolution”, a set o f five resolutions that aim to enlarge the 
participation of women in peace processes and to better address the impact o f war on 
women and girls. Taken together, these efforts are concerned with gender equality or the 
emphasis on equal opportunities for women and men and an understanding in regard to 
the impact of policies, events and actions on different gender groups.
Interestingly, these resolution and spin-off documents - including strategies, 
training modules and analytical reports - all assert that there is a strong linkage between
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peace and “normal” gender relations. However, while fixing gender relations seems an 
appropriate response, it also seems a stretch, particularly considering the cultural reality 
and status of women in most of the UN's member states. This, of course, is not to say that 
gender equality and actions to address the impact of war on women and girls is 
unimportant, but rather it raises questions as to what extent the UN can disseminate these 
norms in intervened societies when interveners themselves have not entirely adopted 
these norms. As a direct result of this observation comes yet another question. Can the 
UN serve as an agent of dissemination to both intervened and intervening societies? What 
positive and negative impact does the presence of this dual reality present for intervened 
nations?
In order to answer these questions I chose the analytical framework provided by 
the theory of organizational learning. In the IR field, Ernst Haas has been an influential 
exponent o f this theory, arguing that organizational learning occurs when new practices, 
based on new norms and purposes, are introduced to a given organization.4 Successful 
learning processes, however, are dependent on a given organization’s capacity to 
generate cross-cultural consensus, or to be sufficiently ample to be accepted across 
different cultures. In an organization such as the UN, cross-cultural consensus can 
become problematic, especially when referring to such a controversial matter as gender 
and women's status and rights.
As a result, this dissertation attempts to assess whether or not an organization can 
learn independently from its member states and serve as an agent of dissemination. In the 
specific case of gender, it becomes clear that the UN's normative framework is strong
4 Ernst B. Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models o f  Change in International Organizations, 
Studies in International Political Economy (Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1990).
and encompasses a view usually associated with the West. At the same time, the 
evaluation of member states’ compliance to resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, 
shows that states which have adopted resolutions provisions are mostly European and 
African states that have passed through a UN intervention themselves. It is thus important 
to assess the UN's ability to put forth its gender approach without member states’ full 
compliance and, in this case, to assess whether the organization is capable of 
disseminating its norms throughout member states and intervened societies.
The argument is that adopting a gender approach to peace operations is part of an 
organizational learning process aiming to improve the UN's response to the challenges of 
international peace and security. This response, however, is dependent on member states’ 
compliance to resolutions' provision and adoption of gender approaches in the field. As 
not all member states are keen to the idea of gender equality, efforts in the field have had 
limited impact.
However, the UN's role as an agent of dissemination cannot be underestimated. 
Even though its importance could not be fully assessed, this dissertation provides enough 
evidence that the UN presence has had a positive impact in the perception and 
understanding of gender in host nations and intervening member states, and has served as 
an important platform for norms' dissemination. The following sections will provide a 
valuable background as to how gender became central to the UN's agenda, as well as the 
concept and mechanism of organizational learning and the overall plan of development 
for this dissertation.
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International security: renewed challenges and rising norms
The transformation of international conflicts and the changing nature of threats 
led the United Nations to question its own earlier approaches to promote peace and 
international security. Peace operations worldwide were no longer dependent on state 
consent; they often became humanitarian interventions, done in the name o f the citizens 
whose governments were unable or unwilling to provide their basic needs or purposely 
violating their rights. With this shifting paradigm came the dissemination of human rights 
norms that elevated the importance of the individual to the detriment o f states. In this 
context, a specific gender approach to peace operations was also put into practice. As a 
matter of fact, gender started to be considered an integral component of peacekeeping 
practices.
This unfolding process was possible due to three main factors: rising norms of 
human security, the establishment of peace operations with a protection of civilians 
mandate and, finally, the increasing concern in regard to women's rights and the specific 
needs o f women and girls in conflict settings. Taken together, these factors opened the 
possibility that gender issues would not only be considered within peacekeeping 
practices, but interestingly understood as central to building a lasting peace.
If there is one great idea the dissemination of which can be attributed to the UN it 
is that of human rights. Since its creation, the UN has been concerned with the generation 
of internationally defined parameters o f how individuals should be treated by their 
governments and what concerned their most fundamental rights. This perspective, 
however, has been in constant confrontation with yet another principle that has always 
been central to the organization, that of sovereignty.
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The importance of sovereignty for the UN is expressed through the principles of 
non-intervention and territorial inviolability and reflects an organizational culture highly 
marked by its member states. Nonetheless, the constant changes in the security 
environment and the placement of the individual as the central target of warring parties 
has contributed to increasing re-evaluation of the concept of sovereignty to incorporate 
that o f humans rights. In other words, governments that are unable or unwilling to protect 
its citizens would lose the prerogatives of state sovereignty and foreign interventions 
could be authorized in the name of citizens under threat.
It is in this context that the concept of human security gained importance within 
the UN. Human security entails shifting the focus o f security from the state towards the 
individual and considering security as a much broader concept. Although there is not thus 
far a consensus over the concept, it is widely accepted that human security goes beyond 
the traditional military related sense to incorporate the everyday needs and concerns of 
individuals, including access to water, medical services and education, improved living 
conditions, etc.5
5 Not only human security shifts the focus o f  security from the state to the individual, it also broadens the 
concept o f  security. The concept was initially put forth in UNDP's 1994 report on Human Development 
when UNDP's ideas o f  human purposes o f  economic development were combined to the new security 
agenda. The concept however is highly criticized. The first aspect to emphasize is that the concept is hardly 
to completely substitute that o f  national security that continues to dominate IR field. The second aspect is 
that the broadening o f  the concept o f security has also been the object o f  serious critics as it security is 
broadened, policy design becomes a challenge. Consequently, the field lacks a consensus regarding the 
scope o f  security, whether it should solely focus on protection against violence or if  it should include 
elements such as education, development and so on. For a complete account o f the development o f  the 
concept within the UN, see: S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security and the Un: A 
Critical H istory, United Nations Intellectual History Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
2006).
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As security is broadened and individuals’ protection becomes an essential part of 
international peace and security, United Nations peacekeeping operations6 were also 
broadened and began to incorporate functions that went well beyond traditional cease-fire 
monitoring. The new operations would oversee elections, re-structure the government, re­
build the security sector and attempt to provide the population and its government with 
capabilities to survive on its own. Most importantly, the UN security forces were put in 
the service of civilians and had the mandate to use all necessary means to protect them.
Since then, peace operations mandates started to slowly incorporate protection of 
civilians at the core of military actions with varying results on the ground. Moreover, the 
UN produced documents that incorporate a human rights dimension to peacekeeping, 
such as the Brahimi Report (2000) that supported a renewed focus on the protection of 
civilians, the Operational Concept on Protection of Civilians,7 and the Lessons Learned 
Note on Protection of Civilians,8 amongst others. Currently, 10 out of 17 peace 
operations authorized by the UN have the protection of civilians as part o f its mandate 
and international norms for human rights emphasized the centrality of the individual.
6 With the transformation o f  peacekeeping practices after the 90 's, different types o f  peace operations 
began to be established. United Nations Department o f  Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), define five 
different types o f  operations: 1. Conflict Prevention: involving diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or 
inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict; 2. Peacemaking: involving measures 
to address conflicts in progress, including diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated 
agreement.3.Peace enforcement: involving the application o f  a range o f  coercive measures, including the 
use o f  military force under the explicit authorization o f the Security Council; 4. Peacebuilding: aiming to 
reduce the risk o f  lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for 
conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development; and finally 5. 
Peacekeeping: in principle, deployed to support the implementation o f a ceasefire or peace agreement. 
However, the boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and 
peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred and peace operations are rarely limited to one type o f  
activity. Traditionally known as peacekeeping operations, it is often the case that regardless the specific 
type o f peace operation, UN's operations are often referred to simply as peacekeeping operations. See: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml. Accessed: 03/26/2013.
7 Department o f Peacekeeping Operations and Department o f  Field Support, "Operational Concept on the 
Protection o f  Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations" (New York: United Nations, 2011).
8"Lessons Learned Note on the Protection o f  Civilians in Un Peacekeeping Operations" (New York: United 
Nations, 2011).
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This transformation has not come without difficulties. Despite the authorization of 
more and more complex peacekeeping operations since the 90 's, the UN and the 
international community in general failed to respond to major atrocities such as the 
genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica and the use of widespread rape as a tool of war, as 
in the case of Bosnia and in many other untold civil wars around the world. In fact, it 
became clear that peace would only be accomplished if protection strategies considered 
differentiated consequences of conflict on the different gender groups.
In parallel, since the UN's foundation, there has been a noticeable progress in 
considering women's rights and specific women's issues within the UN. In fact, from its 
inception, the UN included in the Charter an article containing provisions against sex 
discrimination. Considering that up to 1945 there were no internationally defined norms 
on women's status, it comprised an important step towards defining common parameters, 
rather than considering women's rights as a cultural and thus a domestic issue.
Throughout the years, women's rights were developed in four main areas. 
Initially, women's rights were tackled in economic and political domains. In economics, 
the need was emphasized for women and men to have equal opportunities in labor 
market, education and participation in the economic development and production of their 
countries. Political rights as voters, candidates and legal citizens on their own were topics 
present in the political rights of women. The third area in which women's issues gained 
terrain was human rights. In this particular area, the recognition of violence against 
women and discrimination as a human right violation was an important step toward 
minimizing cultural considerations and bringing women's concerns to the public arena.
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It is in this context that increasing concerns with the specific effects of war on
women and girls led women's issues to debut in the field that comprised UN's raison
d'etre, international peace and security. In 2000, the UN adopted Security Council
Resolution UNSCR1325 and alluded for the first time a link between the impact of war
on women and international security. In the resolutions own terms:
recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on 
women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their 
protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly 
contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and 
security.9
Following 1325 four other resolutions [UNSCR1820 (2008), UNSCR1888 
(2009), UNSCR1889 (2009) and UNSCR1960 (2010)] would comprise what is today 
known as “Women, Peace and Security” resolutions, or the normative framework for 
incorporating a gender perspective to peace processes.
9 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1325" October 31, 2000).
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Table 1: Women, Peace and Security resolutions
UNSCR1325 (2000)
First Security Council 
resolution to link women’s 
experiences o f  conflict to the 
maintenance o f international 
peace and security. Asserts 
women’s leadership and role 
in conflict resolution, peace 
talks and recovery, requires 
build-up o f gender response 
capability in peacekeeping 
missions and gender training 
for all involved in the 




First Security Council resolution 
to recognize conflict-related 
sexual violence as a tactic o f  
warfare and a matter of  
international peace and security, 
requiring a peacekeeping, justice, 
services and peace negotiation 
response.
UNSCR1889 (2009)
Addresses women’s exclusion 
from early recovery and 
peacebuilding and lack of 
adequate planning and funding 
for their needs. Asks for a 
strategy to increase numbers o f  
women in conflict-resolution 
decision making, and asks for 
tools to improve implementation: 
indicators and proposals for a 
monitoring mechanism._________
UNSCR1888 (2009)
Strengthens tools for 
implementing 1820 through 
assigning high-level 
leadership, building judicial 
response expertise, 
strengthening service 
provision, and building 
reporting mechanisms.
UNSCR1960 (2010)
Provides an accountability 
system for addressing 
conflict-related sexual 
violence, including by 
listing perpetrators and 
establishing monitoring, 
analysis, and reporting 
arrangements.
Although mostly focused in the effects of sexual and gender based violence in 
conflict and post-conflict settings, the UN’s gender approach to peace operations is 
comprehensive and considers the physical and structural vulnerability of local women,10 
adopting protection mechanisms that include the restructuring o f the security sector, 
economic empowerment, rule of law and sound legal and judicial systems. This shift in 
the approach meant that issues such as sexual violence could no longer be considered a 
silent side effect and legitimate spoil of war. In order to accomplish peace, the impact of
10 Throughout this dissertation, the terms structural vulnerability and structural insecurity will be used 
interchangeably. The use o f the adjective structural attempts to capture Galtung's concept o f  structural 
violence as a form o f violence where a social structure or institution purportedly prevent people from 
meeting their basic needs. Nonetheless, the term here is used more loosely and simply refers to people's 
inability to meet basic needs. See: Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," Journal o f  Peace  
Research 6, no. 3 (1969).
war on women and girls should be adequately addressed and they should be active 
participants at negotiating tables.11
Besides requiring changes in military tactics and improved training, actions to be 
taken under these resolutions ultimately foresee a change in the structure o f the UN peace 
operation with impact during reconciliation and peacemaking phase but also afterwards 
in the post-reconstruction and development phases, also known as peace-building. As the 
normalization of gender relations in host nations - founded on a Western-based idea of 
women's rights - becomes a central component of peace, policies, strategies and the 
conduct of peace operations should incorporate elements often left aside from military 
considerations and protection strategies.
Issues such as women's empowerment, social status, political participation 
become important elements. Moreover, the use of force to maintain international peace 
and security acquires a new meaning and includes actions to protect women and girls 
from sexual violence. The logic behind dealing with sexual violence not only results from 
the need to address one of the horrors often carried out in wars, but also to rebuild the 
fabric of families and communities, re-establish state authority and construct a reliable 
justice system.
These three elements can be more adequately addressed when sexual violence is 
taken under consideration and not kept as a taboo subject not discussed at the negotiation 
table. Sexual violence destroys the fabric of families and communities by bringing 
discord, confusing bloodlines and inheritance matters and by the pervasive psychological 
effects it brings to victims and families. UN civilians in cooperation with the police and
" Robert Jenkins and Anne-Marie Goetz, “Addressing Sexual Violence in Internationally Mediated Peace 
Negotiations”, International Peacekeeping, V ol.17, Issue 2, 2010.p.261
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the military are in charge of promoting actions that strengthen social cohesion and 
stability and advancing projects that support community development and women's 
empowerment. Promoting effective state authority is done in various fronts, however in 
this particular topic, the reform of the security sector and justice system are necessary 
conditions for breaking the cycle of impunity and for putting in place a state apparatus 
capable of protecting its population, including women and girls from sexual violence.
Twelve years after the launching of the first Security Council Resolution 
regarding Women, Peace and security, a few changes have been observed. At 
headquarters level, implementing tools for UN actors and member states, including 
specific strategies to combat sexual violence, guidelines on how to incorporate a gender 
approach to the work of military and police personnel and gender training modules have 
been created. A structure to support the implementation of these changes was also created 
with the establishment of Senior Gender advisers at headquarters and missions levels and 
with the appointment of a Special Representative to deal exclusively with sexual violence 
at headquarters level with Senior Advisors at mission level. At the member state level, 
countries have adopted the UN's training modules and guidelines and 39 member states 
have created National Action Plans (NAPs) that contribute to promoting gender 
mainstreaming within their societies, particularly in the national military and the police.12
While the adoption of these policies seems plausible and logical, whether or not 
they can be implemented is still unknown. Most of the 39 member states that have 
adopted these policies are either developed states, who already have cultural affinity with 
the matter, or African nations that have themselves passed through a UN intervention and
12 See: Peace Women, “List o f  National Action Plans,” : 03/26/2013, 
http://www.peacewomen.org/naps/list-of-naps.
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thus received the organization's incentive to formulate gender policies. Whether or not 
these are actually put in practice is another matter (note, for example that the DRC, the 
world capital of rape, has its own NAP).
At the same time, little is known about the efficacy of gender policies 
implemented in the field. Although the objective of this dissertation is not to determine 
whether or not they have been successful, it will collect evidence of what is currently 
being done and establish important benchmarks for future research to analyze how 
successful gender policies in peacekeeping setting have been. Most importantly, it shows 
that although still limited in scope, new policies are being generated and an attempt to 
disseminate norms to host nations and member states was made.
Conceptual and theoretical background on gender and women's issues
Before entering into the specific subject of organizational learning and how it 
takes place, the first step is to clarify basic concepts used in this dissertation, in particular 
that of gender, gender equality and gender mainstreaming. Despite the advance in the 
literature of feminist studies, there still seems to exist a confusion between gender and 
women's issues. Although gender does not automatically translate into women's issues, 
the UN's focus on women's issue under the macro scope of gender and the reproduction 
of gender essentialisms in some o f the organization's resolution may have contributed to 
the perpetuation of this wrong image in some circles.13
13 Although this issue will be further developed later, for now, I would like to draw attention to the fact that 
most UN Resolutions on “Women, Peace and Security”, take the instance o f  women as victims and 
vulnerable groups within conflicts and leave aside the important domain in which they act as autonomous 
and agentive actors o f  transformation. In addition, the central issue o f sexual violence against men is also 
left aside, even though that tends to be as problematic and even more silent.
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The experiences and concerns of men, women, boys and girls, before, during and 
after wars are shaped by their gendered roles. These are formed by the cultural, social, 
economic and political context where they live and the expected patterns of behavior and 
obligations they ought to comply with.14 Consequently, it is imperative to understand 
gender as a social system that not only shapes individual identities and lives, but most 
importantly provides a rigid framework that dictates how they should behave, the kinds 
of daily activities they should perform, and how much they should be paid for it.15 In 
other words “it is a way of categorizing, ordering, and symbolizing power of 
hierarchically structuring relationships among different categories o f people and different 
human activities symbolically associated with masculinity and femininity.”16
When gender is understood as a social system, the relationship between 
institutions that reinforce gendered stereotypes and distributes power and resources 
accordingly becomes even clearer. It is often the case that strong ideologies, hidden under 
the premise of “culturally accepted” norms of behavior, further legitimize it. A powerful 
example is the overrated biological differences that are used to dictate the areas where 
women can and cannot perform. The military is one of the best examples where these 
biological differences, seen as unavoidable and unchangeable seem to still nowadays 
determine the kind of roles and branches women can pursue in a military career.17 The
14 Dyan E. Mazurana, Angela Raven-Roberts, and Jane L. Parpart, Gender, Conflict, and Peacekeeping, 
War and Peace Library (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). p. 13
15 Carol Cohn, Women and Wars (Malden: Polity Press, 2013). p.3
16 Ibid.
17 The incorporation o f  women into the military worldwide tends to follow the same pattern. First as 
professionals, they joined the military in areas that were already associated with “feminine” activities, such 
as nurses, teachers, dentists etc. It was only recently that most countries opened combat positions for 
women to join the military. In fact, most countries do not have women in combat arms or when they do, the 
incorporation is so recent that they haven't still reached higher ranks.
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question remains, as if the differences we found in biology are enough to explain the sorts 
of careers that women and men pursue.18
These gendered ideas about men and women influences the kind o f experiences 
each gender group has during war with profound consequences for its aftermath. In terms 
of violence for example, war related sex crimes tend to be seen as a distortion or spoil of 
war. That is why it has been for so many years excluded from peace negotiation tables. 
However, important feminist studies have shown that rather than a distortion, war 
violence is the product of a continuum of violence and a reflection of the previously 
existent violence during peacetime. In other words, peace agreements mean that 
organized armed violence is over, and that women will remain victims if gender relations 
return to the pre-war normalcy.19
That is why the UN's approach to gender in conflict and post-conflict 
reconstruction needs to go beyond the surface and consider the specific subtleties of the 
society where intervention takes place. The UN's overall approach to tackling gender is 
based on a gender equality strategy. The two components of this strategy are gender 
balance and gender mainstreaming. While gender balance refers to the degree to which 
women and men participate within the full range of activities associated with the UN, 
gender mainstreaming refers to actions aimed at assessing the implications of policies and 
events to each gender different group. It also attempts to bring the interests of women and 




and recover from the effects of violence and destabilization at a different pace and in 
different ways.20
Although the appropriateness of this approach in the paper is clear, it becomes 
much more complicated to implement that in practice. Personnel -  including civilians -  
are ill-trained to rightly apply gender mainstreaming in its policies, whatever the area of 
their expertise. Consequently, instead of becoming a cross-cutting issue in all UN 
activities, gender-approaches have been developed as a separate structure.21
Indeed, from its beginning as a separate organ, the Commission on the Status of 
Women (CSW) was created to deal with specific women's issues. Despite the thoughtful 
argument that women's issues and a gender approach should not have a special and 
separated structure, we should not confuse aspirational goals with reality. It would be 
ideal if a gender approach could cross-cut all issues and all personnel was able to 
recognize the implications of its policies to all gender groups and to apply discretionary 
policies to enhance women's rights and empowerment while also considering the special 
needs of men, boys and girls. However, we are not there yet, and just like in 1947 when 
the CSW was created, we still need separated gender units to promote gender 
mainstreaming in peace operations.
In this context, it is important to emphasize that constantly talking about women 
as a vulnerable group that deserves special protection strategies may already be seen as 
genderized. Indeed, reinforcing women as part of a vulnerable group in every UN 
resolution may have adverse effects if not done with caution. Although it is imperative
20 Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, and Parpart, Gender, Conflict, and Peacekeeping, p. 15
21 Angela Raven-Roberts, "Gender Mainstreaming in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Talking the 
Walk, Tripping over the Walk," in Gender, Conflict, and Peacekeeping , ed. Dyan Mazurana, Angela 
Raven-Roberts, and Jane Parpart (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005). p.52.
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that women's agency be addressed and their role in re-building war tom societies 
emphasized, it is a fact that war has disproportionately affected them.22
By no means should this statement translate into ignoring the suffering that other 
gender groups, in particular men may suffer during war. Nonetheless, the pernicious 
tactic involving sexual abuses as part of a war strategy seems to be more evident when 
the victim is a male and the perpetrator another male. When the victim is a woman, the 
strategic thinking before the act is suddenly forgotten and replaced by a general 
acceptance of the fact as a spoil of war and of “boys doing what they are supposed to 
do.”23
Consequently, the thought that “we are just not there yet” seems appropriate, and 
separate provisions for different gender groups are still necessary. Unfortunately, gender- 
neutral policies and agreements are all but neutral and tend to systematically exclude 
women's special needs and participatory instance. This leads us to the second point often 
objected and criticized when discussing UN Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, 
that is, including more uniformed women as a way to better address violence against 
women.
By no means does increasing women's participation in peacekeeping efforts 
reinforce gender essentialisms that women are more caring and thus local women feel 
more prone to communicate with them. Instead, it offers the intervened society a role 
model in which women can do the same activities as men, besides creating better
22 On the role o f  women in post war period see: Sheila Meintjes, Anu Pillay, and Meredeth Turshen, The 
Aftermath: Women in Post-W ar Transformation (London; New York: Zed Books, 2001).
23 This insight was provided during lively discussions in the Symposium “The Missing Peace Symposium 
2013”, organized by SIPRI North America, United States Institute o f  Peace (USIP), PRIO, Human Rights 
Center Berkley Law University o f  California. The symposium was carried out in Washington, DC, on 
February, 2013.
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channels of communication between the population and the mission. We cannot expect 
Sudanese, Congolese, Haitian, or Liberian victim women to react to male uniformed 
personnel the same way that a western female victim of sexual violence may react. We 
are simply not there yet. And thus this first step is necessary, not only for the local 
women, but for all the women who want to be part of peacekeeping efforts and deserve to 
be there.
Organizational learning, institutional transformation and the UN
In order to understand how gender perspectives have been incorporated into 
peacekeeping practices as part of an organizational learning process requires an analysis 
of the concept of organizational learning and the mechanism behind it. The study of 
organizational learning has always been present in organizational theory; however, it is 
relatively novel in the IR field.24 The corporate ontology associated with organizational 
theory has contributed to advancing within the IR field the idea that international 
organizations can have interests different from that o f member states and pursue their 
own agenda. Within organizational theory, the concept of learning itself and how it takes 
place in organizations offers an important theoretical foundation to the claim that the 
United Nations has learned in terms of incorporating a gender perspective and may now 
serve as an agent of dissemination.
This dissertation’s model of organizational learning is based on the understanding 
of international organizations as autonomous entities that are able to produce new
24 For learning in the IR field see: Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models o f  Change in 
International Organizations', Bemd Siebenhiiner, "Learning in International Organization in Global 
Environmental Governance," Global Environmental Politics 8, no. 4 (2012); Lise Moije Howard, Un 
Peacekeeping in Civil Wars (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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knowledge and practices on their own.25 The socialization of these practices among 
member states and their repetition over time is a necessary step for learning to take place. 
The ultimate test here is to find out whether or not a unanimous consensus among 
member states is necessary for a successful learning process to take place.
In the IR field, Ernst Haas was the first to discuss organizational learning in 
international organizations. Since IOs are created and formed by member-states, he 
considers that learning can only take place if the recently created practice reaches a cross 
cultural consensus amongst all member-states. Nonetheless, when considering such a 
diverse organization, as is the case o f the UN, learning would become an extremely rare 
process, and thus this dissertation intends to assess whether IOs can learn independently 
from member states and become agents of dissemination themselves.
In this context, learning refers to the process through which a new international 
practice is created and included within the framework of action of a given 10. It also 
refers to a process of change in which older practices are substituted by new ones, and 
added to the organization's scope of action. This change can be either superficial or affect 
the inner most parts of the organizational culture.
As previously mentioned, the specific case of gender in peacekeeping has shown 
that the UN's renewed normative framework presents inherent challenges to cross 
cultural chasms. In fact, the strong link between fixing gender relations and a lasting 
peace seems to be at odds with the cultural and political reality of most member states
25 The understanding o f  IOs in this dissertation is mostly derived from constructivist approaches. See: 
Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules fo r  the World: International Organizations in Global 
Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004).
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that are tasked with the responsibility of disseminating gender policies in peacekeeping 
settings, and o f host nations' context as well.
Consequently, this dissertation employs a theoretical framework that understands 
organizational learning as a two level process. The first refers to the process through 
which a new practice is generated, disseminated and institutionalized. The second, also 
known as transformation, refers to the ultimate stage of learning when practices are 
consensually accepted and adopted by all member states and become an integral part of 
the organizational culture.
First-level learning is originated due to a change in the context or is either driven 
by the advocacy work of members of an epistemic community26, member states or IO 
bureaucracy. It includes five main phases: organizational dysfunction, which refers to the 
organization's inability to solve problems with the available set of existing practices; re­
examination, or the process through which this existing set o f practices are re-examined 
and new ones are proposed; minimum consensus, referring to the need to acquire a 
minimum acceptance amongst member states, members of the epistemic community and 
IO 's Secretariat; institutionalization, comprising the process of embedding this new 
practice in the institutional framework of the organization through its inscription in 
written documents and re-use in other areas dealt by the organization; and finally, 
dissemination, the process through which this practice is socialized throughout the layers 
of the organization and to member states.
26 As defined by Haas, epistemic communities are formed by a group o f  like-minded professionals that 
work around specific problematic issues and whose specialized expertise and knowledge are central to 
organizational learning.
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In large organizations with headquarters and field offices, a feedback loop 
between the two is necessary. Often, practices originated at headquarters level are not 
fully applicable in other contexts or, when the proposed practices leave the boundaries of 
the ideational world, it is difficult to actually implement them into practice. The constant 
flow of communication between different offices grants the learning process with an 
increased chances of success since it provides updated information on successful and 
failed practices.
The second-level learning refers to the process through which practices are 
socialized to the rest of member states and then accepted and adopted by them. It requires 
that the executive power of those states implement changes in their own national policies 
in order to implement the new practice. When both the organization and its member 
states have changed and learned, that is when organizational transformation takes place. 
It is also important to note that organizational transformation also refers to a much deeper 
process of change. It comprises a change in the core values of the organization, or its 
raison d ' etre. That is why organizational transformation is an extremely challenging and 
therefore rare phenomenon.
Promoting gender and building peace
Considering this definition and mechanism of organizational learning, this 
dissertation argues that as part of UN's search for more adequate responses to challenges 
in the field of international peace and security it has incorporated a gender perspective as 
an integral part of peacekeeping operations. This process was triggered by the UN's 
inability to respond to challenges provoked by modern-day conflicts with the traditional 
mechanism of peacekeeping practice. As a result, an inquiry process led to a re­
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examination of its practices and a shifting focus from the state to the individuals' 
security. In practice, operations became multi-dimensional and included tasks concerned 
with their structural insecurity as well.
Nonetheless, the transformation of peacekeeping practices was not yet complete, 
and in fact, it still isn't. Throughout time, the organization acknowledged that conflicts 
and post-conflict settings had a differentiated effect on women and girls, and its pervasive 
impact would affect not only those gender groups, but also the societal stability, 
economic recovery and state authority. As a consequence, the “Women, Peace and 
Security” resolutions were adopted, providing the blueprints for member-states and the 
UN to incorporate a gender perspective into its peace processes. This renewed approach 
would be the foundation for a lasting peace.
In terms of implementation, the development of accountability, monitoring and 
implementation tools comprise major advances. Once in place they support the process of 
translating into practice resolutions' provisions. Moreover, a growing number of 
supporting documents, such as training modules and checklists for uniformed personnel, 
manuals and studies to be used by all actors involved are being generated. Still, a major 
implementation gap remains due to three main factors:
1. Resolutions provisions propose changing inner cultural traits as a ways to build 
a lasting peace. While these provisions are plausible, they comprise a reality still far to be 
attained not only by host nations, but also by member states intervening in these societies 
entitled with the responsibility of promoting these gender policies. As a consequence, 
advances in these policies are slow and often dependent on the personal efforts o f certain 
people holding key positions.
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2. Moreover, countries where missions are established are characterized by 
extremely volatile environments and any strategy to curb sexual violence and protect the 
population from these acts is context driven. As a consequence, success depends on 
missions' capacity at field level to constantly adapt its practices to the renewed 
challenges that are constantly generated. Field learning and the capacity of field staff and 
personnel to create a specific normative framework that considers the particular features 
of that context and incorporate new actions and policies in accordance to a changing 
environment is thus a necessary condition as well.
3. And finally, since member states are fully involved with peacekeeping 
practices either by sending personnel or by being the main financial sponsor, success also 
depends on how well the organization can disseminate its renewed gender policy to 
member states. The analysis of the two case studies will show that is where 
implementation gap remains widest and most challenging.
In order to assess this UN gender approach and implementation gap, this 
dissertation will discuss the evolving norms focused on the individuals, the 
transformation of peacekeeping practices, and how a gender approach was created and 
institutionalized in the UN. For this purpose, the implementation of “Women, Peace and 
Security” at headquarters, member states and field levels will be analyzed. While the 
analysis of the first two levels will be based on primary documents and literature review 
on the subject, the evaluation of field missions will be based on two case studies, Haiti 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The two cases present an scenario where sexual violence is unfortunately a 
common feature and where the UN has established integrated peace operations where a
26
civilian, a police and a military component perform jointly for the accomplishment of the 
mission's mandate. Moreover, both missions have a gender senior adviser and staff 
responsible for guaranteeing that a gender perspective is seen as a crosscutting issue in all 
missions' activities. However, and most importantly, the specific context of each country 
and the different conditions on the ground resulted in a differentiated awareness 
regarding gender issues that resulted in different policies and strategies to achieve the 
same goal, gender equality and a lasting peace.
Haiti not only is not a post-conflict country but also a country where massive 
rapes as part of a systematic tactic of war is not observed, where the problem is more 
readily associated and related to political oppression, a generational mindset and current 
insecure social, economic and political situation.27 With the earthquake and the enormous 
displacement of people in the country, there was an increasing concern regarding the 
recurrence of sexual violence cases, particularly within the IDP camps, where the lack of 
security and separation between public and private spheres contributed increasing rates of 
rape in the country. These cases however, should not overshadow the politically 
motivated and gang rape that has been present in the country throughout the country's 
history.
At the same time, MINUSTAH has an active Gender Unit with a Senior Adviser 
Gender Focal point to ensure that gender mainstreaming is taken under consideration at 
all levels on the ground and by all components, including actions to prevent, combat and 
eradicate sexual violence. Nonetheless, MINUSTAH does not have a protection of
27 Haiti is not considered by Haitians and the international community in general as a post-conflict country. 
However, as the levels o f  violence reached extreme levels at the turn o f  the century and further hampered 
the living conditions o f  the population, the United Nations was called to act and restore peace.
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civilians’ strategy nor clear guidelines to combat sexual violence. In cases such as Haiti, 
where sexual and gender based violence is not a clear and pervasive face of a conflict, it 
can become a forgotten issue.28
Interviews on the ground showed, however, that thanks to the efforts undertaken 
by some actors in the field -  namely the MINUSTAH's Gender Unit, Police Gender 
Team, UN agencies involved with the issue and civil society organizations -  the issue has 
gained momentum, even though it is overly focused on the IDP camps' cases. In the 
absence of specific mandates, guidelines, and strategies to tackle this problem, much of 
what has been done within MINUSTAH depended on the personal efforts o f the staff 
involved with gender issues. It becomes clear that building a context specific normative 
framework is an essential step to maintaining institutional sustainable efforts throughout 
time. Simultaneously, there seems to exist a mindset amongst much of the UN staff, but 
especially the military, that sexual and gender based violence was a cultural matter, 
indicating that when the relationship between conflict and sexual violence is not clear, the 
issue is associated with the local culture and as a random and opportunistic act.
Congo has passed by two major wars where the targeting of civilians was the 
foremost feature of the tactics implemented by armed groups and government forces in 
the battleground. Moreover, the use of sexual violence against women became the most 
prominent characteristic quickly associated with the conflict in Congo. As part of UN 
efforts to tackle the problem, the establishment of a peace operation with a strong 
protection of civilian mandate was put in place. For this purpose, a UN System-Wide
28 While gender based violence specifically refers to violent acts incurred to a person due to its specific 
gender, sexual violence necessarily refers a sexual contact against someone's will, including rape, forced 
impregnation, genital mutilation, among others.
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Protection of Civilian Strategy29 was established and is currently implemented by all 
mission's components and UN agencies. Furthermore, troop-contributing countries 
(TCCs) are authorized to use all necessary means including force to better protect the 
local population. Specific offices that deal with gender mainstreaming and sexual 
violence are also part of MONUSCO's task force intended to better protect the local 
population and where a specific strategy to combat sexual violence is in place.
If in contrast to MINUSTAH, MONUSCO has a sound normative framework, 
specific strategies, guidelines and tasks clearly defined for each of the components to 
fight sexual violence, one would expect that the impact on the ground would be positive 
and that measurable success could be perceived. In fact, the mission has contributed to 
creating a local state-sponsored infra-structure to combat and deal with sexual violence in 
the country. As part of these accomplishments is the launching o f a national strategy 
against sexual violence,30 undertaken by both the government and different UN 
implementing actors, the improvement o f the legal system and specific law on the 
subject, and the support for female candidates, besides the promotion of a number of 
projects dedicated to empowering women and implementing 1325 in that country.31
Nonetheless, as the fight continues, levels of violence against women do not 
dwindle. At the same time, the UN military constantly receives accusations o f inaction or 
o f letting cultural considerations in regard to women affect their actions. Some of the
29 United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic o f Congo, "Un System-Wide Strategy 
to Protect Civilians in the Democratic Republic o f  Congo", 2010,
http://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/_assets/files/field_protection_clusters/Democratic_Republic_Congo 
/files/UN_W  ide_Protection_Strategy_Final_ 150110_EN.pdf.
30 Republique Democratique du Congo, "Strategic Nationale De La Lutte Contre Les Violences Basees Sur 
Le Genre" (Kinshasa: Ministere du Genre de la Famille et de 1'Enfant, Novembre, 2009).
31 The strategy is divided in five main components, each o f  them has a government and a UN implementing 
partner. Details on the strategy are available on Appendices and on Chapter Five.
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contingents have been accused of not talking to women nor allowing UN women staff to 
spend the night in their base. Moreover, contingents located in close-by areas that have 
been attacked are accused of not responding in a timely manner to the crying requests of 
help from Congolese population.32
Lack of success in Congo comprises a major drawback, especially because one 
would expect that where UN policies have generated more instruments exclusively 
dedicated to address the special needs of women and girls in the field, measurable 
success could be accounted. However, two main factors ought to be considered. The first 
and most obvious is that Congo is an ongoing and complex conflict that further fuels 
violence, while Haiti has passed through high levels of disturbance that are now mostly 
stabilized. The second and most interesting for the topic of organizational learning is who 
comprises the troop- contributing countries in each country. Even though the scope of the 
analysis developed here will not allow major conclusions about the influence of member 
states cultural considerations, it will certainly provide valuable insights on how these can 
have an impact in the field.
The two cases highlight different challenges confronted by the UN to fully 
implement gender as an integral part of peace practices. They also show that as threats 
against the individual are context driven, so should be the strategies to protect them. The 
following section will further describe the methodology applied in this project and the 
analytical framework employed for the analysis of the case studies.
32 In the Walikale massacre (2010), for example, when 303 women, children and men were raped in only 
three days, UN peacekeepers in the surrounding area did not respond to attacks.
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Methodology
In order to evaluate the UN's organizational learning, this project draws on 
document and case study analyses. In this context, the analysis of how integrating gender 
approaches became central to UN peace efforts and the advances carried out at 
headquarters and member-states level is based on the qualitative analysis o f UN and 
member states primary documents, particularly the Reports o f the Secretary General and 
National Action Plans and participant observation through the participation in two 
Workshops designed to improve the UN's gender training modules. The case studies 
analysis mostly draws on participant observations and the semi-structured interviews 
carried out during three field works in Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 
2011 and 2012 as I worked as a consultant for the NGO Latin America Defense and 
Security Network (RESDAL).
As protection of civilians and specifically protection of women and girls is a 
context driven task, the analysis of the two case studies offer a detailed contextual 
analysis of UN actions in this areas and the sort o f challenges that arise from such distinct 
environments. Overall I spent about 45 days in Haiti (May 2011 and September 2012) 
and 30 days in the DRC, where I carried out extensive interviews with UN actors from all 
components, including military, police and civilian, along with interviews with 
representatives from UN agencies, such as the Office for the Coordination Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA), UN-Women, UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), UN Develop Fund 
(UNDP) amongst others. These interviews were complemented by interviews with 
government representatives from the Ministry o f Women's Condition in both countries, 
and interviews with local and international non-governmental organizations. Besides the
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interviews, I have participated in several coordination meetings among different 
missions' sections and agencies and in military patrols. My analysis also stems from my 
personal observations as I participated in these meetings and activities.
Interviews were carried out individually or in group. Uniformed personnel 
interviews were mostly carried out in small groups, particularly with the military and 
formed police units. However, a pattern of group interview could not be established since 
in some cases commanders would remain with the group or officers would be mixed with 
non-commissioned officers. While that may have interfered with the kind of answers 
provided by some groups, it also highlighted the kind of relationship established within 
military and police units that requested interviews to be carried out in the presence of 
commander. In some cases, separate group interviews with commander, officers, non­
commissioned officers, troops and female peacekeepers could be carried out.
Most interviews with UN agencies, government representatives and NGOs were 
carried out individually, or with more than one individual from the same organization, 
section, agency or government institution in their office. In this case, specific questions 
about their activities were abundant and are not reflected in the questionnaire. 
Occasionally, interviews with civilian substantive sections and UN agencies were also 
carried out in groups. In this case, the way they interacted and how much they knew 
about other sections/agencies activities was also evaluated.
Interviews were carried out while I worked as a consultant for RESDAL, were 
consequently focused on the organization's research focus, that is the action of Latin 
American peacekeepers on the field and their contribution to the UN's initiative to curb 
sexual violence. Due to the large amount of interviews that were carried out and variety
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of actors (including besides Latin American contingents, Asian, African and European 
peacekeepers, along with civilians and police working for the UN), this dissertation's 
argument could be developed.
Interviews followed a basic questionnaire specific for each actor but were 
complemented by questions done on the spot based on interviewees' answers.33
Analytical framework fo r  case studies
The case studies' analysis focuses on the various UN efforts aimed at improving 
capacity to respond to threats against local women in conflict and post-conflict settings as 
a central piece in the organization's strategy to build a lasting peace. Hence, the cases 
show how the organization addresses women's specific needs through a comprehensive 
strategy to protect them not only by improving the security situation, but also by 
promoting economic and political empowerment, a sound justice system, reliable security 
and defense forces and ultimately a more equitable society, the necessaiy condition for 
establishing a lasting peace.
For this purpose and based on the underpinnings of UN's resolutions on Women, 
Peace and Security, each of the case studies' gender policy will be evaluated according to 
the five pillars that compose UN strategy on the ground:
33 View Annex I for questionnaire and Annex II for interviewed actors.
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Table 2: Case Studies indicators
Components Description Indicators
Legal Existence o f specific mandates and
framework guidelines regarding protection o f
civilians, and in particularly women and 
girls against sexual violence, and how it 
translates into practice
Qualitative analysis o f missions' 
mandates.
Qualitative analysis o f  a 
comprehensive strategy to protect 
civilians, and in particular women 
and girls against sexual violence. 
Qualitative analysis on gender 
issues is included in the routine 
activities o f the mission.
Gender Balance Female representation amongst 
uniformed personnel and the role they 
carry out. It also refers to the existence 
o f affirmative policies to include more 
women amongst personnel (uniformed 
and civilian), and in decision-making 
positions within the mission.
Quantitative analysis on women 
representation in the police and 
military.
Qualitative analysis o f  the role 
they carry out.
Qualitative analysis on the role 




As defined by the UN, security sector is: 
“a broad term often used to describe the 
structures, institutions and personnel 
responsible for the management, 
provision and oversight o f security in a 
country.”34 These include defense, law 
enforcement, corrections, intelligence 
services and institutions responsible for 
justice system, border management, 
customs and civil emergencies. Actors 
that play a role in the security sector 
include ministries, legislative bodies and 
civil society groups.
For the purpose o f this dissertation, only 
the initiatives related to the 
improvement o f the justice system, rule 
o f law and police institutions are taken 
into account.
Qualitative analysis o f  UN's 
actions towards the improvement 
o f the host nation's security sector, 
including the revision o f the 
constitution and other legal 
instruments that guarantees legal 
gender equality and the 
criminalization o f all forms o f  
violence against women; the 
strengthening o f the judiciary 
system as ways to break the cycle 
o f impunity and accomplish justice 
and the formation and training of 
forces responsible for maintaining 
a stable and safe environment in 
the host nation.
34 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f the Secretary General on Securing Peace and 





Protection Actions undertaken by the police and Qualitative analysis o f the actions
military component to protect women undertaken by UN uniformed
and girls from gender based violence personnel with the specific
objective o f protecting women, 
such as patrols, escorts and 
checkpoints.
Empowerment Initiatives undertaken by all missions Qualitative analysis o f initiatives
component with the objective o f  aiming to strengthen women's
strengthening women's social, economic social, economic and political
__________________and political status in the society._________ status in the society.______________
Chapters outline
The following chapters reconstruct the United Nations organizational learning 
process, illuminating how a gender approach to peace processes was created as an 
international practices to improve the UN's response to modem day security challenges 
and as a central element of its strategy to build a lasting peace. They also highlight the 
UN's major drawbacks when implementing this strategy.
In this context, Chapter Two carries out a detailed analysis of organizational 
learning in organizational theories and in IR field. The literature review on organizational 
theory concepts and mechanisms of learning was particularly useful since it escaped the 
deterministic approach often present in IR field and which considers IOs as a mere 
instrument of states national interests. Moreover, it also offered important insights into 
the organizational learning process itself, particularly in regard to each of its phases and 
learning enablers or the conditions or factors that facilitate learning. In the IR field, an 
analysis of Haas model of organizational learning was carried out, highlighting its main 
contributions for this research, that is his concept of learning as the introduction of 
renewed practices to solve problems the 10 is no longer able to solve with the existing
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tools and the participation of epistemic communities as enablers of learning. Haas' 
model, however, emphasized that organizational learning would only take place once 
member states transformed their practices and learned themselves. In order to assess the 
possibility that the organization can learn without member states full commitment, a five- 
phase model of learning (organizational dysfunction, re-examination, minimum 
consensus, institutionalization and dissemination) requiring only a minimum consensus 
amongst part of membership was proposed.
Chapter Three evaluates the factors that enabled this learning to take place and 
puts forth the evidence at headquarters level that the UN has incorporated a gender 
perspective to peace process as a product of its most recent learning process. The 
emerging norms centered on the individual, the creation o f peace operations with 
protection of civilian mandates and the diffusion of women's rights are important factors 
that allowed gender to be included in UN's actions in the field of international peace and 
security.
The specific impact of war on women and girls mobilized epistemic communities 
and UN actors, leading to the debut of a gender approach in peace processes. In this 
regard, UN resolutions on “Women, Peace and Security”, provided the blueprints for the 
incorporation of a comprehensive strategy to incorporate gender considerations to all UN 
sponsored peace processes. Major accomplishments in this regard, including the creation 
of implementing tools, guidelines, manuals, etc. are all described in Chapter Three, along 
with the main challenges and shortcoming that the UN has confronted thus far.
Chapter Four contains the case study of Haiti, providing a rich overview of the 
country's unstable political life and the status of women in Haitian society. While an
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analysis of the nature of sexual violence in this country is provided, the chapter focuses 
on the analysis of MINUSTAH gender policy on the ground in accordance to the 
previously defined five indicators (legal framework, gender balance, security sector, 
protection and women's empowerment). The chapter shows that the absence of a specific 
protection of civilians mandate and/or strategy to combat violence against women 
impacted on the mission's ability to mainstream gender throughout all its activities and 
became dependent on the personal efforts of the people working in the field.
In contrast, Chapter Five portrays Congo's case study and highlights that when a 
context driven normative framework and implementing tools are formulated, gender can 
be more easily mainstreamed throughout all mission's components and actions in the 
field. As in Chapter Four, a rich overview o f the country's historical background, 
particularly the years of dictatorship and abuse and the two Congo wars is provided along 
with the status of women in Congolese society, emphasizing their role in the subsequent 
peace process and the impact the conflict has had on them. The analysis of MONUSCO's 
gender policy on the ground was carried out in accordance to the previously defined five 
indicators (legal framework, gender balance, security sector, protection and women's 
empowerment) and shows that in this case, the extremely volatile conditions in the 
country and differentiated learning among member states have affected the 
accomplishment of positive and measurable impacts o f MONUSCO's gender policy on 
the field.
Considering the model of organizational learning adopted in this dissertation, 
Chapter Six synthesizes the evidence that the United Nations' incorporation of a gender 
perspective to its peace process is a dynamic learning process and that the organization is
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currently acting as an agent of practices dissemination. The main challenges encountered 
in the two case studies for a full implementation of the UN's renewed gender policy is 
also highlighted in the light of each specific context of each country. This analysis 
indicates that despite the different contexts, violence against women was part of a 
continuum of violence and previous status held by women in each society. Appropriately 
and according to resolutions' provisions, the UN has adopted a comprehensive protection 
strategy that considers these prevalent features; however, the volatile conditions on the 
ground, differentiated learning pace among member states and absence of a context 
driven normative framework impacted negatively on UN actions. Finally, a few 
recommendations on how the UN can improve its implementation strategies, including 
the strengthening feedback loops between field operations and headquarters and lessons 
learned sharing system among field missions are also provided.
The dissertation concludes with observations on the current state of the UN's 
learning process, accomplishments and challenges to the future.
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CHAPTER 2 
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING AND TRANSFORMATION: A 
THEORETICAL APPROACH
The incorporation of a gender approach to peacekeeping operations (PKO) is part 
of a complex organizational learning process initiated by the UN in order to improve its 
response on the ground. This process was triggered by the transformation o f modern-day 
conflicts, the severe implications to women and girls and the increasing importance of 
gender concerns internationally. As a consequence, the UN has re-evaluated its 
peacekeeping practices re-focusing on individuals' security and qualifying gender as an 
integral part of peace processes. Evidence of learning can be found in the organization's 
documents, such as resolutions; guidelines and training modules; and in practice, with the 
creation of units dedicated to conceptualizing and disseminating a gender approach in 
peace operations around the world.
Nonetheless, the adoption of a gender perspective by member states is still far 
from being accomplished. In order to assess whether an organization can implement and 
disseminate practices in the absence of a full commitment from the membership, an 
analysis of how organizational learning processes take place is deemed necessary. The 
study of organizational learning is central to this analysis by pointing out the process 
through which new international practices are created and socialized within the different 
layers of the organization and to member states. “As human collectivities that serves the 
personal interests of their member states, as well as the general ends o f their mandators,”
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1 international organizations (IOs) must be able to balance political constraints 
imposed by state units and the communal interests that founded them.
Studying organizational learning models derived from organizational theory adds 
to an understanding of organizational culture, its structure and different components, as 
well as how each of these components can learn simultaneously but at different paces. 
Highlighting the differences between organizational and member states’ learning is thus 
an important step towards understanding the UN’s limits and advances in fostering a 
gender approach as an integral part of peacekeeping operations. For this reason, the 
purpose of this chapter is not to extensively dwell on organizational theory literature, but 
rather to identify important concepts in mainstream literature on the subject that is useful 
for the analysis.
The concept and mechanism behind organizational learning is central. Learning 
refers to the process through which new practices are created with the objective of 
solving problems that the organization is no longer able to solve with the existing set of 
norms, rules and procedures. Based on a constructivist understanding of IOs, the 
conceptualization of IOs in this chapter is that of autonomous entities who can act 
generate norms on their own. Their capacity to disseminate these norms to member states 
will be the main focus and point of scrutiny in this dissertation. Hence, in the 
construction of the organizational learning model, IOs’ autonomy was translated into the 
differentiation between organizational learning and individual member states’ learning. In
1 Gayl D. Ness; Steven R. Brechin, "Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organizations," 
International Organizations 42, no. 2 (1988).
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other words, the model attempts to establish whether or not IOs are able to learn even 
when unanimous consensus over a new practice has not been reached by member states.
The absence of unanimous support for the creation and institutionalization of new 
practices is intrinsically related to the concept of practice itself. As defined by Adler, 
practices are patterned meaningful actions developed in a particular context to solve a 
problem that need the concerted action of states. In this context, the compliance of all 
states is not required to implement practices. In fact, since these practices entail 
socialization, they also encompass learning and the transfer o f knowledge from one state 
unit to the other. Accordingly, organizational learning is a two part process: it creates and 
institutionalizes practice and disseminates it amongst member states.
The ultimate stage of organizational learning is transformation. In this context, 
organizational transformation refers to the process through which the product of 
organizational learning has been passed on to member states, which in turn have learned 
and changed their national policies to accommodate the new learning product. Once an 
organization manages to transfer the knowledge to its member states, then it is able to 
transform itself.
In order to unpack this model, this chapter is divided in three main sections. The 
first deals with the concepts and understandings of organizational learning derived from 
organizational theory. These approaches are derived from other social science fields such 
as administration and economics and conceive organizations as independent from their 
individual members. Organizations, different from international organizations, are not 
formed by member states but private individuals or collectivities working for a common 
purpose. This theoretical perspective has informed a particular stream of IR literature that
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liberates IOs from the constraining state-centric ontology that has long conceptualized 
IOs as instruments o f states, providing them with autonomy and agency. Two important 
concepts were derived from organizational theory and applied to this project’s model of 
organizational learning: organizational culture, or the core values and assumptions that 
guide organizational behavior; and organizational learning itself, since it separates 
individual members’ learning from organizational learning.
The second part of this chapter discusses organizational learning in IR theory and 
underlines the challenges found by previous authors who have ventured into this subject. 
The objective of this section is to unfold what other IR authors have proposed as to how 
processes o f learning in international organizations can take place. The literature 
indicates that amongst IR scholars that have ventured this topic, a major cross cultural 
consensus amongst member states is necessary for a successful learning process to be 
accomplished.
While the difficulties of implementing gender approaches to peacekeeping 
practices reinforces this argument, the third and final section lays out an organizational 
learning model that requires only a minimum consensus amongst memberships. This 
five-phase learning model perceives IOs as agents of dissemination and accepts 
differentiated learning pace among member states. The transfer of knowledge between 
the organization and its field and regional offices was also examined. In this regard, the 
establishment o f a feedback loop that informs headquarters of lessons learned contributes 
to the successful examination and implementation of a practice.
This final section also deals with the topic of transformation and its relationship 
with organizational learning. Once organizations have successfully learned and new
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practices are established, states are socialized and learning can be transferred from one 
state unit to another and/or from the organization itself to member states. The unanimous 
consensus of member states over a new practice and its implementation at the national 
level will complete the transformation. The establishment of this theoretical framework is 
the first step to evaluate whether UN 's current strategy of dissemination, that is 
establishing ideational goals still far from being a reality on most member states and 
intervened societies can actually contributes to disseminate these norms.
Organizational learning: definition and approaches
The corporate ontology associated with organizational theory has contributed to 
advancing within the IR field the idea that international organizations can have interests 
different from that of member states and pursue their own agenda. According to this 
theoretical strand, organizations are highly formalized structures formed by private 
individuals with well-defined goals. However, while they serve individuals' interests, 
they also separate themselves as autonomous entities with an organizational culture that 
has been formed either by the interaction of its individual members or influenced by the 
leadership. In any case, the organizational culture is different from that of its members.
The concept o f organizational culture is understood here as the practices, norms 
and artifacts of organizations that make organizations' behavior predictable. This concept 
is linked to that of organizational learning for two main reasons. First, it informs how 
learning can take place, that is, how within a particular set of norms and procedures, new 
information is analyzed and categorized. Second, and most importantly, organizational 
learning involves a change in the organizational culture. Whether the change is profound
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or relative, it is within the organizational culture that learning is portrayed and 
institutionalized.
Within organizational theory, the concept of learning itself and how it takes place 
in organizations offers an important theoretical foundation to test whether or learning can 
successfully take place without a unanimous consensus n the part of member states. In 
fact, a brief literature review on organizational learning shows that most authors accept 
the separation between individual members' learning and organizational learning.
The concept of organizational culture and the mechanism o f organizational 
learning will be analyzed in this section because these tools offer important insights into 
the process through which learning can take place in IOs.
Organizational culture
The concept of organizational culture is central because it both highlights the 
“content” of organizations in terms o f what lies behind their actions, such as their 
normative framework, values and principles, as well as, how changes can occur in the 
context o f that underlying organizational culture. Schein defines culture in general as a 
dynamic process enacted either “by our interactions with others and shaped by leadership 
behavior, and a set of structures, routines, rules and norms that guide and constrain 
behavior.”2 It is formed either by informal processes, whereby the constant interaction 
between group members eventually leads to the adoption o f common patterns and norms
2 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 3rd ed., The Jossey-Bass Business & 
Management Series (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004). p. 1
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of behavior, or by a more formal process through which the “personal views, goals, 
beliefs, values and assumptions o f the leader will shape the group culture.”3
Hence, organizational culture is specifically defined as a pattern of shared basic 
assumptions that was learned by a group (...) and that has worked well enough to be 
considered valid and therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.”4 In other words, organizational 
culture is accumulated learning by its members and a struggle towards patterning 
practices that have been successful thus far. Because culture implies some level of 
structural stability in the group, changing its meaning is difficult as group members are 
attached to the meaning and predictability rendered by that particular culture.
The author explains that organizational culture can be perceived at three different 
theoretical levels within an organization. The first level, also called “artifacts”, refers to 
the visible organizational structures and processes. These could refer to the organization's 
building, its particular architecture, its location and its constitutive charter, structure and 
processes. The second level, or “espoused beliefs”, refers to the strategies, goals and 
philosophy behind the organization. Within this category are the shared and consensual 
assumptions amongst group members based on prior learning which are usually explicit 
in the organization's documents, such as guidelines and strategies. Finally, the third level, 
named “underlying assumption” by the author, is comprised of the unconscious and 
taken-for-granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts and feelings that guide the formulation of 
purposes, strategies and actions within the organization. This is the ultimate source of
3 Ibid. p. 15
4 Ibid. p. 17
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organizational behavior and it tends to be implicit. Because they are non-confrontable 
and non-debatable, these beliefs are extremely difficult to change.
The concept of organizational culture as defined by Schein is of utmost 
importance to understanding the nature of organizations and how they may possess an 
identity of their own. In the IR field, understanding organizational culture as a mere state 
sponsored enterprise overshadows the processes through which they interact amongst 
each other and the Secretariat's staff, generating patterns of behavior that do not 
correspond to one or another group. This is an important step toward understanding the 
process through which IOs can learn, retain knowledge and generate new practices on 
their own before disseminating them to member states.
Learning and change in organizations
Although varied definitions of organizational learning co-exist in the literature, 
they underscore the core element of organizational learning as “a change in the 
organization that occurs as the organization acquires experience.”5 Schein's explanation 
of culture is particularly helpful to understanding the mechanism of change behind 
organizations. Indeed, a major reason why change sometimes fails to take place is the 
neglect of important aspects of organizational culture that may not be so easily 
substituted by another and consensually accepted by the group.6
The concepts of organizational learning and change are almost synonymous, 
though learning involves more than mere change and encompasses the transfer of
5 Ella Miron-Spektor and Linda Argote, "Organizational Learning: From Experience to Knowledge," 
Organization Science 22, no. 5 (2011). p. 1124
6 Mats Alvesson and Stefan Sveningsson, Changing Organizational Culture : Cultural Change Work in 
Progress (New York: Routledge, 2008). p.3
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knowledge as well. Indeed, within the literature, learning is identified as a change in the 
organization's knowledge due to accumulated experience or its re-examination. This 
knowledge can be either tacit, such as a change in the organization or its members' 
cognition, or explicit, such as a change in the procedures and practices carried out by the 
organization.7
Broadly speaking, an organization can be said to be learning when it acquires new 
knowledge or is able to process different kind of knowledge. Some authors,8 argue that it 
is through members that most organizational learning takes places, as it is usually through 
them that new knowledge is acquired, deposited and then transferred to other members or 
to the organization's structure (guidelines, strategies, etc.). However, organizational 
learning does not equal individual members learning.9 Individual learning may not 
necessarily transfer to the organization's structure nor reflect in its actions. However, if 
this individual learning is translated into new procedures widely accepted by the rest of 
the group and embedded in the organization's structure, documents, strategies, etc, then 
learning has taken place and knowledge transfer has been initiated.
Along these lines, Argote and Spektor perceive the complete organizational 
learning process as having three sub-processes: creating, retaining and transferring 
knowledge.10 The process of creating knowledge refers to the process through which an 
organization's unit learns something new and changes its practice according to the 
recently acquired knowledge. Once this new knowledge is widely recognized within the
7 See: Mark Easterby-Smith, Mary Crossan, and Davide Nicolini, "Organizational Learning: Debates Past, 
Present and Future," Journal o f  Management Studies 37, no. 6 (2000).
8 See: Miron-Spektor and Argote, "Organizational Learning: From Experience to Knowledge."
9 Donald A. Schon and Chris Argyris, Organizational Learning Ii: Theory, Method, and Practice, 2nd ed. 
(Addison-Wesley, 1996). p.6
10 Miron-Spektor and Argote, "Organizational Learning: From Experience to Knowledge." p .l 128.
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organization, it can be repeatedly re-used and is consequently retained in the organization 
through repeated practice and occasionally institutionalization. The final sub-process, 
knowledge transfer, is defined within this literature as indirect learning or the process by 
which one unit learns from the experience of another unit.
The literature review on organizational learning is extremely useful in the context 
of acknowledging the possibility that these international organizations can learn and 
change overtime. The ontology of organizational theory opens up the possibility of 
understanding international organizations in similar ways, suggesting that IOs can learn 
from their experience, generate knowledge and transform themselves. Moreover, the 
discussion of how learned knowledge can be transferred offers an explanation as to how 
knowledge can travel throughout the many layers and structure of an organization such as 
the UN’s field offices and headquarters and its member states.
Triggering learning
The literature review on organizational learning reveals that learning processes 
can be mindful and attentive, as a result of a conscious effort to change the organization's 
action11 and less mindful or routine, referring to those instances through which superficial
1 9learning takes place when improving performance. Because unconscious learning 
usually refers to the improvement of an action and its increase in frequency that does not 
result in profound changes in the organizational culture, this project’s model of
11 Karl E. Weick; Kathleen M. Sutcliffe, "Mindfulness and the Quality of Organizational Attention," 
ibid. 17, no. 4 (2006).
12 Daniel Levinthal and Claus Rerup, "Crossing an Apparent Chasm: Bridging Mindful and Less-Mindful 
Perspectives on Organizational Learning," ibid., no. 6.
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organizational learning can benefit more from an analysis focused on conscious learning 
efforts.
In this context, learning is necessarily triggered by the identification o f a 
problematic situation and a “mismatch between expected results of action and what is 
actually achieved (...), [blocking the flow of] spontaneous activity and giving rise to 
thought and the search for a solution and the re-establishment of the flow of action.”13 
Problems thus give rise to a process of inquiry that may result in the proposition of new 
practices that are more suitable to solve the problem than the existing set o f actions.
Interestingly, Schon and Agyris attribute to individuals within an organization the 
responsibility of identifying a problem, initiating the inquiry process and proposing 
solutions. 14 However, learning may not necessarily be passed on to the organization. 
Only after learned knowledge is successfully embedded in the organization, be it through 
the organizational memory held by other individual members or through epistemological 
artifacts, such as the organization's documents, does learning take place.
In other words, organizational learning is initiated by the identification o f a 
problem that the organization's existent rules and procedures can no longer solve. This 
identification then triggers a process of re-examination and, as a result, new rules and 
procedures are proposed. It is only after these become consensually adopted practices 
within the organization that learning is considered to have occurred.
Learning is then facilitated either by agents of change, such as the organization's 
leadership or other individual employees that push for reforms, or by environmental-
13 Schon and Argyris, Organizational Learning Ii: Theory, Method, and Practice, p. 11
14 Ibid. p. 12
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driven forces, that is, changes in the context where the organization operates.15 In the 
latter, the transformation of the context may generate problems that were not previously 
considered by the organization, or it may happen that the existing set o f organizational 
actions is no longer enough to solve a problem due to changes in the context. At the same 
time, the work of individuals capable of identifying problems and pushing for the process 
o f inquiry and proposing solutions is as necessary as the rising of the problem itself, since 
in their absence the problem may not even be identified in the first place.
This analysis has shown that a model of organizational learning applied to 
international organizations can benefit from the agentive and autonomous character 
delegated to organizations in organizational theory literature. Moreover, the mechanism 
behind organizational learning highlights important phases, such as the rise o f a problem, 
the examination of issues and the elaboration o f a new set of rules that could be used in 
the process of organizational learning and applied to IOs. The following section will 
highlight the main characteristics o f IOs and lay the basis for the construction of the 
organizational learning model used to test whether or not organizational learning 
processes can be concomitant to member states' learning and contribute to the 
dissemination of renewed norms and practices.
15 The analysis o f  the organizational environment marked the important recognition o f  how environmental 
forces shape goals, internal procedures and ultimately the behavior o f organizations. Early analysis o f  
organizational environment showed how their variance determined the best organizational structure for 
higher efficiency performance rates. See: Brechin, "Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as 
Organizations"; Paul R. Lawrence and Jay William Lorsch, Organization and Environment; Managing 
Differentiation and Integration (Boston,: Division o f Research, Graduate School o f  Business 
Administration, Harvard University, 1967).
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Organizational learning in international organizations
The previous analysis has shown that organizational theories can influence the 
study of international organizations by adopting an analytical instance that does not put 
member states at the center of organizational action. Within the literature of international 
organizations, some approaches have benefited from the perception that organizations 
can be autonomous from its members and are able to learn and change over time. The 
first IR theoretical strand to take advantage of sociological studies on organizational 
behavior was functionalism, introducing a normative aim and a teleological purpose for 
IOs.16 Later on, having incorporated the precepts of a more modem idea of international 
politics, theories such as constructivism and principle-agent theory also based their 
theoretical foundations on the sociological understanding of organizations. O f particular 
note is Weber's emphasis on the agentive power of bureaucracies and delegated authority 
of states as the seminal source of IOs' autonomy.
The possibility of organizational learning and change in international 
organizations has also been present in IR literature. Among mainstreaming authors, Haas' 
description of two interrelated process -  learning and adaptation -  can occur within IOs. 
According to the author, organizations can reinvent themselves and redefine their original
16 David Mitrany is amongst the first scholars that made use o f organizational theory. His main 
contributions were the definition o f  peace and welfare as the normative aim o f organizations and the focus 
on technically specialized functions as means that would lead to political considerations that would render 
conflicts unnecessary. The involvement o f  states in these organizations would produce shifts in their 
cognition and values, leading them to support a more integrated world community. Changed values would 
imply the erosion o f  the strict national loyalties, while the simple involvement in IOs would enmesh 
participants in beneficial exchanges and raise the costs o f  war. However, Mitrany’s theory was based on a 
rather naive view o f  organizations as mere tools o f their creators. Other functionalists, beginning with 
Haas, updated the contents o f  this theory by drawing more on sociological studies and relaxing the view o f  
IOs as mere tools and founding neo-functionalism. See: Brechin, "Bridging the Gap: International 
Organizations as Organizations"; David Mitrany, A Working Peace System  (Chicago,: Quadrangle Books, 
1966); Robert W. Cox; Harold K. Jacobson, The Anatomy o f  Influence (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1974).
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goals if member states agree to do so. In other instances, IOs adapt and improve their 
performance due to changes in their procedures and rules as a better way to tackle 
problems, even though their underlying values, principles and purposes remain the same. 
The core difference between these two processes lies in the deepness of change and 
cross-cultural consensus.
Haas’ conceptualization of organizational learning and his description o f the 
mechanism driving change are enlightening because they approach the “problem” of 
having states as founders and members o f IOs and how they can impact the process of 
learning. Without a unanimous state consensus, learning cannot take place. Hence, 
learning would be an extremely rare phenomenon in organizations so culturally diverse 
such as the UN.
Nonetheless, the study of IOs' autonomy and their capacity to create and 
disseminate norms among member states indicates the possibility of separating IOs’ 
knowledge from that of states'. In fact, an analysis of UN contributions to various issues 
indicates that the organization has norms of its own, apart from member states and 
attempts to function as an agent of dissemination. A number of UN documents, written 
by the Secretariat, serve as a source of principles, values and norms, besides also 
providing guidelines o f action in a number of cases. Although not all states agree on all 
issues, a number o f these documents are actually implemented and may even serve as 
ways of disseminating the norm and/or monitoring states behavior in issues such as 
human rights.
For this reason, a discussion on the concept of international practices is also 
necessary. Practices, understood here as patterned meaningful actions, is a ways of
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socializing states to behave in certain ways. In international organizations, new practices 
can be the result of a learning process, created to solve issues that states cannot solve on 
their own. The dissemination of practices within international organizations is a ways of 
transmitting learned knowledge to member states.
The discussion on IOs’ autonomy, Haas’ model of organizational learning, and 
the concept of international practices and how they are disseminated form the theoretical 
basis of the model of organizational learning developed here.
Organizational learning vs. member states learning
This dissertation’s conceptualization of international organizations is based on a 
constructivist theoretical approach that assumes IOs are social creatures formed by “a 
distinct social form of authority with its own internal logic and behavioral proclivities.”17 
Other theoretical approaches to organizational learning applied to IOs take a similar 
instance and differ only in the degree to which IOs can learn and transform apart from 
member states.
IOs' internal and behavioral logic aligned to the set of norms, ideas and principles 
that inspired and guided their creation, are at the core of the organizations’ identity and 
comprise their organizational culture. Although every organization differs, IOs share a 
few distinct characteristics. As most institutionalists emphasize, international 
organizations are comprised by rigorous procedures and rules that conditions their 
behavior and grants the system with predictability.18 Indeed, one of IOs' main
17 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules fo r  the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, p.3
18 See: Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations 
Theory (Bolder: Westview Press, 1989); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and D iscord
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contributions to international politics is the establishment of a set o f rules that provides 
more transparency to transactions and increases the possibility of cooperation between 
states.
At a rudimentary level, international organizations' authority is “delegated 
authority from the states”19; organizations are created to solve specific problems and are 
granted authority by states to act on their behalf, in accordance to the rules and 
procedures commonly agreed upon by their members and based on the specific expertise 
they possess. Once IOs are granted with that authority, their actions are seen as 
impersonal, legitimate and representative of the larger community's interest. From that 
moment on, the separation of states' interests from IOs' behavior is a necessary condition 
for maintaining IOs' legitimacy. At a practical level, IO staff work with this sense of 
authority when following the rules and procedures.
The centrality of rules in IOs' behavior as well as their delegated authority from 
states form the basis of IOs' authority. Other elements, such as their specialized expertise 
and the pursuit of higher goals and moral principles in the name of state community, also 
provide them with legitimacy. Since IOs are usually endowed with tasks directed towards 
the common good of the group, they are granted with a moral authority that further 
legitimates their advice and actions. Indeed, IOs' employees are civil servants that do not 
represent the interests of their own states, but rather that of the organization. This staff 
tends to be highly qualified and knowledgeable on the subject matter that concerns the IO
in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Bruce M. Russett and 
John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace : Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations 
(New York: Norton, 2001); Robert Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," 
International Security 20, no. 1 (1996); Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories and Empirical 
Studies o f International Institutions," International Organizations 52, no. 4 (1998).
19 Barnett and Finnemore, Rules fo r  the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, p.22
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for which they work. Because of their specialized expertise, they are considered an 
“authority” on the subject of their work and thus have legitimacy to propose actions on 
their own. As wisely put by Barnett and Finnemore, it is this sound authority that 
provides IOs with relative autonomy to propose new norms and actions that are often also 
adopted by states.
Along the same lines, principal-agent theory also grants IOs with autonomy. This 
approach, developed in other areas o f social sciences such as economics and American 
politics, has been hijacked by IR scholars in recent years.20 Researchers within this 
theoretical strand focus on the relationship between principals (or states) and agents (or 
international organizations) and how the former delegate the later with authority to act on 
their behalf. In IR literature, the basis of this argument is the finding that delegation 
mechanisms found in domestic politics can be similar to those found at the international 
level.21 States exercise varying levels o f control over their agents, but this control varies 
in degree rather than by type of mechanism.
The process of delegation would then entail that states as principals would grant 
authority to IOs who have thus been empowered to act on their behalf in certain pre­
defined matters. The definition of agent and principal is mutually constitutive, that is, one 
can only be defined in relation to the other. However, principals are able to both grant 
and rescind authority to agents. In the specific case of international organizations, it
20 See for example: Tamar Gutner, "Explaining the Gaps between Mandate and Performance: Agency 
Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform," Global Environmental Politics 5, no. 2 (2005); Darren G. 
Hawkins, Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, Political Economy o f Institutions and 
Decisions (Cambridge, U K ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Daniel L. N ielson and 
Michael J. Tierney, "Delegation to International Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank 
Environmental Reform," International Organizations 57(2003); Mark Polack, "Delegation, Agency, and 
Agenda Setting in the European Community," ibid.51, no. 1 (1997); Roland Vaubel, "Principal-Agent 
Problems in International Organizations," Review o f  International Organizations 1, no. 2 (2006).
21 Hawkins, Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, p.5
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becomes clear states are the principals. Occasionally, other actors in the international 
system, such as the media and other organizations such as NGOs, may act similarly to 
principals. However, only states are able to empower and disempower IOs from acting on 
their behalf on certain previously defined areas.
The analysis of why states may delegate authority to IOs has been extensively 
discussed in IR theory. Principal-agent theory proponents emphasize arguments similar to 
those put forward by institutionalists when explaining the possibility o f cooperation 
between states. In fact, they claim that states can take advantage of IOs because they are 
themselves a form of cooperation. The possibility of establishing a division of labor as 
well as the advantages of counting with specialized expertise are important motivations to 
join IOs and endow them with authority. Other motivational factors for states include 
saving resources, managing policy externalities, facilitating collective decision-making, 
resolving disputes, and enhancing credibility.22
The possibility of conflicting interests between agents and principals is also 
considered within this theoretical approach. As a result, control mechanisms may exist 
including rules, monitoring practices, reporting obligations and institutional checks and 
balances. Despite them, agents are usually granted with the autonomy to pursue the 
principal's goals in ways that are integrally or partially defined by agents themselves. The 
degree of institutional autonomy thus varies from organization to organization and 
depends on the level of control mechanisms established by principals.
Nonetheless, international organizations do possess a window of opportunity to 
act on their own within the boundaries of the role and functions states have defined. In
22 Ibid. p. 13
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this context, the principal-agent theory coincides with the constructivist approach that IOs 
possess agency and may act in ways that are not entirely in accordance with member 
states' interests. These two theories also converge in their claim that IOs are provided 
with leverage to pursue an independent agenda through the authority delegated to them 
by states and because of their specialized expertise and the legitimacy conferred by their 
multilateral forum.
The idea that IOs have autonomy to pursue the goals defined by its founders as 
well as the ability to create and disseminate norms indicates that there may be instances 
in which they can produce knowledge on their own. This knowledge is then disseminated 
within IOs' structure and membership before it is recognized as a new and 
institutionalized practice. It is in this context that learning can take place.
Organizational learning in IOs: a review o f  Ernst Haas model
Within IR literature, the seminal work of Ernst Haas takes the debate of 
organizational learning to a new level as he describes the specific process through which 
international organizations can adapt, learn and change over time. The specific 
consideration of states' roles in this process is one of his main contributions to the study 
o f organizational learning in IR field. Specifically, he argues that learning can only occur 
once a cross cultural consensus amongst all members is achieved. Moreover, his 
elaboration on the definition of epistemic communities as enablers o f learning is key to 
this study because this group of like-minded individuals from various backgrounds -  
practitioners, scholars, etc - and with specialized know-how provides organizations with 
valuable expertise, necessary for a successful learning process. His writing on
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organizational learning and adaptation were highly influential to the study of 
international organizations, particularly in regard to environmental issues.23
Haas theorizes that organizations are embedded in a particular historical context 
and have their own organizational cultures. Haas' concept o f organizational culture can 
be divided in two inter-related elements that resembles Shein's description of third and 
second level elements of organizational culture. The first, or underlying assumptions, 
refers to the principles, values and goals that guide IOs’ action. These are deeply rooted 
features o f IO's organizational culture and are difficult to change since they are at the 
core of its “genetic code” and are an integral part of them as beings. The second level 
element refers to secondary features of IOs' organizational culture, such as the 
procedures and strategies to pursue the organization's goals. Although both can change, 
the process of changing the former is far more difficult.
In this context, Haas’ understanding of learning involves a change in the 
organization's purposes, principles and values, or underlying assumptions.24 In an 
incomplete learning process, an observable change in organizations’ behavior and 
activities would occur, but without fundamental redefining of organizational goals and 
values. This process is defined as “adaptation” and comprises a change in the ways
23 See for example: Peter M. Haas and Ernst Haas, "Learning to Leam: Improving International 
Governance," Global Governance 1, no. 3 (1995); Nielson and Tierney, "Delegation to International 
Organizations: Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform"; Frank Biermann, Bemd 
Siebenhiiner, and Anna Schreyogg, International Organizations in Global Environmental Governance, 
Routledge Research in Environmental Politics (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2009); 
Stephen Bauer, "Does Bureaucracy Really Matter? The Authority o f  Intergovernmental Treaty Secretariats 
in Global Environmental Politics," Global Environmental Politics 6, no. 1 (2006); Peter Haas, 
"International Institutions and Social Learning in the Management o f Global Environmental Risks.," Policy 
Studies Journal 28, no. 3 (2000); Siebenhiiner, "Learning in International Organization in Global 
Environmental Governance."
24 Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models o f  Change in International Organizations, p. 3
58
through which the organization pursues its purposes, or a change in its secondary 
features.
It is important to note that not all adaptation process is positive and these changes 
do not always improve IOs’ actions on the ground. Haas clarifies that adaptation can be 
either incremental or turbulent resulting in positive changes in the former and in a 
continuous non-growth in the latter.25 The difference between these two adaptation 
categories lies in the organizational ability to promote changes coherently and in 
accordance to the defined goals and with positive consequences.
As an illustration, the author cites the creation o f peacekeeping operations within 
the UN's system of collective security system in 1956. Since this initial change was 
within the boundaries of the previously defined goal o f maintaining international peace 
and security and in accordance to UN's underlying principle of sovereignty and non­
intervention, it consisted of an incremental adaptation. Haas, however, rightly evaluates 
that the transformations in peacekeeping practices that occurred in the beginning of the 
90 's degenerated into a turbulent non-growth model. Indeed, the invention of UN 
peacekeeping operations (PKO) comprised an innovative change to overcome context- 
driven forces, particularly the Cold War and the Security Council's inability to act. 
However, as the Cold War ended and the nature of conflicts changed, the UN increased 
its scope of action within PKOs by adding activities in contexts that were considerably 
different from those where the organization intervened during the past decades. This 
increment, however, was not accompanied by a reflection process that would result in the 
re-examination of the principles and doctrines necessary to maintain the coherence of UN
25 Ibid. p.3
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actions in the field. The subsequent failures in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, amongst 
others, are the result of an incoherent increase in the scope of UN actions, followed by a 
loss of authority from which the UN is still recovering.
Consequently, an important tool for organizations to maintain their authority is to 
“learn how to learn” or adapt.26 Organizations with the ability to constantly change in 
changing contexts thrive in a state-centric dominated international system. As previously 
indicated, change in organizations can be triggered by a change in actors' interest or in 
the environment or context. “Learning in an international organization implies that the 
organization's members are induced to question earlier beliefs about the appropriateness 
of ends of actions and to think about new ones to revalue themselves.”27 The learning 
process thus involves a common understanding of the causes of the problem that 
triggered the reflection process on new shared solutions and consensual “set of larger 
meanings about life and nature not previously held in common participating members.”28 
The ability to leam is thus the ability to recognize failures and re-examine existing set of 
principles and actions.
Because international organizations are engaged in the implementation of 
transnational policies and continuous interaction between politically and culturally 
diverse actors such as national governments, non-governmental organizations, interest 
groups, business firms, professionals, etc, learning depends on the ability to “share 
meanings across cultural and ideological chasms.”29 In other words, “collective problem­
26 Haas and Haas, "Learning to Leam: Improving International Governance."




solving among 160-odd30 states o f widely different cultural commitments and with 
divergent historical memories would seem to depend on the ability to transcend cultural 
and historical boundaries, to establish trans-cultural and trans-ideological shared 
meanings.”31
Haas’ introduction of the cultural element is particularly useful for the object of 
this dissertation. Gender may be a controversial and sensitive subject within certain 
cultures and the analysis of UN learning in “gender-related” practices would be 
incomplete if it ignored the vast cultural differences between member states. At the same 
time, though, it may be necessary to free the model o f organizational learning from the 
“problem of states” so that it is possible to evaluate whether changes in the organization's 
norms and practices that are initiated by the Secretariat may result in changes in the 
actions implemented by member states.
As rightly put by Finnemore and Barnett,32 ignoring the special nature of IOs 
formed by sovereign state units is as much a mistake as defining IOs autonomy as the 
ability to follow an agenda despite powerful states’ willingness to comply. States possess 
different power potentials within organizations and, conflicting interests with these may 
hamper organizational change.
Learning enablers
Haas and Haas grant epistemic communities a special role in promoting 
organizational learning by defining them as a group of like-minded professionals that
30 Haas was referring to the United Nations, which, at the time had around 160 member states.
31 Ibid. p. 17
32Bamett and Finnemore, Rules fo r  the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, p. 154
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work around specific problematic issues, and whose specialized expertise and knowledge 
are considered central to a successful learning process. In this context, organizational 
learning can be either initiated by these actors working outside the organization or by 
actors working within the boundaries of the organization.
Epistemic communities, or professionals working for NGOs, business firms, etc, 
scholars and practitioners in the area, can initiate the learning process by pushing the 
Secretariat to consider their specific point of view on an issue they want the organization 
to pursue. They can also search for member states support and form a coalition of 
favorable states to convince other member states and the Secretariat to look into their 
proposals and adopt them. Once the Secretariat has been persuaded by one dominant 
epistemic community along with a coalition of willing states, the learning process can be 
initiated and transferred throughout all of the organization's layers. It is also common that 
once the learning process has been initiated, the organization selects members of the 
epistemic communities to actively participate in the search for new shared solutions, 
either as consultants or as an integral part o f the team dedicated to that particular issue.
This practice is evident in the preparatory meetings before major conferences 
where NGOs, scholars and other practitioners are invited to discuss the Conference topic 
and propose issues to be included in discussions with states’ representatives. 
Occasionally, the selected members are also granted observer status and are able to 
participate and, on some occasions, speak on a number of issues. This free flow of ideas 
between these professionals and states is an important process through which new 
knowledge can be inserted in the organization during the learning process and further 
improving it.
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However, the authors admonish that “organizational learning requires that the 
efforts of epistemic communities be accepted and advocated by a coalition of hegemonic 
member states rather than being endorsed by majorities of weak states.”33 This comment 
seems to be in line with the idea that although it is possible organizations promote their 
own norms, the need to gather strong states’ support is a necessary condition for a 
successful implementation of the norm. The ultimate stage of organizational learning 
would be the adoption and acceptance by member states’ executive power of the new 
policies in accordance to the learning process the organization has gone through.34
Because organizational learning involves consensual knowledge, the authors point 
out that learning is extremely rare, particular in organizations like the UN, which is 
formed by very culturally and politically different members. Moreover, they point out to 
yet another factor that makes learning a difficult process to take place: the organizations' 
capacity to promote linkages between issues.35 They argue that the need to have “linkage 
capacity” to promote organizational learning is a result of the transformation of the 
international political arena, where deconstructing and setting problems apart in different 
categories is no longer possible.
Because issues are so interconnected, solutions ought to be multi-disciplinary in 
order to be adequate. Although setting issues apart and promoting separate actions may 
seem easier when addressing different problems, responses are likely to be inadequate as 
they will leave behind important interconnected causes of the problem. Although 
complex linking among policy issues is necessary for success, international negotiations




are bloated as they call for larger package deals and long-term policies that member states 
may not be willing to fully commit themselves to.
It becomes evident that the process of learning within organizations depends on a 
number of factors, such as the capacity to promote political and ideological consensus, 
establish linkages between issues and allow the free flow of ideas between the 
organization and members of the epistemic community. The literature also indicates that 
a number of actors working within and outside IOs function as enablers of learning. 
Among those actors, epistemic communities’ contributions have been highly emphasized 
as important sources of specific knowledge that can generate new and more adequate 
practices.
However, epistemic communities are not the only facilitators of learning and 
change. In fact, member states themselves can actively work toward the promotion of 
learning by framing issues of their interest and forming coalitions of other states and 
members o f the epistemic community to support their cause.36 Depending on which states 
join, there is a great possibility that they may be successful, especially if  these are rich, 
developed and powerful states.
Other learning enablers include the bureaucracy within the organization and the 
context itself. A strong bureaucracy can propose new ideas and push the Secretariat to 
adopt its proposal. It can also search for member states’ support and form a “coalition of 
the willing”, thus increasing chances that their proposal will be considered by the high
36 Similarly to earlier functionalist texts, Haas duels over the influence o f  member states producing change 
in organizations. He argues that changes are produced by member-state dissatisfaction and pressure for 
change. According to him, these can be interpreted as a threat to organizational autonomy, since if  
proposed changes do not meet membership requirements, they may lose funds, personnel, prestige, etc.
See: Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models o f  Change in International Organizations.
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level staff within the 10 and by member states’ representatives. Finally, changes in the 
environment may also trigger a learning process. Indeed, the transformation of the 
political and historical context along with shifts in the regulatory and normative patterns 
in the environment may render IOs’ action inefficient and obsolete and the need to learn 
and/or adapt would become necessary.
This analysis has thus far shown that there is a theoretical stream in IR literature 
that accepts IOs as capable of acting on their own even when member states do not fully 
agree with their policies. These scholars also accept the idea that organizational learning 
is possible. However, they condition this process to the achievement of a consensual 
trans-cultural agreement among member states, Secretariat's civil servants and members 
of the epistemic community on new forms of structures and norms. Under these 
conditions, learning becomes an extremely rare phenomenon.37 In this context, there are a 
few factors that contribute to the process of learning, including the capacity to link issues 
and allow the free flow of ideas between the epistemic community, IO staff and member 
states. The actions of these three groups of actors, along with changes in the environment 
where the organization operates, are the main contributing factors that enable learning. 
By identifying functional problems and pushing for solutions, these actors can trigger a 
learning process.
However, the presence o f all these necessary conditions together seems to 
conceptualize learning as an extremely rare process and the important steps taken by 
organizations on their own seem to be relatively ignored. Consequently, I would like to 
draw attention to Barnett's and Finnemore's central argument regarding IO 's agency and
37 Siebenhttner, "Learning in International Organization in Global Environmental Governance." p.96
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their capacity to spread norms, fix meanings and categorize the world, bringing important 
knowledge that may be reflected not only in the practice of organizations, but also in the 
text of central documents. In this context, Emanuel Adler's practice-based approach38 
will contribute to the understanding of how practices are generated and socialized to 
states. In the particular context of this dissertation, a focus on practices generated within 
IOs will point out to how they can engender new knowledge to be later disseminated to 
states.
International practices
A practice oriented approach emphasizes the social construction of practices as 
consensually adopted forms of action in the international system. For the proponents of 
this renewed approach, “world politics can be understood as structured by practices, 
which give meaning to international action, make possible strategic interaction, and are 
reproduced, changed and reinforced by international action and interaction.”39
In this context, practices are understood as patterned actions developed in a 
particular context that provides them with socially constructed meaning. In other words, 
practices can be defined as meaningful behavior that has been repeated over time as a 
result of positive feedback, or as an action socially recognized as meaningful based on 
background knowledge acquired through experience.
38 Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, International Practices, Cambridge Studies in International 
Relations (Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
39 Ibid. p.5
66
Adler unpacks the notion o f practice in five different elements.40 The first element 
is performance, or the process of doing something; the second is pattern, pointing out to 
the fact that practices exhibits some regularity over time and space; the third is 
competency, or the social recognition of practices as being competent; the fourth is the 
background knowledge or the accumulated experience and understandings; and finally, 
the fifth is the linkage between discursive and material worlds as practices are themselves 
a connection between implicit meanings and explicit actions.
Resembling Haas' notion of epistemic communities, Adler’s argument is that 
practices are exercised and transformed in the framework of community of practices. 
These are “inter-subjective social structures that constitute the normative and epistemic 
ground for action, but are also agents, made up of real people, who -  working via 
network channels, across national borders, across organizational divides, and in the halls 
of government -  affect political, economic and social events.”41 Their action thus 
contributes to both the generation and ending of the life cycle of practices by creating, 
disseminating and institutionalizing them. This process involves engaging groups of 
agents “in a community of practice where learning takes place and meanings and 
identities are negotiated and transformed.”42
The life cycle of practices first includes generation as a socially recognized 
meaningful action, then diffusion in the system and, finally, institutionalization. Not all 
practices pass through all these phases; for example, institutionalization may be
40 Ibid. p.7
41 Ibid. p. 17
42Emanuel Adler, "The Spread o f  Security Communities:Communities o f Practice, Self-Restraint, and 
Nato’s Post-Cold War Transformation," European Journal o f  International Relations 14, no. 2 (2008). 
p. 196
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problematic, as many of them can deteriorate and disappear over time. In this context, 
organizational learning could be understood as the process through which practices 
become institutionalized within a particular international organization, embedded in its 
super-structure and carried out by its members and staff.
The single most important aspect of international practices for this dissertation is 
the concept o f practice dissemination through socialization. As Adler points out, the 
process through which practices are generated does not depend on the unanimous 
acceptance of its validity. Instead, it is the constant repetition of practice that socializes 
states to accept and institutionalize them. Consequently, international practices are not 
dependent on a consensus about their importance, but on their socialization and 
dissemination in the system. Accordingly, this dissertation attempts to assess whether 
learning can take place without unanimous consensus from member states, as practices 
are generated independently from states, the question of whether they can actually be 
implemented remains. According to Adler's argument, as practices are generated, they 
are later socialized and adopted by a number of member states, which permits this new 
practice to be institutionalized.
Rather than just focusing on the practice of “promoting gender in PKOs”, this 
dissertation will focus both on the content of this specific practice and in the mechanism 
that may or may not disseminate this new practice within the UN and to its members. 
This has been possible thanks to the combined effects of the epistemic community 
dedicated to this issue and the institutionalization of protection of civilians into the UN's 
normative PKO framework in the 21st century. For this purpose, the following session 
will lay out the organizational learning mechanism used to determine whether and how
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promoting gender in PKO has been proposed and institutionalized by the UN and what 
consequences this new international practice has produced thus far.
A model of organizational learning
This dissertation’s model of organizational learning is based on the understanding 
of international organizations as agents of dissemination that are able to produce new 
knowledge and practices and later diffuse them to its members. The socialization o f these 
practices among member states and their repetition over time is a necessary step for 
learning to take place. However, the institutionalization of a new practice does not 
depend on the unanimous consensus among member states.
In this context, learning refers to the process through which a new international 
practice is created and included within the framework of action o f a given IO. It also 
refers to a process of change in which older practices are substituted by new ones, and 
added to the organization's scope of action. This change can be either superficial or affect 
the inner most parts of the organizational culture. For this reason, a thorough 
understanding of the concept of organizational culture in international organizations will 
help clarify the different levels in which learning can take place. In fact, as argued by 
Haas, changes in the core values and principles of organizations are much more difficult 
to enact and often require the member states’ unanimous consensus.
For this reason, this dissertation employs a theoretical framework that understands 
organizational learning as a two level process. The first refers to the process through 
which a new practice is generated, disseminated and institutionalized. The second, also 
known as transformation, refers to the ultimate stage of learning when practices are
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consensually accepted and adopted by all member states, and become an integral part of 
the organizational culture.
First-level learning is either originated due to a change in the context or driven by 
the advocacy work of members of an epistemic community, member states or IO 
bureaucracy. It includes five main phases: organizational dysfunction, which refers to the 
organization's inability to solve problems with the available set of existing practices; re­
examination, or the process through which this existing set o f practices are re-examined 
and new ones are proposed; minimum consensus, referring to the need to reach a 
minimum acceptance among member states, members of the epistemic community and 
IO's Secretariat's staff; institutionalization, comprising the process of embedding this 
new practice in the institutional framework of the organization; and finally, 
dissemination, the process through which this practice is socialized throughout the layers 
of the organization and to member states.
In large organizations with headquarters and field offices, a feedback loop 
between the two is necessary. Often, practices originated at headquarters level are not 
fully applicable in other contexts or, simply confront major challenges to be translated 
into practice. The constant flow o f communication between different offices grants the 
learning process with increased chances of success since it provides updated information 
on successful and failed practices.
The second-level learning refers to the process through which practices are 
socialized to the rest of member states, and then accepted and adopted by them. It 
requires that the executive power of those states adopt national policies in accordance to 
the new practice. When both the organization and its member states have changed and
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learned, that is when organizational transformation takes place. It is also important to 
note that organizational transformation also refers to a much deeper process of change. It 
comprises a change in the core values of the organization, or its raison d ' etre. That is 
why organizational transformation is an extremely challenging and therefore rare 
phenomenon.
The following sections will thus analyze this two-level learning process. First, the 
concept o f organizational culture and its content will shed some light on how and where 
the process of learning takes place. Following this discussion is a full description of the 
learning process, conditions under which learning more easily takes place and an 
evaluation of the possibilities for a full-blown transformation to occur.
Organizational culture in IOs
As shown in Schein's analysis, organizational culture is the guiding principle that 
leads organizations to behave, act and understand the world in specific ways. Any change 
in the organization or learning process necessarily implies a breach in the original 
organizational culture. His three-level analysis is particularly helpful because it allows 
the audience to determine how profound the change was and if it resulted in a complete, 
partial or imperceptible organizational change.
The application of Schein's three-level concept o f organizational culture to 
international organizations needs a few considerations as the state-centric ontology 
embedded in analyses concerning IOs is absent from his analysis. Moreover, since the 
kind of states that are members of the analyzed IO influences its underlying and espoused 
values, considerations about state representation ought to be included both in the 
definition of organizational culture and in the mechanism of organizational learning.
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Therefore, the three-level definition of organizational culture applied to international 
organizations will be defined as follows.
The first level, or “artifacts”, consists of the physical world surrounding the 
organization and its ordering principles; the building, its structure and how the 
organization is internally organized-such as the voting process and the different level of 
executive power conferred to each of the organization's bodies— are important elements 
to be considered in this level. The second level, or “espoused values”, refers to IOs' goals 
and strategies to pursue them. Espoused values are embedded in the rules, procedures, 
strategies, and guidelines within the organization and can be easily comprehended 
through a analysis o f the organization's written documents. Finally, at the third level, or 
“underlying assumptions”, lie IOs' norms, principles and values that may not be 
explicitly stated but are part of the underlying beliefs, perceptions, thoughts and feelings 
within the organization. One important aspect within this level is the espoused values by 
member states.
The presence of member states and the relative constraining power and control 
mechanisms they possess are common features to all international organizations. 
However, the types of member states are not. A fully western international organization 
with modem capitalist democracies as members will be different from an organization 
that is comprised of mostly non-Westem states with different forms o f government. The 
point I am trying to make is that the state composition of an IO may incur certain values 
and principles located in the third level of Shein's organizational culture definition. 
While the addition of new members may not mean a transformation per se, the inclusion 
of considerably different states with values different from that of the organization may
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lead to a learning process and the generation of an extra set o f problems the organization 
will have to deal with.
The first and second levels of organizational culture are physical, procedural and 
action based evidence of the organization's underlying principles. That is why changes in 
the first and second levels of organizational culture are more easily attainable and may 
reflect Haas' concept of adaptation, that is, the inclusion of actions with the purpose of 
solving a problem without necessarily changing the organization's core principles and 
values. However, the concept of learning here encompasses that of adaptation and 
indicates the adoption of new and successful actions to solve problems that could not be 
previously solved by the existing set of activities developed by the organization. A 
change in the core values of the organization, similarly results from a learning process, 
though a much deeper one, initiated by the re-examination of its core values and the 
generation of new and more adequate espoused values and artifacts, resulting ultimately 
in the complete transformation of the organization.
A second consideration is now necessary. Haas’ definition of organizational 
learning implies the questioning of earlier beliefs and the re-definition o f new solutions 
that are consensually accepted by the members of a culturally and politically different 
group. For the author, a learning process is only achieved if disseminated and adopted by 
these culturally and politically different units. Considering Haas’ definition, in an IO with 
similarly represented states, learning seems to be more easily accomplished than in 
culturally diverse organizations such as the UN. Nonetheless, can the learning process in 
a universal organization such as the UN have its importance minimized because it was 
not fully adopted by 193 member states? Particularly, in regard to gender issues even
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though we have asserted that UN's resolutions present intrinsic challenges to be adopted 
by all member states, the organization is still attempting to disseminate renewed gender 
norms and practices.
As a consequence, in order to assess whether this practices can be adequately 
implemented by these culturally diverse member states, the organizational learning model 
proposed here will take these aspects under consideration and establish a framework of 
analysis that considers the differences between learning and transformation and 
emphasize organizational agency in the establishment of international practices. 
Departing from Adler's definition of international practice as socially meaningful 
patterns of actions competently affecting the environment, we consider the end of an 
organizational learning process as the successful institutionalization o f international 
practices through an IO.
The model
As previously discussed learning is a two-level process, the last of which involves 
organization transformation with the acceptance of changes in the core values of the 
organizational culture by all member states. However, the completion of a learning 
process does not require second-level learning to happen. In fact, organizational 
transformation is an extremely rare phenomenon heavily dependent on membership and 
context.
This section will thus focus on first-level learning, or the process through which a 
new international practice is created, disseminated and institutionalized within an IO. It 
can be divided in five different but complementary phases: organizational dysfunction, 
re-examination, minimum consensus, institutionalization and dissemination.
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Organizational dysfunction
Every IO has a set of well-defined aims, strategies and actions designed to 
effectively accomplish those goals. Occasionally, changes in the environment in which 
IOs operate provoke the rise o f a new set of problems or the re-modeling of old ones. 
These changes often lead to a mismatch between the existing set of strategies and actions 
available and the challenges brought about by the new problem. This mismatch will be 
reflected in the IO's inability to put forward an adequate solution, rendering the system 
dysfunctional and trigging a process of re-examination of rules, procedures, strategies 
and actions available.
Re-examination
This is the process by which IO staff and member-states' representatives re­
examine the existing framework in search for a new and more appropriate one. As rightly 
suggested by Haas, the free flow of ideas from the epistemic community or like-minded 
professionals with the specialized expertise in a particular issue area or problem has been 
identified as a necessary condition for the rise of a suitable solution. Although the 
participation of Haas' epistemic community in the formulation of a new framework of 
action is not necessarily part o f the re-examination phase, it is definitely a contributing 
factor in the search for a framework that can adequately and successfully address the 
challenges of a constantly changing environment.
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Minimum consensus
Because unanimity is almost impossible, learning would be an extremely rare 
phenomenon if dependent on an absolute consensus between all member states, IO staff 
and the epistemic community. Accordingly, a minimum consensus on the proposed 
solution is deemed necessary before it is institutionalized and put into practice. This 
consensus should be reached by a group of states’ representatives, including powerful 
ones, IO staff and members of the epistemic community. If epistemic communities, 
comprised o f like-minded professionals with deep expertise in a given issue area, do not 
agree with the prescribed solution, they may influence opposition. Consequently, it can 
be difficult for consensus to be reached or institutionalization and dissemination initiated 
if the epistemic community disapproves of the proposed solution. The same is true in 
regard to IO staff and member states, particularly the powerful ones that may have other 
resources besides coalitions to stop a proposal from being disseminated and implemented 
in practice.
However, it is important to consider that states do not necessarily place the same 
importance on all issues; it may be the case that some of them do not fully engage in the 
process of finding and agreeing on a new solution and their initial support is not 
necessary. Moreover, it may be the case that their voice is not fully heard if powerful 
states are in favor of the proposal. Finally, under certain conditions, particularly when 
learning refers to practices outside the sphere of interest of powerful states, it may be that 
minimum consensus does not require the support of powerful states. However, these are 
rare occasions, and in any case, learning would have occurred only superficially without 
affecting the core of the organizational culture.
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Institutionalization
Institutionalization refers to the process through which a given practice is 
institutionalized in the organization's structure by being added to the set of existing rules, 
procedures, actions, etc. that governs the organization or by substituting a former one. 
Institutionalization refers to the process of explicitly ingraining the recently acquired 
knowledge into the organization as an integral part of its organizational culture. 
Interestingly, institutionalization occurs before dissemination. As it can be observed from 
the case of gender approaches to peacekeeping, the strong link between normalized 
gender relations and a lasting peace is already embedded in many of the organization's 
documents and doctrines of action even though few member states have adopted 
resolutions provisions.
Dissemination
The final stage of organizational learning, dissemination refers to the process of 
putting into practice the recently agreed solution. As this action is successfully 
implemented, it is then disseminated and reiterated over time and space. Its validity will 
depend on the successful results it generates when applied to similar problems in 
different times and geographical positions.
It is important to emphasize the role of IOs' agency in the process of 
organizational learning. As previously emphasized, most IOs have a Secretariat staffed 
with civil servants that do not work in the name of their national governments but rather 
for the organization. It is this group of individuals that is tasked with the responsibility of 
re-examining the existing framework and coming up with a more adequate one. It is in
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this particular phase that the window of opportunity to create and spread norms in the 
system is the largest. Although a group of member states’ representatives is usually 
selected to either actively participate or simply consult in the re-examination process, it is 
the Secretariat's responsibility, not that o f any particular state, to create a new and more 
adequate framework for future actions.
When states’ unanimous compliance and the differentiated levels of change are 
added to the equation, learning becomes more possible and IOs’ agency more easily 
perceived. This model can be applied for both small and larger organizations; however, in 
the case of the later it is important that lessons learned from field offices are readily 
available for headquarters and vice-versa. Occasionally, it may happen that a learning 
process is not complete because lessons learned from the field do not inform headquarters 
about most appropriate actions and thus it is not replicated in other places, lacking 
institutionalization. This is why a learning feedback loop is necessary.
The following section will discuss the mechanism through which knowledge is 
transferred and learning can take place in the organization as whole rather than only in 
individual units. The analysis will be based on the notion of a first and second loop 
learning, the latter being the stage when new knowledge becomes lessons learned and are 
transferred to the organization's headquarters and disseminated to other field offices. If 
applicable to other contexts, then learning becomes an integral part of the organization's 
culture and fully integrated into its normative framework and actions.
Learning feedback loop
International organizations are considerably different in terms o f purpose, size, 
procedures and member-states. They can be regional organizations, comprised of
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culturally, politically and socially similar states or larger organizations composed of 
coalitions of diverse states. They can have specific and functional purposes such as 
enhancing economic cooperation in particular issue areas like coal and steel, as was the 
case in the European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC) arrangement o f 1951 between 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, Germany, France and Italy. Or they can be 
comprehensive organizations such as the European Union, which evolved from the ECSC 
and deals with major political, economic and security issues, while enjoying greater 
powers and more encompassing initiatives as illustrated by the adoption of a common 
currency by twelve of its member states.
For this reason, a digression about organizational learning in a large organization 
with regional and/or field offices is necessary. In these cases, learning can become a more 
complex process, especially when initiated at a field or regional office. While field 
offices can accomplish learning on their own, new practices may or may not be 
transferred to the headquarters and, consequently, also used by other units/departments or 
offices. In this context, Lise Moije Howard's analysis about first and second level 
learning can be enlightening.43 She analyzes UN missions that have been considered 
successful in the literature - Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Eastern 
Slavonia and East Timor - and determines that the main factor explaining the missions’ 
success is the presence of first level learning.
The author defines first level learning as individual learning on the field or at 
mission level. An effort is required to understand the local causes of conflict as a ways to 
better address them, and actions to fulfill the mandate are constantly changing based on
43 Howard, Un Peacekeeping in Civil Wars.
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what is learned by UN personnel through their interaction with the local population and 
context. This individual level learning, however, should be translated into a change in the 
structure and strategies ruling the mission, thus affecting other actors within the mission 
and how they interact in that particular environment.
Hence, organizational learning becomes manifest when these lessons learned 
result in organizational procedures, routines strategies, structures and goals. Second level 
learning, is a change in the organization's overall means, structures, and goals at 
headquarters level in response to new understandings of problems and their causes at 
mission level.44
Considering Howard’s understanding of learning as a looped process between the 
field and headquarters, we can easily think about field and headquarter learning as 
comprising first and second loop learning respectively. In other words, first loop learning 
can be understood as the refining of a practice implemented on the field or at another 
regional office, while the second loop learning involves the redefinition of the practice at 
the headquarter level and then transmitted to the other units/departments/offices within 
this same organization.
It is important to notice that in many cases first loop learning may lead to second 
loop learning. Depending on the issue area, problems are identified by regional and field 
offices and quite often they are in better position to advocate for solutions based on the 
reality and conditions on the ground and which may not be entirely known at the 
headquarters. In fact, interviews carried out on the field in the UN peacekeeping 
operations in Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo have shown that field staff and
44 Ibid. p. 19
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headquarters do not necessarily agree on a number of issues.45 In fact, field staff usually 
has a much more thorough understanding of conditions on the ground and are thus in 
better position to come up with solutions that are more suitable to that particular context 
and based on the resources they have on the ground.
Digressions about how headquarters procedures cannot be fully employed in the 
context of field peacekeeping operations were also common among interviewees. Often 
called “the bubble”, headquarters may produce procedures and rules that may not be fully 
applicable to the field, especially if they have not been based on information fed by the 
field itself. While field operations follow the overall same underlying assumptions of 
headquarters and frame their actions on the same espoused values following general 
guidelines and strategies formulated by headquarters, at that level, they also have their 
own specific norms which are often more adequate to the challenges they confront on that 
particular context, with their own standard operations procedures, strategies and 
guidelines.
In this context, it is important to maintain a feedback loop between the field 
and/or other regional offices and the headquarters so that practices created at headquarter 
level are well informed, based on the reality on the ground, and have better chances of 
being successful. This feedback loop not only informs headquarters o f positive and 
negative actions, but also comprises an important set of lessons learned that will help the 
institutionalization of a new practice and the completion of a learning process. There are 
several ways through which organizations can establish this feedback loop, including the 
establishment of reporting processes through which field and regional offices send the
45 Interviews were carried out during two extensive field works carried out in Haiti (June/2011 and 
September/2012) and Democratic Republic o f  Congo (February/2012)
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headquarter reports on their activities, and o f monitoring initiatives with headquarters' 
staff visiting and evaluating field activities.
As an illustration, UN peacekeeping practice has a well-established and complex 
process of feedback loop that constantly informs not only the Secretariat but also member 
states at the General Assembly and Security Council of the field activities, lesson-learned 
and challenges.46 Each peace operation has a Special Representative of the Secretary 
General on the field in direct contact with Secretariat in New York, who is also 
responsible for gathering information on the mission's activities and sending it to the 
headquarters periodically. Moreover, mission components -  police, military and civilian 
-  maintain databases on activities, that are sometimes fed daily, and either shared with 
New York or sent through daily reports.
While this is an important practice since it allows headquarters to create adequate 
policies that reflect the reality on the ground and ,most importantly, lessons learned from 
one mission can be passed on to another, it is surprising how so far from reality UN 
documents tend to be. If the gap between the field and headquarters cannot be explained 
by the lack of information, it becomes even more challenging to find out what specific 
factors account to this paradoxical reality. One successful example is the formulation of 
an inventory of best practices to curb sexual violence in peacekeeping settings. 
Nonetheless, even though the inventory comprises an excellent mechanism to transfer 
knowledge and thus facilitate learning, whether or not these lessons learned are actually 
being disseminated is a different story.
46 The most easily available set o f  information compiled through this feedback loop process is the reports o f  
the Secretary General to either the Security Council or to the General Assembly. They can either be on the 
progress o f  implementing certain practices, on specific peace missions, or on the overall activities o f  the 
United Nations as a whole.
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In fact, the different realities and feedback from the field is not always taken into 
consideration in the formulation of new practices. Moreover, the lack of resources in 
some international organizations can be a further challenge in the process of 
organizational learning. Haas' example of turbulent non-growth experienced by the UN 
when the scope of its peacekeeping operations was increased in the 90 's illustrates the 
damage that the absence of a functioning feedback loop between the field and 
headquarters can cause, especially if conjunction to lack of resources. In that situation, 
failures on the ground were not well informed to other missions and mistakes were 
repeated; most importantly though, the grand vision o f a complex peace operation was 
not accompanied by a grand contribution from member states, resulting in dysfunctional 
peace operations that had ample purposes and extremely small resources. Failure then 
should be expected.
This section has shown how the transfer of knowledge occurs in large 
organizations, particularly those that have offices in locations that are different from that 
of the headquarters. This knowledge transfer is part o f the learning process previously 
described and is an extremely important element of organizational learning processes in 
large organizations.
Nonetheless, there is yet another important aspect that ought to be taken into 
consideration. The organizational learning model suggested that only a minimum 
consensus was necessary to have a new practice disseminated throughout the layers of the 
organization and put into practice. In some situations, though, if  practices are to be 
directly implemented by member states rather than Secretariat’s staff, as is the case of 
military troops in peace operations, then learning becomes dependent on those states’
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willingness to implement practices; sometimes, these states were not part of the minimum 
consensus.
Organizational learning vs. organizational transformation
Organizational learning and organizational transformation are two different but 
correlated processes of change. The first feature of transformation is a shift in the 
defining values, and principles of the organization, or the core of its organizational 
culture. Secondly, another main difference between these two processes lies in the degree 
to which states fully adopt learned experience and change themselves and their practices. 
In fact, as previously explained, transformation is the final stage of learning, when the 
learned practice is transmitted and accepted by member states. Not all learning processes 
result in transformation; however, transformation necessarily results from a 
comprehensive learning process.
As described earlier in this chapter, the process of learning proposed here does not 
require a consensus among all member states, although a minimum consensus is always 
necessary before recently acquired knowledge can be put in practice. Indeed, it would not 
be fair to say that the UN, for example, has not learned in terms of a gender approach to 
peacekeeping operations because countries do not comply with the goal of having 10% of 
female peacekeepers on the ground. Not only has the UN Security Council approved a 
number of resolutions in that regard, but training modules, guidelines and new units were 
created with the objective of reaching that goal. Nonetheless, the question of whether or 
not non-state compliance affect UN efforts in peace settings remain and as will be noted 
in the case studies may even hamper positive impact in the field. That is why we 
introduce the concept of organizational transformation, or the ultimate stage of learning.
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In order to further illustrate this point, one can examine the case o f protection of 
civilians, which is the result of a re-evaluation process that has placed the security of the 
individual as the top priority of peace operations. The successful practice o f protection of 
civilians depends on a number of factors, among which are the elaboration o f an adequate 
strategy, the implementation of comprehensive programs that address economic, social 
and security threats to the individual and finally the adequate establishment o f protection 
mechanisms to be implemented by the military component. Taken together, the 
successful implementation of a protection of civilian mandate depends on the hard work 
of the Secretariat staff, of member states’ financial contributions and on a good 
performance of national troops deployed in peace operations worldwide.
Although protection of civilians does constitute a learning process that had almost 
universal consensus about its importance and has been repeatedly transferred from one 
operation to the next, it still cannot be counted as an organizational transformation. The 
reason lies primarily on the degree to which states are willing to implement changes in 
their national structure to support transformation. In fact, states such as China and Russia, 
with a clear diplomatic inclination against any clumsy notion of sovereignty, may give 
conditional support to mandates that go against their inclinations. They may evaluate 
their support on a case by case basis rather than conceding universal support. In other 
cases, the implementation of a successful protection of civilians mandate may depend on 
states' willingness to use force and provide troops with adequate training. However, it is 
often the case that states have special memorandum of understanding with the UN that 
does not allow their nationals to get involved in certain types of operations or may not 
provide them with the kind of training required for an adequate job.
85
Most importantly, protection of civilians as a new practice incurs in changes at the 
core of the organization's values and principles. Since its creation, the UN has been the 
depository of sovereign countries. The increasing importance of the individual and the 
spread of norms such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is definitely affecting the 
UN's action on the ground, with peacekeeping operations that are increasingly becoming 
more robust. Although a learning process has been initiated, R2P is not yet a consensual 
practice among member states. In fact, the international community is still quite far from 
a consensus in this particular area.
In these situations, although learning has taken place, a full transformation has 
not. Transformation thus necessarily involves a change at the core o f the organization's 
values and a cross-cultural consensus that would result in change at the national level of 
each member state as well. That is where the co-existence o f politically, culturally and 
economically different member states may impose important obstacles for a successful 
transformation.
IOs with culturally similar states may experience transformation more often than 
those that don't. In cases such as that o f the European Union, it may be easier to achieve 
organizational transformation. In this context, the specific rules of each organization and 
the specific subject area where learning took place may affect the degree of difficulty for 
an organization to accomplish transformation.
Organizational transformation is thus a sub-process of organizational learning, or 
its ultimate stage. By differentiating organizational learning and member-states’ learning, 
the process through which international practices are created, disseminated and 
institutionalized through their socialization between states is clarified. Moreover, it also
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explains how organizational transformation can take place, that is, by the acceptance and 
adoption of a new practice by the totality of the membership. This new practice would in 
turn entail changes in the core values of the organization, or those deep rooted underlying 
norms and principles that guide the organization’s action.
However, the presence of certain factors may facilitate or impose further obstacles 
to both process of organizational learning and transformation. They will be analyzed in 
the following section.
Organizational learning lessons learned
There are a number of factors that can influence the occurrence of learning in 
international organizations. Among those, four are the most significant: One, the 
constant flow of ideas between epistemic communities and a given 10; Two, the presence 
of a learning feedback loop between regional/field offices and headquarters; Three, the 
establishment of performance monitoring;47 Fourth and finally, the particular issue area 
where a new practice is to be created. Taken altogether, these factors influence the 
possibility and speed of learning.
As earlier emphasized, the free flow of ideas between epistemic communities and 
the organization is an important step towards generating and refining international 
practices. These experts, having different backgrounds and specific know-how and 
experience on a given issue, will facilitate the creation of an adequate practice, improving 
consensus and enhancing chances of success. At the same time, the presence of opposing 
epistemic communities in the process of generating a new practice may slow down the
47 The idea o f  performance monitoring as a ways to enhance organizational learning was taken from Haas 
and Haas, "Learning to Learn: Improving International Governance." p.271.
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process. In any case, their presence during all phases of organizational learning is only 
beneficial, and also serves as an important source of performance monitoring and re- 
evaluation.
Learning feedback loops further enhance organizational learning processes, 
particularly in large organizations with field/regional offices and headquarters. The 
establishment of information sharing systems and communication mechanisms are 
necessary to maintain a constant flow of information between all o f the organization's 
units. They will inform the Secretariat whether practices have been successfully 
implemented and how performance can be further improved. They will also map the 
exact conditions under which practices are less likely to be effective, while context- 
driven analysis will be able to determine the applicability o f the practice throughout 
space and time.
Performance monitoring is a good way of maintaining a system of checks and 
balance that will readily identify organizational dysfunction and pinpoint the need to 
change. The increased socialization of international practices and upturning consensus 
over their validity may hinder the ability of the organization to identify problems that can 
no longer be adequately solved by the existing set of actions at the organization's 
disposal. It is important that a panel of experts from the epistemic community constantly 
participates in monitoring and revaluation processes, since their expertise and outside 
perspective may facilitate the identification of problematic areas.
Finally, the specific issue area where a new practice is to be generated may also 
impose further obstacles or contrarily facilitate learning. Interestingly, most IR literature 
on organizational learning deals with environmental issues, indicating that there is a
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niche within that particular area that has attracted scholars’ attention. Indeed, many have 
determined that certain organizations have learned, such as the United Nations 
Environment Program and the World Bank. The absence o f writing on organizational 
learning on other issues can be evidence of the challenges for learning when applied to a 
given field. In fact, according to Haas and Haas, ecology, natural sciences and 
engineering are areas where learning can easily occur, while in economics, social science 
and law, learning is extremely challenging. The authors' explanation points to the 
absence of a strong epistemic community within the last group. Despite the challenges 
posed by the area of social science to the development of new practices, a their lack of 
institutionalization, is not due to the absence of epistemic communities but to the nature 
of the subject matter that may be controversial and render a minimum consensus difficult 
to be achieved.
To conclude this section, an important consideration regarding 10 membership is 
necessary. As analyzed earlier, the specific cultural and political characteristics of 
member states is an important feature within IOs. They can affect the process of 
organizational transformation, since it can be extremely difficult to achieve unanimous 
consensus and have states implement new practices if they are culturally and politically 
diverse. However, the existence of cultural, ideological and political chasm between 
member states may hinder the process of organizational learning as well. In some cases, 
there might be coalitions of opposing states battling to foster their own causes within IOs, 
seriously hampering the organization's ability to achieve even a minimum consensus.
The purpose o f this sub-section was to provide readers with some factors that can 
impact learning and transformation processes. Although they are not triggers of learning,
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they form an important set of conditions that may hinder the process of learning if not 
taken under consideration. In the current international system, where the context tends to 
change frequently, new sets of problems are continuously generated. It is important for 
organizational survival that they are able to learn and change in order to comply with the 
imperatives of this constantly changing international order.
Conclusions
The model of organizational learning laid out in this chapter supports the 
differentiations between organizational and member states’ learning, and between 
organizational learning and transformation. This differentiation was necessary in order to 
assess the argument that member states inability to adopt gender policies themselves 
negatively affect UN's actions in peacekeeping settings.
As it was shown, learning is an evolving process that may be triggered either by 
environmental-driven forces or by agents o f change, such as member states, 10 staff and 
members of the epistemic community. The initial phase is the identification o f a problem 
and the organization's inability to solve it with the available practices, which leads to the 
subsequent phases of re-examination and the generation of a new practice, the search for 
a minimum consensus amongst member states, and finally the institutionalizations and 
dissemination of the new practice.
Organizational transformation refers to the process through which changes in 
deep-rooted values, principles and goals of the organization have been shifted and 
accepted by member states. This is an extremely rare phenomenon, dependent on the 
organization's ability to achieve cross cultural and ideological consensus. It also points to
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the existence of a fundamental problem with the organization's raison d'etre, since it 
refers to a change in the core of its organizational culture.
The analysis of these processes is essential to understanding the current process of 
learning and transformation that the United Nation is passing through. This chapter 
provided the framework of analysis central to the argument o f this dissertation, that is, 
that the UN's gender approach to PKO is part of a learning process centered in the 
increasing importance of the individual in detriment of the state. Since its creation, 
sovereignty has been one of UN's crowning principles. The focus on sovereignty was 
translated into the principle of non-intervention and a focus on traditional security issues 
that are mostly concerned with the state and its survival. It reflected the historical 
moment that marked the creation of the United Nations.
Throughout the years, though, environmental-driven forces have forced the UN to 
adapt to a new context. The changing nature of conflicts and threats indicated that 
individuals living within the states were bearing the brunt of suffering. As a consequence, 
new norms and practices were generated in order to better address the needs of those 
whose rights have been violated.
The discussion of gender as an integral component of PKO is part of this 
changing security environment. It comes from the recognition that modem day conflict 
affects women, girls, men and boys differently and is concerned about addressing these 
specific needs accordingly. Within a renewed normative framework, where protection of 
civilians is a top priority and peace can only be accomplish with social development and 
societal healing, gender in PKO became central in most of UN documents in the field of 
international peace and security.
The subsequent chapters will show the gender approaches were incorporated and 
their main challenges in field missions. Chapter three will focus on the development of 
protection of civilian norms and on when and how gender was included as an integral 
part of that process. Chapters four and five, will analyze the two case studies, pinpoint the 
initiatives on the ground that reflect this learning process and evaluate how successful 
they have been so far. Finally, chapter six will analyze the possibilities o f further 
advancing this issue and the future o f gender in PKO as an international practice.
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CHAPTER 3 
FROM EVOLVING NORMS TO INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES: 
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING AND GENDER APPROACHES
United Nations' learning process in incorporating a gender perspective as an 
integral part of peacekeeping practices was generated due to three main factors: the 
evolving norms focused on the individual, in particular human security; the establishment 
of protection of civilians mandated operations with comprehensive protection strategies 
that consider physical and structural vulnerabilities of individuals; and finally, the 
surfacing norms focused on gender equality. Despite drawbacks due to the co-existence 
of different cultural approaches to problems such as discrimination, women's rights and 
violence against women, the UN has consolidated an important normative and legal 
framework as essential embryonic inputs to the dissemination of gender-based 
international practices in the security domain.
As previously shown, organizational learning occurs when the organization 
identifies a mismatch between its actions and their subsequent impact in the field and as a 
consequence, searches for renewed practices that may improve their response on the 
ground. Throughout the years, as international security environment changed, the UN's 
practices in peacekeeping settings had to incorporate new functions and shift the focus of 
its approach from the state to the individual. While protecting civilians is a trend in 
current peacekeeping operations, it confronts major challenges since the centrality of the 
state is still a major feature of its organizational culture. It is in this context, that the
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consideration of specific women's needs in the context of war became not only important 
for the organization, but the basis for founding a lasting peace.
Although the United Nations has been concerned with sex discrimination from its 
inception,1 it was only after the elapse of half a century that women's issues would be 
considered within the sphere of peace and security, at the core of the organization's 
raison d'etre. The normative progress in addressing the different impact that complex 
emergencies and conflicts have on women and girls and the new gender-sensitive 
practices in peace operations gained attention with the securitization of sexual violence 
and the increasing consensus that it has been used as a tool of war. In this regard, the 
unremitting efforts of women's organizations was central to bring the issue to the UN 
main executive body, the Security Council. They also formed the backbone of UN 
progress in areas related to women's issues and gender based approaches.
The feminization of poverty, illiteracy and war casualties is a reality. Not only do 
more women die as a consequence of war,2 they also comprise 60% of worldwide 
refugees and 70% of IDP populations.3 Consequently, it is imperative that policies 
explicitly address the special needs of the different gender groups.
The disproportionate victimization of women in particular in terms of sexual and 
other gender based violence is a reality that needs to be dealt with. While a rights-based 
or needs-based approach to conflict is necessary, the return to peace invariably means the
1 United Nations, "Charter o f  the United Nations", October 24, 1945, 
http ://www.un. org/en/documents/charter/.
2 See for example: Patrick Meier and Helga Hemes Christin Ormhaug, "Armed Conflict Deaths 
Disaggregated by Gender," in A Report fo r  the Norwegian Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs (Oslo: PRIO, 2009 ); 
Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset o f  Battle 
Deaths," European Journal o f  Population 42(2005); Human Security Report Project, "The Shriking Costs 
o f War," in Human Security Report (Vancouver: HSRP, 2010).
3 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Returnees, 
Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons", June 15, 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/4cl If0be9.html.
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return to the gender status quo, prior to conflict, irrespective of the roles and gains 
afforded to women during conflict.4 Hence, reconstruction efforts must also be concerned 
with the normalization of unfair gender relations that destabilize societies, social fabrics 
of communities and families and ultimately undermines peace process.
As a result o f this concern, throughout the 90 's, and especially after 2000, the UN 
organized events and elaborated resolutions that would deal with the problem of gender 
in war. Urging member states to provide more female uniformed personnel, granting 
gender training to peacekeepers and staff, and establishing the relationship between 
sexual violence and a lasting peace, the United Nations gave an important step toward 
improving its capacity to respond to these threats.
In order to analyze this evolution, this chapter will be divided in three main 
sections. The first will discuss the normative context that opened the way for the 
consideration of women's special needs in conflicts as part of the organization's efforts to 
attain international peace and security. Since its creation, the UN has been the main 
venue and sponsor of human rights. The evolution of norms focused on individual's 
rights was transposed to the security area through the concept of human security that 
shifted the referent of security from the state to the individual and put the same security 
apparatus at their service. Peace operations have become more robust and mandates 
expanded to include protection of civilians as a top priority. Military force was no longer 
the primary means to accomplish peace; democracy, human rights and humanitarian
4 While a needs-based approach prioritizes social and material needs, the rights-based approach focuses on 
political reorganizations (human rights, justice, equality, elections, pluralism, participation). The literature 
however tends to emphasize that conflict opens up the possibility o f  empowering women and effecting 
structural social transformations and reproducing new social, economic and political realities that redefine 
gender and caste hierarchies. See, for example: Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen, The Aftermath: Women in 
Post-War Transformation.
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assistance would become important dimensions of UN's strategy to enhance individual's 
security.
The second section focuses on the surfacing norms focused on women's rights 
and its status in international politics. Initially focused on economic and political rights, 
the international women's movement grew stronger and managed to transform certain 
issues, such as violence against women, that were previously treated as a private matter 
into an international concern. When women's issues entered the human rights arena, it 
took advantage of the development o f international defined parameters and monitoring 
mechanisms that further facilitated the universalization of their rights. The increasing 
concern to women's issues and the rampage reality of the use of sexual violence in 
conflicts led the UN to finally consider it as a matter of security and initiate a learning 
process that would culminate with the adoption o f gender approaches to peace operations.
The third section will focus on the specific framework developed by UN 
resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, which constitute the normative background 
o f this learning process. While they reflect a learning process through which new 
international practices were introduced to UN peacekeeping practice, they also suffered a 
major implementation gap. The cultural differences between states and organizations 
within the UN constituted the primary obstacle for the full incorporation of a gender 
perspective on the ground.
In a nutshell, this chapter will show what factors led the UN to initiate a learning 
process and how it has been developed thus far. While the increasing importance for 
individual's concern, women's issues and war-related sexual violence are important 
factors that account for the unleashing of the process, the continuous cooperation
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between the UN and civil society organizations contemplated the generation of an 
important normative framework.
United Nations organizational culture and evolving human rights norms
The transformation of international conflicts and the changing nature of threats 
led the United Nations to question its own earlier approaches to promote peace and 
international security. Peace operations worldwide were no longer dependent on state 
consent; they often became humanitarian interventions, done in the name of the citizens 
whose governments were unable or unwilling to provide their basic needs or purposely 
violating their rights. This shifting paradigm came along the dissemination of human 
rights norms that elevated the importance of the individual in detriment of the states. In 
this context, a specific gender approach to peace operations was also put into practice. As 
a matter of fact, gender started to be considered as an integral component of 
peacekeeping practice.
In order to comprehend this process and the challenges it entails, understanding 
UN organizational culture is central. Since its creation, the UN has been the arena of 
continuous disputes between states and of various attempts to foster national interests 
internationally. Nonetheless, the UN has also been the scenario to the development of 
great ideas that were disseminated to member states and adopted internationally as central 
practices and norms to guide politics amongst nations. The presence of these two worlds 
within the UN is an important aspect of the organization's culture. Indeed, it is this 
remarkable feature that explains the concomitant advances and drawbacks in the advance 
of a gender approach as a consensual practice to peace operations.
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While placing individuals as the main object of security have not reached a cross- 
cultural consensus amongst member states, within the UN the norm of “responsibility to 
protect” has the support o f some major member states, resulting in peace operations with 
broader mandates and centered on protection of civilians. This section will thus explain 
UN's organizational culture and how the rising norm of human security has been 
translated into renewed peacekeeping mandates focused on protection of civilians.
Organizational culture: sovereignty vs. human rights
Understanding UN's organizational culture is a necessary step not only to 
understand how a learning process can take place within the organization but also to 
establish a lower critical threshold when determining the importance of international 
organizations as norm socializing actors. The single most important feature of UN's 
organizational culture is its dual composition, being at the same time the arena where 
states battle to foster their own national interests, and by another the showground where 
ideas aimed to solve the world's common problems are generated.
This internal division in UN's composition has been noted before. In 1996, Inis 
Claude's influential piece on UN's internal division influenced the rise o f analyses that 
conceived the organization as composed by two separate entities with different 
capabilities and purposes. (Claude 1996)5 The first UN was formed by the battalion of 
civil servants and the Secretary General, who work under the UN flag supposedly to 
provide impersonal and neutral judgment on various issues. The second UN, on its part, 
was comprised by the states and comprised the arena where they battled to advance their
5 Inis L. Claude, "Peace and Security: Prospective Roles for the Two United Nations," Global Governance 
2, no. 3 (1996). p.291
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own agenda or to cooperate in the search for partnerships and common solutions for 
shared problems.6
The strong presence of these two worlds within the organization is often 
translated into often irreconcilable practices and principles. In no area this is truer than in 
international peace and security where the legacy of state sovereignty translates into the 
principle of non-intervention and territorial inviolability, and the surfacing norms of 
human rights into the use of force to protect civilians. In other words, the organization is 
the arena where the triumph and recast of state sovereignty has taken place.7 While it is 
true that the dissemination of human rights norms and the emergence of concepts such as 
that of human security and human development has dislocated the focus from the state to 
the individual, the strong presence of states throughout UN's history still raise doubts of 
whether or not the organization is able to act impartially during circumstances where 
gross violations of human rights have been identified. The UN's behavioral record in 
contrast shows that Westphalian features remain a strong part of UN's character and 
politics.
The implications of UN's dual composition character becomes evident when 
states act in the reassurance of their rights. From the very beginning, the founding fathers 
of the UN created a structure that would accommodate the interests o f World War II 
winner states and included principles that would ultimately protect them. Since the 
League of Nations failed due to lack of effectiveness and protection mechanisms to major
6 The international civil service is a legacy o f  the League o f  Nations. According to Weiss, Carayannis and 
Jolly (2009), UN staff comprise 55,000 civil servants, excluding another 20,000 that work for the 
specialized agencies, the 100,000 temporary staff in peace operations and 15,000 short-term employees at 
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group.
7 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty : Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1999).
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states' interests, the UN would have a powerful executive body, the Security Council, 
where the Big-5 with veto power could participate in the emerging liberal order while 
maintaining their status quo. Under this premise, sovereignty and non-intervention were 
at the core of the organization's principles.
These, however, were not the only principles that were celebrated in San 
Francisco. Human rights and gender equality were discussed and included in the Charter, 
being part of the new organizations espoused values from its foundation. The atrocities 
committed during the Second World War contributed to a growing sentiment that the new 
order should be built on the respect of human rights. Although 1948 resulted in a 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights rather than an International Bill containing clear 
actions to curb gross violations of individuals' rights, it constituted the first 
internationally organized effort to improve life conditions of worldwide citizens.
Throughout the years, due to increasing assertiveness on the part of the Secretary 
General and the influence o f civil society organization, human rights assumed a 
prominent space within the UN.8 In fact the UN has been the main venue and sponsor of 
various human rights conferences, covenants and treaties. The Declaration would be 
complemented by two covenants, several conventions and multiple conferences that 
further enhanced the dissemination of human rights on a variety of issues including
8 The increasing influence o f  civil society organizations, experts and scholars within the UN led some 
authors to re-evaluate Claude's analysis o f  the two UNs and include a third one. The third UN would then 
be comprised o f  nongovernmental organizations, independent commissions, experts, consultants, scholars 
and other group o f individuals that engage with the first and the second UN influencing their priorities, 
policies, ideas and ultimately, their actions. It is formed by like-minded professionals from different 
backgrounds that provide their expertise on a number o f  issues, coming close to Hass' epistemic 
communities. They have played a significant role in the development and promotion o f  UN's current ideas, 
lobbying for them and influencing public opinion. See: Thomas Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, and Richard 
Jolly, "The Third United Nations," Global Governance 15, no. 1 (2009).
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torture, genocide, racism, sex discrimination, minorities and children.9 Interestingly, 
groups that have traditionally been excluded from rights-based considerations, such as 
minorities, women and children, gained their own space and experienced an important 
expansion and international diffusion.10
The UN also created a supporting structure to further enhance the monitoring and 
standardization of states behavior in defending individual's rights, including the early 
creation of the Commission of Human Rights (1947), the Office of the High 
Commissioner of Human Rights (1993) and the Human Rights Council (2006), that 
substituted the first. Despite intense criticism to the actual efficacy of the Commission 
and most recently the Council, it is important to note the role that the special rapporteurs 
had not only in promoting new ideas and understanding of human rights and its 
protection, but also calling attention to states that were not complying with 
internationally established behavioral norms and often unleashing actions.
A final piece o f evidence of the development o f human rights and how these laid 
the foundations for a shift in the focus of international politics towards the individual is 
the creation of Special Tribunals (former Yugoslavia and Rwanda), the signing of the 
Rome Statute in 1998 and the creation of the International Criminal Court that came into
9 Universal Declaration o f  Human Rights (1948), Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f  the 
Crime o f  Genocide (1951), Convention Relating to the Status o f  Refugees (1954),Convention on the 
Elimination o f  All Forms o f  Racial Discrimination (1964), International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1976), International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1976), Convention on the 
Elimination o f  Discrimination Against Women (1981), Convention Against Torture (1987), Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples Convention (1989), Convention on the Rights o f  the Child (1990),International Convention 
on the Protection o f  the Rights o f  All Migrant Workers and Members o f  Their Families (2003), Convention 
on the Rights o f  Persons with Disabilities (2007), International Convention for the Protection o f  All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance (2010).
10 For a complete account on the UN role in generating human rights norms and mechanisms o f  protection, 
see: Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, Human Rights at the Un: The Political History o f  Universal Justice, 
United Nations Intellectual History Project Series (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2007).
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force in 2002. Its main importance lies in the criminalization of human rights violations 
and the establishment of international mechanisms to punish those responsible for these 
atrocious acts.
The linkages between individuals' security and that o f the state would later be 
established by the concept of human security, further enhanced by the linkage between 
these two and development. Despite UN's occasional difficulties implementing actions to 
better protect the individual, the organization has been the arena where central concepts 
and ideas to improve the life conditions of billions have been generated and slowly 
disseminated to member states.
Human security: the theoretical base to protect the individual
The UN's goal to foster cooperation between states, serve as “an impartial 
broker” and as the main engineer in the construction of new norms and patterns of 
behavior is the most debatable of its features. Critics pertaining to varied theoretical 
strands have emphasized its limitations particularly when confronting member-states 
unwillingness to cooperate and adapt to these emerging international concerns.11 On the 
other hand, the organization's focus on civilian issues in attempt to improve social and 
economic indicators along with the security situation is underlined by theorists as an 
undeniable contribution from the worlds' organization.12
UN's ideational role in promoting the individual is at the core of this 
dissertation's argument. In fact, it has been the renewed emphasis on the humanization of
11 These theoretical strands are mostly associated with realism and neo-realism.
12 Constructivist authors have been particularly adamant on the organization's contribution in terms o f  
knowledge and ideas.
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development, security and the establishment of protection mechanisms centered on the 
everyday lives of individuals that laid the foundation for the consideration o f specific 
women's rights and needs. The incorporation of a gender approach as an integral part of 
peacekeeping practices and of peace processes is an interconnected process based on a 
comprehensive protection strategy that encompasses the central aspects of both human 
development and human security concepts.
The appearance of these two concepts in UN's discussions is not recent. In fact, as 
rightly argued by Macfarlane and Khong13, ideas related to human security are as old as 
the Westphalia order itself. It was only with the changing context that these flourished at 
the end o f the 20th century. At the core o f human security's concept is the idea that states 
are responsible for the security o f its citizens. The establishment of sovereignty and the 
principle of non-intervention in 1648 had as the objective to impede other nations from 
intervening in the domestic affairs of other nations, particularly in regard to how these 
nations treated its own citizens. However, by linking states' security with states' 
responsibility over the lives of their own citizens, Westphalia itself opened the possibility 
for what centuries later was enunciated as the “responsibility to protect” and which led to 
a recast -  though not consensual -  of the meaning of sovereignty.
Concerns in regard to the individual and its protection were further enhanced 
through International Humanitarian Law, in particular the four Geneva Conventions that 
attempted to protect the wounded, prisoners of war and non-combatants. International 
law regarding minorities, refugees and workers, along with the mechanisms to protect 
them, are also important pre-UN initiatives that supported framing the individual as an
13 MacFarlane and Khong, Human Security and the Un: A Critical History, p.6-7
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important referent of security. However, it is undeniable that although the germination of 
ideas that led to the concept o f human security were incubated outside the UN, it was 
through the organization's multiple forums o f discussions between states, epistemic 
communities and Secretariat that the concept was embedded in norms and ideas, 
protection mechanisms created and practices disseminated.
As previously discussed, the UN was the main venue for the development of 
human rights norms and mechanisms of monitoring and implementation, as expressed in 
the series of Covenants, treaties and conventions sponsored by the organization. In 
addition to this aspect, the UN has also been the arena of fruitful creations, such as the 
concepts of human development and human security itself, especially through the work 
of United Nations Development Fund (UNDP) reports, and Secretary General incisive 
actions, all in the pursuit o f a space for the individual in international negotiations.
The linkage between development and security was an important step towards a 
more comprehensive approach to causes of conflicts and better ways to address it. Human 
development, expressed in UNDP's first human development report in 1990, first 
connected development with issues beyond the economic development of the state, such 
as education, mortality levels, life expectancy, etc.14 Most importantly, was the 
advancement of the notion that what counts is not so much the national aggregate, but 
“individual quality of life and capacity of individuals and communities to exercise control 
over their lives”.15
14 United Nations Development Fund, "Human Development Report 1990" (New York; Oxford: UNDP, 
1990).
15 MacFarlane and Khong, Human Security and the Un: A Critical History, p. 11
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The humanization of development referred to the process through which statist
development perspectives were substituted by others focused on the individual family
and community needs, incurring in the reorientation o f public policies related to welfare
and economic development of the state. This renewed understanding has merged the
discussions on human development and security. In fact, the core of the debate on human
security revolves around development and protection, making the differentiation between
these two instances somewhat artificial, especially in conflict settings.16
As emphasized in UNDP's Human Development Report 1994, the concept of
security was leveled down to the level of the individual and incorporated important
aspects of human development:
For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about 
their daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Will their 
families have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets 
and neighborhood be safe from crime? Will they be tortured by a 
repressive state? Will they become victim o f violence because of their 
gender? Will their religion or ethnic origin target them for persecution?17
In this context, there was also an increasing consensus on the link between 
development and security. In fact, as early as 1992, Boutros Boutros Gali, then Secretary 
General of the United Nations, had already brought attention to the pervasive effect of 
war on the population and to its sources as deeply rooted in the society itself, including 
social, economic and political instability.18 As a strategy to accomplish international 
peace he was the first to propose the curtailment of sovereignty and a comprehensive
16 Ibid., p. 141
17 United Nations Development Fund, "Human Development Report 1994" (New York; Oxford: UNDP, 
1994).
18 United Nations Secretary General, "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping", January 31, 1992, http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf.
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peacekeeping strategy that addresses economic, social and political development of
states. As emphasized by Boutros Boutros Ghali:
The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed (...)
It is the task of leaders of States today to understand this and to find 
balance between the needs of good internal governance and the 
requirements of an ever more interdependent world. Commerce, 
communications and environmental matters transcend administrative 
borders; but inside those borders is where individuals carry out the first 
order o f their economic, political and social lives.19
Hard hitting speeches on the concept of sovereignty and the need to respond to 
atrocities within member states with or without its consent continued during Kofi 
Annan's tenure. Following the “humanization” o f security and its linkage with 
development, there was an obvious shift away from an exclusive military approach to the 
safety of states. Not only did the safety of states depend on factors beyond traditional 
military power, state security was increasingly related to that of its citizens; and thus to 
the four elements of sovereignty defined in the 1934 Montevideo Convention 
(population, territory, government, and international recognition) to which a fifth would 
be added, the responsibility to protect its own citizens.
As part of the work of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, the 2001 report “The Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) encompasses the 
essential dichotomy present within the UN. Claiming that it is the responsibility o f the 
international community to intervene when states are unwilling or unable to protect its 
own citizens, this emerging norm puts the protection of individual rights at the top of 
UN's priorities and is in striking opposition to the traditional notion of sovereign and its 
accompanying principles of territorial inviolability and non-intervention.
19 Ibid.
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The innovative feature of R2P lies in the implementation of a mechanism to 
enforce the protection of human rights. The use of force, initially envisage as a ways to 
protect states’ territorial and political independence was now being urged as a means to 
accomplish the protection of the populations living therein. Despite its promises though, 
R2P has been the objective of serious critics, especially in regard to the selective 
character o f its intervention that seem to fulfill a more national agenda of member states 
rather than the need of individuals whose rights were being violated. Finally, within the 
global south, countries have even developed alternative views of the R2P, such as 
Brazil's Responsibility while Protecting (RwP),20 that emphasizes non-coercive measures 
to protect civilians as a ways to avoid the legitimization of unilateral policies in the name 
of the broader international community interests.
As the analysis has shown, the UN's organizational culture is characterized by its 
dual composition and the presence of dichotomous principles at the core o f its espoused 
values. In fact, the perpetual mismatch between the first and second UNs is fully 
represented in the occasional instances where the organization remains gridlocked. In no 
other area this is truer than in the intersection between the intervention with the use of 
force and human rights. Although the development of human rights norms has initiated a 
process of institutional learning, one in which the individual is placed before the state, it 
is probable that this learning process will remain incomplete and occur at a different pace 
throughout UN's member states. Trouble with the universalizing of human rights and 
selective use o f robust measures to protect rights are recurring features of UN's actions in 
this area.
20 Department o f  Peacekeeping Operations and Department o f  Field Support, "Operational Concept on the 
Protection o f  Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations."
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The incorporation of a gender approach to peace operations is directly related to 
this discussion and as such suffers from the same illness. Different interpretations within 
member states in regard to human rights and the priority given to women's rights 
translates into an unequal learning process. As much as UN's recast of sovereignty is still 
underway, so are the protection mechanisms to protect individuals and the ideas that 
incorporate gender as a cross-cutting element in all UN activities, and in particular in the 
pursuit o f a lasting peace.
Multi-dimensional peacekeeping and protection o f  civilians
“Changing ideas, to the extent that they are meaningful, are rooted in changing 
realities.”21 The evolving norms focused on the individual and the formulation of 
mechanisms to guarantee individual's safety was the result of changes in the international 
environment. The changing nature of conflicts and threats are amongst the main 
contextual transformations that generated the need to change and the initiation of an 
inquiry process through which new practices were created.
94% of all armed conflicts fought in the 90 's comprised civil wars with a 90% 
rate of civilian death rate as a consequence of deliberate warfare strategy of targeting 
civilians.22 As a result, the UN's approach changed. From 1948 to 1988 peacekeeping 
operations had only two functions -  observe peace through the monitoring and reporting 
of cease fire and keep peace through the establishment of buffer zones and zones of
21 Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions o f  
1965, Princeton Paperbacks (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). p.3
22 Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict.
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disengagement.23 Throughout the years though, the UN incorporated a new strategy for 
managing the problem of civil unrest and state failure: deliver humanitarian assistance, 
protect civilians and re-build failed or collapsed states.
This first effort to deal with this new set of problems was the so called “second 
generation” of peacekeeping operations. Initially, however, as argued by Haas,24 these 
were not accompanied by a thorough process of re-examination and devolved into a 
disorganized practice with wide encompassing mandates, limited resources and no clear 
purpose or rules of engagement. After major failures and with the important intellectual 
contribution of the Secretary General and Secretariat staff, renewed norms were 
introduced and peace operations were backed by an institutional and normative 
framework that supported actions on the ground. What was previously an effort to outwit 
the Security Council's inability to act during the Cold War gridlock, became UN's central 
effort in the terrain of peace and international security. Peace operations would only grow 
in number, budget, size and functions.
The increase in peacekeeping activities was impressive. From 1948 to 1978 a total 
number of 13 peacekeeping operations were established. In the following period (1978- 
1988), no operation was authorized and it was only after the 90 's that new peace missions 
were authorized by UN's Security Council.25 In fact, the number o f authorized peace 
operations tripled in the following decade. (Michael W. Doyle 2006)26 Evidence that the 
permanent members of the Security Council were more agreeable is the fact that four
23 Richard Jolly, Louis Emmery, and Thomas George Weiss, Un Ideas That Changed the World, United 
Nations Intellectual History Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).
24 Haas, When Knowledge Is Power: Three Models o f  Change in International Organizations.
25 Jolly, Emmerij, and Weiss, Un Ideas That Changed the World, p. 173
26 Nicholas Sambanis Michael W. Doyle, Making War and Building Peace (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2006). p.6
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times more resolutions were approved while the amount of sanctions authorized 
increased seven times. Most impressively, the peacekeeping budget skyrocketed from 
230 million before the 90 's to 3.6 billion at the turn of the century.27
Since 1948, a total of 67 DPKO led operations have been established, 14 of those 
are ongoing.28 As of January 2013, total of around 111,880 field personnel are spread in 
the UN peace operations around the world.29 Amongst those, 92,968 are uniformed 
personnel (80,764 are military and the other 12,204 are police), and 18,912 are civilians 
(international staff comprising 5,082, local staff 11,748 and the UN volunteers 2,082).30 
While all 193 member states contribute one way or another, either with staff, equipment 
or funds, 114 of those contribute with uniformed personnel.31 Most impressively the 
current peacekeeping budget recently reached 7.3 billion.32
The expansion of peace operations meant that previously simple functions carried 
out by lightly armed soldiers would give place to complex and multidimensional tasks. 
Some of these tasks include organization of elections and carrying out of elections, 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration (DDR), training and organizing 
security and defense institutions, in addition to supporting government structures in areas 
such as rule of law, human rights and development, amongst others.
This comprehensive approach to peace operations not only responds to the new 
logics of conflicts but is also in accordance to the precept of human security.
27 Ibid.
28 Data available at DPKO's statistics section. See: Department o f  Peacekeeping Operations, “
Peacekeeping Fact Sheet,” 03/18/2013,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.shtml.
29 Ibid.
30 t u : a
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Increasingly, peace operations' focus was shifted from the state to the well-being of the 
individuals living within them. Conflict negotiations and reconstruction programs became 
concerned with the root causes o f conflicts and the strengthening of states institutional 
ability to function properly and provide adequate living conditions for its citizens.
Under this premise, the structure of peace operations became more complex, 
mandates focused on protection of civilians and personnel would no longer be solely 
comprised of “boots on the ground”, but also professional and expert civilians hired by 
the Secretariat. As the peace operations themselves, protection strategies would depend 
on an integrated and comprehensive approach, centered on physical and structural 
vulnerabilities of individual human beings. The focus on the individuals and the 
integrated character of peace operations would become the fundamental features of UN 
contemporary peace operations. These practices alongside the increasing importance of 
human rights considerations and human security perspectives provided an opening and 
set the stage for the introduction of gender approaches to peace operations.
As much as the new practice seemed to be in accordance to the changing nature of 
conflicts and threats, critical literature on the UN's actions piles up. The UN failure's to 
avoid a sequence of massacres during the 90 's has led the organization to rethink its 
mandate in peace operations. The genocides and horrific attacks against civilians in 
Rwanda, Srebrenica, Bosnia, etc, has brought the international community to a halt; the 
status, vulnerability, significance and role of civilians in modem conflicts have changed.
When belligerents terrorize the population by attacking them, raping the women 
and volunteering kids as child soldiers, civilians are no longer collateral damage, they are 
the target and an important audience to conquer. As fights and battles get closer and
I l l
closer to home, capturing the hearts and minds of the population has never been more 
important. In the age of communication, building and maintaining global and local 
legitimacy is a necessary condition to achieve strategic goals. The impact o f conflicts on 
civilians is vital: not only have they moved from the sidelines to being the cornerstone of 
military operations, they are also a critical factor determining strategic outcomes, and 
thus the need to transform.
Committed to improving its response to the atrocities committed in contemporary 
warfare the UN embarked in a process of inquiry and search for best approaches to peace 
operations. In 1998, former Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan urged 
the international community to pay closer attention to ways through which the UN could 
ensure that the civilian population is protected from atrocities and human rights violations 
during conflicts. The logic was that if  the UN is to protect civilians, then its peace 
missions ought to have a mandate that supports these actions. And so, in 1999, the United 
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was authorized to “take the necessary 
action... within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians 
under imminent threat of physical violence.” 33
In this context, the 2000 Report o f the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 
(also known as the “Brahimi Report”)34 offered an in-depth critique of the conduct of UN 
operations and provided a series of recommendations to improve previous failures. In 
summary, the report emphasized the establishment of peace operations with clear and 
achievable mandates, an integrated peace operation structure with civilian, police and
33 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1270", October 22, 1999, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/l 270( 1999).
34 The report was named after the Panel chair, UN Under-Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi.
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military components working together and developing complementary and joint tasks, 
and adopting a comprehensive strategy that included actions dedicated to improving the 
security and institutional environment within intervened states.35
Although the Brahimi report provided important benchmarks for the improvement 
of UN actions in conflict and post-conflict settings, it did not provide a definitive answer 
as to how civilians could be better protected.36 Following Kofi Annan's pledge for a new 
normalcy where civilians are protected, and the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect 
during UN's General Assembly in 2005, the normative framework for a protection of 
civilians mandate and the implementation of robust operations was found.37
Bellamy argues that the R2P manages to shift the focus from the intervening 
countries to the host country, and that it plays with the interface between states' 
responsibility as part of its sovereignty and the duty of the international community to 
respond.38 However, putting together the concept of sovereignty and that of human rights 
defense was never consensual, even after the 2011 Libya intervention, when R2P was for 
the first time used to justify military intervention under Security Council Resolution 
1973.
35 For a complete review o f the report, see: William J. Durch et al., "The Brahimi Report and the Future o f  
Un Peace Operations," (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003).
36 Robert Schutte, "Minding Gap: Approaches and Challenges to Robust Civilian Protection Approaches " 
(New York: Friedrich Ebert Stifitung, 2011). p. 2
37 The R2P was only once explicitly used to justify a military intervention when in 2009, under Security 
Council Resolution 1973, military force was authorized to protect civilians in Libya. Operations that 
counted with protection o f  civilians mandate and were established prior to the intervention in Libya, did not 
explicitly use the normative framework provided by R2P. In fact, the United Nations Organization 
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic o f  the Congo (MONUSCO) and the United Nations 
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) are important recent cases where protection o f  civilians is a top priority, 
albeit not authorized under R2P premise.
38 Alex J. Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect: From Words to Deeds (New York: 
Routledge, 2011). p.9
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In fact, although currently 10 out of 17 peace operations authorized by the UN 
have the protection of civilians as part of its mandate, none of which were authorized 
under the explicit “claiming” of R2P. Two of these operations, the United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and United Nations Mission in Darfur 
(UNAMID) have protection of civilians as top priority, and do not use the R2P language.
Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandated peace operations, though, seem to be 
more widely accepted. The main problem is the implementation gap and the absence of a 
shared understanding of what PoC means and how it should be implemented by the 
various actors on the field, namely the military, the humanitarian community and 
international and local political actors, such as mission's senior leadership and host 
government. The absence of a shared understanding about PoC and a comprehensive 
strategy to implement the protection of civilian mandate has caused various missions to 
take different actions with varying results.
It is also important to mention that PoC is extremely dependent on the specific 
context of the host nations. While is certain occasions urban militias are the main threat, 
in others it is armed groups acting under the cover of vast jungles in the heart of Africa. 
As a consequence, PoC strategies require context-driven actions, planned in accordance 
to the specific threats present on the ground. Assessing local populations’ main source of 
vulnerability is also central to a successful PoC strategy. Hence a continuous dialogue 
with the local population and collaborative work with the civilian component is the 
necessary condition for an adequate response.
The analysis shows that traditional peacekeeping no longer holds in the era of 
intrastate conflicts and civilian bloodshed. UN peace operations have become
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multifaceted, multidimensional and more robust. In the absence of a strong and legitimate 
governmental authority, local perspectives regarding the UN troops are fluid and do not 
necessarily resemble that of the government. The kind of challenges imposed to the 
military component are dramatic, not only does their traditional modus operandi need to 
be readapted to include new capabilities and innovative strategies, but they can no longer 
work on their own
In this context, the increasing concern with civilians and crimes committed 
against them including the massacres, disappearances, looting, fire, kidnapping, and 
torture, amongst others, has opened the possibility for the treatment of violence against 
women be dealt with as a matter o f security. Although sexual and other types o f violence 
are common during conflicts - occasionally even a deliberate strategy to undermine 
opponents during war -  these are not included in peace accords are not dealt with during 
pacification and post reconstruction efforts.
For a long time, gender based crimes during war were met with silence (and they 
still are!) and apathy, and very few concrete actions were undertaken by the international 
community to actively engage this particular issue when dealing with matters of peace 
and security. Nonetheless, the advances of the last decades in terms of re-focusing the 
object of security on the individual and adding to the military component functions that 
include the protection of non-combatants, sexual violence was finally recognized as a 
tool of war and a threat to international peace and security.
By placing this renewed focus on this issue, gender issues could be tackled in 
peace operations environment. The adoption of Security Council resolutions attested the 
relationship between security, peace and an environment free of sexual and other gender
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based violence. It also generated a several actions to better implement resolutions' 
provisions: the creation of bodies to promote gender mainstreaming on all UN actions, 
including its protection strategies; the elaboration of training modules, so that the military 
and the police can adequately respond to these crimes on the field; and the adoption of 
comprehensive protection strategies that further legitimizes the complex nature of this 
crime, by reinforcing the need to promote economic development and women's 
empowerment as a ways to improve its vulnerability and better protect them.
Even though the impact of these actions is still limited, they comprise important 
benchmarks when analyzing progress made in the area. The following section will 
discuss how gender considerations and women's rights became central to the UN agenda, 
laying the foundation for the incorporation of a gender approach as an integral part of 
peace operations.
The road to international peace: evolving norms on women's rights
UN's renewed concept o f human security and the focus on peacekeeping 
approaches to protect civilians constituted important steps towards the consideration of 
the specific needs of women and girls in conflict settings. Nonetheless, it was the parallel 
development of norms centered on women's rights, the securitization of the systematic 
use of sexual violence as a tactic of war and the assumption that a lasting peace depends 
on the foundation of more equitable and fairer societies that provided the final push for 
the special consideration of women's issues on the ground.
Based on these surfacing norms of individual's security and protection, women's 
rights' agenda, and gross violations in conflict areas, the UN developed a comprehensive 
gender-sensitive approach to peace operations as a way to better address women's
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vulnerability in mission areas. This strategy is based on gender equality and aims to 
promote equal opportunities for men and women in peace processes as well as to consider 
the specific impacts of different policies for each of the different groups. Although 
gender does not translate automatically into “women's issues”, there is an important 
interface between the two due to the fact that in conflict settings women are the most 
victimized and suffer all types of violence including sexual violence.
The description of how women's rights became central in the UN's agenda along 
with the understanding o f the systematic use of sexual violence as a tool of war are 
central to trace the origins of gender approaches to peace operations. Above all, it was 
only after some women's issues, such as sex discrimination and violence against women, 
entered the human rights arena, that matters that were previously considered private was 
slowly put in the public sphere of the state and were subjected to internationally defined 
parameters to which states should abide. Once this linkage was established and the 
serious consequences of the systematic use of sexual violence clarified, the security 
apparatus was put in service o f this agenda and robust force was accepted as a way to 
stop these acts from happening in mission areas.
Women's rights
As much as the UN has been the main venue for the development of human rights 
internationally, the same is true in terms of women's rights. The UN has been the arena 
where women's organizations have battled for the inclusion of women's issues as a 
special concern and the major sponsor of international instruments to enhance their 
rights. Throughout the UN's history, women's rights advancement passed through 
different phases. While initially focused on economic development and political rights,
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after the 90 's women's issues gained in the human rights arena, and issues such as sex 
discrimination and violence against women became violations of human rights. Aligned 
to UN's focus on individual protection, the development o f women's rights was the main 
venue for its debut in the international security arena.
During the San Francisco Conference, where the UN charter was signed in 1945, 
four women representatives and around 40 civil society organizations managed to include 
a historical reference against sex-discrimination in the founding document o f the United 
Nations.39 The reference comprises an under-looked advancement in the development of 
women's rights, since it was the first time that discrimination on the basis of sex was put 
in an international legal instrument, and differed considerably, from other previously 
established international organizations. IOs had mostly remained silent in regard to the 
existence o f an international minimum standard to the treatment of women's issues and 
considered the subject cultural specific.40
The inclusion of that reference on the Charter was vital to the subsequent creation 
of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW) and the subsequent work developed 
by the organ 41 The first mostly recognized product delivered by the Commission in 
conjunction with ECOSOC was a comprehensive Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against women. Even though the Declaration comprises only an 
aspirational rather than binding law, it was an important step in expressing international
39 On the importance o f  Article 3, and how it was included in the Charter, see: Devaki Jain, Women, 
Development, and the Un : A Sixty-Year Quest fo r  Equality and Justice, United Nations Intellectual History 
Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005); Charlotte Bunch, "Women and Gender," ed.
Thomas Weiss and Sam Daws, The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007); Jolly, Emmerij, and Weiss, Un Ideas That Changed the World.
40 Bunch, "Women and Gender."
41 Before 1987, the Commission would meet only once every other year and counted with the steady 
participation o f  about 30 to 50 NGOs. Over time, though, CSW ’s functions and importance increased, and 
meeting were held more often. By the 90‘s more than 600 NGOs were involved with its activities.(Ibid.)
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parameters on the status of women internationally and which would later be the founding 
basis for the Convention on the Elimination o f Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW).
Women's participation in the economic development of the country and their 
political rights grew stronger throughout the first four decades of UN's creation, with the 
establishment of the “UN Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace” in 
1976 and the four Conventions on Women, carried out in Mexico City in 1975, 
Copenhagen in 1980, Nairobi in 1985 and finally in Beijing in 1995.42 Most importantly, 
these conferences served as a forum where women's organizations could connect with 
governments to push for their agenda and trigger changes at the political level.
These conferences also served for networking and issue linkage.43 While it 
became clear that worldwide women shared some common problems, they also had 
differing agendas, as illustrated by the North/South divide and other divisions caused by 
race and social class considerations. 44 Although these conferences were majorly focused 
on economic and political rights, discussion on subjects that would later become central 
to our discussion, such as violence against women were also present. Participants were 
adamant in reiterating that more attention should be paid to the subject and that the
42 For a detailed account on the development o f  women's rights within the UN See: Jain, Women, 
Development, and the Un : A Sixty-Year Quest fo r  Equality and Justice. A shorter version can be found on 
Bunch, "Women and Gender." and a summary o f  Devaki's findings in Jolly, Emmerij, and Weiss, Un 
Ideas That Changed the World. Chapter 4.
43 Kathryn Sikkink and Margareth Keck underlines the benefit o f networking and issue linkage in book: 
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). Connecting between organizations from the south 
and the north allowed financial flows and strategy that had northern countries' government pressure 
southern governments to adopt accepted human rights norms. Moreover, issue linkage, such as connecting 
women's rights with other issues, such as development, environment, etc, could expand the support for 
specific causes.
44 Bunch, "Women and Gender." p. 487-8
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conference needed to find instruments through which the role of women in peace and 
development was reinforced.
In fact, the Beijing Platform of Action, the resultant document from the Fourth 
Conference on Women carried out in 1995 in Beijing, defined the status of women in 
conflict zones as a critical area where women's rights should be pursued.45 The 
Conference also underlined what is now widely known, but not as much back then, that 
is, civilian casualties in conflicts have outnumbered that of the military and that most of 
those were comprised by women and children.
Other vital contributions of these Conferences was the creation o f organs within 
the UN that would later be central to the placement of women's issues also in the 
international peace and security arena. Amongst these organizations, is the creation of 
United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) in 1976, an agency that 
became central in advancing the women's agenda in the UN and in the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and later in the adoption of 
UNSCR1325.46
The International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women 
(INSTRAW), created in 1980 was yet another cornerstone UN body that provided an 
enormous contribution to the advancement of policies and ideas that no longer defined 
the status of women vis a vis their relation to men, but considering the broader
45 Kathleen R. Kuehnast, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, and Helga Maria Hemes, Women and War: Power and  
Protection in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute o f  Peace Press, 2011). p.l
46 The importance o f  CEDAW cannot be overstated. It provided provisions and spelled out social, 
economic, political and civil rights o f  women in both private and public sphere. Interestingly, although the 
convention has been ratified by 185 countries it also contains the largest number o f reservations.
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implications of global economic, political and social changes and their impact on 
women's lives.
In 1993, during the Vienna Conference, a great success in the women’s rights 
agenda was accomplished, when violence against women was proclaimed a human right 
violation, not a private matter, but one that should be dealt according to internationally 
established parameters. With the establishment o f a Special Rapporteur on Violence 
Against Women after the Conference, an emerging regime with minimum standards 
arose, and although implementation remains a challenge still nowadays, the initiative 
constituted an important step toward the recognition of women's rights as an universal 
human right.47
The issue of violence against women has also been present in other instances. 
From its inception, in 1993, the Office for the High Commissioner o f Human Rights 
(OHCHR) had gender mainstreaming as part of its mandate and as a consequence, most 
of its reports had a separated section on the effects of certain human rights violation for 
women. In the same year, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW). Although the declaration comprised 
a non-binding law, it set standards and identified violence against women in three spheres 
- family, community and state -  further contributing to the “publicization” of a matter 
that has long been considered a private concern 48
These initiatives led UNIFEM to start a trust fund on the elimination o f violence 
against women and implement projects towards that end. While from 1994 to 2006 the
47 It is important to note that within the human rights arena, women's rights present important tensions, 
especially between the principle o f  universality and cultural specificities.
48 Bunch, "Women and Gender." p. 501.
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former Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution on the subject every year, 
from 2006 onwards the Secretary General himself reported to the General Assembly on 
the accomplishments thus far achieved by the organization. The Secretary General's 
involvement with this issue cannot be overstated. From his position he is able to 
influence emerging norms and practices to be adopted by member states. In this regard, 
the creation o f the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary General on Gender 
Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI) was another great step forward. High level 
official reports and policy recommendations were directly sent to the Secretary General.49
As the individual became an important focus for the UN, so did women's issues. 
The 1994 Human Development Report, previously cited as an importance instance 
towards the “humanization” of development, launched the gender-related development 
index, establishing an undeniable link between gender and human development. This link 
would only be reinforced in 2000, during the Millennium Summit, when gender equality 
and empowerment of women became concrete targets of the Millennium Development 
Goals.
Although the formal association between women's rights, violence against 
women and international peace and security would only be established with Resolution 
1325, the earlier connection with development and the establishment of international 
patterns regarding violence against women comprised an important sustaining basis for 
the progressing normative framework on the matter. The final act in terms of gender 
mainstreaming in all UN activities was the creation of the UN-Women, the UN's agency
49 Throughout the years, OSAGI would greatly contribute to the debut o f  gender issues in peace and 
security. The organ served with important leadership on gender mainstreaming issues and on inter-agency 
networks on women and gender equality. Most importantly, an inter-agency task force on women peace 
and security was created as an attempt to understand the effects o f  war on women.
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responsible for placing gender as a cross-cutting issue that should be considered 
throughout all programs implemented by the organization. The UN-Women is a hub of 
gender initiatives as it merged and built on the important work of four previously distinct 
parts of the UN system, which focused exclusively on gender equality and women’s 
empowerment: 1. Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW); 2. (INSTRAW); 3. 
Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI); 
4. United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). The merger of these four 
organizations also meant that a single structure was responsible for promoting gender 
mainstreaming in all UN activities in a more coordinated and effective way.
The implementation gap in terms of women's rights is still a reality and one of the 
most contentious areas where the universality o f human rights is continuously disputed. 
However, it is important to notice how throughout time, the UN served as the main venue 
to the development of a normative framework through the arduous efforts of civil society 
organizations and UN staff committed to the cause. Despite this gap, it is often the case 
that UN documents are the only legal instruments that can be used by local groups when 
attempting to exercise pressure on national governments to accomplish change.
These advances, particularly after women's rights became a central human right 
issue and an integral part of the development effort, are an important foundational basis 
for the consideration of gender in the domain of international peace and security, and 
wartime gender based violence as a threat to peace consolidation processes. The 
following sub-section will thus focus on the main factor that led the consideration of 
gender issues to the Security Council.
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The interface between wartime sexual violence and international peace and security
UN's Analytical and Conceptual Framing of Conflict Related Sexual Violence, 
defines it as:
(...) rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence... against women, men, 
girls and boys. Such incidents and pattern occur in conflict or post-conflict 
settings or other situations of concern (e.g. political strife). They also have 
a direct or indirect nexus with the conflict or political strife itself, i.e. a 
temporal, geographical and/or causal link.50
Two important aspects stand out in this definition. First is the important fact that 
it includes sexual violence committed against other gender groups that many resolutions 
leave aside, and secondly it shows the differing aspects of sexual violence. Indeed, the 
level and type of sexual violence varies from conflict to conflict from state to state and 
assuming it is a systematic tool of war in every instance also hampers our ability to 
recognize the contextual specificities that are necessary to generate adequate policies.51 
Although motivations vary, it is often the case that war-time related sexual violence is not 
just a matter of opportunity and throughout history battles were often fought on women's 
bodies as a result of previously existent unequal gender status.52
Using sexual violence as a tool of war has proved to be extremely effective. It 
affects social stability by disrupting interpersonal relations within the micro universe of
50 UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict, "Analytical and Conceptual Framing o f  Conflict Related 
Sexual Violence," (New York: United Nations, 2011). p.3
51 Amelia Hoover Green Dara Kay Cohen, Elisabeth Jean Wood, "Wartime Sexual Violence: 
Misconceptions, Implications and Ways Forward," in Special Report (Washington D.C.: United States 
Institute o f  Peace, 2013). p.2
52 Office for the Coordination o f  Humanitarian Affairs, "Use o f  Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts: 
Identifying Gaps in Research to Inform More Effective Interventions" (New York: Policy Development 
and Studies Branch, June 26, 2008).
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the families and communities; and it impacts on economic recovery and state authority.53 
As long as women's recovery is hampered, their active participation in economic and 
reconstruction activities are seriously obstructed. Moreover, the often widespread 
impunity environment that sinks in after peace agreements leads to increasing 
discontentment with government institutions and lack of trust.
As a consequence, the strategy to address women's vulnerability to sexual 
violence is based on comprehensive protection strategy, reinforcing the relationship 
between development, security and women's empowerment. Although the focus on 
sexual violence has been disproportionate, actions to curb sexual violence are intended to 
have positive spill-over effects to other gender-related issues, such as supporting 
women's participation in the economic reconstruction and improving local rule-of-law 
and public security systems. Ultimately, these efforts aim to form the foundational basis 
for an equitable society and reinforced peace.
Although sexual violence remains widespread there are a few accomplishments 
that ought to be noted. In particular, the advancement of international legal mechanisms 
that qualifies sexual violence as a war crime and crime against humanity was central to 
the evolution of norms and protection mechanisms. Sexual violence, whatever the type, 
has been documented to have happened in the past, such as during the Second World War 
and the use of “comfort women” by the Japanese army, however specific mention to 
sexual crimes during the Tokyo War Crime Trials were minimal.
This reality, however, started to change first with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993, allowing victims of sexual violence
53 Robert Jenkins Anne-Marie Goetz, "Addressing Sexual Violence in Internationally Mediated Peace 
Processes," International Peacekeeping 17, no. 2 (2010). p.265.
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to step forward and accuse perpetrators; then the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (UNICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, both of which included sex 
crimes amongst the long list of criminal activities that have taken place during the 
conflicts in these countries.54
The signing o f the Rome Statute in 1998 -  in force in 2002 - which culminated 
with the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) also adds to the array of 
positive legal advances in terms of addressing war-related sexual violence and curbing 
impunity. Not only does the Statute recognize rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, 
pregnancy and sterilization as forms of sexual violence and, as such, as crimes against 
humanity, it also relates women trafficking with slavery. The creation of a witness 
protection program, the existence of counseling services for victims, and the possibility 
of awarding victims with reparations under the scope of the ICC shows the increasing 
recognition of the need to address this crime and a concern for comprehensive 
approaches as a way to deal with the matter.55
Unfortunately, the Court has limited jurisdiction. Not only has it depended on 
which state are parties, only crimes committed after it entered into force (2002) can be 
prosecuted by the Court. In some instances, UN's Security Council can bring a case to 
the Court's attention, as was the case with Khadafy in the aftermath of Libya's 
intervention; most o f the times, though, the permanent members of the Security Council 
do not reach a consensus and cases are not brought to the Court. As an illustration, as
54 Other legal instruments include regional agreements. The International Conference on the Great Lakes 
Region's Protocol on the Prevention and Suppression o f  Sexual Violence Against Women and Children is a 
great example
55 Sanam Anderlini, "Translating Global Agreement into National and Local Commitments," in Women and 
War: Power and Protection in the 21st Century, ed. Kathleen Kuehnast, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, and 
Helga Hemes (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute o f  Peace, 2011). p. 23
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state-sponsored human rights violations -  including sexual violence - spurred in Syria, 
the Security Council was unable to both act or bring the case to the ICC due to China's 
and Russia's veto powers and unwillingness to authorize an intervention on a political 
ally.
UN's Security Council’s inability to act is not new. However, it is important to 
recognize instances in which the organ did reach an agreement and prompted sustaining 
efforts to promote international peace and security. One of such efforts was the inclusion 
of gender approaches to peacekeeping activities and the recognition that sexual violence 
was a threat to international peace, providing the foundations for the authorization of all 
necessary means to address this issue.
Thus far, the analysis has shown that parallel to the development of a security 
concept focused on the individual and peacekeeping practices dedicated to protect them, 
the UN was the main venue for the development of women's rights and the sponsor of 
manifold initiatives that contributed to disseminate international norms to protect their 
rights and further consider their status and special needs in conflict zones. They form the 
backbone of the normative framework that allowed these issues to be linked with the 
organization's main purpose and raison d'etre, promoting international peace and 
security.
The following section will cover the adoption of a gender approach to peace 
operations, explaining what it consists of and detailing the main challenges for its future 
implementation.
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Gender as an integral part of peacekeeping practices
Promoting gender balance and equality has been a UN goal since its creation; 
however, it is only after the year 2000 that the organization started to focus its action in 
yet another area: peace and security. As part of UN's efforts to promote and maintain 
peace, gender approaches were gradually included in all UN's missions' mandates. 
Although the systematic use of sexual violence as a tool of war has hijacked the “gender 
and peacekeeping” agenda, important consideration towards increasing the participation 
of women in peace processes as better ways to attend to their needs and ultimately 
accomplish peace are also in place. That is not to say that war-related sexual violence is 
not an important issue, but rather part of a bigger discussion on the role of women in 
societies and the need to enhance their participation when reconstruction takes place.
The importance of adopting comprehensive protection strategies also lies in the 
fact that war-time violence usually represents a magnified reflection of gender based 
violence that was already present during peacetime. During war, when previously 
established gender relations are redefined, it is often the case that women are left alone 
and as the head of household, occasionally they also become combatants. However, they 
are usually excluded from DDR programs, or have their previous gains reversed when the 
conflict ends and gender relations are normalized again. Hence, the end o f conflicts is an 
important moment where innovative actions to reverse dire gender relations; 
reconstruction and protection strategies must thus consider this continuum of violence 
and attempt to lay the foundations of a fairer and more equitable state.56
56 See for example: Tsjeard Bouta, Georg Frerks, and Ian Bannon, Gender, Conflict, and Development 
(Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005); Meintjes, Pillay, and Turshen, The Aftermath: Women in Post-W ar
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The absence of sexual violence from peace-agreements is also striking. When 
gender considerations are not included in agreements, the voices o f women will most 
probably be left out of reconstruction programs.57 Moreover, silencing on the topic of 
war-time sexual violence not only undermines women's recovery, it also contributes to 
the normalization of this crime. We must remember that in some cases widespread 
conflict-related sexual violence has allegedly contributed to the normalization of this act 
amongst civilians, who then carry out similar actions under the premise of being 
“accepted” and “normal”.
In order to address these issues the UN has created a comprehensive gender 
approach to peace operations. This strategy is based on a series of resolutions approved 
since 2000 with the objective o f enhancing women's participation in peace processes and 
improving the organization's response to sexual and gender based violence. They form 
the base of the organization's learning process and the foundation o f international 
practices aiming a lasting peace.
Despite the advances on the normative realm, the implementation of practices has 
proved to be challenging. In order to better assess where challenges remain, this section 
will not only show the evolution of the normative realm, but also evaluate the 
implementation gap. While this section will mostly focus on the implementation gap at 
headquarter and member states level, the following chapters will provide a thorough 
evaluation of how this strategy is being -  or not - implemented on the field.
Transformation; Haleh Afshar and Deborah Eade, Development, Women, and War: Feminist Perspectives, 
Development in Practice Reader (Oxford: Oxfam, 2004).
57 See for example: Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, and Parpart, Gender, Conflict, and Peacekeeping; and 
Donald Steinberg, "Women and War: An Agenda for Action," in Women and War: Power and Protection  
in the 21st Century, ed. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat Kathleen Kuehnast, Helga Hemes (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute o f Peace, 2011).
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Women, Peace and Security resolutions: the normative realm
The adoption of resolution 1325 in October 2000 by the Security Council was the 
result of the diligent work of civil society organizations and UNIFEM that exercised 
pressure on members of the organ and organized a forum through which country 
representatives could hear directly from those affected on the ground, including victims. 
It also comprised a historic evolution in the way the matter was internationally seen, 
since a clear relationship between peace and an environment free of sexual violence was 
established and a series o f actions towards improving UN actions in this regard were put 
in place.
It was common knowledge among women's organizations and UN institutions 
concerned with gender that the comprehensive Brahimi report lacked a nuanced analysis 
on the causes o f conflict and paid insufficient attention to sexual and gender based 
violence.58 The Windhoek Declaration, on its part, and the resulting Namibia Plan of 
Action was strictly concerned about gender approaches in peace operations. Organized by 
DPKO's Lessons Learned Unit and hosted by the Government of Namibia in May, 2000, 
the seminar “Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support 
Operations” looked at practical ways through which the UN system could put in practice 
a series of actions to enhance a gender approach to peace operations. As a matter o f fact, 
the “Namibia Plan of Action” was the base document for Resolution 1325 and 
maintained much of its content.59
58 Raven-Roberts, "Gender Mainstreaming in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Talking the Walk, 
Tripping over the Walk." p.47
59 Louise Olsson, "The Namibian Peace Operation in a Gender Context," ibid. (Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers), p. 169.
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Two related events taking place in New York in October 2000 further contributed 
to the adoption by the Security Council of Resolution 1325 (UNSCR1325). These were 
an open discussion on Women, Peace and Security between members of the Council and 
the other was an Arria Formula meeting on the same topic where members of the Council 
could discuss the impact o f violence on women and their role in peace processes with 
representatives from local civil society organizations and victims themselves.60 While the 
former counted with declarations of support from 40 member states, the latter constituted 
an informal and confidential meeting where women from Zambia, Sierra Leone and 
Guatemala were heard.
Despite subsequent criticism, UNSCR1325 was an important step towards the 
advancement of a new format to peace operations concerned with the security o f the 
individual and with the different impact that conflicts and destabilization have on 
different gender groups. The resolution provided a series of actions to be undertaken by 
the UN system and member states in order to improve the organization's response to the 
challenges on the ground, particularly, the specific effects on women. Moreover, it was 
the first time women's experiences in conflict were linked to the maintenance of 
international peace and security, stressing that women's leadership in conflict resolution 
and gender approaches in peacekeeping are necessary steps to build a lasting peace. 61 
The main objective was to increase women's participation in peace processes and
60 Mazurana, Raven-Roberts, and Parpart, Gender, Conflict, and Peacekeeping, p. 15
61 Under the broad reference o f  gender approaches to peacekeeping a series o f specific actions can be 
identified: these include gender mainstreaming in terms o f  specific considerations on the impact o f  policies 
on gender groups, promoting gender balance, and improving protection through training and a renewed 
protection o f  civilians role for the military.
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decision-making related to conflict resolution as well as improve protection of women 
and girls on the ground through increased female personnel and better gender training.
Although the resolution fails to establish monitoring mechanisms, enforcement 
actions or benchmarks for progress evaluation, it set the first comprehensive series of 
actions aimed at better attending the special needs o f affected women on the ground. 
Noting the slow progress at the national level, in 2004 the Security Council called 
member states to implement National Action Plans (NAPs) or other national strategies as 
a way to articulate and implement provisions of UNSCR1325.62 NAPs are basically a 
policy and binding document that captures the specificities o f the national structure and 
establishes parameters and benchmarks to accomplish better gender mainstreaming in 
accordance to the provisions of the resolution. Calling for inter-government cooperation 
and civil society participation, NAPs are also an important tool to avoid duplicated 
actions while also complying with UN renewed normative framework for peace 
operations.
Because the responsibility to implement the resolution belongs to multiple actors 
including the UN system, member states and parties to the conflict, it is a challenging 
task. The need to include more women as peacekeeping personnel (in all components) 
and as peace negotiators, the establishment o f gender units on the ground, and improved 
training on the military as a ways to better assess gender based crimes, can be highlighted 
as important provisions to be implemented. While state compliance has varied immensely 
within the UN system, the involvement of multiple UN actors, lack of leadership and of
62 United Nations Security Council, "Statement by the President o f  the Security Council", October 28, 
2004, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/S-PRST-2004-40-E.pdf.
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inter-agency coordination has led to inconsistent implementation of the resolution's 
provisions.
It is important however to underline that despite difficulties to implement this 
evolving normative framework, the United Nations is taking important steps forward, in a 
continuous process of inquiry and quest for better ways to address challenges on the 
ground and improve the UN system response. Indeed, efforts to reinforce the UN's 
actions in addressing the special needs of women and girls were further enhanced by four 
subsequent resolutions, mostly focused on the systematic use of sexual violence as a tool 
of war.
The first of those was Security Council Resolution 1820 (UNSCR1820), adopted 
in 2008. Its main contribution was shifting the UN response to sexual violence from the 
humanitarian to the security approach, further reinforcing the need to change the structure 
o f peace operations and its doctrine and tactics.63 Resolution 1820 was the first to spell 
out the harsh effects sexual violence has on communities and established a clear link 
between international peace and an environment free of sexual violence. Urging the 
Secretary General and member states to ensure that sexual violence in conflict is 
addressed in conflict resolution and post-conflict recovery efforts.
In this regard, provisions under resolution 1325 are complementary to 1820 and 
include increasing the number of uniformed female personnel, improving training 
modules, including sexual violence in peace agreements, communication with local 
women's organizations and specific protection strategy to address this problem in conflict 
zones, amongst others. While the Secretary General has been releasing yearly reports on
63 Anne-Marie Goetz, "Addressing Sexual Violence in Internationally Mediated Peace Processes." p.261
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the implementation of these resolutions, a network of 13 UN entities has been created to 
better coordinate these efforts has been created. The “UN Action Against Sexual 
Violence in Conflict” supports coordination efforts and work closely with other local, 
national and international actors to improve actions on the ground.64
Resolution 1888 (UNSCR1888) was adopted in 2009 and has the objective of 
strengthening tools for implementing 1820 through assigning high-level leadership, 
building judicial response expertise, strengthening service provision, and building 
reporting mechanisms. In this regard, it calls for the appointment o f a Special 
Representative of the Secretary General on Sexual Violence, and the provision of 
strategic support on actions to combat sexual violence to UN country teams and peace 
Operations. The peace operations in Darfur, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo are the first to have sexual violence components primarily dedicated to elaborating 
comprehensive protection strategies to curb sexual violence on the ground. These 
strategies encompass actions that aim to improve judicial, security-related and political 
responses to sexual violence on the ground. Due to lack of specific data on sexual 
violence measuring impact is a challenging task, however important advances in terms of 
implementing renewed strategies and monitoring actions have been accomplished.65
Resolution 1889 (UNSCR1889) was also adopted in 2009 and calls attention to 
the exclusion of women from early recovery and peace building activities leading to the 
continuous inadequate planning and funding of actions aimed at attending the special
64 For further information on their work, see: UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict, “ Stop Rape 
Now,” 03/18/2013, www.stoprapenow.org.
65 Data on sexual violence is a challenge. As an example o f  the challenges, increasing trends may only 
signal better reporting systems rather than an increase in cases. Moreover, it is often the case that different 
actors on the ground use different reporting systems, making it difficult to have a unified reporting system.
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needs of women. As prescribed by UNSCR1325, a strategy to increase the number of 
women in conflict-resolution and decision-making and the establishment of specific 
monitoring mechanisms and indicators towards this goal are imperative. These indicators 
and plan for implementation of gender-responsive peacebuilding were presented by the 
Secretary General in 2010. 66
It thus becomes clear that these resolutions as well as its implementation 
indicators and strategic plans are all complementary and were often bundled together 
under comprehensive implementation strategies and reports of the Secretary General on 
the advancement of UN actions on this issue. The last of Security Council Resolutions on 
this topic thus far is resolution 1960 (UNSCR1960), adopted in 2010. Following critics 
on the absence of accountability mechanisms to guarantee the implementation of these 
resolutions, RES 1960 provides an accountability system for addressing conflict-related 
sexual violence that includes reports on parties credibly suspected of committing sexual 
violence, establishment of monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements on conflict 
related sexual violence and the need to submit annual reports on advances.
UNSCR1960 represents an important advance in comparison to the other 
resolutions since it provides “teeth” or actual mechanisms for monitoring and 
implementation. In particular, the tactics of “naming and shamming” with the list of 
armed groups that apply sexual violence as tactics of war represent a more aggressive 
approach to end this practice. The mechanism was first used in the January 2012 report of
66 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f  the Secretary General on Women, Peace and Security", 
September 24, 2010, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/498. For more 
information on the topic see also: "Report o f the Secretary General on Women'S Participation in 




the Secretary General on Sexual Violence that documented conflict related sexual 
violence and specifically referring to the names of military forces, militia and other 
armed groups allegedly using sexual violence as a tool of war.67
The five resolutions on Women, Peace and Security constitute the normative 
framework towards the incorporation o f a gender approach as an integral component of 
peace operations. Its adoption also signals the recognition that threats to international 
peace and security include individual threats to civilians and proposes a renewed focus 
centered on individuals protection. Although some of these resolutions do not have 
accountability mechanisms -  as is the case of UNSCR1325 (2000) and UNSCR1889 
(2009), others have specific provisions on the formulation of indicators, strategies and 
commitments towards the implementation of actions to accomplish UN's overall gender 
equality policy in peace operations, ensuring that specific gender crimes, especially 
sexual violence, are rightly addressed, and that women are a central participant in peace 
processes.
Although implementation remains a challenge and there is still a gap between the 
normative and practical realms, gender approaches to peace operations is in the 
international security agenda.
From evolving norms towards international practices: the implementation gap
Considering the renewed challenges in international security environment and the 
organization's inability to adequately respond to threats, the United Nations initiated a 
learning process in search for improved ways to better respond to the renewed threats
67 "Report o f  the Secretary General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence", January 13,2012, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/33.
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encountered on the ground. In this context, while a renewed security concept refocused 
on the individual has evolved, international practices dedicated to better protect civilians 
arose. As part of these efforts, specific concerns with women's interests, rights and 
protection needs assumed renewed importance within the organization. Not only has the 
organization been the main venue for the development of specific women's rights, it has 
also been pivotal in securitizing the issue and linking it with the organization's main 
purpose. In this context, maintaining international peace and security also means 
addressing the specific effects o f conflicts on women, particularly combating systematic 
use o f sexual violence as a tool of war.
As analyzed, the series o f UN resolutions on Women, Peace and Security have 
mostly confronted an implementation gap. Although resolutions set important standards 
towards the enhancement of women's security and improvement of its vulnerable status, 
they often fail to create binding and enforcement mechanisms so that all involved actors 
take the necessary actions to establish and disseminate these specific provisions as 
international practices.
Considering the practice of gender approaches to peace operations, two 
dimensions ought to be considered. First, there are the necessary changes at headquarters 
and member states level, these include for example the adoption of National Action Plans 
by member states and the provision of gender training modules, appointment of gender 
advisers to missions and establishment of monitoring mechanisms by UN headquarters. 
The second dimension refers to the specific in-mission practices, such as the 
incorporation of gender in missions' mandate, the establishment of specific protection 
strategies and activities towards improving national capacity to respond to sexual and
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gender based violence. A feedback loop between these two dimensions is also necessary, 
so that norms create at headquarters level take under consideration lessons learned from 
the field.
The evaluation of practices that have been widely incorporated by member states 
and UN staff and further disseminated from mission to mission and state to state, 
provides a diagnostic of the state of UN's learning process. It also pinpoints the main 
challenges and highlight key areas where further normative development ought to take 
place. This section will thus evaluate some of UN's main accomplishment at 
headquarters level and define the central components for a successful gender approach 
strategy in-mission.
The implementation gap at headquarter and member state level
Since UNSCR1325, the United Nations has taken important steps towards 
translating into practice the norms it has created. While each of the five resolutions 
further refines a gender approaches to peace operations as an international practice, 
supporting analytical documents, the establishment of benchmarks and monitoring 
mechanisms measuring success and the elaboration and adoption of new training modules 
for military forces and National Action Plans are the first real evidence of change. At the 
same time, however, difficulty to measure the impact of UN policies and slow pace of 
progress in certain areas -  such as the increased presence of women in peace operations -  
mount against any idea of progress.
The search for establishing specific targets, implementing, monitoring and 
reporting mechanisms along with accountability systems comprise the greatest success. 
Mostly dependent on the work carried out by the Secretariat and other sister agencies,
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since the debut of women's issues in the international peace and security arena, 
supporting documents to aid the work on the ground have multiplied and as exemplified 
by UNSCR1960 (2010), some have even established binding mechanism and time-bound 
commitments towards the implementation of a gender approach to peace operations. 
Among these documents, there are the reports o f the Secretary General on Women, Peace 
and Security, on Sexual Violence, and on the Implementation of the Resolutions 1820 
(2008) and 1888 (2009); specific studies carried out by UN's Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, and the several training modules designed to improve response 
on the ground.68
As previously discussed, one of the main critics to UNSCR1325 was the inability 
to create effective action plans for all implementing parties and absence of an 
accountability mechanism. As a result, in 2004 the Security Council called a System- 
wide Action Plan (SWAP) for the implementation of UNSCR1325 provisions and an 
Inter-Agency Task Force on Women, Peace and Security was created.69
Since then two SWAPs were created, one comprising the period of 2005-2007 
and the other covering 2008-2009 period. Nonetheless, the yearly Reports o f the 
Secretary General on Women Peace and Security, have highlighted that the elaboration of 
these System-wide Action Plan have had little impact and the UN system have not met 
with the recommendations. In 2010, in celebration of the ten year anniversary of 
' resolution 1325 a report of the Secretary General stated that SWAP results remained 
disappointing and that the possibility of measuring achievements was a challenge.
68 For a directory on UN's training materials on gender and women's issues, see: Women watch, “
Directory o f  UN resources on gender and women's issues”, 03/19/2013, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/directorv/gender training 90.htm.
69 United Nations Security Council, "Statement by the President o f  the Security Council."
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As a result, in July 2011 a UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace 
and Security: 2011-202070 with specific goals, targets and indicators to measure UN 
progress in the area. The framework established a High-level United Nations Steering 
Committee on Women, Peace and Security (HLSC-WPS) to oversee and monitor 
progress and defined four broad areas where advances ought to be accomplished:
Figure 1: Women Peace and Security four implementation pillars
P R E V E N T I O N
P A R T I C I P A T I O N
Prevention of conflict and 
all forms of violence 
against women and girts in 
conflict and pos-conflict
Women participate equally 
with men and gender equality is 
promoted in peace and security 
decision-making processes at 
national local regional and 
international levels
P R O T E C T I O N
R E L I E F  A N D
R E C O V E R 7
Women's and girls’ rights are 
protected and promoted in 
conflict-affected situations
Women and girls' specific 
relief needs are met and 
women’s capacities to act as 
agents in relief and recovery 
are reinforced in conflict and 
post-conflict situations
Source: UN Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security: 2011-2020.
Although it is still soon to evaluate UN's progress in accordance to each of these 
areas, the continuous reformulation of targets and recurrence of open debates every 
October and informal council meetings on the subject, shows the organization's 
commitment to improve and disseminate this practice. Other accomplishments in this 
area include: the Inter-Agency Task Force on Women, and Peace and Security in
70 United Nations, "Un Strategic Results Framework on Women, Peace and Security: 2011-2020" (New  
York: United Nations, July 2011).
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February 2001, the creation o f a Gender Unit at DPKO headquarters and in mission,71 
appointment of women/gender focal point to all departments and missions' components, 
the elaboration of gender training modules and guidelines for integrating a gender 
perspective into the work of the military and the police in peacekeeping, the elaboration 
of a gender equality policy for peacekeeping,
Besides promoting gender mainstreaming in all missions' activities, these senior 
advisers are responsible for guaranteeing that local women are included in peace 
processes, that their concerns are considered within local legal and judicial system and 
procedures and that the necessary measures to protect women and girls from sexual 
violence are taken by all missions' components.72
Gender balance
Evaluating the presence of women in peace processes activities is a direct 
measurement of the implementation of one of UNSCR1325 provisions. It also points out 
where exactly the main challenges remains, whether on the field or at headquarters and 
which implementing actor is most falling behind with the resolution's compliance.
In terms of civilians, from the period 2000-2010, there has been a shy increase of 
3.3% in the number of female staff working at UN's Secretariat, from 35.5% (1,785 out 
o f 5,034) in 2000 to 38.8% (3,945 out of 10,175) in 2010. This data, however, does not
71 The appointment o f focal points for women should be seen in the context o f  the GA resolution 59/164 on 
Improvement o f  the status o f women in the United Nations system and the letter to senior managers from 
the Secretary General o f  3 April 2008, which reaffirms the urgent goal o f  achieving 50/50 gender 
distribution in all categories o f  posts within the UN system.
72 The eight missions where senior gender advisers are present are: UN Organization Stabilization Mission 
in the Democratic Republic o f  the Congo (MONUSCO), UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), UN  
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), UN Mission in 
South Sudan (UNMISS), African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), UN Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
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separate those working in the area of conflict resolution nor includes the staff on the field, 
where the discrepancies between male and female staff tend to be the largest. As the 
graph bellow shows, the percentage of women in high level positions is the lowest, while 
its presence in less skilled jobs, as those required by the P-l level is the highest.73
Figure 2: Gender distribution staff in the Professional and higher categories
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Source: UN Women, 2010.
According to Puerchguibal, in 2008, out o f 66 top management positions in peace 
building only six were occupied by women.74 In fact, DPKO's proportion of women's 
participation increased by only 1.3 percentage point in comparison to the same period.
73 P-l to P-5 positions refer to professional positions, being P-l with the lowest qualification demands and 
P-5 the highest. D -l and D-2 refer to director and chief positions, representing important high level 
positions within the UN. The UG on its part corresponds to those leadership positions that include the 
Secretary General, Under-Secretary General, Assistant Secretary General, Director General and Deputy 
Director General.
74 Nadine Puechguibal, "Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction," in Gender 
Matters in Global Politics: A Feminist Introduction to International Relation, ed. Laura Shepherd (New  
York: Routledge, 2010).
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While in 2000 women comprised only 31.7% of total personnel - 59 out of 186 - in 2010 
they comprised 33% - 108 out of 327.
Figure 3: Gender distribution staff at the DPKO
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Source: UN Women, 2010.
In peace operations, civilian women staff comprises a total o f around 7,500 or 
30% of the total international civilian personnel working for peace operations around the 
world. Amongst national staff women summed up to a meager 17%.75 Three women lead 
peace operations as Special Representatives o f the Secretary-General (SRSG) and one as 
acting head (Afghanistan, Darfur, DRC). Nonetheless, the number for military and police 
women are considerably lower. Out of approximately 125,000 peacekeepers, women 
constitute 3% of military personnel and 10% of police personnel in UN Peacekeeping 
missions. However, there are three all-female Formed Police Units (FPU) serving in three
75 This and the following data were all gathered at DPKO's webpage. See: Department o f  Peacekeeping 
Operations, “ Gender and Peacekeeping”, 03/26/2013, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/women/womeninpk.shtml.
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different peace operations. These are the Indian FPU serving in Liberia and the two 
Bangladeshi FPUs, one serving in Haiti and the other in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. The goal is to reach at least 10% of women's participation in the military by 2014 
and 14% of women's participation in the police by the same year.
Despite challenges to increase these numbers, they already constitute an advance. 
According to DPKO, in the 32 years between 1957 and 1989 a total of only twenty 
women served as uniformed UN peacekeepers. Besides, until the adoption of the 
resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, no women had served as Special 
Representative of the Secretary General. Since the adoption of UNSCR1325, there has 
been an increase in female uniformed personnel, especially as military observers as their 
presence doubled in only five years, going from 2% in 2005 to 4.1% in 2010. However, 
as the DPKO's statistical report on female uniformed personnel shows, it was not until 
2005 and 2009 that sex disaggregated data were compiled for the military and police 
personnel respectively.
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Table 3: Evolution of Female personnel in UN operations
17,423 47,131 44.230 36,948 30.743 67,807 74,341 83,32*  33.576 95,419
1.30% 1.63% 1.96% 3.07%
Source: DPKO/OMA Statistical Report on Female Military and Police Personnel in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations Prepared for the 10th Anniversary o f  the UNSCR 1325, 2010.
Despite that, many challenges remain to ensure an adequate representation of 
women in peace processes. As they are underrepresented in decision making structures of 
political parties and armed groups they are not automatically invited to participate as 
delegates in peace talks. According to Anderlini, since 2000 women have comprised only 
7% of peace negotiators and less than 3% of signatories.76 “The support provided by 
peacekeeping missions in this area has been uneven and often lacks a coherent 
strategy.”77 It is often the case that women directly affected by conflict or disasters, such 
as those within IDP camps and in rural areas are left out. This o f course, is not true for all 
missions, but has unfortunately been a trend.
76 Anderlini, "Translating Global Agreement into National and Local Commitments." p. 27
77 Department o f  Peacekeeping Operations and Department o f  Field Support, "Ten-Year Impact Study on 
Implementation o f  Un Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in 
Peacekeeping" (New York: United Nations, 2010). p. 16
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An interesting initiative that may have spill-over effects in this area is the support 
to increase the participation of women in political processes. UN missions with this 
mandate have worked hard sensitizing stakeholders, promoting affirmative actions and 
gender sensitive electoral laws, training women candidates and providing security women 
candidates during elections.78 There has been a measurable increase o f women candidates 
elected and women voters, at least in a number of countries with UN presence -  such as 
DRC, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Haiti, Sudan and East Timor.
NAPs
The adoption of National Action Plans by member states was not a mandatory 
policy directive from UNSCR1325. However, following Security Council's discussion on 
how to improve implementation on 1325 and the call for UN System-Wide Action Plan, 
member states were also urged to launch Action Plans on their own. However, because 
the implementation of NAPs depends entirely on member states willingness and 
commitment to the cause, compliance has achieved mixed results. As for today 39 
countries have launched NAPs, most of them coming from developed areas, in particular 
Europe, and African countries that have themselves been the object of an intervention in 
recent years. Below is a complete list of countries that have launched NAPs.79
78 Ibid. p. 18
79 The complete list can be found on the report o f  the Secretary General on Peace Women and Security, 
2011, see: United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f  the Secretary General on Women, Peace and 
Security", September 29, 2011,
http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/SecurityCouncilMonitor/Reports/sg_report_wps_oct_2011 .pdf.
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Table 4: Evolution in the launching of National Action Plans
Country NAP Date
Australia National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 March, 2012
Austria National Action Plan on Implementing 
UNSCR 1325
August, 2007/ Revised in 
January, 2012
Belgium National Action Plan on the 
implementation o f UNSCR 1326
May, 2010
Bosnia Hezergovina National Action Plan for the 
Implementation o f the UNSCR 1325
July, 2010
Burundi National Action Plan on Security Council 
Resolution 1325 and 1820
August, 2011
Canada Action Plan for the Implementation o f  
United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions on Women, Peace and 
Security
October, 2010
Chile National Action Plan for the 
Implementation o f the UNSCR 1325
August, 2009
Cote d'Ivoire National Action Plan for the 
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325
January, 2007
Croatia National Action Plan for the 
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325
2011
Denmark Action Plan for the Implementation o f  
UNSCR 1325
June, 2005/Revised in 
2008
Democratic Republic of 
Congo
National Action Plan for the 
implementation o f the UNSCR 1325
June, 2010
Estonia Action Plan for the Implementation o f  
UNSCR 1325
November, 2010
Finland National Action Plan for the 
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325
September, 2008/ Revised 
in 2012
France National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 
Women, Peace & Security
November, 2010
Georgia National Action Plan on UN SCR 1325 December, 2011
Germany National Action Plan on the 
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325
December, 2012
Guinea National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 July, 2011
Guinea-Bissau National Action Plan on UNSCR 
1325 and Implementation Matrix
July, 2011
Iceland National Plan o f Action for the 
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325
March, 2008
Ireland National Action Plan on UNSCR November, 2011
Italy National Plan o f Action for the 





Liberia National Action Plan for the 
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325
March, 2009
Lithuania Action Plan for the Implementation of 
UNSCR 1325 on Women Peace and 
Security
December, 2011
Nepal National Action Plan for the 
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325
October, 2010
Netherlands National Action Plan for the 
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325
December, 2007/ 
December, 2011
Norway Action Plan for the Implementation of 
UNSCR / NAP Strategic Plan for 2011- 
2013
March, 2006
Philippines National Action Plan for the 
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325 and 
1820
Mar-10
Portugal National Action Plan for the 
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325
August, 2009
Rwanda National Action Plan for the 
Implementation o f the UNSCR 1325
May, 2010
Senegal National Action Plan for the 
Implementation of the UNSCR 1325 i
2-M ay-11
Serbia National Action Plan for the 
Implementation o f the UNSCR 1325
2011
Spain National Action Plan for the 
Implementation o f the UNSCR 1325
November,2007
Sierra Leone National Action Plan for the 
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325
March, 2011
Slovenia National Action Plan for the 
Implementation o f UNSCR 1325
July, 2011
Sweden National Action Plan to implement 
UNSCR 1325
October 2006/Revised in 
2009
Switzerland National Action Plan to implement 
UNSCR 1325
Oct-10
Uganda Uganda Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 & 
1820 and the Goma Declaration
December, 2008
United Kingdom National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 







United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace 
and Security
December, 2011
Source: Peace Women, “List o f  National Action Plans”, 03/19/2013, http://peacewomen.org/naps/list-of- 
naps.
The table shows two important aspects in the adoption of NAPs by member states. 
The first relates to the institutional constraints imposed by regional institutions 
committed to the subject, in particular the European Union and NATO, leading all 
member states to launch their action plans. The second reinforces the importance of 
taking advantage of peace operations as an important instance to promote more equitable 
societies, since the majority o f African states that have launched National Action Plans 
are also those that have been subjected to UN peace efforts. Despite the difficulty of 
proving the effectiveness o f these foreign-sponsored plans o f action, they give pressure 
groups and women's organizations leverage to encourage national governments to 
recognize the impact of wars on the status of women and urge continued efforts towards 
more equitable societies.
Training modules and guidelines
Initiatives to create gender training modules for peacekeepers were already in
place prior to the adoption of UNSCR1325 (2000). 80 These modules were further
developed and currently gender is one of the obligatory training modules that all
peacekeepers receive before and during deployment. Besides, guidelines and checklists
80 Angela Mackay, "Mainstreaming Gender in United Nations Peacekeeping Training: Examples from East 
Timor, Ethiopia, and Eritrea," in Gender, Conflict, and Peacekeeping, ed. Dyan Mazurana, Angela Raven- 
Roberts, and Jane Parpart (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005). p.265
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for incorporating a gender perspective into the police military components have also been 
created in 2008 and 2010 respectively.81 These included a detailed checklist with specific 
tasks to be carried out at tactical, operational and strategic levels.
These materials were complemented by specific gender training modules that 
were also recently created. These were prepared throughout 2010-2012 and a pilot course 
in Africa, Latin America and Asia was carried out with training modules for tactical, 
operational and strategic levels. The elaboration of these specific training modules was 
carried out with the participation o f external consultants, member states representatives 
and gender specialists.82
Other gender training includes those directed to gender focal points for military 
and police in mission as well as civilians directly related to gender policies. The main 
problem, however, is to guarantee that these training are adequately passed to troops to be 
deployed. Although some countries invite United Nations representatives to carry out 
pre-deployment training, member states are responsible for carrying out the training 
themselves. Another great challenge is the fact that gender issues tend to be readily 
associated with Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and uniformed personnel, in its 
majority still comprised by men, tend to be wary to discuss these issues.
The UN-Women, have also developed a scenario-based training, but mostly 
focused on sexual violence issues. Interestingly, the responsible for the training is Gen. 
Patrick Cammaert, former Brigade Commander in the DRC. In missions, gender training
81 Department o f  Peacekeeping Operations and Department o f Field Support, "Guidelines for Integrating 
Gender Perspectives into the Work o f  United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Missions," (New York:
United Nations, 2008).
821 have participated as an external consultant in one o f the consulting workshops on the elaboration o f  
these modules guideline. They consisted in the review and editing o f the text and formulation o f  practical 
scenarios.
150
is often provided by civilians, and most of the time by women. Although they tend to be 
the experts on the field it is important to have someone aware of military culture to 
provide this training. They tend to better understand, if course is given using simple and 
direct language followed by specific tasks, which is why checklists tend to work better 
for them. Using a former male general may be an excellent strategy to pass the message.
Prevention o f  conflict related sexual violence
Initiatives to incorporate a gender policy and enhance women's leadership role 
are complementary to the initiatives to prevent sexual violence on the field, and have 
been planned in conjunction with those. Since UNSCR1820, first considered widespread 
and systematic use of sexual violence as a threat to international peace and security, 
training modules, studies and strategies to address sexual violence have been developed 
at headquarters and mission level. The accountability mechanism present in the text of 
UNSCR1960 was first put in practice through the “naming and shaming” strategy on the 
first report of the Secretary General on Conflict Related sexual violence, that cited armed 
and militia groups allegedly related to sexual violence and started a monitoring, analysis 
and reporting system on cases of sexual violence cases around the world.83
The report also provided examples on how sexual violence has threatened 
security, undermined peace efforts and was used as political tool o f oppression during 
elections or civil unrest in countries such as Chad, Central African Republic, Nepal, Sri 
Lanka, Timor-Leste, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Guinea, 
Kenya, Syria among others. Finally, it also specified the initiatives in place that seek to
83 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f  the Secretary General on Conflict-Related Sexual 
Violence."
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identify signs of sexual violence and protect the population and finally ensure that the 
issue is included in peace agreements.84
The creation of the inter-agency coordination network, the UN Action Against 
Sexual Violence, has further synchronized efforts to reduce combat related sexual 
violence. This coordination mechanism has generated the previously cited joint 
DPKO/UN-Women scenario-based trainings on sexual and gender based violence for 
military peacekeepers. Other two important initiatives that UN Action Against Sexual 
Violence follows closely have been the appointment of Special representative of the 
Secretary General for Sexual Violence in 2010 and the subsequent policies, and the three 
field offices representatives of sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Darfur and Liberia.
The presence of a sexual violence component is peace operations have been 
positive because it managed to include the issue into the planning, execution and 
evaluation of missions' mandates. Moreover, the formulation o f local strategies to 
combat sexual violence can also be cited as a direct result of the establishment of these 
units that work exclusively on this issue. Additionally, peace operations (not only those 
with sexual violence units) have also provided technical expertise to the drafting and 
enactment of major pieces of legislation aimed at combating sexual violence as it is the 
case in Afghanistan, DRC, Liberia, Sierra, Leone and East Timor. The creation of 
specialized sexual and gender based violence local police units is also a UN victory in
84 UN News Center, “UN Report on Sexual Violence During Conflict Singles Out Worst Offenders”, 
February 23, 2012, Accessed: 03/19/2012,
http://www.peacewomen.org/news article.php?id=4745&tvpe=news.
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Burundi, Chad, Darfur, DRC, Haiti, Liberia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Sudan and East 
Timor.85
However, as SGBV remains prevalent in mission areas around the world and due 
to the slow pace of progress that has been shown an Analytical Inventory of 
Peacekeeping Practice for Addressing Sexual Violence has been issued in 2010 and a 
second edition in 2012, pinning down specific tasks that the military can carry out to 
better protect civilians from sexual violence.86
The Inventory calls attention to a major analytical and implementation gap. As 
much as national authorities should be held accountable for protecting their citizens, and 
local and international civilian personnel from the UN and other international and civil 
society organizations are in better position to understand the problem, the potential role 
of uniformed peacekeepers to help fight sexual violence remain under-looked.
Indeed, due to increasing critics against peacekeepers that have been identified 
with SEA and sexual violence themselves, commanders remain wary of sending out 
troops to have an increased contact with local women. In this regard, the innumerous 
cases of misconducts by peacekeepers (and also by civilian and UN police personnel) 
piles against UN's conduct record on the field. It was only in 2003, that the organization 
launched a Zero Tolerance policy, forbidding sexual contact between UN personnel and 
locals and only in 2005 that a Conduct and Discipline Unit was created to provide 
guidance and record allegations against the UN. Despite that, the challenge as to how
85 Department o f Peacekeeping Operations and Department o f  Field Support, "Ten-Year Impact Study on 
Implementation o f  Un Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in 
Peacekeeping." p. 31.
86United Nations Department o f  Peacekeeping Operations, "Addressing Conflict Related Sexual Violence: 
An Analytical Inventory o f  Peacekeeping Practice" (New York: DPKO, 2010).
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make individuals accountable remains, since most of them have immunity and it becomes 
member states responsibility to prosecute them. Cases of misconduct have disastrous 
effects on UN image and ultimately undermine peace efforts, these, however are still 
common.
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that the military can easily pick on some 
signs of violence, and if adequately trained on gender issues they could help prevent 
these hideous acts from happening. By being the armed institution on the ground, not 
only they have a primary role in protecting women from the violence itself, they can also 
support individuals’ social and economic development, improving their structural and 
physical security and decreasing its vulnerability. Consequently, connecting to the 
civilian staff is not enough, understanding the distinct contribution that the military 
component can perform in a peace operation of this sort is essential to contribute to this 
agenda. The military can reach remote areas, provide daily patrols, and offer a security 
response to a problem that currently lacks a security framework.
Most frequently, uniformed personnel are the first point of contact with victims. 
They must thus know how to carry out a first response, which ought to assure medical 
support and confidentiality of the victim. As the Analytical Inventory points out, how 
they respond to these cases affect the image of the mission and the overall ability to 
deliver strategic outcomes. For that reason, understanding the gender and cultural 
dynamics of certain societies may be indispensable for achieving an enduring peace. 
However, in many cases, they are simply not prepared. A representative from the sexual 
violence unit highlights “they try to do their best, but the wrong way. In the eager to be 
effective, they take pictures of the victims, they get names, where they live, they question
154
everybody. Instead of helping, by doing that they end up putting victims in more 
danger.”87
Actions on the field are not only important for conflict resolution and protecting 
civilians. They help to build a fairer society by providing a role model in which gender 
concerns are taken seriously. In post-conflicts societies, building a new normalcy is 
strategic to build a more gender balanced and equitable society and thus an enduring 
peace.
More than protecting civilians against sexual and other types o f violence it has 
also become the role of the UN to avoid that sexual violence is normalized. Calling a 
dreadful act a hazy cultural feature o f a people can be misleading and may undermine all 
efforts. As much as the general role of protecting civilians requires a coordinated work 
between all missions’ components and o f those with other actors on the field, the same 
holds true for protecting women and girls from sexual violence.
As a former MONUC SRSG stated in 2009:
There will never be enough resources... this is why, for example, we are 
trying to understand the communities better... We need to recognize that 
protection is more than just having military boots on the ground. It’s about 
how you use them, and how you can connect with your civilian staff. 8 8
In order to assure a protective environment and the restoration of security, a 
lasting peace agreement and a healthy political and social environment is necessary for 
the development to take place, decreasing thus the structural vulnerability o f local 
population to suffer this particular type of physical violence.
87 Interview carried out with Sexual Violence Unit Representative on February, 2012, Democratic Republic 
o f Congo.
88 United Nations Department o f  Peacekeeping Operations, "Addressing Conflict Related Sexual Violence: 
An Analytical Inventory o f  Peacekeeping Practice. " p.8
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Being that the military the component where most difficulties have been found to 
incorporate a gender approach, it remains the questions if we, as scholars and 
practitioners can indeed request them to perform these functions. It is often the case that 
they do not fully grasp the concept of a gender perspective and as the Secretary General 
himself states “there is an equally enduring belief in some military circles that bullets, 
bombs and blades constitutes the ‘war’, while rape is a disciplinary infraction or a private 
aspect of culture based gender relations.”89
That is why providing military and police for that matter with specific tasks, 
standard operations procedures and checklist is an important initiative. It is also essential 
that they are able to perform gender analysis and include incidents in patrol reports as a 
ways to better assess specific threats women may be subjected. As the subsequent 
analysis of the case studies in chapters 4 and 5 will show, the military component reflects 
where cultural considerations and member states unwillingness are a major obstacle for a 
successful completion of a learning process. With inadequate training, undisciplined 
soldiers and vastly male composed, the military has been a standing stone bastion where 
gender approaches have been most challenged.
UN gender strategy on the field: the 5 pillars
UN Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security highlighted the road towards 
improving the effects of conflicts on women and girls. This strategy is based on gender 
equality and included gender balance and gender mainstreaming actions, varying from 
increasing the number o f uniformed personnel on the ground to the establishment of
89 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f  the Secretary General on the Implementation o f  
Resolutions 1820 and 1888."
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better protection mechanisms to attend women and girls victims of sexual and gender 
based violence. In order to accomplish these tasks, missions on the ground usually have a 
specific gender component responsible for carrying out the mission's gender policy and 
guaranteeing that gender is fully integrated into the planning and execution o f missions' 
mandates.
Considering resolutions' provisions and supporting documents towards the 
enhancement of women's status, UN's gender approach to peace operations is based on 
five main components: legal framework, gender balance, protection, security sector and 
empowerment. These are focused on improving the situation of local women, better 
responding to their specific needs and improving their status, constituting thus a 
comprehensive strategy that goes beyond their physical security and considers their 
structural security as well.
The first of these components would be the reinforcement of a legal framework 
that place specific provisions for the protection and empowerment of women and girls, 
particularly in the mandate of peace operations. The absence o f gender specific 
provisions in peace operations is often translated in the lack of necessary resources, 
adequate equipments and context-specific training necessary to prevent, deal and combat 
widespread and/or systematic sexual violence on the ground.90 Lack of resources may 
further translate in UN's inability to install efforts to improve local justice system and set 
reparations mechanisms.
But mandates are not the only elements of a strong legal framework that can help 
sustain continued efforts to support women and girls on the ground. Specific strategy to
90 Anne-Marie Goetz, "Addressing Sexual Violence in Internationally Mediated Peace Processes." p. 263
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protect civilians and/or to combat sexual violence would provide mission with specific 
tasks for all components -  military, police and civilian -  based on the local context to 
better respond to the specific threats against women and girls.
A second important element central in UN's gender approach to peace operations 
is gender balance. As previously explaining gender equality gender balance refers to 
equal participation between men and women in all levels and positions. It is important 
that a quantitative analysis is accompanied by a qualitative analysis of the specific roles 
women are carrying out within the mission, and in particular within the military 
component.
An increasing presence of women in peace operations is particularly important to 
guarantee that women's special needs are considered in the planning execution and 
evaluation of missions' mandates and specific tasks. In the case of uniformed personnel 
in particular, female personnel supports disseminating a role model to intervened society, 
by showing that women and men can participate in the same kind of activities, and 
further enhance channels of communication with the local population. Despite critics that 
arguing that more uniformed women enhance contact with local women reinforces 
gender essentialisms, the reality on the ground shows that indeed women are more at ease 
to communicate their problems to other women. Considering that in many of these 
countries where sexual violence is a common feature, state and militia forces are usually 
those most involved with perpetrations it is understandable that uniformed female staff 
may facilitate contact with victims.
Another important component o f UN's gender approach on the ground is 
protection. Protection strategies are mostly carried out by uniformed personnel, although
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combined efforts of multi-agency teams tend to provide better threat assessment and 
response to populations based on a multi-dimensional understanding of their needs. 
However, as previously emphasized by the UN Analytical Inventory, the military 
component in particular can comply with a specific and very important role in terms of 
facilitating contact, transportations and protection through the use o f force to vulnerable 
populations.
If an ostensive presence already provides dissuasive effects on armed groups, the 
actual use of military forces to provide escorts and patrols to local women may even have 
more positive results. The same holds true for police and civilian components if  clear 
integrated protection tasks and responsibilities are planned according to the specific 
context where they are deployed. In some environments, particularly those of urban 
criminality it will be the UN Police who will have direct contact with victims. On the 
other side, professional civilians, with specific expertise, such as rule of law, human 
rights, etc, can assess different situations and identify the priority needs of the population. 
In a context o f sexual violence they may offer valuable insights on how improve the 
vulnerable status of women on the ground.
The fourth component is central for a sustaining protection effort in the aftermath 
of conflicts and the establishment of a more equitable society. Security sector is broadly 
defined as “the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, 
provision and oversight of security in a country.”91 These include various institutions 
responsible for law enforcement, justice system, and defense. Since the 90 's UN peace
91 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f  the Secretary General on Securing Peace and 
Development: The Role o f  the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform", January 23, 2008, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/62/659.
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operations have broadened its mandate to include a series of actions, amongst which are 
several related to strengthening the local security sector. Training of local police and 
military, improvement of justice and legal systems are some of the tasks UN personnel 
are responsible on the ground.
Improving the local security sector, particularly in terms of strengthening security 
and defense forces capacity to maintain a safe environment, is already an important 
measure to guarantee sustained efforts to better protect local women and girls. However, 
occasionally, UN personnel is involved with the provision o f specific gender training to 
local police and military, guaranteeing that specific gender provisions are included in the 
national constitutions and legal documents. Unfortunately, it is often the case that sexual 
violence and gender based violence are not criminalized in intervened societies. In these 
cases UN civilian staff responsible for rule of law and human rights have a central role in 
making sure that the national system adopts the necessary measure for the prosecution of 
these crimes and that discriminatory practices are outlawed.
The final component of UN's gender approach in peace operations is the 
empowerment of women in the economic social and political life of the state, through 
gender balanced actions during reconstruction process. This strategy is based on the 
assumption that vulnerability of women is based on discriminatory practices and a low 
social, economic and political status of women in these societies. Consequently, it is also 
the UN's role to guarantee women's empowerment as the foundation for a more equitable 
society where women's vulnerability is decreased.
Although some of these elements receive more attention than others. The analysis 
of UN actions on the ground underlines the importance of this integrated approach as a
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ways to respond to the specific needs of women. The underlying logic is that these 
actions will produce a multiplier effect on the host nation’s capacity to provide its 
population with a stronger, more equitable society
Conclusions
Since its creation, UN's greatest contribution has been the production of 
knowledge and ideas in an attempt to solve the world's common problems. Throughout 
the years the organization has provided essential data and expertise for creating 
knowledge that feeds in the formulation of new norms that inform the design of policy 
programs and international practices.92 In other words, learning has been a constant in the 
organization's behavior. The integration of a gender perspective into peacekeeping 
practices is part of a learning process focused on the increasing importance of the 
individual in international security and responds to renewed challenges on the ground 
with spill-over effects to UN's overall protection strategies.
With the increased impact of conflicts and other threats to individuals' security 
and rights the UN initiated a learning process to adapt its structure and policies and better 
respond to these challenges. As part of this process, a conceptual framework based on 
human security has arisen and with that peace operations focused on the security of the 
individuals living within the state were put in practice. Despite the repeated failures, the 
UN is continuously re-examining its practices and generating new ones in a continuous 
learning process.
92 Leon Godenker and Christer Jonsson, "Evolution in Knowledge," in The Oxford Handbook on the United 
Nations, ed. Thomas Weiss and Sam Daws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). p.83
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The incorporation of a gender approach to peace operations is part of that. While 
norms focused on the individual have arisen, women's issues have gained terrain within 
the UN. In fact, the organization has been the principal venue for the development of 
women's rights and specific gender concerns. Although women's issues have been 
developed in separated structures, recently there is a tendency of considering the matter 
as a cross-cutting issue in all of the organization's activities. Evidence of that is the 
creation of the UN-Women, the merger of four different institutions dedicated to the 
advancement of women as a ways to better coordinate efforts and enhance gender 
mainstreaming.
The debut of gender considerations in the international peace and security has 
been mostly focused on the specific needs of women and girls in conflicts, specifically 
their vulnerability to conflict-related sexual violence. Although other gender groups are 
often victims of these acts as well, women have been disproportionately affected, and 
thus the UN has taken important steps to address this problem. In this context, the 
“Women, Peace and Security Resolutions” offer the blueprint for a better response on the 
ground. As such, it has disseminated and institutionalized gender in peacekeeping 
practices as part of UN's organizational learning. Despite that, there is still an 
implementation gap, especially on the field and among part o f the membership that raise 
obstacles this learning to have a deeper impact on the ground.
In terms of implementation, the development of accountability, monitoring and 
implementation tools comprise major advances. Once in place they support the process of 
translating into practice resolutions' provisions. Moreover, a growing number of 
supporting documents, such as training modules, and checklists for the military
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component, manuals and studies to be used by all actors involved are being generated. 
The challenge however, remains member-states compliance.
In fact, despite commitments to put gender equality in practice, the different 
organizational and national cultures present within the UN comprise the main obstacle for 
a universal dissemination of a gender approach. 93 The full implementation o f these 
practices depends on member states compliance and staff willingness to incorporate 
gender approaches to its daily work. Nonetheless, their “cultural baggage” and 
detrimental considerations to women's issues becomes clear when policies are generated 
without the full consideration of how they impact on women's lives.94 In no other area 
this is clearer than within the military component deployed on the ground. As the analysis 
o f case studies will show, certain battalions are 100% male and refuse to communicate 
with local women, further hampering the organization's ability to provide an adequate 
response to gender based violence.
Still, the development o f these renewed norms and practices focused on women's 
specific needs, rights and status comprise a great accomplish on its own. Gender 
approaches provide a more nuanced analysis of the context and available policies, 
shaping the way certain issues are perceived as well as the design of protection strategies. 
By promoting a gender approach to peace operations the UN is promoting more equitable 
societies and ultimately a stronger base for founding a lasting peace.
93 Heidi Hudson, "Peacekeeping Trends and Their Gender Implications for Regional Peacekeeping Forces 
in Africa: Progress and Challenges," in Gender, Conflict, and Peacekeeping, ed. Angela Raven-Roberts 
Dyan Mazurana, Jane Parpart (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005). p .l 11
94 Angela Raven-Roberts, "Gender Mainstreaming in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Talking the 
Walk, Tripping over the Walk," ibid., ed. Dyan Mazurana, Angela Raven-Roberts, and Jane Parpart 
(Rowman and Littlefield Publishers).p.43-44.
163
In this context, UN's learning process has been successful in creating and 
institutionalizing new practices however whether or not the organization has thrived in 
disseminating these to its membership and field missions remains a question. Member 
states are adopting changes at a different paces, as it becomes evident in the analysis of 
the case studies. Another challenge is the military behavior itself and their relationship 
with renewed protection of civilian tasks. As rightly put by MacKay, it is in the nature of 
the military itself, “there is a contradiction between the warrior soldier, trained for arms 
and to fight and kill, and the image of the peacekeeper, trained to negotiate, protect and 
defuse tension.”95 And so the question of whether or not we can request them to perform 
the kind of tasks that a gender approach requires persists.
The following two chapter will focus on UN's gender strategy on the ground and 
will evaluate both the cases of Haiti and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The two 
cases offer a rich analytical context since the context and nature of sexual violence are so 
different in the two countries. Most importantly, while sexual violence has reached 
unprecedented levels in the DRC, attention has been captured and a specific mandate to 
protect women and girls was established. Haiti, by contrast, only had the protection of 
women against sexual violence included in its mandate recently. While a complete 
learning process depends on the adoption of renewed practices by both the UN and 
member states, the evaluation of the two cases will show that learning at the two levels is 
interdependent. And in this case, the UN has taken the first step in addressing gender 
based violence.
95 Angela Mackay, "Mainstreaming Gender in United Nations Peacekeeping Training: Examples from East 
Timor, Ethiopia, and Eritrea," ibid. (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers), p.278
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CHAPTER 4 
WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI
Adopting a gender perspective to UN peace operations is part of a learning 
process initiated by the organization to improve its response to the renewed challenges 
found on the ground. As a result, an inquiry and re-examination process of existing 
practices was initiated, leading to the formulation of a renewed sound normative 
framework. While the new normalcy focused on the protection of individuals and 
women's rights, novel international practices focused on the impact of war on specific 
gender groups were launched. The logic was simple: addressing the specific impacts of 
war on women, better protecting the population from sexual and other gender based 
crime and improving the social, economic and political status of women would promote a 
more balanced, equitable and fair society, establishing the foundations for a lasting peace.
However, as the preliminary analysis in chapter 3 showed, the initiative suffers 
from an implementation gap. Although guidelines, training modules, strategies and infra­
structure have been generated to accommodate the new provisions, the UN still confronts 
major challenges, including member states compliance and lack of resources. While 
missions are still established under encompassing mandates and limited resources, 
member states fail to send effective, well-trained troops with the participation of female 
personnel. This of course is not the only challenge, but has become the most visible.
In order to further pinpoint where the implementation gap takes place and 
supports a mainstreaming strategy to further disseminate these renewed practices, this 
chapter analyzes the case study o f Haiti and the actions on the ground that have been
165
carried out by the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)1. On the 
one hand, it attempts to identify initiatives that contribute to promote a gender 
perspective in the host nation, on the other it evaluates if  UN directives are adopted by 
troop contributing states (TCCs). This analysis will contribute to determine whether the 
UN's organizational learning and its renewed focus on the individual are being 
implemented, are taken into account by member states, and whether changes towards that 
goal are being promoted.
Haiti is an interesting case study. It has been plagued by sexual and other forms of 
gender based violence against women for a long time, and has been the object o f different 
UN peacekeeping missions since the 1990s. Moreover, it reflects a paradoxical reality: it 
is not a conflict or post-conflict situation. Gang rivalries led to the multiplication of 
several political upheavals and the worsening o f the security and humanitarian situation. 
Although Haitians fought Haitians on the streets, it was just enough not to be called or 
considered a civil war by the international community and the Haitians themselves.
MINUSTAH has been active in the country since 2004 and despite the 
accomplishment of important goals, such as the establishment of a democratic 
government and the improvement of the security situation, Haiti confronts a complex 
humanitarian crisis exacerbated by the constant recurrence o f natural disasters and the 
dependence on foreign aid. As Haitians demand the UN to leave, its weak government 
structure shakes dangerously in the light of new political disturbances and lack of 
resources to address its population's basic needs.
1 From the French “Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti”.
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Nonetheless, the absence of a clear protection of a civilian mandate as a high 
priority shows that the incorporation o f protection strategies into the planning, execution 
and evaluation of operations is dependent on the context. The same is true in regard to 
specific provisions to respond to women's special needs and threats. It was only after the 
earthquake and the increased levels of violence against women and girls that tasks that 
specifically deal with the matter were explicitly mentioned in the mission's mandate and 
translated into practice.
As this realization is an important contribution to the strengthening of the UN's 
efforts worldwide, it also shows that it is not until violence becomes a quintessential 
feature o f a conflict, post conflict or reconstruction setting, that specific protection 
mandates are formulated. Finally, it is only after this legal framework is established that 
specific tasks are designed to be carried out by the mission personnel on the ground.
This chapter will thus be divided in three main sections. The first will provide rich 
background information on Haiti's historical context, emphasizing the role that weak and 
corrupt governments have had on the elevated levels of violence and the specific 
consequences for Haitian women. The Haitian state has long been characterized as 
predatory, having oppressed the population and inflicted elevated levels o f violence 
against them. In this context, women have not escaped. Although being traditionally 
considered second-class citizens, they suffered during the bloodiest of the dictatorships 
that reined the country, the Duvalier dynasty. During that period, Haitian women were 
oppressed and victimized as much their male compatriots, being further subjected to sex- 
specific violence, such as rape. The practice continued throughout the years and
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subsequent governments. Currently, gang related and opportunistic violence is the most 
common feature of gender based violence in Haiti.
The second section will look into the UN’s presence in Haiti since the 1990s, 
underlining the limits of intervention and the current format of the mission. As an 
integrated peace operation, MINUSTAH's actions are carried out by its three components 
(police, military and civilian), often in cooperation. Although each have distinguished 
mandates, challenges on the ground become complex and multi-dimensional joint efforts 
become necessary. It is important however, that as the country stabilizes, the mission 
enters a new phase and is preparing to leave. Understanding how this process will take 
place is imperative to address the government's capacity to maintain sustained efforts on 
its own in the subsequent period.
The final section will evaluate how MINUSTAH has incorporated a gender 
perspective in accordance with the five previously defined indicators, that is, legal 
framework, gender balance, security sector, protection and empowerment. Despite its 
limits, MINUSTAH's gender policy has improved throughout time and has given 
important steps towards the consideration of gender as a cross-cutting issue for a 
successful reconstruction and development strategy.
From the pearl of the Caribbean to a broken nation
Haiti, “the mountainous land”,2 is the home of 10 million inhabitants, the poorest 
o f the Americas. It is also the place where there are more NGOs per square meter are 
settled and fight over the scarce available international resources in an economic crisis
2 Haiti means “Mountainous language” in the Arawak language o f  the original Taino inhabitants o f the 
Hispaniola Island.
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setting. However, not even concentrated aid has managed to rescue Haiti from its current 
gruesome condition. The socio-economic devastation, gang-related crime, a weak and 
corrupt government, an under-prepared national police and a disillusioned population are 
just some of the countless challenges ahead.
Current literature on Haiti emphasizes the ghastly effects o f the January 2010 
earthquake that hit the island and brought 60% of the capital city to the ground. 
Nevertheless, few analyses went beyond the obvious grisly economic conditions as a 
main reason explaining the country's unpreparedness for a high magnitude earthquake. 
Haiti's long history of authoritarianism and oppression, class cleavage -  often expressed 
in the form of state corruption and embezzlement of official funds -  foreign intervention, 
neglectful and dishonest leaders compound the picture of this complex state. 
Understanding these factors is a step forward to formulate adequate and responsive 
policies and to comprehend the UN strategy in the country.
At the same time, understanding how these factors affect the lives of Haitian 
women is central for an adequate assessment of their current living conditions. Despite 
the widespread presence of gang related and politically motivated violence against 
women, the media have emphasized insecurity in IDP camps as the main explanatory 
factors behind these violent acts. Although it is true that with the reasonably controlled 
political situation and the pacification of areas where these armed groups acted may have 
contributed to a decrease o f systematic acts of violence against women, violence follows 
at a continuum and is still present in Haitian society.
They have historically been victims of violence and still are. Violence against 
women is not only politically motivated, a tool o f war or an opportunistic act, it reflects
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the status o f women in society and a particular mindset that justifies it. Hence, 
understanding women's vulnerability to violence also includes learning about their living 
conditions, their political participation and possibilities for the future. This section will 
then focus on the tale of how Haiti became a violent nation and the specific implications 
of it for Haitian women.
A contextual note: class divide, violence and corruption
Most people know Haiti for the disasters it has endured and not for its historical 
past or the wonders that once made this country known as the “Pearl o f the Caribbean”. 
The road to a broken nation has been a long one. In fact, the history of exploitation and 
oppression is as long as the country's existence as a political entity from the moment the 
first Spanish colonizer stepped on the island. During the French colonization, initiated in 
1697, the country was dedicated to the production of sugar and became the richest and 
most prosperous of the Caribbean, hence “the Pearl of the Caribbean”. Nonetheless, only 
landowners, that is 5% of the Haitian population would benefit during the French 
domination period.3
The enormous class divide has been present in Haiti's history from the beginning. 
In fact, it is the alignment of the elite with either corrupt governments or the military that 
has resulted in the frequent political disturbances and the despotic inheritance as 
illustrated by the numerous individuals that declared themselves emperors, presidents and 
governors for life since Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the first Haitian ruler. A “predatory 
republic”, as Haiti has been called, “is a regime in which the trappings o f a liberal
3 Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, Haiti: The Breached Citadel (Toronto: Canadian Scholar Press, 2004). p.7
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democracy co-exist with the Hobbesian struggle to monopolize the few sites of public 
power with access to wealth and privilege.”4 In other words, the government has been 
repeatedly used by a minority to maintain its political and economic status at the expense 
of everybody else, reinforcing a “generalized pattern of callous indifference and a 
thoroughly individualist attitude.”5
Indeed, the country has consistently been plagued by weak and often corrupt 
successive governments. The constant political disturbances have also caused economic 
paralysis and chaos throughout Haiti. It was only recently that a democratically elected 
president handed the government over to another democratically elected president. 
Oppression and coups d'etat have also been a constant in this country where serious 
violations of human rights, including torture, forced disappearances, kidnapping, amongst 
others have often been committed against the civilian population.
Haitians often appeal to superstition when trying to cope with the country's 
enormous problems. During the night, the sounds of the voodoo practices could be heard 
in different locations and stories about how Haiti became a broken nation fill the 
imaginary of the local population. Whether ancient Haitians, practitioners o f voodoo, are 
responsible for bringing disgrace to the country through an evil pact with the devil is 
unknown; however, many believe that an equally powerful and mystical action is 
necessary to rescue the country from its current humanitarian situation.6
4 Robert Fatton, Haiti's Predatory Republic : The Unending Transition to Democracy (Boulder, Co.: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002). p.8
5 Ibid.
6 During the field-work, different interviewees commented that Haitians truly believe that the country is 
cursed as a result o f  a pact that Haitian ancestors did with the devil.
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Throughout history the now extinct Haitian Armed Forces have been used to 
oppress the population and are the main perpetrators of serious human rights abuses 
during the ever-lasting military rule. With few exceptions, including the US occupation 
period (1915-1934), the majority of Haitian presidential regimes have been headed by 
generals. After independence and with no official recognition on the part of France or the 
United States until 1825 and 1862 respectively, Haitian liberators with no knowledge or 
culture o f democratic practice, proclaimed themselves the defenders and the permanent 
government of the island, following the French model of military organization that they 
knew.7 And so they built up a militarized state, with weak civilian institutions and 
ministries, and a senate and a parliament crowded with military personnel. In a nutshell, a 
government by the military for the military.8
Because there was an important concern about the possibility o f external 
intervention, the army opted to create a de-centralized and fragmented institution, 
resulting in competing units across the region. The competition among these different 
military units would result in the constant struggle between them over the central power, 
as shown by the successive different military governments that governed the country 
coup after coup. In 1915 though, with the US occupation, the army was re-structured, 
centralized and professionalized. Under US control, the Haitian armed forces were 
consolidated in Port-au-Prince and assumed mostly a police function, while the external 
defense was entrusted to the marines.9 A new constitution established that the president





was the head of the army and throughout that period, civilian presidents, supported by the 
foreign forces, were able to govern the country.
Nonetheless, as nationalist movements against the occupation and international 
pressure grew stronger, the marines left and with that old habits resumed. The 
interference of a now more organized and professional army in the political affairs of the 
state was once again an easily identifiable feature of Haitian politics. The alliance with 
elite interests though was a necessary condition for the success of military actions in the 
country's politics. As the army's role became to abolishing unhelpful dictators, the 
Duvalier strategy was plain and simple: neutralize the army and stay in power.
The Duvalier reign, composed by father and son presidential turns for almost 30 
years, passes in Haiti's history as one of the bloodiest of all the dictatorships. Under a 
populist and black nationalist platform, Francois Duvalier won the 1957 elections. 
Neutralizing the army and maintaining his corrupt rule was a priority, and thus, Papa Doc 
- as he was also known - created a paramilitary force, the Tonton Macoutes.10 During his 
presidency, the Tonton Macoutes were used to counterbalance the army and oppress 
political opposition. By dismissing and transferring military dissidents to recently created 
military attache posts overseas and the introduction of the Tonton Macoute as an 
auxiliary force of the army, the army's ability to overthrow the dictator was seriously 
undermined. At the same time, oppression against the population reached unprecedented
10 The creation o f this paramilitary force was a slow process that according to Laguerre (1993, p .l 10) can 
be divided in three phases. Firstly, when they were known as “cagoulards”, their identities were kept secret 
and they would function as spies and oppressing “police” for the regime, being responsible for 
intimidations and physical harm to members o f the opposition. The second phase, consisted o f  the slow 
process through which they started to carry out interrogations and arrests on their own, culminating in the 
official creation o f  the Tonton Macoute, a paramilitary force, trained by the army, who would receive more 
benefits and have more authority than the army itself. In practice it resulted in a parallel, more powerful 
and less organized armed organization. It is said that occasionally not even the central government would 
know for sure the number and identities o f  its members.
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levels to the point that it pitted all of society against the regime: poor, middle class or 
rich, men or women, suffered from the atrocities committed by the president's militia. It 
was during his tenure that many Haitians left the country never to return.
The atrocities continued in the following government of Jean-Claude Duvalier, 
Baby Doc, only to further prevent the country from getting on track. Paradoxically, the 
excesses committed during the Duvalier era is a turning point in Haitian history that led 
to the rise and strengthening of social movements and a renewed political conscience 
among the citizenry in general. Unfortunately, the emergence of a civil society in Haiti as 
a force to limit and counterweight the use o f violence by the state apparatus against the 
population has had limited effects thus far.
Following the fall o f Baby Doc, exiled in France, a series of military governments 
controlled the country. However, a popular movement bom during the Duvalier period 
would be strengthened and emerge as a promising political force whose agenda was more 
closely identified with that of the majority of the Haitians. The Lavalas movement was 
headed by Jean Bertrand Aristide, carried the slogan “tout moun se moun” (every person 
is a person) and swept the streets of Port- Au-Prince and the rest of the country. In the 
1990-91 elections, 67% of Haitians cast their ballots and elected Aristide as the new 
president of the Republic.
That was an important moment in the historical memory of most Haitians, who 
finally saw a change in the dominant political structure. Indeed, prior to the coup that 
would overthrow Aristide after only seven months, he put in place a thorough program 
responsive to the demands of the lowest sectors, including basic needs programs and
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more public spending on health, education, potable water, electricity, judicial reform, 
rural infra-structure, and so on."
Aristide's government, however, inherited endemic problems that resulted from 
the political culture and structure of Haitian society: a civilian opposition including 
hardcore Duvallierists, a discontented business community and an army wary of the 
president's intention to separate the police from the military.12 As a result, the balance 
between the interests of the elite and those of the military was once again destabilized, 
resulting in the coup that culminated in the bloody government of Raoul Cedras for the 
next three years.
Increasing international pressure led to a UN/US armed intervention in 1993 
counting more than 20,000 soldiers involved. Aristide was authorized to return at the end 
of 1994 after spending three years in exile. His return, though, was considered a major 
disappointment, since the old patterns of corruption and despotism would resume. Most 
importantly, due to the numerous problems caused by the Haitian military, it was 
dismantled in 1995 and a new police institution was created with the support o f the UN.
Many o f the former military joined the new Haitian National Police (HNP), while 
others joined gangs and other armed groups, often related to those paramilitary forces, 
such as the Tonton Macoutes, that have constantly contributed to increased levels of 
violence in the country, particularly in some neighborhoods o f the capital Port-au-Prince.
11 Beverly Bell, Walking on Fire : Haitian Women's Stories o f  Survival and Resistance (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 2001). p. 154
12 Laguerre (1993, p.6) argues that the army 's strong opposition against the separation o f  the army and the 
police prompted the coup. He points out four main reasons as to why the army was strongly against the 
creation o f  a separate civilian police force. Firstly, it would severely reduce the army's size and hence its 
influence; secondly, the police comprised an important source o f  legal income and a point o f  contact with 
civilian politicians and civil society; thirdly, an independent police force may be a nuisance to the army's 
influence and illegal activities; and finally, it would just become harder for the army to depose a 
government as they had been doing throughout the years.
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Also worth mentioning is the fact that Aristide himself created the chimeres, another 
paramilitary group used to silence opponents. Other groups, such as the ziglendos, 
constituted criminal organizations, without a political agenda, but usually involved in 
drug trafficking and other illegal activities that terrorized, looted and abused the 
population for its own economic benefits.13
In 2004, the international community yet again watched another political uprising 
in Haiti. The country's usual political disturbances would soon disrupt Aristide's second 
term initiated after his election in 2000. In February 2004, a revolt began in the city of 
Gonaives and soon spread to other parts of the country. As the government lost control 
over the capital city, politically motivated and gang related violence resumed again. Jean 
Bertrand Aristide was removed from power and exiled in Africa. While the participation 
of the US government in those events could not be confirmed, an interim government led 
by Boniface Alexandre as President and Gerard Latortue as Prime Minister was 
established.
The UN's first reaction was to authorize a Multinational Interim Force soon to be 
substituted by a stabilization mission to support constitutional political process and the 
establishment of a secure and stable environment.14 MINUSTAH was soon established 
with the primary mandate of restoring a secure and stable environment, promoting the
13 Fatton, Haiti's Predatory Republic : The Unending Transition to Democracy.
14 This Multinational Interim Force was established under Security Council resolution 1529 (2004). United 
Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1529", February 24, 2004, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/l 529(2004).
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political process, strengthening Haiti's government institutions and rule of law structures 
and finally promoting and protecting human rights.15
In 2006, democratically elected Rene Preval assumed the presidency until Michel 
Martelly won the following elections and assumed his position as the new president in 
2011. The peaceful and uninterrupted transition from one democratically elected 
government to another is considered by MINUSTAH officials an important 
accomplishment to the democratic tradition in this rather volatile country.
The years of 2006 and 2007 marked the entrance of a renewed security situation 
when several of the most dangerous districts within the capital of Port-au-Prince were 
pacified by UN soldiers. Gangs were dismantled and there was no organized violence 
against the Haitian state. In that context, insecurity would be more related to fights 
amongst different gang members, drug and arms trafficking, robberies and kidnapping.
This context led to another phase in the reconstruction of devastated Haiti. The 
years from 2008 to 2010 left the “peace enforcement” phase behind and focused on 
strengthening the Haitian government and institutions as well as maintaining a controlled 
security situation. However, the 2010 earthquake was a serious and severe blow to Haiti's 
economic, social and political recovery. In the light of 220,000 deaths, the complete 
destruction of 60% of all government buildings and other important infrastructure, 
including the UN headquarters, the Security Council authorized an increased deployment
15 MINUSTAH was established under Security Council resolution 1542 (2004). "Resolution 1542", April 
30, 2004, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/l 542(2004).
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of forces to the fragile country to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction and 
stability efforts.16
The earthquake, whose epicenter was just 15 km southeast o f the capital Port-au- 
Prince, caused US$7.2 billion worth in damage that surpassed Haiti's 2009 entire GDP 
by 20%. As the already fragile economy and political infra-structure of Haiti yielded to 
the 7.0 magnitude earthquake, the security and humanitarian situation worsened to 
alarming levels. Joint planning with humanitarian agencies and UN-country teams was 
encouraged and the mission's efforts to stabilize the country were driven by the 
earthquake context until recently. Currently, humanitarian efforts are being phased out 
and a development approach focused on strengthening the government capacity is being 
put in place.
As this brief context shows, Haiti is a very complex and paradoxical case. 
Thinking about gender in Haitian society also means tackling the problems related to its 
history of corruption and despotism, economic dependency and inability to build a 
reliable police force and a justice system accountable for the rule of law and the abuses of 
those in power. The following section will provide an overview of the status of Haitian 
women and the development o f the women's movement in the country.
Women in Haiti and gender based violence
The persistent exclusion and discrimination of women since the foundation of the 
Haitian state aligned with the Republic's continuous political unrest, extreme poverty and
16 Data displayed in the official website o f  the Office o f the Special Envoy for Haiti. See: Office o f  the 
Secretary General Special Adviser, “ Key Statistics,” 10/16/2012, http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/relief- 
and-recovery/key-statistics/.
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succession of weak and corrupt governments have contributed to the vulnerable condition 
of Haitian women. The paralysis of the economic system, the lack of security on the 
streets, the anxiety caused by the extreme conditions in which most of the population 
lives and the blurring o f the barriers between the public and private spheres also 
contribute to violence and to the opportunistic brutal acts often suffered by women. 
Likewise, Haitian women have historically been defined as minor citizens by the state 
and submitted to politically motivated gender based violence. Haiti may not have a 
conflict and the violence against women may not be called a tool of war, but it can 
certainly be called a tool of oppression.
Throughout history, Haitian law has defined women as daughters and wives of 
Haitian men. Until 1979 married women were legally considered minors and Haitian 
women married to foreigners would lose their citizenship and property rights.17 As a 
matter of fact, according to common law marriage, in the wake of the husband's death, 
and in the absence of an offspring, the couple's property and goods would go to the dead 
husband's parents and siblings. Moreover, the criminalization of rape in Haitian law 
came late, only in 2005, and to this day formal prosecution o f any type of criminals is 
rare.18
Numerous reports from different human rights organizations documented 
widespread violence against women particularly in the 1990s, indicating that besides 
being victims of all forms of violence as much as male counterparts, they were further
17 Bell, Walking on Fire : Haitian Women's Stories o f  Survival and Resistance. p.21
18 Interview with representatives from some NGOs on the field, including Avocats sans Frontier, Viva Rio 
and SOFA indicated that occasionally, an informal arrangement in the form o f financial compensation 
exists between victim's family and perpetrator. Interviews with these NGOs representatives were carried 
out in Port-au-Prince, June, 2011.
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inflicted with sexual violence, including rape, beatings, physical mutilation and assaults. 
These politically motivated rapes were particularly common during the Duvalier period 
and after the 1991 military coup d'etat that overthrew President Jean Bertrand Aristide.
However, as much as historical accounts ignore the participation of Haitian 
women in key turning points o f Haitian history, such as the anti-colonial struggle, 19 
reports on gender based violence in Haiti only started to appear in the 1990s. The first 
report on rape in Haiti was not published until 1994. It discussed the organized state 
violence against women during the 1991-93 coup, finding that women were often raped 
and/or subjected to other forms o f gender based violence for their political beliefs and 
their relationship with others that would hold political beliefs other than those of the 
dictatorship.20 Acts were generally committed by members o f the armed forces in Pro- 
Aristide neighborhoods. Another report by the UN/OAS Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) in 
Haiti showed that 52% of rape victims were close relatives of activists while 18% were 
activists themselves.21
Nonetheless, a prominent author in the literature of Haitian feminism, Carolle 
Charlies,22 argued that the violence and the sex-specific abuses inflicted on Haitian 
women -  and men for that matter -  during the Duvalier government reached extreme 
levels and contributed to changing gender relations within the society. Women, for the
19 The role played by women and their participation in the anti-slavery and anti-colonial war o f  
independence are left out o f  historical accounts. In fact, their “political” participation tended to focus on the 
benevolent actions o f  the wives o f  leaders. However, their active participation took varied form o f protests 
and other actions including “suicide, poisoning, participation in marronage and rebellions”. (Charlies,
1995.p. 146)
20 National Coalition for Haitian Refugees and Human Rights Watch, "Rape in Haiti: A Weapon o f  Terror" 
(New York, July, 1994).
21 UN/OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti, "Haiti: Droits De L’homme Et Rehabilitation Des 
Victimes," (Port-au-Prince, 1997).
22 Carolle Charlies, "Gender and Politics in Contemporary Haiti: The Duvalierist State, Transnationalism, 
and the Emergence o f  a New Feminism (1980-1990)," Feminist Studies 21, no. 1 (1995). p .139
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first time, were viewed as an important political actor, and thus they would become the 
target of state violence as much as male compatriots.
Throughout the years and Haitian history, political disturbances and state 
organized violence have affected the development and institutionalization o f women's 
movements. The first Haitian feminist organization, the Ligue Feminine d'Action Sociale 
[Feminine League for Social Action], was created in 1934 and was dedicated to women's 
political rights, such as universal suffrage and other rights, including marriage equality 
and equal access to education. These women came from privileged backgrounds and 
were more concerned about gender in its relationship with the state rather than within the 
household. They have contributed to the accomplishment o f important goals such as the 
right to vote and access to higher education in 1950, although those were still limited to 
Haitian women of select segments of society.23
With the inauguration of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1957, women's 
organizations, members and activists were systematically targeted and attacked, 
banishing them to the underground and limiting their activities throughout the period.24 
However, since the state no longer considered them politically innocent actors, they 
became conscious of their role. By the end of Baby Doc's reign, in 1986, women groups 
had staged various protests, including a march against all forms of gender discrimination 
that counted more than 30,000 women.25 The period marked by high levels of violence
25 Ibid.p.146
24 Anne Fuller, "Violence: Haitian Women Unite W om en's Rights and Human Rights," Association o f  
Concerned African Scholars (1999).
25 Charlies, "Gender and Politics in Contemporary Haiti: The Duvalierist State, Transnationalism, and the 
Emergence o f a New Feminism (1980-1990)." p .152
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resulted in renewed awareness amongst women groups o f their collective subject of 
social change.
It was also during this period that the first Haitian exodus occurred and the 
women's movement gained another boost from exiled Haitian women in the United 
States and Canada. Initially centered in the patriotic movement, these movements would 
soon be organized around clear gender issues. Charlies argues that immigrants in North 
America were confronted with the ascribed social and sexual roles they had forgone.26 
Increasing control over the household resources and identification with the problems that 
Canadian and American women also confronted, they turned their political agenda 
toward gender issues in addition to the general mission against Duvalier’s oppressive 
regime.
The end of the Duvalier period and the return of many of these refugees resulted 
in an enormous momentum for the development o f the women's movement in the 
country. Some of these organizations are still currently active, such as Fanm D'Ayiti 
[Haitian Women], Comite Feminin [Feminine Committee], SOFA and Kay Fanm 
[Women's Home]. The presence of these returned refugees in these organizations is 
striking, reaching up to 60% of their members.27 Moreover, although poor women had 
been consistently left out of feminist movements, the Duvalier dictatorship leveled class 
differences and united women. During this period, they came together in the struggle for 
women's rights and lobbied the government to fulfill its duties as the guarantor of those 
rights.28
26 Ibid. p. 149
27 Ibid. p. 152
28 Bell, Walking on Fire : Haitian Women's Stories o f  Survival and Resistance, p. 150
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Under Aristide's rule, the movement accomplished important victories. In 1994, 
the army was dismantled and a Ministry of Women's Condition and Women's Rights 
was created. In fact, six of Aristide's ministries, including the post o f prime minister, 
were headed by women, giving space to the implementation of top-down initiatives for 
the rights of women.29 In 1995, Haiti was represented by the Minister of Women's 
Conditions and Women's Rights at the Conference on Women in Beijing. At the same 
time, Haitian civil society organizations carried out dissemination and awareness 
campaigns regarding the Conference and its importance in the country. Over the years the 
Ministry has had its budget reduced and was almost shut down a few times, indicating 
that women affairs are nowhere close to being a priority for the Haitian government.
More recently, particularly after the second time Aristide was overthrown in 
2004, violence against women has increased again.30 Cases of gang rapes have 
multiplied, particularly in the years between 2004 and2006. Although accurate data on 
this kind of crime is difficult to find, a report by the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights on the situation of violence and discrimination on women reported that 
GHESKIO hospital received approximately ten rape cases per day during the month of 
November 2006.31 The Commission also acknowledged having received documentation 
from varied sources on several more cases of horrendous nature, such as family members 
being forced to have sexual intercourse with relatives. In most of the cases, unidentified 
armed groups or gangs were the primary perpetrators of violence. Accounts of women
29 Besides the Ministry o f  Women's condition and the Prime minister, the ministries o f  Foreign Affairs, 
Education, Commerce, Social Affairs and Labor and Information were represented by women.
30 Joe Mozingo, "In Haiti's Chaos, Unpunished Rape Was Norm," The Miami Herald, May 16th, 2004.
31 Inter-American Comission o f  Human Rights, "The Right o f Women in Haiti to Be Free from Violence 
and Discrimination" (Washington D. C.: Organization o f  Ameircan States, March 10, 2009). Paragraph 50.
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being forced to work for gangs are also mentioned. Besides serving their aggressors, 
many women were also subjected to beatings and sexual violence.
During this period, there were entire sections of the capital that were controlled by 
gangs with near total absence of the state in several areas where not even the UN could 
fully operate. On the bright side though, the subsequent pacification of these 
neighborhoods highly contributed to decreasing levels of urban violence, including those 
perpetrated against women. This is one of MINUSTAH's successes.
Haiti is a signatory of important covenants and conventions on women's and 
human rights. As an original UN member, the country has ratified the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. It has also ratified the Convention for the Elimination of 
all Forms o f Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1981, and the Inter-American 
Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of violence Against Women 
in 1996. Moreover, with the exception of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and the Convention Against Torture, and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment and Punishment, Haiti has signed all major conventions and 
covenants. However, signature of these legal instruments has had little practical and 
formal significance.
What is more, the country has a long-history of discrimination against the female 
population, which has resulted in the current vulnerable status of women in Haitian 
society. Discriminatory practices also hinder efforts to make the state accountable for its 
duties. By signing these international agreements, the Haitian government has 
acknowledged its responsibility for addressing gender imbalances and violence against
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women. It should be stressed that its inability to do so constitutes a human rights 
violation.
Interestingly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported in 2009 
that the current situation of women in Haiti “(•••) is a result of the historical 
discrimination and inferior treatment they have faced because of their sex, compared to 
their male counterparts. (...) forms of discrimination against women have been a fixture 
in the history of Haiti, both in times of peace and in times of unrest and violence.” 32 The 
report also establishes a relationship between the discriminatory behavior of men and the 
brutal acts of violence against women, also fueled by the general acceptance of 
discrimination. The existence of these social conceptions regarding female inferiority and 
subordination, have historically limited women's access to education, health, justice and 
labor in Haiti.33
The field work showed that culture was the primary explanation for gender based 
violence in Haiti. According to most of the interviewees, women’s status in Haitian 
society is a submissive one. Being responsible for the support of the family, they easily 
end up as victims of economic exploitation by their own partner and are targeted in 
unsafe environments, like that of the post-earthquake scenario.
This is also the primary reason why many civil society organizations, both 
international and national, along with UN actors, emphasize that the earthquake context 
only brought to the surface a problem that has always been present in Haitian society. It 
is true that with the displacement of 1.5 million people as a result of the earthquake and 
the establishment of numerous IDP camps, women became even more insecure. Food
32 Ibid. paragraph 7.
33 Ibid.
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shortenings, lack o f separated male/female latrines, limited light, and the absence of 
government or UN forces in the camp in the months following the earthquake were 
factors that contributed to this increased vulnerability. Nonetheless, an understanding of 
the historical conditions that put women in their current vulnerable status in the Haitian 
society is necessary.
Since the earthquake, various reports have pictured the staggering conditions of 
women living in IDP camps and reported on the increased levels of violence against 
them.34 In a 2012 civil society report, it was emphasized that not only numbers of rape 
and sexual assault have risen, but also that survival sex has increasingly been the only 
option for poor women and girls in their quest to survive.35 Survival sex is understood as 
the exchange of sex for food, cash favors and protection in an environment where women 
struggle to cover their basic needs.
Within MINUSTAH, civilians were the most reticent in categorizing SGBV as a 
security problem. However, they did recognize that the occurrence of sexual and other 
forms of violence against women have been frequent within IDP camps. In an interview 
with MINUSTAH's Gender Unit, it was confirmed that the current security conditions 
have facilitated the recurrence of SGBV in Haiti, particularly in the camps, and for that 
reason security counter-actions had been taken.36 Consequently, the UN has tackled the
34 See for example: Amnesty International, "Aftershocks: Women Speak out against Sexual Violence in 
Haiti'S Camps," (London: International Amnesty, 2011).; Brooke Stedman, "Security after the Quake? 
Addressing Violence and Rape in Haiti," in Peace B rief {Washington DC: United States Institute o f  Peace, 
2011).; Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, "Yon Je Louvri: Reducing Vulnerability to Sexual 
Violence in Haiti’s Idp Camps," (New York: CHRGJ, 2012).;Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 
"Sexual Violence in Haiti'S Idp Camps: Results o f  a Household Survey," (New York: CHRGJ, 2011).
35 KOFAVIV International Women’s Human Rights Clinic, MADRE, Center for Gender and Refugee 
Studies,Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, Global Justice Clinic "Struggling to Survive: Sexual 
Exploitation o f Displaced Women and Girls in Port Au Prince, Haiti," (2012).
36 Interview carried out with representative o f  MINUSTAH's Gender Unit, in Port-au-Prince, June, 2011.
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problem of sexual violence with a stronger military and police presence in the IDP 
camps, contributing to a decrease in the levels o f physical insecurity in these places.
However, it is also important that these intrinsic social stereotypes and state 
weaknesses are addressed. While the first step is to increase awareness about Haiti's 
social and historical context among those tasked to protect the population, other steps 
should follow, including efforts to strengthen the judiciary system, the police and 
government capacity to promote equal access to education, health care, justice and the 
labor market.
Accordingly, the UN-Women and many other civil society organizations, such as 
Doctors Without Borders (MSF) and SOFA, a Haitian NGO dedicated to reporting and 
eradicating sexual gender based violence (SGBV), also provided their opinion on the 
matter. They argue that it is a mistake to blame IDP camps for the problem of widespread 
sexual violations and other types of gender based violence (GBV). “It perpetuates a 
wrong view of the problem, GBV has always been present in Haiti; the IDP camps 
violations has only brought the topic to the surface and the international community 
could no longer ignore it”.37
Gender based violence in Haiti is thus different from that in conflict or post- 
conflict situations. First of all, Haiti is not considered by the Haitians or by the 
international community as a conflict or post-conflict zone, despite similar destructive 
signs. And second, the kind of massive rapes and violations used as a tool o f war are not 
observed in Haiti, where the problem seems to be more related to political instability, a 
generational mindset and the current insecure social, economic and political situation.
37 Interview carried out with representative o f UN-Women field office in Haiti in Port-au-Prince, June, 
2 0 1 1 .
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While women are constantly victims of several types of GBV, particularly 
domestic violence, they confront yet another vast array of challenges to pursue treatment 
and justice. As informed by Concertation Nationale [National Dialogue], a national 
platform related to the fight against SGBV comprising local organizations, government 
ministries and international UN agencies, there are only a few health centers that treat 
SGBV victims and even fewer provide them with the “medical certificate”, or official 
proof of crime, necessary for victims to start a law suit.38 Not only the limited number of 
centers challenges their access to medical centers, but also the fact that it is costly, as 
transportation and fees may apply.
Moreover, the Haitian Police lack the capabilities to address these crimes. Not 
only are forensic specialists absent, there are also only a limited number of personnel 
trained in gender issues. Even if victims surmount those obstacles, the justice system will 
pose the next challenge. Barely working, it rarely condemns criminals, who may also 
become victims of the system, being thrown in prisons without judgment or defense 
lawyers.
This debate encounters another difficulty: the reporting system. The “problem of 
data” was common ground in almost all interviews performed. While some would point 
out that the earthquake destroyed the database, others would emphasize that the different 
ways of reporting did not, up to now, allow the establishment of a joint database. As a 
consequence, patterns of SGBV occurrences cannot be determined.
Nonetheless, there seems to be an even more worrisome reason as to why the 
reporting system is so debatable. It seems that there is no consensus on the definition of
38 Interview carried out with representative from the Concertation National in Port-au-Prince, June, 2011.
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SGBV and different actors interpret it in different ways. “What is reported as SGBV? 
Just because the victim is a woman, it does not mean that it involved a case of gender 
based violence. You cannot say that a female victim o f an assault is a victim of gender 
based violence”, explained a UN police officer.39
The position of the MSF representative was a similar one. When asked if the 
organization had a database on SGBV cases it was explained that they did. However, they 
would not make it public because it is not in their interest to officialize 
misinterpretations.40 In this regard, the UN-Women representative added that there had 
been several studies published recently that had emphasized the increasing number of 
SGBV cases, however, it was questioned:
“How do you know if the data indicate that SGBV has increased or if there was an 
increase in reporting violations? The only conclusion one can make out of this is that 
awareness campaigns may be working better and women are less shy to report cases. It 
doesn't necessarily mean there was an increase in sexual violations, it can mean there 
was an increase in reporting the crimes.”41
And that is true. The situation in Haiti is not favorable for reliable quantitative 
data. Not only did the existing database dissolve with the demise of the Ministry of 
Women's Condition,42 but not a single method of collecting data seems to follow any 
statistically reliable technique. Moreover, as gender becomes a fashionable topic and 
more organizations are interested in working in this area, there is a gap between the
39 Interview carried out with UNPol representative in Port-au-Prince, June, 2011.
40 Interview carried out with representative from the Doctors Without Borders (MSF) in Port-au-Prince, 
June, 2011.
41 Interview carried out with representative o f  UN-Women in Port-au-Prince, June, 2011.
42 Along with the Ministry o f Women's Condition, other ministries' buildings and the National Palace 
collapsed with the 2010 earthquake.
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generally accepted definitions of sexual and other types of gender based violence and 
those of many field workers who do not seem to have an adequate or appropriate idea 
about the nature of the issue.
The recent endorsement o f the new Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe and the 
publication of new constitutional amendments, though, represent important progress in 
improving women's vulnerable status in Haiti. Mr. Lamothe was sworn in with a cabinet 
of 22 ministers, o f which 7 were women. Furthermore, with the new constitutional 
amendments, a quota of at least 30% women's in government was approved. These are 
important steps in addressing inequality in a society where gender relations can easily be 
disrupted. Most importantly, it is a small step towards women's empowerment and the 
improvement of their social status.
The analysis has shown that Haiti's history of extreme violence, class divide and 
government corruption has contributed to the gruesome condition that the country 
currently experiences. Violence has been the product of loyal government forces, para­
military forces, armed groups and militias often associated with a political figure seeking 
protection. As they were not adequately demobilized, they would still terrorize the 
population long after their “creators” lost power. In recent years though, MINUSTAH 
actions in the most dangerous neighborhoods has contributed to the decrease of activities 
by these criminal groups.
The elevated levels of violence present in Haitian society were always harshly felt 
by women. If their precarious social, political and economic status increased their 
vulnerability, the presence of these politically motivated violent groups would only result
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in even more violence for them. Quite often, violence against women, meant sexual 
violence.
Throughout the years, though, the issue has gained attention under a different 
facet. As displacement increased in the country, particularly after the earthquake, these 
acts of sexual violence were mostly associated with the lack of security conditions within 
camps and viewed as isolated and opportunistic. Although it is true that the enormous 
displacement has facilitated widespread acts of sexual and gender based violence in Haiti, 
protection strategies only focused on this explanation do not consider the continuum of 
violence and the pre-existent conditions that facilitate the spread of such acts in Haitian 
society. It is true that levels of violence are exacerbated as insecurity in camps grows, but 
this only reflects the vulnerable status of Haitian women. Protection strategies should 
thus remember the past, consider the historical and cultural context and plan accordingly.
The following sections will provide some background on UN action in Haiti and 
give a detailed account of its gender policy on the ground.
Haiti and the UN: a working partnership coming to an end?
As Haiti's historical context has shown, political instability is a constant in Haiti's 
history. Hence, the UN's involvement in Haiti started well before the establishment of 
MINUSTAH in 2004 and it has been accompanied by increasing criticism due to the lack 
of enduring positive outcomes. Missions established prior to MINUSTAH though, had a 
limited mandate and/or were limited to a short duration only. Since it was primarily 
concerned with the development of Haitian police forces after the dismantlement of the 
army during the 1990s, the police remains MINUSTAH's main priority and is the 
primary indicator o f when MINUSTAH will leave the country.
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This section will provide important insights into previous UN interventions, the 
current security situation and challenges for the future. A brief explanation on 
MINUSTAH's structure and the role of each component in the light of the mission's 
mandate will also be provided. As the mission prepares to leave the country, re­
adjustments will occur and it is imperative that gender considerations are highlighted 
during this process.
The UN presence in Haiti
Before 1993, two observation missions were established in Haiti: the United 
Nations Observer Group for the Verification o f the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH) in 
1990 and the joint UN-OAS International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), 
established after Aristide's overthrow in 1991 to observe the status of human rights in the 
country. However, the first peacekeeping operation was only established in 1993, when 
the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was authorized by the Security Council 
with the mandate of supporting the modernization of Haitian armed forces and creating a 
new police force.43 Despite the request of the Haitian government, discord between the 
civilian government and the military forces obstructed the fulfillment of UNMIH's 
mandate.
In 1994, UNMIH's mandate was revised, authorizing the formation of a 
multinational force to prompt the return of the legitimate Haitian government and the 
establishment of the rule of law. The force of about 20,000 men, led by the United States,
43 UNMIH was established by Security Council resolution 867 (1993). United Nations Security Council, 
"Resolution 867", September 23, 1993, http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/515/30/PDF/N9351530.pdf?OpenElement.
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successfully reestablished civilian authority and UNMIH's renewed mandate could be 
fully carried out in 1995.44 According to the new mandate, the mission was tasked with 
assisting the national government in fulfilling its responsibilities, establishing and 
maintaining a stable environment, professionalizing the troubled armed forces and 
creating a separated police force. The returning president, Aristide, then dismantled the 
army and created a new civilian police with the support of the UN peacekeeping mission.
After the legislative and presidential elections -  both held in 1995 -  Aristide, who 
completed his interrupted presidency, handed his position over to the democratically 
elected Rene Preval, who took office in 1996 and officially requested UNMIH to extend 
its mandate until the end o f June of that same year 45 Following UNMIH, the United 
Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) was established in July 1996 with the main 
responsibility of professionalizing and training the recently created Haitian National 
Police (HNP), besides promoting institution-building, national reconciliation and 
economic rehabilitation in Haiti. 46
UNSMIH was substituted by the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti 
(UNTMIH) from August to November 1997. UNTMIH had a small military component 
mostly concerned with the security of UN personnel and a bigger civilian police 
component mostly focused on training HNP's specialized units in crowd control, rapid
44 UNMIH's mandate was revised in 1994 and 1995 through Security Council resolutions 940 (1994) and 
975 (1995). See: "Resolution 940", July 31, 1994, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/312/22/PDF/N9431222.pdf?OpenElement; "Resolution 975", January 
30, 1995, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/028/26/PDF/N9502826.pdf7OpenElement.
45 UNMIH's mandate was extended until June 30th, 1996 by Security Council resolution 1048 (1996). See: 
"Resolution 1048", February 29, 1996,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1048(1996).
46 UNSMIH was established under Security Council resolution 1063 (1996). See: "Resolution 1063", June 
28, 1996, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1063(1996) . .
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reaction force and palace security.47 It was the Secretary General's opinion that without 
the support of the international community, Haiti's new police force would disintegrate 
and be unable to promote a safe and stable environment.
In this context, the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) 
was established in December 1997.48 The mission lacked a military component and was 
concerned primarily with the establishment o f a “professional, self-sustaining, fully 
functioning national police of adequate size and structure, able to conduct the full 
spectrum of police functions, to the consolidation of democracy and the revitalization of 
Haiti's system of justice.”49
When the government fell in 2004, armed groups and gangs took control of varied 
parts of the city. When MINUSTAH was first established, it was authorized to perform 
disarmament and demobilization in any remaining military militia in the country. The 
presence of armed groups and gangs in these safe havens in the capital contributed to an 
increased level of urban violence in Haiti. These gangs, responsible for violent crimes in 
different neighborhoods, are considered “an inherently political phenomena,”50 and were 
used as instruments of political warfare by discontented elites that funded their activities.
Since the control o f the slums in Port-au-Prince by these armed groups constituted 
a threat to the recent reinstalled and fragile government of Haiti (2006), the neutralization 
of their actions was a priority. Consequently, MINUSTAH conducted a series of military 
and police operations with the intention of pacifying the people in these places and
47 UNTMIH was established under Security Council resolution 1123 (1997). See: "Resolution 1123", July 
30, 1997, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/l 123(1997).
48 MIPONUH was established under Security Council Resolution 1141 (1997). "Resolution 1141", 
November 28, 1997, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/l 141 %281997%29.
49 "Resolution 1123."
50 Robert M. Perito and Michael Dziedzic, "Haiti: Confronting the Gangs o f  Port-Au-Prince," in Special 
Report (Washington, DC: United States Institute o f  Peace, 2008).
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capturing gang leaders. The success of this initiative is considered MINUSTAH's number 
one accomplishment.
The pacification of these neighborhoods, particularly Cite Soleil, Bel-air and Cite 
Militaire led Haiti and MINUSTAH to a different phase in the peace efforts. Now, 
development and economic recovery are the country's top priorities. Haiti's gruesome 
economic condition is indeed responsible for its fragile infra-structure and vulnerability 
to the natural disasters that continuously hit the island. Around 2.3 million people were 
displaced after the most recent earthquake and to this day around 390 thousand still live 
in the IDP sites spread around the capital.51
In a context where financial resources are not readily available for the population, 
violence, criminality and political unrest can easily affect the country. Although 
MINUSTAH has passed through a long period of relative calm in past months, the 
volatility of Haiti's security is a widely recognized feature of the country and one 
intrinsically related to the country's economic dependency. The 2012 Report of the 
Secretary General on MINUSTAH efforts showed an increase in homicides throughout 
2012.52 As for the source of increasing instability, it is attributed to the remaining 
presence of armed gangs, usually involved with murders, kidnapping, robberies, narcotics 
and small arms trafficking, racketeering and fights for territorial influence. In fact, 85 to 
90% of these crimes occurred in sensitive areas of Port-au-Prince, such as Bel-Air, Fort
51 Data displayed in the official website o f  the Office o f the Special Envoy for Haiti. See: Office o f  the 
Secretary General Special Adviser, “Key Statistics,” 10/16/2012, http://www.haitispecialenvoy.org/relief- 
and-recovery/key-statistics/.
52 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f the Secretary General on the United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti ", August 30, 2012, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/628. 
paragraph 11.
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National and Martissant, and others widely known for their elevated levels of criminal 
activities, including Cite Soleil, Carrefour and Croix des Bouquets.
But security is not the only problem. For instance, bilateral and multilateral 
donors have allocated 12 billion dollars in humanitarian aid for the post-earthquake 
response, greatly exceeding Haiti's GDP. Because Haiti is so dependent on foreign aid, 
one of the main challenges for stabilization efforts in the future is economic recovery.
Investment of hundreds of millions of dollars in an uncertain intervention and 
additional hundreds of millions in aid has produced poor returns. Although the 
democratic government has been reestablished along with other state institutions since 
2006, there is a gap between the state's capabilities and its desire to be free from the 
international presence within its territory. “Without MINUSTAH, Haiti will return to the 
pre-MINUSTAH state of nature”, was a common response in all interviews with 
international actors performed during the field work. If  that is true, it may not take long 
until we find out. MINUSTAH's forces are being downsized and civilian efforts to build 
governmental capabilities to take over MINUSTAH's tasks are already in place.
According to resolution 2070 that renewed MINUSTAH's mandate in 2012, a 
number of political milestones were accomplished and are a sign of progress in the 
process of stabilization.53 Among them, the resolution cites the parliament’s ratification 
of a new prime minister, the installation of the Superior Council of the judiciary, and the 
publication of the constitutional amendments. It is also important to note advances in the 
security sector, elaborated in the five-year 2012-2016 Haitian National Police (HNP)
53 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 2070", October 12, 2012, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2070%282012%29.
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Development Plan, and jointly presented by MINUSTAH and the Haitian National 
Police.
The strengthening of the Haitian security sector, including the judiciary system 
and the police, is an important step toward improving the protection and physically 
vulnerable status of Haitian women. Although the current condition of Haitian police is 
still precarious, it is a necessary improvement for a sustained secure environment after 
the UN leaves the country.
MINUSTAH: mandate, structure and personnel
MINUSTAH is an integrated peace operation and as such it has a civilian, a 
military and a police component under a civilian political leadership that collaborates to 
fulfill the UN's mandate on the ground. Although each component has different tasks, 
overall their joint effort contributes to improving the government's authority and its 
capacity to govern the country.
The civilian component is mostly involved in institutionalization efforts and the 
strengthening of the government capacity through the work o f its substantive sections, 
such as Civilian Affairs, Rule of Law, and Human Rights, amongst others. At the same 
time, they are also working on efforts to improve security and the social and economic 
situation in the country. As an illustration, the Community Violence Reduction Section 
implements projects that aim to provide the local population with temporary jobs and/or 
training to develop basic skills for their own survival. This section, along with Civilian 
Affairs, often provides funding for projects implemented by various actors including the 
military, thus facilitating their relationship with the local population. Human Rights on its
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part, has been involved in resolving problem of the inadequate response by the criminal 
justice sector to rape complaints.54
The police component’s mandate priority is the mentoring of the Haitian National 
Police and the overseeing of their actions on the ground. This component is thus divided 
in two main pillars: operations and development. While the latter is focused on capacity 
building and training, the former comprises operational work carried out by the police to 
support stabilization efforts and HNP's actions on the ground. An example o f the 
activities carried out by the UN police includes joint patrols with the HNP and the 
military component, training, and generation of tools such as the Standard Operation 
Procedures (SOPs) for gender based violence.
MINUSTAH's police component is formed by Formed Police Units (FPUs) and 
individual police, also known as UNPol. Among the biggest challenges encountered by 
the UN police on the ground, the language barrier, the differentiated training and the 
relationship with the HNP were most cited. Many UNPol come from Canada, France and 
French speaking countries in Africa. Nonetheless, the vast majority of UNPol officers 
speak only English as a second language, complicating the internal communication and 
the communication with those they aim to protect. UNPols come in individual missions 
and usually work with police from different countries that have received different 
training. These differences can, sometimes, pose obstacles to full integration and optimal 
functioning of the system. Finally, because the UN police component does not have the 
executive mandate, it depends on joint actions with the HNP for the success of its
54 A report by this section found that between June to August 2010, 62 cases of rape were reported and as 
o f December 2011, only one had reached prosecution stage pending trial. For more information, see:
Human Rights Section and Office o f the High Commissiner for Human Rights, "A Profile o f  Police and 
Judicial Response to Rape in Port-Au-Prince" (Port-au-Prince: United Nations, June 2012).
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operations. This relationship can sometimes be complicated, since HNP lacks personnel, 
infra-structure and is often accused of corruption and not trusted by the population. 
Consequently, one of UNPoFs objectives is also to improve their interaction with the 
HNP and that of the HNP with the local population.
Figure 4: Military contingents in Haiti
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Finally, the military component has the primary mission of promoting a stable and 
safe environment, conducive to the successful implementation of the UN's mandate and 
the strengthening of government authority and its institutions. The military component 
currently has a total of eight infantry battalions (Argentina, Brazil [2], Chile, Jordan,
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Nepal, Sri Lanka and Uruguay), two infantry companies that are also the Force 
Commander's force of reserve (Bolivia and Peru), a naval unit (Uruguay), a military 
police unit (Guatemala) and six engineer companies (Brazil, Chile-Ecuador, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea and Paraguay).
However, the military component is currently being downsized. In fact, since the 
pacification of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the capital and other areas o f the 
country, the military component has been increasingly involved in the implementation of 
social and economic projects aiming to decrease the physical and structural insecurity of 
Haitian citizens, including the revitalization of public spaces, illumination, and 
professional training.
The downsizing of the military component is part of the mission's strategy. After 
reaching a peak of 8,940 military personnel after the 2010 earthquake, MINUSTAH 
forces are being reduced to a maximum of 6,270 troops.55 According to the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), the security situation has been calm and 
humanitarian efforts are being phased out to be substituted by developmental initiatives 
aiming to strengthen the national government.56 In fact, MINUSTAH's military 
component is no longer present in four of the country's 10 d&partements [departments or 
regions] (South, Grand-Anse, Nippes and North-West) and is slowly being substituted by 
Formed Police Units (FPU), who are taking over the responsibilities for maintaining a 
stable environment. The police component will also be reduced from a total of 3,241 to
55 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 2070." Paragraph 2.
56 Interview carried out with the Special Representative o f the Secretary General and Head o f  Mission 
Mariano Fernandez from Chile in Port-au-Prince, September 2012.
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2,601 personnel, with the withdrawal of 400 individual police and the reduction o f a total 
number of formed police units to 10.
As important stabilization goals are achieved, MINUSTAH continues to adjust its 
format to the national context and to draft a plan for a reconfiguration and conditions- 
based consolidation for the mission. The mission has agreed with the local government, 
civil society partners and UN country team that a few benchmarks are to be established 
serving as key indicators o f progress in the stabilization process. While the operational 
effectiveness of the HNP is the top priority, other benchmarks should evaluate the 
maturity of key rule of law institutions, the capacity to organize fair elections, amongst 
others.
This section provided the background information on the UN's presence in Haiti, 
the current security situation in the country and the challenges for the future. As 
MINUSTAH prepares to leave the country, it is important that stabilization efforts can be 
sustained by the national government on its own. As previously shown, extreme 
conditions in which most of the Haitian population lives in insecurity, have appalling 
effects on the lives of Haitian women. Consequently, it is important that a concerted 
effort to maintain stability and improve living conditions can be sustained over time.
MINUSTAH's current configuration is one of an integrated mission. Considering 
Haiti's context, that is the best format to address the complex challenges confronted by 
the country. At the same time, the calm security environment and absence of conflict 
means that the country no longer needs a UN mission with such an expanded military 
component. The longer the mission stays and the more armed it is, the more Haitians
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openly criticize its presence. During this downsizing phase though, it is important that 
gender receives due attention and that efforts are sustained.
The following section will analyze MINUSTAH's efforts in gender 
mainstreaming. As will be explained, by emphasizing an inclusive approach to improve 
the status of Haitian women, positive spillover effects for the development of a more 
equal Haitian society may be accomplished, facilitating the improvement of social and 
economic conditions of the population in general.
Incorporating gender into peacekeeping: MINUSTAH gender policy and the UN 
learning process
A successful learning process entails an interdependent relationship between the 
organization and member states. As previously analyzed, the UN has done a relatively 
good job in promoting the transformation of its practice in the field o f international peace 
and security by incorporating a gender perspective as a way to accomplish a lasting 
peace. While advances have been noted, it is in the field that major challenges can be 
found. The analysis of MINUSTAH's gender policy and how those five previously 
defined components of UN gender strategy are being implemented in the field can offer 
valuable insights into the specific challenges for the future.
The five variables -  legal framework, gender balance, security sector, protection 
and empowerment -  represent a comprehensive gender strategy that not only looks into 
the physical protection of women but is also concerned about the existing factors that 
contribute to their vulnerability, including living conditions, political and social status 
and weak state institutions, particularly the judiciary and the police. This section will thus
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provide detailed information on MINUSTAH's gender policy and describe its 
accomplishments and shortcomings for each of the five variables.
MINUSTAH's gender policy
Overall, despite the slow pace, MINUSTAH has been successful in implementing 
a gender policy throughout its components and has taken important steps to increase 
women representation within the national government and to improve its capacity to 
respond to gender group specific needs. Particularly, the police component has played a 
fundamental role in improving the national police ability to address gender based 
violence. At the same time, the military component has also shown progress, albeit 
slowly Although gender is not fully incorporated into the routine work of soldiers, 
important accomplishments such as the appointment of gender focal points at battalion 
and company levels show the mission's increasing commitment to gender issues.
The Gender Unit is one of MINUSTAH's civilian substantive sections and has the 
main objective of promoting gender mainstreaming within all MINUSTAH components 
and sections and guaranteeing that their actions are gender sensitive with a positive 
impact for local women. For this purpose, it attempts to cooperate with civil society 
groups, women's organizations and government partners as a way of promoting a more 
equal society and making sure that women’s needs are considered and that the 
government's capacity to protect their rights is enhanced.
MINUSTAH is one of the few missions that have participated in DPKO's 
preliminary testing of the “Guidelines to Incorporate a Gender Perspective into the work
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of UN Military in Peacekeeping Operations”57, and thus is an example of missions in 
which the civilian component is familiar with the topic and understands UN directives on 
Women Peace and Security. Moreover, it is also one o f the nine UN missions that have a 
Senior Gender Adviser in accordance with Resolution 1325.s8
Like most UN missions with a gender office or unit, MINUSTAH's Gender Unit 
works closely with appointed gender focal points within all o f the mission's sections and 
components; in collaboration they attempt to promote gender as a cross cutting issue in 
all implemented projects and actions. Within the military, gender focal points are 
appointed at the component level -  currently the G9 or Civil-Military Chief under the 
mission’s military command occupies that position -  and battalion level. As a result, the 
whole military force and each national contingent, including the smaller company units, 
have a designated gender focal point. The police, for its part, have a Gender Team that 
operates in the offices of the MINUSTAH Gender Unit. Some UNPol commissariats also 
have gender focal points. Although still in progress, these three actors -  the Gender Unit, 
Chief of U-9 and Chief of Police Gender Team -  are increasingly coordinating their 
actions to increase efficiency and promote a positive impact on the ground. The 
challenge, though, is to overcome the bureaucratic complexity of the mission that often 
hampers a timely and integrated response between all components.
57 Department o f  Field Support Department o f  Peacekeeping Operations, "Guidelines for Integrating 
Gender Perspectives into the Work o f  United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations," (New York: 
United Nations, 2010).
58 DPKO maintains a Gender Unit in the following missions: UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic o f Congo (MONUSCO), UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), UN Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL), UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), UN operation in Cote d'Ivoire 
(UNOCI), UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur 
(UNAMID), UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and UN Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL)
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In order to improve collaboration and understanding on gender issues, the gender 
unit provides the tools to strengthen the mission's capacity to include a gender 
perspective in its actions. For example, they administer induction training on gender for 
all uniformed personnel (military and police) and specific gender training for gender 
focal points and uniformed personnel working in IDP camps.59
With regard to the cooperation between MINUSTAH and other UN agencies in 
gender related issues, there is a gender thematic group that existed since before the 
earthquake, but was put aside during post-disaster relief. As the post-earthquake context 
improved, this thematic group has returned and is under the leadership o f the UN- 
Women. Moreover, there is also a SGBV cluster led by UNFPA (due to its expertise in 
collecting data), which is currently under a protection cluster led by Human Rights 
Agency that is currently being phased out. For that reason, this cluster may go to the 
gender thematic group. Interestingly the Ministry o f Women's Condition is getting 
involved and is taking ownership of coordination actions.
Within the police, the integration of gender issues has benefited from a top-down 
approach, starting with the Police Commissioner, aimed at expanding the UN police’s 
capacity to respond to specific security needs of women. He was responsible for creating 
the Gender Team and placing its officers within the Gender Unit to facilitate cooperation. 
The UN police component’s main mandate is to strengthen HNP's capabilities. 
Therefore, UNPol’s key strategy to incorporate a gender perspective into its work has 
been to train the HNP in this matter. The goal are sustainable efforts and that local police
59 While the induction training is a quick and standard 45 minutes training, the specific gender training 
usually lasts three days and is tailored according to the target group and functions they will comply with.
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are able to fulfill all the functions MINUSTAH's police component is currently carrying 
out and to protect women and girls from sexual and gender based violence.
Moreover, improving UNPols’ capacity to address sexual violence is also part of 
this component's strategy to advance overall mission efforts in the area. In an interview 
with a representative of the Police Gender Team, it was explained that generating tools to 
better deal with sexual and gender based violence in Haiti is also a priority to the Police 
Gender Team.60 For this purpose, they were tasked with the writing of Standard 
Operations Procedures to deal with sexual violence, an awareness manual for UNPols 
stationed in the IDP camps, and the terms of reference for the commissariats' gender 
focal points, amongst others. Furthermore, they participate in the induction training on 
the recently created SOPs and on gender issues.
Finally, the UN police also have a gender based violence specific database. The 
database was created in 2011, and although initially thought to incorporate data from all 
security sectors, so far it is only the police who feed it. The database is directly under the 
leadership of the Police Commissioner, who employs a desk officer responsible for 
inputting data. As data is central for analysis, planning and the evaluation of operations, 
the initiative is an important way to include a gender approach to police planning.
The inclusion of a gender approach within the military component has been 
slower. Currently, gender does not figure as an important component of military 
planning, reporting and analysis, except in a few instances such as duties performed 
within the IDP camps. The increasing vulnerability of women within IDP camps led to a 
tailored military response, with increasing military patrols within IDP camps, where they
60 Interviews with representative o f  UN Police Gender Team carried out in Port-au-Prince, September,
20 1 2 .
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were not initially allowed to enter. Although patrols occur only in the biggest and most 
dangerous IDP camps, this is an important initiative and represents a way through which 
gender can be integrated into military actions. However, it encompasses a limited view of 
the Haitian women's reality and can be further improved. The military has an 
extraordinary capacity to analyze and recognize signs o f threat. If this capacity is used to 
recognize signs of abuse and violence, it can help to prevent gruesome acts from being 
committed against women and girls.
Nevertheless, the military reporting cell does not have a category for gender based 
violence, and thus it becomes very difficult to take gender into account in military 
planning and analysis, when reports analyzed by the intelligence cell does not specify 
gender crimes. The Gender Unit has been pushing the inclusion of a category that 
incorporates a gender feature to improve military planning and is currently working 
closely with the Office of the Force Commander to start implementing top-down 
approaches so that gender can be more easily mainstreamed within that component.
An example of a top-down approach, initiated by New York and reinforced by the 
Office of the Force Commander, was the issuance o f a 2011 directive from the Force 
Commander appointing a Gender Focal Point within the military component. Very 
recently (in 2012) national contingents also were requested to appoint gender focal 
points. Although focal points still lack understanding of their role and how the military 
component can include a gender perspective into its routine work, the initiative represents 
a true instance of cooperation between the civilian and military components in gender 
issues.
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The absence of specific guidelines on the role and tasks of MINUSTAH's military 
gender focal point and each contingents' gender focal points is a challenge still to be 
addressed. It demonstrates that progress is dependent on the personality and commitment 
of those holding that position and of military commanders. While these personal efforts 
are responsible for the current progress found in the military component, it is important 
that guidelines are written so that initiatives are sustainable throughout time.
This is particularly true in regard to contingents' gender focal points. They 
receive a three-day training in gender created by the gender unit and U-9 and carried out 
jointly with the military training cell. Although they retain general knowledge about the 
matter, a meeting with all of MINUSTAH's gender focal points showed they were 
reluctant to speak about their role, possibly because they were unsure about the tasks and 
roles entrusted to them.61
It is important that gender focal points and personnel in general understand that 
gender is not only about women and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA). During field 
work carried out in 2011, most contingents would relate gender issues with the behavior 
of their personnel towards the local population or were simply unaware of UN resolutions 
on Women, Peace and Security and what they entail. Although SEA is an important part 
of integrating a gender perspective into the work of the military component, the 
protection role of the military and their support o f local women could be enhanced, if  an 
appropriate view of gender is to be understood.
Nonetheless, the 2012 field work showed a slightly different reality. Despite some 
exceptions, most contingents showed a better understanding of the resolutions at least
61 Interview with contingents' gender focal points were carried out in Port-au-Prince, September 2012.
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among the higher ranked officers. In an interview with a representative of the Gender 
Unit, it was explained that most personnel that receive the induction training on gender 
are mostly unaware of gender issues in general and emphasizes that member states should 
reinforce pre-deployment training.62 Although all personnel sent to peace operations 
receive a pre-deployment training module dedicated to gender named Core Pre- 
Deployment Training Module (CPTM)63 it is the member states' responsibility to 
provide the course or invite UN experts to give them.
An important aspect of a mission's gender policy is the kind o f policies that are in 
place to curb misbehavior, particularly sexual abuse and exploitation that can seriously 
undermine the UN's image in the host country. MINUSTAH in particular has recently 
been in the spotlight for serious accusations of sexual abuse by Uruguayan marine 
peacekeepers and a local Haitian boy, who was allegedly raped. A video recorded by the 
marines themselves was made available online and caused enormous trouble for the 
contributing country and the UN. Although Uruguay took exemplary actions, with the 
repatriation of the accused and a trial where the costs for the victim's trip to Uruguay was 
paid, the negative image of the country and of the UN has persisted among the 
population.
62 Induction training is an obligatory training for all officers as they arrive in the mission. Depending on 
commanders orders and the size o f  the battalion or company sent, more personnel including non­
commissioned officers can also take the course. It is obligatory, though that every soldier receive the 
training either by MINUSTAH representatives or by the officers who have attended the course.
Nonetheless, gender is only one o f  16 different modules that is given to participants in a period o f  two days. 
Consequently, it is common that participants do not retain all information received.
63 As in the case o f  the induction training, the CPTM also have different modules, being gender only one o f  
them. The way the CPTM is administered varies a lot from country to country. Many countries have their 
own peacekeeping training center with their own instructors others invite the UN to give with the course. It 
is also common that other organizations, such as the UN-Women, are invited to give the gender module, as 
it is the case o f  Brazil. All these aspects differ from country to country.
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In an interview with the Conduct and Discipline Unit, it was emphasized that the 
military is the component that proportionally gives them least trouble. However, due to 
the immunity and the public image o f peacekeepers, it is also these cases that mostly 
affect the organization's image. It was mentioned that the unit is currently dealing with 
various paternity cases, and that an accountability strategy ought to be developed. While 
civilians can be somewhat constrained from these behaviors by affecting their salaries, it 
becomes more difficult in the case o f the military. A proposed strategy is to link 
commanders' accountability to misbehavior of soldiers and the possibility of getting a 
personal commitment from peacekeepers that they will refrain from misconducts. 
However, the challenges for a successful accountability strategy are huge.
As shown, the presence of the Gender Unit as the hub of gender awareness 
initiatives has been extremely important in the Haitian context, which is characterized by 
increased urban violence, including gender based violence, but which is not easily 
associated with women's vulnerable status. However, as the context has shown, Haitian 
women have long been victimized and oppressed, and the understanding of their 
vulnerability and the improvement o f the mission's capacity to respond to these sex- 
specific threats is of the utmost importance.
The following sections will evaluate MINUSTAH's gender policy according to 
the five previously defined variables: legal framework, gender balance, security sector, 
protection and empowerment.
Legal framework
This indicator refers to the existence of specific mandates and guidelines 
regarding the protection of civilians, in particular women and girls, against sexual
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violence and how it translates into practice. The complex reality of the Haitian context 
was translated into encompassing mission mandates since its establishment in 2004. 
These mandates include several responsibilities that vary from the establishment o f a 
peaceful and secure environment to the support o f government institutions’ govemability 
and efforts to promote human rights and assistance in the wake of the constant natural 
disasters that affect the island. Although protection o f civilians figures as part of the 
mandate since Resolution 1542 of April 2004 first authorized the deployment o f the 
mission, it was never mandated as a top priority.64
Specific challenges confronted by women, including the need for political 
representation, human rights abuses and special needs as a vulnerable group, were 
included in the Security Council resolutions that renewed MINUSTAH's mandate 
throughout the years. Moreover, resolutions have also reaffirmed the importance of 
resolutions on Women, Peace and Security and the need to address violence against 
women, supporting government institutions to carry out this responsibility. 
Unfortunately, though, the mission does not have specific strategies to protect civilians in 
general, nor to protect women against specific gender crimes to which they may be 
subjected.
Although all resolutions that renewed MINUSTAH mentioned the affairs of 
Haitian women in one way or another, it was only after the 2010 earthquake and the 
widespread violence committed against women within IDP camps, that specific tasks to 
protect women, including the strengthening of mechanisms to address sexual violence, 
increased joint patrols, training of HNP on sexual violence issues and improvement of
64 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1542."
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women's access to justice, started to be more systematically included in the text o f these 
resolutions. The last Security Council Resolution 2070 specifically “encourages all actors 
in the Haitian Government, the international community and civil society to renew their 
efforts to eliminate sexual and gender-based violence in Haiti; as well as to improve 
response to rape complaints and access to justice for the victims of rape and other sexual 
crimes.”65
Also worth mentioning is that Resolution 2012 (2011) requests the elaboration of 
a protection of civilians plan, when explaining the effects the earthquake has had on the 
population and the kind of threats confronted within IDP camps, and in particular those 
confronted by vulnerable groups such as women and children. Although the plan has not 
yet been created, it shows the UN's commitment to the cause. It also shows that the 
context highly influences the elaboration of strategies such as the one regarding the 
protection o f civilians. Although the Haitian population, and women for that matter, have 
been victims of state and gang sponsored violence throughout the years, it was not until 
the harsh conditions of the IDP camps were highly publicized and figures reached 
alarming proportions, that a legal document explicitly requested a plan to deal with the 
matter. Along the same lines, after the inclusion of new duties and tasks related to the 
protection of women in IDP camps, actions such as increased patrols within IDP camps 
were included in the planning of operations and undertaken by uniformed personnel, 




Reports of the Secretary General have a pre-defined framework that includes one 
section for gender. These reports are helpful and they group all gender related actions 
undertaken by MINUSTAH and the national government throughout the period covered 
by each of them. They also provide recommendations on how to improve the areas that 
need strengthened efforts. Besides being an important source o f information, they 
encourage the consideration of gender as a cross-cutting issue and remind member states 
of their commitment to enhance gender equality in host nations and improve women's 
protection.
Gender balance
This indicator refers to the analysis of female representation amongst uniformed 
personnel and the roles they carry out. It also refers to the existence of affirmative 
policies to include more women amongst personnel (uniformed and civilian), and in 
decision-making positions within the mission. Unfortunately data on civilian personnel 
disaggregated by sex is not available, and thus an analysis of the civilian component 
could not be included. The participation of civilian women in the mission leadership is 
limited. Amongst MINUSTAH substantive sections, few are headed by women, 
including the Gender Unit.
As expected, the MINUSTAH military component has a total representation of 
women at only 2,45%. Moreover, with few exceptions most military women occupy 
professional posts, such as those within the medical branch or logistics, and have limited 
contact with the population. Nonetheless, this is a general trend all over the world since 
the militaries in various parts o f the world still put several constraints upon the
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participation of women in all military branches, particularly those closely related to 
combat.
Women within MINUSTAH's police component on its part do better than those in 
the military with a 10.07% representation, being right on the UN 10% goal. The UN 
police component has a total o f 2,780 uniformed personnel including individual police 
and Formed Police Units. The Police Commissioner and its deputy are men; however, the 
head of the Police Gender Team is a dedicated police woman, highly experienced in the 
field.66 The combined figure for uniformed personnel is 5.75% of women representation.
Table 5: Uniformed personnel disaggregated by sex, as of October 2012
Contribution Male Female Total % of W omen
UNPol 951 153 1104 13.86%
FPU 1549 127 1676 7.58%
Total Police 2500 280 2780 10.07%
Military 7114 179 7293 2.45%
TOTAL 12114 739 12853 5.75%
Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012
The lack o f women representation accounts for one of the biggest challenges 
within the military component. Consequently, one of the main directives of RES 1325 
main directive is also the most challenging to implement as changes are highly dependent 
on contributing states' willingness to implement them within the national context.
66 Interviews with representative from the Police Gender Team carried out in Port-au-Prince, September 
2012 .
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Currently, three contingents do not have any women within their contingents: Indonesia, 
Jordan and Sri Lanka.67
This is not the only problem though. Most of them are in health and logistics 
branches being mostly within the limits of barracks and having very limited contact with 
the population. Indeed very few contingents have women in combatant positions and 
carrying out similar functions as its male peers. Amongst all interviewed contingents the 
only countries that had women with combat training and thus carrying out patrols, 
checkpoints and other activities that result in more contact with the population were 
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala and Uruguay.
Nonetheless, women in doctor, nurse and dentist positions are also important as 
most contingents provide health care to the local population and having female 
representatives within the medical crew is an important way of increasing the relationship 
with the local women and discussing issues such as sexual and gender based violence. In 
fact, within Brazilian and Bolivian contingents, the female medical personnel indentified 
genital infections as one of the most common cases they have found when treating the 
population. In these cases, the personnel can support local women's awareness on 
protection from STDs, birth control, and in the case of abuses and violence, be readily 
able to recognize signs of violence.
Amongst contributing troops, Bolivia, Guatemala, Philippines and Argentina 
presents the highest percentages of women representation within its personnel, with 
7.18%, 7.25%, 7% and 6.78%, respectively. It is important to highlight that the 
Philippines provides all MINUSTAH's clerks, consequently, the female personnel along
67 Visit to Jordanian Battalion and interview with senior officers, staff and personnel was carried out in 
Killick, September, 2012.
215
with the male counterparts work independently in the various military cells and branches 
within MINUSTAH.
The percentage of women in the deployed forces overseas and their function is a 
direct reflection of these countries' national policies and how the incorporation of women 
is carried out nationally. For example, Argentina's Ministry of Defense has a strong 
gender policy, having sent guidelines on the specific work that the battalion's gender 
focal point ought to carry out, including contact with local women's organizations and 
promotion of gender awareness courses for the rest of the personnel. Although the 
interview with the Argentinean focal point showed that not all of those functions are 
carried out (particularly contact with women's organizations), it shows national 
commitment at the state level and initiatives such as that can be used as an example in the 
mission to be duplicated.68 In fact, Argentina's Ministry of Defense is working on its 
Plan of Action in accordance to RES 1325 to be fully implemented within the national 
Armed Forces.
In this regard it is worth mentioning Chile, that since 2009, under Michelle 
Bachelet's government, has created a National Action Plan to improve gender 
mainstreaming within its defense and security forces.69 Bolivia also presents an 
important female contribution to MINUSTAH and its personnel seemed to be well 
integrated into the contingent's daily activities.70 However, one important observation 
ought to be made. With the exception of one young Lieutenant, who had received
68 Interview with Argentine senior officers, gender focal point and personnel was carried out in Gonaives, 
June 2011.
69 Interview with Chilean senior officers, gender focal point and personnel was carried out in Cap Haitien, 
June 2011.
70 Interview with Bolivian senior officers, gender focal point and personnel was carried out in Port-au- 
Prince, June 2011 and September 2012.
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military training and was able to carry out the same functions as the male peers, including 
patrols in the IDP camp of Tabarre under Bolivia's responsibility. The rest of the 
personnel were civilians, mostly from the health branch that works for the Army back in 
their home country as civilians, but are sent as military with the company deployed in 
Haiti.71 That is one of the main reasons why they are not allowed to go on patrols even 
though military medical personnel often go on patrols as well. However, the Bolivian 
case should further be highlighted because it was one of the first countries to incorporate 
women into the officer military academy, having women with the rank of colonels and 
soon to be general. Missions around the world, such as that established in the DRC count 
with female Bolivian commissioned officers serving as military observers.
Both Brazil and Paraguay do not have women in combat positions within their 
armed forces -  with the exception of Brazil's air force -  and thus their female personnel 
are limited to those allowed to join the military, comprising mostly doctors, nurses, 
dentists, and in the case of Brazil, there are also translators and others in logistic 
functions, such as lawyers.72 Interestingly though a recent law approved by Brazilian 
President Dilma Rousseff obliges the military institutions in Brazil to incorporate women 
in all positions within the next five years. It is an important development considering the 
country's aspiration to have a permanent seat at the Security Council, this step is indeed 
necessary to show to the world the country's ability to promote peace in accordance with 
the organization's guidelines. In fact, many countries of the developing world use the
71 This data refers to the period o f  September/2012. With the personnel rotation, the reality within Bolivian 
personnel may have changed.
72 Visits to Brazilian Battalions I and II and Interview with senior officers, gender focal point and personnel 
were carried out in Port-au-Prince, June 2011 and September 2012. Interview with Paraguayan Engineer 
Company senior officers, gender focal point and personnel was carried out in Port-au-Prince, September 
2012 .
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participation in peace operations as a ways to enhance its influence in international 
politics. An interesting way to accomplish national commitment to resolution 1325 is 
tying it to political national aspirations, perhaps through contact with the permanent 
mission in NY and/or diplomatic representations in the host nation.
An important consideration to be made is that in order to take advantage of 
women's presence within the military forces deployed, it is important that they are able to 
speak to the women directly or have female translators, particularly in cases of sexual 
crimes and gender based violence. This issue was raised by Brazilian Battalion I that 
explained that they lack local female translators and while they put their female personnel 
to participate in CIMIC activities and speak to local women, they are sent with local male 
translators and that may hamper this effort. This is an interesting point to be taken to 
MINUSTAH's administration. Although many of the military contingents do not have 
women, having local female translators may also support the contact with the local 
population.
In the case of Sri Lanka, two of the six translators were female, but differently 
from their male peers they were not allowed to do the night shift or go on patrols. 
Specific orientation on the use of female translators could thus contribute to enhance the 
component's overall capacity to respond to women's protection needs.
It is also important that women have the same routine duties, such as guard, so 
that male counterparts do not believe they have been privileged. In some contingents, 
women were sent on patrols even when not coming from combatant arms. Whilst this 
initiative supports the UN goal to have more uniformed women as facilitators o f contact
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between the military and the local population, it is not a UN nor a national policy, but a 
personal choice of the commander.
Table 6: Military contribution disaggregated by sex, as of October 2012
Country Male Female Total % of Women
Argentina 674 49 723 6.78%
Bolivia 194 15 209 7.18%
Brazil 1,872 21 1,893 1.11%
Chile 486 13 499 2.61%
Ecuador 66 1 67 1.49%
Guatemala 128 10 138 7.25%
Indonesia 178 0 178 0%
Japan 223 2 225 0.89%
Jordan 251 0 251 0%
Nepal 354 7 361 1.94%
Paraguay 160 2 162 1.23%
Peru 364 8 372 2.15%
Philippines 146 11 157 7.01%
Republic of 
Korea
235 6 241 2.49%
Sri Lanka 861 0 861 0%
Uruguay 922 34 956 3.56%
Total 7114 179 7293 2.45%
Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012
In the police, women representation amongst UNPols is considerably higher than 
within the FPUs, reaching 13.9% versus 7.6%, respectively. One of the main reasons is 
that UNPols interested in participating in peace missions are sent on individual missions 
and the process of selection and deployment is based on merit, not appointment. FPU's 
on its part has a similar modus operandi to that present in the military. They live within 
the constraints of their bases and usually have a paramilitary structure, mostly comprising 
military police.
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In terms of proportional female representation within the UNPol, seven countries 
have women comprising more than 30% of national personnel. These are India with 
66.67%, Norway with 57.14%, Thailand with 41.67%, Rwanda with 40%, Burkina Faso 
with 36.25%, and Russia and Uruguay with 33% each. The elevated percentage of 
women is also explained by the limited personnel deployed as most of these countries 
contribute to less than 10 UNPol (with the exception of Burkina Faso, Rwanda and 
Thailand).
Burkina Faso is further highlighted due to the important number o f women police 
contribution in absolute terms. Out of 80 police officers deployed by this country in Haiti, 
29 are women, being the country that most sends female police complying with 
individual mission. Rwanda, on its part contributes with 12 female UNPols out of a total 
of 30. Burundi, Canada, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, and the United States, also contribute with 
more than 10 female UNPols.
Table 7: UNPol contribution as of October, 2012
Country Male Female Total % of Women
Argentina 17 3 20 15%
Bangladesh 10 0 10 0%
Benin 35 0 35 0%
Brazil 2 0 2 0%
Burkina Faso 51 29 80 36.25%
Burundi 30 10 40 25%
Cameroon 50 5 55 9.09%
Canada 78 10 88 11.36%
Central African Republic 3 1 4 25%
Chad 8 1 9 11.11%
Chile 10 4 14 28.57%
China 16 0 16 0%
Colombia 14 3 17 17.65%
220
Table 7: Continued
Country Male Female Total % of Women
Cote d'Ivoire 113 10 123 8.13%
Croatia 5 0 5 0%
Egypt 31 0 31 0%
El Salvador 10 4 14 28.57%
France 32 2 34 5.88%
Guinea 11 1 12 8.33%
India 1 2 3 66.67%
Indonesia 9 1 10 10%
Jamaica 1 0 1 0%
Jordan 34 0 34 0%
Madagascar 3 1 4 25%
Mali 27 1 28 3.57%
Nepal 9 1 10 10%
Niger 66 13 79 16.46%
Nigeria 3 1 4 25%
Norway 3 4 7 57.14%
Pakistan 10 0 10 0%
Philippines 23 3 26 11.54%
Romania 21 3 24 12.5%
Russian Federation 2 1 3 33.33%
Rwanda 18 12 30 40%
Senegal 20 2 22 9.09%
Serbia 5 0 5 0%
Sierra Leone 3 1 4 25%
Spain 17 1 18 5.56%
Sri Lanka 19 2 21 9.52%
Sweden 1 1 2 50%
Thailand 7 5 12 41.67%
Togo 3 0 3 0%
Turkey 17 1 18 5.56%
United States 72 13 85 15.29%
Uruguay 2 1 3 33.33%
Yemen 29 0 29 0%
TOTAL 951 153 1104 13.86%
Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012
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Female representation amongst FPUs is relatively high in Haiti due to 
Bangladesh's all female FPU. Bangladesh deploys two FPUs to MINUSTAH, a male and 
a female, consequently, its female representation reaches 33.13%, while the 
representation of women within the FPUs is of only 7.6%. Nepalese, Rwandan and 
Senegalese FPUs also contribute with limited number of police women, each with a total 
of 10, 4 and 7 women, and a total female representation of 7.25%, 2.5% and 5% each. 
India, Jordan and Pakistan do not deploy any women amongst their FPU personnel.
Table 8: FPU contribution as of October, 2012
Country Male Female Total % of W omen
Bangladesh 214 106 320 33.13%
India 459 0 459 0%
Jordan 319 0 319 0%
Nepal 128 10 138 7.25%
Pakistan 140 0 140 0%
Rwanda 156 4 160 2.50%
Senegal 133 7 140 5%
TOTAL 1549 127 1676 7.58%
Source: UN Department o f  Peacekeeping Operations.
Bangladesh's female FPU has been sent to Haiti since 2010. The current 
personnel comprise a total of 160, 106 of which are women. In an interview with the 
Bangladeshi senior officers it was explained that all officers are women and that male 
representation in the unit comprises non-commissioned officers dedicated to minor 
tasks.73 In this regard, it is important to emphasize that it is not only about having more 
women on the ground, but also putting them in key functions so that they can serve the
73 Interview carried out with senior officers and personnel was carried out in Port-au-Prince, September 
20 1 2 .
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purpose the UN underscores as the reason why more women should be sent to peace 
operations. Not only a matter of gender balance, their position within MINUSTAH and 
what they are doing is what really matters to have a decisive impact on the ground.
During a first field work carried out in MINUSTAH in 2011, an interview with 
the 1st all female Bangladeshi FPU was carried out and it was argued that it was not until 
the end of their stay in Haiti that they were sent to IDP camps and patrolling activities 
that would promote an encounter with the local population, being previously restricted to 
security of UN facilities and other duties not directly related to the population.74
The third Bangladesh contingent though, seemed to be fully integrated within 
MINUSTAH structure, performing the same kind of functions that other FPUs were 
carrying out including crowd control, IDP camp patrolling and security of UN facilities. 
In a conversation with the personnel, they confided that the language is the toughest 
barrier to bond with the population. Although they have various English interpreters, 
most of the troop does not speak English, and even less French. This further complicates 
the matter because if they cannot communicate with those they aim to protect, 
successfully fulfilling this duty can be challenging. This is felt even more so when the 
cultures of these two countries are so different and the interaction between them can be 
affected by the different codes of conduct that each culture has.
Security sector
As defined by the UN, a security sector is: “a broad term often used to describe 
the structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and
74 Visit to the Bangladesh Female FPU was first carried out in Port-au-Prince, June 2011.
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oversight of security in a country.”75 These include defense, law enforcement, 
corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for justice system, border 
management, customs and civil emergencies. Actors that play a role in the security sector 
include ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, only the initiatives related to the improvement o f the justice system, rule of 
law and police institutions are taken into account.
Security sector reform is a vital component of stability and longer-term 
development in Haiti. However, due to the specific Haitian context where the sole state 
institution is the Haitian National Police, MINUSTAH's approach to the reform of the 
country's security sector differs considerably from other peacekeeping contexts.76 Hence 
UN's support to SSR in Haiti is mostly focused in police capacity building, an effort that 
has been undertaken since 1993, when the first of several UN missions mandated to 
strengthen HNP's capabilities was established.
UN Police is the component most directly involved with SSR in Haiti. The 
provision of training, equipment and the building of internal control capacities have been 
the major focus. Moreover, with the purpose of building a strong national police able to 
respond to gender based violence, the UNPol presents two main initiatives dedicated to 
this goal: the first is the Police Academy, the second is the so called “Norwegian Sexual 
Violence Team”.
The Haitian Police Academy was created in 2006, and it is an important training 
center for the local police. There are 25 UNPol offices that work within the Academy
75 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f the Secretary General on Securing Peace and 
Development: The Role o f  the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform."
76 United Nations Department o f  Peacekeeping Operations, Office o f  Rule o f  Law and Security Institutions, 
Security Sector Reform Unit, "The United Nations Ssr Perspective," (New york: SSR Unit, 2012).
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overseeing the quality and standard of the training provided there. It is the HNP officers 
themselves who train their counterparts. Mostly, UNPol officers are responsible for 
providing the initial training for trainers and for a continued monitoring of the courses 
and training carried out by the Academy. In fact they are divided in different sections, 
considering their own skills and work with HNP officers to improve the different courses. 
According to a UNPol representative, “working together with the HNP and overseeing 
their training activities is a ways of slowly passing all responsibility for them, so they can 
act on their own when MINUSTAH leaves.” 77
In regard to gender and SGBV, the police academy is mostly focused on the 
training of the judges, the HNP inspector and the Commissioner, while the Norwegian 
Team is responsible for the standardization of basic gender training of all HNP police 
agents. The content of the course covers specific techniques and methods for questioning 
victims and suspects and searching. More than providing HNP with the basic knowledge 
to carry out serious investigations regarding SGBV, this initiative is important because it 
brings gender to the forefront of police work and is the first steps toward making them 
accountable for addressing this problem and protecting the vulnerable.
The Norwegian Sexual Violence Team consists o f a two-part project fully 
financed by Norway and implemented on the ground by a team of six Norwegian UNPols 
sent to Haiti to work exclusively on this particular project.78 The independence of their 
work, in parallel to the UN's time consuming bureaucracy and separate budget is to
77 Interview carried out UNPol representative within the Police Academy in Port-au-Prince, September, 
2012 .
78 Interview with the Norwegian Team was carried out in Port-au-Prince, September, 2012. .
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blame for the important accomplishments achieved by the Team in a period of only a 
year.
They carry out two main projects: 1. Strengthening individual local capacity 
through training courses, and 2. 2. Strengthening institutional capacity through an 
improved HNP structure to conduct gender affairs and promote coordination with 
regional offices.
The first project focuses on the standardization of all gender training received by 
all HNP police officers. Having also trained the trainers, HNP now has certified gender 
instructors that provide training in Creole and advance gender issues within the local 
police. The second project, focuses on improving coordination and infrastructure, having 
accomplished the construction of an office for HNP's Head o f Gender Policy and having 
the construction of regional offices for all administrative departments under way. The 
objective is to ensure that gender polices are easily implemented at the regional level and 
in accordance to its particular context.
Appointed in 2005 as the Gender Policy person for the national police, Madam 
Gauthier calls herself “an army of One” as she is the only currently appointed HNP 
officer to work on gender issues.79 The Norwegian project also intends to address this 
lack of personnel by having officers appointed in each department and an office where 
they can carry out their activities.
As it was explained, the project initially financed by Norway is running out of 
money. Nonetheless, the members of the team explained this is a UN original idea that 
Norway endorsed and currently other countries are studying the possibility of joining the
79 Interview with the Head o f HNP's Gender Police Office, Madam Gauthier, was carried out in Port-au- 
Prince, September 2012.
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project and contributing with the financial resources necessary to complete the project. 
Amongst the countries interested in funding the project are Brazil and Spain.
Since Haiti does not have military forces,80 the MINUSTAH military component 
is not engaged with strengthening local's institutional capacity to maintain a stable and 
safe environment, its activities are mostly dedicated to carrying out activities that support 
the accomplishment of a stable Haiti. Nonetheless, few joint activities are carried out 
with the National Police. In this sense, the military carry out checkpoints and patrols with 
the local police in its areas of responsibility. This interaction has been qualified as 
positive by most of the contingents, as they do not have the jurisdiction to act on their 
own. Regardless, the relationship with the HNP has been often qualified as difficult, due 
to the bad reputation of their interventions.
Finally, there is a MINUSTAH Rule of Law section dedicated to strengthen the 
country's justice law. An important accomplishment in terms of SSR in Haiti has been 
the re-opening of the School o f Magistrates in 2009, the presidential appointment of the 
President of the Supreme Court in October 2011, and the elaboration of the five-year 
2012-2016 Haitian National Police (HNP) Development Plan, jointly presented by 
MINUSTAH and the Haitian National Police.
80 The absence o f  a Haitian Army does not mean that this possibility is completely o ff  the table. President 
Martelly has promised during his presidential campaign to bring the military back and former members o f  
Haitian Armed Forces were seen occupying former military bases, training and on parades in the beginning 
o f this year. The FC and the SRSG have both admitted they were indeed around, but with the cut o f funds 
and without the international community's support, it is very difficult that Martelly can maintain its 
campaign promise. To curb their actions, MINUSTAH launched Operation Sunrise, in order to curtail the 
movement the circulation o f illegal weapons. However, and despite the HNP's improvement, MINUSTAH  
needs to put some thought into this matter and maybe having the military component involved with special 
training on areas such as engineer, coast guard, and reforestation. The fact o f  the matter is that if  Haitian 
armed forces are to be recreated or any other form o f  force, such as a gendarmerie or specialized forces 
such as those cited, a gender perspective ought to be included from the beginning, and the involvement o f  
both Haitian government and MINUSTAH's gender experts is paramount.
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The HNP Development Plan foresees the achievement of 15,000 fully operational 
service police officers serving by 2016. That would require an entry level of 1,200 cadets 
in each promotion year (currently at 241 level) and the improvement of middle level and 
senior officers to ensure adequate training and supervision o f new recruits.81 Moreover, 
the Plan also includes the attainment o f “adequate logistic and administrative capacity, 
accountability and respect for human rights and rule o f law, a robust vetting process, and 
enhanced recruitment procedures and training, with an emphasis on specialized units and 
strengthened border control and deterrence of transnational organized crime.”82
In regard to Haiti's justice system, prison overcrowding and arrests without trial 
are amongst the top challenges. In an interview with a UNPol correction officer working 
at one of the prisons in Port-au-Prince, it was emphasized that there are many detainees 
who never had a trial and are just thrown in prison.83 Cases of witnesses being arrested as 
criminals were also cited. According to a UN 2012 Justice Review,84 MINUSTAH 
Justice Section has been providing logistical support for the establishment and overall 
management of legal aid offices. The report also mentions that since the opening of the 
first legal aid office in February 2008, 10,838 consultations have been provided and 
4,793 liberations have been obtained.
81 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f  the Secretary General on the United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in H aiti"
82 According to the Report o f the Secretary General on MINUSTAH dated from August 31st, 2012, the 
progress in vetting police officers is a serious challenge. Although vetting centers have been established in 
2006, “to date not a single officer has been dismissed as a result o f  the vetting exercise.” Ibid.(Paragraph, 
23)
83 Interview with UNPol Correction Officer was carried out in Port-au-Prince on June, 2011.
84 United Nations Department o f  Peacekeeping Operations, Office o f  Rule o f  Law and Security Institutions, 
Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service, ”2012 Justice Review," in Justice Review  (New York: DPKO, 
2012).
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A final comment on SSR in Haiti, refers to the various reference by different 
actors on the field, including the Ministry of Women's Condition and Rights, and all 
MINUSTAH substantive sections on the existence of “informal community based 
arrangements.” Interviewees confirmed the existence of a parallel justice system that 
tends to promote financial arrangements between the victim and the perpetrator, rather 
than taking it to the formal justice system.85 As it was explained, the system formally 
exists under the name of “Justice de Proximite”, where “a juge de paix”, or judge, 
facilitates the arrangement usually between the victim's family and the perpetrator. The 
system was blamed by many as one of the sources of impunity and the persistence of a 
mindset that disregarded gender based violence, including rape, as minor crimes. 
However, it was emphasized by MINUSTAH Rule of Law section that it does not consist 
of an informal arrangement since it is foreseen in Haitian Law and that they are working 
to improve their capabilities as well.86
Protection
This indicator is mostly concerned with actions undertaken by the police and 
military component to protect women and girls from gender based violence. Protection 
within MINUSTAH is undertaken by both the military and the police. Specifically in
85 A group interview with MINUSTAH substantive sections -  Gender Unit, Human Rights, Civilian 
Affairs, Child Protection, Community Violence Reduction, Joint Military Analysis Center, Conduct and 
Discipline and Rule o f  Law -  was carried out in Port-au-Prince, February, 2012. Interview with 
Representatives o f  the Ministry o f  Women's Condition and Rights were conducted around the same period.
86 This was an point o f  disagreement amongst different actors. Within the Ministry o f  Women's Condition 
for example, there were interviewees with different opinion in regard to the matter, emphasizing that the 
intervention o f  the ju ge de paix  in minor cases would be ok, others would emphasize that is the Haitian 
Law prescribes an act as crime that should be dealt with the Justice System not the ju ge de paix. 
MINUSTAH Rule o f  Law section, left the meeting before more questions could be addressed and 
unfortunately the subject could not be thoroughly explored.
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regard to gender, both the police and the military have initiatives to enhance women's 
protection, however, the approach tends to be limited and focused on the displacement 
feature of the Haitian context. The Gender Unit on its part provides tools by improving 
training on sexual violence and develops initiatives with local institutions to enhance 
their performance in these matters.
In this regard, one of the successful actions undertaken by the Unit in 
collaboration with the Ministry is the creation of private spaces within IDP camps to 
receive victims of sexual violence. The initiative was qualified by a Gender Unit 
representative as very good as “she [the victim] may not be in good conditions and may 
need a private place to be received.” While one of those has already been established in 
the Carradeux IDP camp, two others are under way in two other IDP camps and in seven 
national police stations. These initiatives are important not only because they improve 
treatment to victims, but also because they support the establishment of an infrastructure 
and a mindset that will stay after the mission leaves, therefore having an enduring and 
positive effect on the local society.
Along with the International Organization for Migration the Gender Unit also 
organized 28 trainings for national police officers on police response to sexual and 
gender based violence, in addition to 27 training sessions for Haitian legal professionals 
on legal recourse for victims of sexual violence.87 Interestingly, the Unit also participated 
in the training of 30 community leaders to support the establishment of community 
networks to raise awareness of how to prevent sexual and gender based violence. Finally, 
the Unit provided support to women's organizations during the 360 training and
87 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f the Secretary General on the United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti " Paragraph 34
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awareness-raising workshops that resulted in the creation of a national platform of action 
for women and their communities.
The military is directly involved with protection. Besides being tasked with the 
mandate to establish a safe and stable environment in Haiti, the military component in 
MINUSTAH is also tasked with protection of civilians, although different from 
MONUSCO it does not explicitly comprise a top priority in UN documents. In the 
fulfillment of its mandate, the protection of women and girls against violence and 
promoting gender is accomplished mostly indirectly. However, it is important to keep in 
mind that the military component has successfully carried out operations that curbed gang 
activities, and the analysis of Haiti's complex political situation showed that women were 
constantly victimized by these and other armed groups. Consequently, the capture of 
gangs leaders, their ban from some neighborhoods and the overall decrease in criminal 
activities had thus an immense effect on women protection that is not often cited as one 
the main contributions o f the military component to women's protection, possibly 
because it is not directly associated by the military themselves as one of the merits of 
their actions.
In this context, it is also worth mentioning the work carried out by the engineer 
component. In a displacement environment where the differentiation between the public 
and private spheres is rather blurry, the building of infrastructure can be accounted as an 
important factor that affects the security of women and girls. Although dependent on a 
civilian structure within MINUSTAH - the Mission Planning Cell - six countries have 
sent military engineer companies to support reconstruction efforts in Haiti. The 
companies develop projects throughout Haiti and do not have a specific area of
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responsibility being sent to carry out different projects in the capital and elsewhere. 
Although not under the direct leadership of the force commander, the engineer 
component is central to the overall efforts carried out by the mission.
Unfortunately, engineers have confronted enormous challenges to respond to all 
the demands received. Consequently they work under a priority plan. In this sense, it 
would be important to have gender defined as one o f the priorities in this plan. In Haiti, 
private matters such as taking a shower is often done publicly, further complicating the 
context in which sexual and gender based violence take place. The engineer component 
could contribute to addressing this problem by focusing on gender sensitive projects that 
contributes to enhancing the separation between private and public spheres. In fact, 
possibilities are endless and the engineer component could be used to increase women's 
security and improving their status in the society by being tasked with projects that have 
a positive and direct effect on women's structural and physical vulnerabilities.
Protection by the police is undertaken by UNPols deployed in the various 
commissariats throughout Haiti. In regard to women's protection an important project is 
underway: the Gender Mobile Unit. The Gender Mobile Unit is responsible for patrolling 
IDP camps to support victims of sexual violence.88 Currently formed by 15 UNPol, three 
of which are men, they are divided in three teams o f five police officers, whose job is to 
be present in different IDP camps, promoting sensitization campaigns amongst local 
population regarding sexual violence and accompanying victims to get medical care and 
to report the incident. For that purpose, they ought to maintain a close relationship with
88 Interview with members from the Gender Mobile Unit were carried out in Port-au-Prince, September 
2012.
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the IDP camp community leader and with local organizations involved with gender issues 
in order to organize and promote sensitization campaigns.
They also have a close contact with the HNP and the UNPol commissariat who 
receives victims and immediately calls them when a sexual violence case comes up. 
Furthermore, they have the contact of hospitals and clinics that will give the medical 
certificate necessary for victims to start a law suit against perpetrators. Finally, they also 
have contact with organizations that proceed with the follow-up on victims once the 
Haitian justice system is activated. In fact, a UNPol Gender Team representative 
commented that due to its non-executive mandate, the UNPol do not usually do the 
follow-up on cases. Nonetheless, MINUSTAH Human Rights Section does and 
consequently, they often consult with that section to leam about how cases are being 
handled within the Haitian judiciary.
One of the main constraints of the Gender Mobile Unit is that it only works within 
the IDP camps and only in a few of those (the biggest and most dangerous). As it was 
explained by a representative o f the Gender Unit, the Gender Mobile Unit program 
initiated under the Police Gender Team covered areas other than the IDP camps. 
Nonetheless, with the reorganization of UN police structured they were transferred to the 
umbrella of the IDP camp pillar, and thus were constrained to patrols within those. 
Initiatives to relocate them would highly benefit Haitian women and enhance their 
protection.
An important component of protection is the ability of the mission to 
communicate with to the population and identify their priority needs. The military 
component is relatively well related to the local community and, in a few cases, to the
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local government as well. Nonetheless, their relationship with women's organizations or 
government institutions related to women's affairs and gender issues is very limited and 
often channeled by the U-9 and Gender Unit. The police, on its part has an extensive 
contact with the local community and women's groups, particularly within the IDP 
camps where the Gender Mobile Unit operates.
The military component community outreach is mostly carried out through a 
steady relationship with local community leaders, particularly within IDP camps and the
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development of CIMIC activities. CIMIC activities have become one of the central 
pillars of the military component and the face o f the mission. All interviewed contingents 
carry them out in various places and neighborhoods. CIMIC activities are fulfilled on a 
voluntary basis and thus depend on resources each contributing country provides to its 
deployed military; nonetheless they are always carried out in consultancy with the U-9 
and local partners that express the population's primary needs in a determined area.
The military component also has the chance of developing social and economic 
projects with the support of the Civilian Affairs (CA) and Violence Reduction 
Community (CVR) sections. These sections support the Quick Impact Projects (QIP) and 
the Labor Intensive Projects (LIP) and end up having a dual purpose: serving the 
community and facilitating the military component relationship with the population. 
These projects are varied and each component is entitled to identifying needs on its area 
of operation, formulating the project and carrying it out if funds are approved. In the case
89 The constant communication with the local population, though is hampered by an important element: the 
language. Most personnel do not speak French and creole for that matter. English knowledge may also be 
limited, particular amongst non-commissioned officers and thus continuous communication with the 
population may be a problem. However, possibly because o f  the presence o f  foreigners in Haiti for so long, 
an increasing number o f Haitians speak Spanish, Portuguese and English, the language o f  the intervening 
countries. This is mostly observed in the cities and is not generalized.
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of QIPs, projects have a limited budget and must be carried out in a short period of time. 
As an illustration of the projects currently being carried out by the military component, a 
few can be cited: the construction of a school in Mome Casse, rehabilitation of a square 
in Cite Soleil, Vocational training in Cap Haitien, rehabilitation of drainage system, and 
provision of school.
Interestingly, none of the interviewed military contingents maintained regular 
meetings with local women's organizations to address the protection needs they view as 
important. In fact, the military component's relationship with the local women's 
organization is well below the optimum. Despite that, a few positive initiatives were cited 
in some of the contingents and are worth mentioning as a ways to encourage others to 
replicate the initiative.
A noteworthy initiative was undertaken by the Brazilian battalion under the 
leadership of the U-9 and the Gender Unit. Talks with couples about family matters and 
women's rights were carried out with the support of local groups that helped with 
translation and the adaptation to the local context. Although not originated within the 
battalion, this initiative is particularly important as it addresses one of the biggest 
problems regarding gender in Haitian society, that is, the discrimination that Haitian 
women are sometimes subjected to, encompassing a proactive action pursuing positive 
change. Other contingents should be involved with activities of this sort, maybe first 
under the leadership of the Gender Unit and U-9 until it becomes a regular activity as 
many others that have been incorporated into the military component's routine and are 
not part of its mandate, such as the CIMIC activities themselves.
235
Other talks about women's rights, breast feeding and sexual violence were also 
carried out by the same battalion. Other contingents have also mentioned similar 
activities, such as the Bolivian contingent. In fact, within the Bolivian contingent, it was 
mentioned that surprised by the high number of pregnant young women, they often carry 
out talks about how to protect themselves from sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV 
and how to avoid pregnancy. Some of the Bolivian women that have participated in these 
talks confided that many had seen a condom for the first time when they showed it to 
them. These talks were given to both men and women and were carried out by Bolivian 
male and female officers.
The doctors and nurses within this same contingent also said that in some 
occasions, during CIMIC activities they are provided with private rooms so they can treat 
local women that have genital infections, appointed as one of the most common diseases 
they find when examining the local population. Although they often do not speak the 
local language they are able to understand them by the gestures and provide medicines. 
On the positive side, most contingents mentioned offering medical services to the local 
population and have female staff to attend local women.
Amongst interviewed contingents, only one confirmed having received Haitian 
women victims of sexual and gender based violence. Brazil's Battalion II (BRABATT II) 
has a company permanently established in Bel-air, a complicated neighborhood in Port- 
au-Prince. Within the company's base Brazilian civil defense has established a clinic 
open to the local population. BRABATT II's commander reported that in a period o f 4 
months (April to September, 2012) they had attended 46 victims of SGBV in that clinic. 
Personnel stationed in that base commented that the population often trusts the military
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component and looks for help. Interestingly, within that base there is a HNP 
commissariat dedicated only to gender issues as well as an UNPol establishment with a 
gender focal point. In an interview with a public information officer stationed in that base 
in 2011, the research team was informed that victims are treated or taken to hospital 
depending on the seriousness of cases, while the HNP and the UNPol are called to 
proceed with legal matters with the
In regard to the police, as previously mentioned, the police component is one of 
the most integrated on the ground and has a close relationship with the local population, 
the Haitian National Police, and NGOs and other agency partners. Particularly in regard 
to sexual violence victims' care, UNPol has an extensive network of contacts that varies 
from the HNP itself to hospital and organizations that can provide medical and 
psychological care, besides legal advising. The Mobile Gender Unit makes contact use of 
these contacts, for example.
Overall, UNPol tends to maintain a close relationship with community leaders and 
local women's organizations to bond with the local context and populace, particularly in 
the UNPol commissariats within the IDP camps. Community leaders channel the 
communication between the population living in the camps and organizations that works 
there, such as NGOs, UN agencies and the UNPol. They often have a few demands that 
are presented to different actors in the hope that requests are going to be fulfilled.
Empowerment
It refers to initiatives undertaken of the mission's components with the objective 
of strengthening women's social, economic and political status in the society. Women's 
political and economic empowerment are amongst the top of the Gender Unit objectives,
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and various initiatives on this particular matter are undertaken in partnership with the 
Ministry of Women's Condition and local civil society organization. The military has 
also increased the promotion o f gender sensitive QIPs and CVR programs that can 
economically benefit women, while Police efforts within the framework of Haitian SSR 
have contributed to promote Haitian women's participation within the National Police. 
Amongst UN agencies, various develop economic and empowering projects with the 
local population, particularly the UNDP, UN-Women and UNHCR.
The Gender Unit has accomplished a remarkable goal in terms of women's 
political empowerment. The inclusion of the 30% women representation in government 
quota in the constitutional amendment counted with the Gender Unit involvement and 
active support. Also, during the last elections, they were involved with activities that 
aimed to enhance women candidates and to protect them during the election. The 
increased number of women in politics can have long-term effects upon the effective 
promotion of Haitian women's rights. This initiative is also positive in terms of putting 
women's issues in the forefront of politics, having a spillover effect in terms of 
advancing a mindset change in Haitian society.
In regard to the military component empowerment activities, although CIMIC 
activities and the fulfillment o f those social and economic projects with the economic 
support of Civilian Affairs and CVR are not part of the military mandate, those are part 
of their daily activities and some of them are designed exclusively to benefit women. 
While there is an emphasis on the distribution of food and water to women, some projects 
particularly those regarding professional training directly affect women's conditions by 
providing them with skills that can improve their economic and thus social position
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within the society, further decreasing its vulnerability. Although these projects are 
limited, and mostly lack a conscious understanding on the part of the military component, 
if  more gender sensitive projects are designed, more women can be benefited and enjoy 
enhanced status within the society.
UN agencies have strong linkages with local organizations and some have 
projects designed to benefit women.90 In fact a gender marker has been created so that all 
projects implemented by the agencies explain how they can also benefit gender 
mainstreaming. UN-Women, UNFPA and UNHCR argued they have safe houses for 
victims of sexual violence. Most importantly, is that these houses also offer training and 
limited compensation, so that they can re-start their lives afterwards. They allow victims 
to stay in the houses for a period of 3 months and also provide them with training so that 
they are able to work and sustain themselves. After this period they refer to partners to do 
a follow up on the cases.
UNDP clarified, that since they finance projects undertaken by other 
organizations they have many projects that are gender sensitive. 70% of UNDP's 
programs streams gender, however, the UNDP representative highlights that mostly these 
projects are closely related to enhancing women's economic power and the other to their 
protection. Particularly after the earthquake special attention of projects that can 
specifically address women's vulnerability were enhanced.
Finally in regard to UN Women's work in Haiti. It was explained that their main 
focus is promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women as the main
90 A group interview with UN agencies -  UNHCR, UNDP and OCHA -  was carried out in Port-au-Prince, 
September, 2012. An interview with UN-Women representatives was carried out in Port-au-Prince, June 
2 0 1 1 .
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ingredients for a successful reconstruction effort and the accomplishment of development 
goals. For these purposes, its representatives have emphasized the need to remove 
structural obstacles, such as cultural attitudes and institutions that prevent the progress of 
women within the Haitian society.91 One of its main areas of engagement is increasing 
women's voice, being through the political participation or in a broader sense, such as 
within professional organizations or the civil society. Another important priority for the 
UN Women is economic development. As most of Haitian households are headed by 
women there is an urgent need for encouraging employment opportunities and creating 
livelihood opportunities for women.
As the analysis has shown, women's empowerment is carried out by different 
actors in the field, including MINUSTAH components and UN agencies. Although the 
agencies are clearly separated from the mission, due to its impartiality principle, their 
relationship is increasingly strengthening and collaboration is necessary for sustainable 
positive outcomes to be accomplished in Haiti.
The analysis of each one of these indicators has provided a rich account of how 
MINUSTAH's gender policy is being incorporated throughout all mission's components 
and has offered some insights on the impact o f these efforts in Haitian society. Overall, 
there are important advancements in all components and a gender perspective is slowly 
being incorporated as an integral component o f all mission's policies. Although there is 
still the need for a separated structure to promote gender mainstreaming to exist, their 
efforts are impacting on personnel's ability to consider gender on the ground and 
progress, although slow, is continuous.
91 Interview with UN-Women representatives were carried out in Port-au-Prince, June, 2011.
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Conclusions
Overall, MINUSTAH's compliance with UN resolutions on Women Peace and 
Security is relatively good, slow progress has been accomplished and a gender 
perspective has been integrated by and large as a cross cutting issue in the mission's 
actions on the field. Most advances though can be identified within the police 
component, due to the intrinsic features of police work and the Haitian context; being 
directly in contact with the population and local police on a daily basis puts them on alert 
to issues that may often be less clear to the military. The work developed by the Gender 
Mobile Unit, the Norwegian Sexual Violence Team and the sexual violence database are 
examples of how serious gender is taken within this component.
However, despite being slow, progress has also been accomplished by the military 
component. The appointment of gender focal points and the increasing awareness 
regarding gender issues is the result of a joint work between the gender unit and the U-9 
and has proven to be invaluable for gender mainstreaming amongst military personnel. 
Nonetheless, challenges ahead are varied and mostly dependent on member states 
willingness to promote change.
The existence of a Gender Unit as a coordinator section on gender issues has been 
pivotal for accomplishments observed thus far. The generation of tools to enhance gender 
awareness and of initiatives throughout MINUSTAH civilian sections and police and 
military components have contributed to increase the mission's understanding ofh the 
reality for local Haitian women, their needs and specific threats. Although still far from 
accomplishing an equitable Haitian society, MINUSTAH has given important steps in
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that direction, particularly when strengthening local institution's capacity and advancing 
an enhanced status for local women.
The different accomplishments though reflect the possibilities of the mission to 
have more or less interference in the different components and actions undertaken. The 
police component, for example, is divided in UNPols who come in individual missions 
and who do not respond to any national institution, and the FPUs that have a structure 
similar to that of a military institution. The creation of the different teams dedicated to 
different gender aspects was a top down initiative from the Police Commissioner -  with 
the exception of the Norwegian Sexual Violence team -  that is carried out by individual 
police personnel from different nationalities that do not come under a hierarchical 
structure. Although, the specialization and number of police sent by contributing 
countries matter; because they comply with individual missions, the Police 
Commissioner has the option of using most UNPol to perform whatever functions for 
which he or she is most suitable, and amongst those, having gender specialists to work 
within these teams.
For the military component though, it may be more difficult and it will reflect one 
of the main challenges for the UN to fulfill its learning process and accomplish 
institutional change. An example is that women's representation remains extremely low 
within the military component and in particular within Asian countries. The presence of 
uniformed women in peace operations reflects the kind of national policies implemented 
at home. The same can be said about the tasks and duties they perform.
Considerations regarding the role they perform within the battalion, if  they have 
equal opportunities and similar duties, are also important for analysis. Often, though,
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these important elements are dependent on the personal leadership of the commander 
who may have the female personnel performing similar tasks and duties according to 
their military branch. Unfortunately, it is also the case that because they are women they 
are given different tasks. Although manning policies and equal opportunities for 
uniformed personnel within peace operations is part of the UN normative, not all member 
states have similar initiative and attitude, particularly in regard to gender.
Pre-deployment training goes along the same lines. For the UN to comply with its 
protection of civilian mandates and be in a better position to protect women and girls 
from sexual violence, it matters how well the deployed personnel are trained on gender 
issues. It also matters how soldiers behave and how much the population trust them. 
Although the UN can and has in the past sent whole contingents back home due to 
accusations of SEA, what can the UN do to oblige states to incorporate more women into 
their military forces and have them incorporated into branches that results in more 
contact with the population?
The answer is very little. Nevertheless, states committed to peace operations with 
an interest in further enhancing its participation in international politics are adapting their 
internal context to that o f the UN. Evidence points that some developing states are 
increasingly adopting UN Resolutions on Women, Peace and security; while developed 
states, particularly Europeans, promote change possibly as a ways to enhance 
performance on the ground and to serve as an example. Many Latin American countries 
have indeed promoted national policies to promote the participation of women in the 
military and these policies are being translated into the increasing presence of women in 
peace operations, at least amongst the military from this particular region.
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Although the different historical and cultural context may put extra challenges 
amongst some countries to include a gender perspective into the work of the deployed 
personnel, few actions can be undertaken to prompt them to perform changes. The 
understanding of the operational needs of having military women, the performance of 
functions directly related to the protection of women, the contact with local women's 
organizations promoted on the ground may slowly show the advantage of promoting 
change.
The case study of Haiti showed, despite being slow, that a peace operation can 
promote gender within the host nation and into the contributing countries as well. Gender 
is an important instance through which the importance of the individual is being 
enhanced in the UN. If organizational learning is an interdependent process through 
which the organization creates and disseminates new practices, this case study has shown 
that these practices are indeed being adopted by some member states although at a 
different pace throughout different components and the various countries. The 
accomplishment of positive change in this particular area has spillover effects to the 
peacekeeping in general by promoting a more equitable society, sustainable economic 
development and strong institutions capable of carrying out the state basic functions.
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CHAPTER 5 
WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF 
CONGO
The case studies provide an important insight into the specific challenges the UN 
confronts in disseminating a gender approach to peace operations with the intent of better 
responding to threats on the ground. The analysis of the efforts undertaken by United 
Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic o f Congo (MONUSCO)1 is 
particularly important. Different from the Haiti case, where sexual violence is not an 
easily recognized feature of the crisis, the DRC is widely known as the world capital of 
rape. While the attention to the topic has generated a sound normative framework and 
specific strategies to protect civilians and combat sexual violence, the conflict does not 
dwindle, and fighting continues, particularly in the Eastern part.
The direct consequence of the extreme levels of sexual violence and the existence 
of a normative framework to deal with the problem is that awareness about gender and 
the impact of war on women and girls are disseminated and specific tasks to better 
protect them are in place. However, with the increasing levels of disturbances between 
armed groups, the constant displacement o f the population and the government’s inability 
to exercise state authority over its territory, sustained peace efforts are hampered.
Despite that, the UN’s organizational learning as an interdependent process 
through which new practices are generated by the organization and disseminated to the 
states has met with fertile ground in the DRC. The country has been the scenario where
1 From the French Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Republique 
Democratique du Congo.
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numerous innovative actions to better protect the population are constantly generated. 
The Analytical Inventory2 on how to address conflict-related sexual violence, for 
example, draws on a number o f lessons learned from the Congolese case. However, it is 
also the place where levels of violence against women do not decrease and where more 
challenges are added every day.
Considering this complex scenario, this chapter will analyze MONUSCO’s 
gender policy and the specific challenges it has confronted on the ground as a way to 
pinpoint where the implementation gap lies, whether in the UN itself or member-states’ 
inability and/or unwillingness to adopt this renewed gender approach. Ultimately, this 
analysis will contribute to determine whether the UN’s organizational learning and its 
renewed focus on the individual are being implemented, taken into account by member 
states and if changes towards that goal are being promoted.
The chapter will thus be divided in three main sections. The first provides a rich 
background on Congo’s history and the vulnerable status of women within its society. An 
analysis of the UN’s capacity o f delivery could not ignore the extremely complicated 
context presented in the DRC. International and local dynamics constantly spurs violence 
within the country, and what is worst, the targeting o f civilians has become an integral 
part of warring parties’ strategy for territory dominance. “All bad things can be found in 
this one place”3: intruding neighbors; local and international militia groups; a corrupt 
government; an inadequate, unprepared and mischievous defense force; illegal
2 United Nations Department o f  Peacekeeping Operations, "Addressing Conflict Related Sexual Violence: 
An Analytical Inventory o f  Peacekeeping Practice."
3 Interview with representative o f  Doctors without Borders carried out in Eastern Democratic Republic o f  
Congo, February, 2012.
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exploitation of natural resources; widespread diseases and starvation and a population 
that has been violated, displaced, abused and attacked many times throughout history.
In this context, women’s inferior status in Congolese society and historical 
incidence of sexual violence further contributed to have this crime become its most 
recognizable feature. The country has unfortunately earned the fame of being the world 
capital of rape and “the worst place on earth to be a woman,” attracting the attention of 
the international community to the dreadful consequences of the massive and systematic 
use of sexual violence as a cheap and effective tool of war. While attention is welcome 
and joint efforts necessary, the feeling of insecurity has not faded, and social and 
economic indicators have even worsened in some parts of the country. Most importantly, 
in light of the Congolese context the effectiveness of the international community efforts 
are constantly questioned.
Considering this background, the second section evaluates the UN’s presence in 
the country, focusing on the MONUSCO’s structure and mandate in the light of current 
challenges. From the beginning, the UN’s presence in the DRC has been “special.” In 
fact, the first UN mission established in the country in 1960 did not follow the traditional 
parameters of UN peacekeeping practices of the time and was the first to incorporate a 
civilian component and functions that went beyond the traditional cease-fire monitoring 
to directly support the government in its efforts to maintain rule of law and oversee the 
withdrawal of Belgian forces. MONUSCO, the last of the UN missions established in the 
country, is one of the first missions that had a mandate to protect civilians as a high 
priority. Hence the UN approach to the increasing threats to civilians is based on the
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robust use of force and innovative joint initiatives between civilian, military and police 
components to better assess threats against civilians.
The third section evaluates MONUSCO’s gender policy in accordance to the five 
previously defined indicators -  legal framework, gender balance, security sector, 
protection, women’s empowerment. Protection against sexual violence is founded on a 
national strategy with various implementing partners. Likewise, peacekeepers are 
authorized to use all necessary means to protect women and girls from attacks. For that 
purpose, a renewed integrated mission structure with a strong protection component 
running through all its sections was established. Specific offices that deal with gender 
mainstreaming and sexual violence are also part of MONUSCO’s task force to better 
protect the local population.
This approach is based on an inclusive protection concept that goes well beyond 
physical security. Under this premise, a strong linkage between democracy, development, 
a sound judiciary system and an environment free from sexual violence and other crimes 
committed against civilians exists. It then becomes evident that as such, MONUSCO’s 
strategy is encompassing and depends on the joint efforts o f all its components -  the 
military, the police and the civilian - ,  UN agencies, civil society and local government to 
apply this inclusive view as a crosscutting strategy to better protect Congolese citizens.
The specific features of the Congolese background means that the military 
component, being the main armed institution on the ground, does have a special role in 
securing the civilian population, supporting the reaching out to remote areas, facilitating 
civilian expert outreach and supporting the national forces. It is thus imperative to 
understand the contextual challenges, achievements and shortcomings of their presence
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on the ground along with the civilian initiatives as a ways of facilitating a thorough 
understanding of the UN’s institutional transformation.
Despite the challenges posed by a state-driven international system, the United 
Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) is a hub of initiatives that place 
the individual in the spotlight. These efforts are a direct consequence of the protection of 
civilians mandate as a top priority and the specific context encountered in the Congo that 
highlights the extreme insecurity lived by the population on a daily basis. While the 
mission was planned in accordance to this renewed mandate, having norms and a 
structure that fully supports this goal, there are still implementation gaps mostly related to 
the inability of Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) to adequate their input as 
stipulated by the UN: the execution of a robust mandate where a gender perspective is 
integrated in terms of gender balance, adequate protection strategies and community 
outreach.
The Democratic Republic of Congo, its people and their struggle for peace
The history o f the Democratic Republic of Congo is a sad story. The country is 
the second largest in Africa with a population of over 71 million and one of the poorest in 
the world, with a total of 1.7 million internally displaced people and 500 thousand 
refugees elsewhere.4 It is located in the heart of sub-Saharan Africa, having borders with 
eight different countries. Considering the immensity of its territory, Congo5 is lightly
4 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “2012 UNHCR country operations profile - Democratic Republic 
o f the Congo.” January, 2012. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c366.html. Accessed: 
11/28/2012.
5 From 1960 to 1965 the DRC's name was “Republic o f Congo” as its neighbor, the French Colonized 
country that had Brazzaville as the capital. In that period the two Congos were distinguished either by
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populated with its inhabitants spread across a vast territory and complex geography. 
Filled with jungles, natural resources and active volcanoes, the lack of infrastructure is 
still one of the main challenges for the implementation of a successful protection strategy.
The continued violence in the country reflects a past of foreign intervention, a 
corrupt dictatorship and presence of various armed groups, local and international, that 
constantly attack the population and exploit its resources. While the two Congo wars 
were an expression of the extreme levels of violence, corruption and exploitation always 
present in the country, the specific impact of war on women was the reflection of a 
continuum of violence and disregard associated with the inferior status they have held 
throughout the years in society.
Foreign interventions and the presence of armed groups are not the only 
explanatory factors for the extreme levels present in the country. Complicated civil- 
military relations and internal divisions also contribute to rising disturbances and 
comprise yet another layer of complexity to the causes o f war. In a place where the armed 
forces were historically built to serve the elite and formed by elements of a controversial 
and ineffective DDR program, the level of brutality is high, and human rights violation 
common place. In this context, women have become the central elements of a hideous 
tactic to advance in war. Worst, sexual violence has become not only the most 
recognizable feature of the conflict but also normalcy in that society.
This complex scenario requires innovative actions on the part of the UN and other 
international actors involved with peace efforts. In order to adequately protect the 
population and incorporate a gender approach to the peace operation established in the
Congo-Leopoldville (today Kinshasa) and Congo-Brazzaville, or simply by “the Congo” and “Congo” 
respectively.
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country it is imperative that the historical roots o f the conflict and the multiple 
explanatory factors that prompted it are fully understood. This section then will be 
provide a thorough background of Congo’s history, focusing on the underlining factors 
that led to the continued conflict in the Eastern part of the country, the context in which 
its armed forces were created and the status and current conditions of Congolese women.
A contextual note: exploitation and war
The history of Congo has been largely characterized by the exploitation of its 
resources, its people and war. Years o f exploratory colonialism, decades of dictatorship 
and several years of war have left a mark in this country and its people. Many of the 
Congolese have not known peace or a different life than that of constant fear, 
militarization and foreign intervention. For women, the impact o f war has been 
particularly harsh. Not only have they suffered with the movement of illegal armed 
groups, lack of economic opportunities and constant displacement, they have also been 
victims of gender based crimes and fallen prey of a vicious tactic to win the war.
The exploitation o f Congo’s riches began early.6 In 1885, King Leopold II of 
Belgium acquired the country as his private property, and exploited his land - the “Congo 
Free State” - with disregard to the population, having caused the death of several 
thousand indigenous Congolese and enriched at the expense of his colony.7 Following 
international pressure and criticism to Leopold’s actions in the Congo, the country was 
“promoted” to being a Belgian colony from 1908 to 1960.
6 On a brilliant account o f  King Leopold’s rule in the Congo see: Adam Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost 
: A Story o f  Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998).
7 Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline o f  the Zairian State (Madison, Wis.: 
University o f  Wisconsin Press, 1985). p.7
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As it is the case in most recently independent states, the Congo also had its share 
of dictators, one in particular. Mobutu Sese Seko, a young army officer promoted a coup 
d ’etat in 1965 ending with the initial democratic movement that followed Congo’s 
independence in 1960 and concluding the government o f the first elected Congolese 
president, Patrice Lumumba, assassinated in that same year.
In the Cold War environment, Mobutu’s “kleptocracy”8 would not be of great 
concern to Western observers mostly concerned with events in Europe. The leader had 
successfully institutionalized a corrupt regime that contributed to the private enrichment 
of the elite in power. Violation of human rights and oppression were just the short list of 
numerous other problematic actions undertaken during his rule. Soon after his rise to 
power, Mobutu outlawed all political activity claiming political diversity was dangerous 
for stability and created his own party, the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR) 
[Popular Movement of the Revolution].9 Although presidential and legislative elections 
took place in 1970, 1975, 1977, 1977, 1982 and 1987, they did not threaten Mobutu’s 
autocracy, who ran as the sole candidate in a few of those.10
As opposition grew stronger against Mobutu, disturbances re-started in the 
1990’s. In addition, in 1994, when 2 million Hutu refugees, including the Interahamwe 
militia, who actively participated in the massacres in Rwanda, were placed in the South 
Kivu, the situation deteriorated quickly. The Hutu Rwandan refugees were perceived as a 
threat to Congolese with Rwandan ancestry (mostly Tutsis), who were brought to Congo
8 The term refers to the kind o f regime established during Mobutu’s rule. Widely recognized as extremely 
corrupt, Mobutu’s regime would benefit a small elite by the personal enrichment through embezzlement o f  
state resources.
9 Zoe Marriage, "Divisive ‘Commonality’: State and Insecurity in the Democratic Republic o f Congo,"
Third World Quaterly 32, no. 10 (2011). p.1895-6
10 Rene Lemarchand, The Dynamics o f  Violence in Central Africa, National and Ethnic Conflict in the 
Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 2009). p.194
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in the 1930’s by the Belgian colonizers to alleviate the over-populated neighboring 
country. Violence soon broke out with attacks promoted by the recently placed refugees 
against the Congolese Tutsis and Rwanda through the border and vice-versa. Rwanda 
then launched an invasion in the DRC to allegedly defend these Tutsi Congolese, having 
as partners anti-Mobutu elements including Laurent-Desire Kabila,11 soon to be president 
of the Democratic Republic of Congo. (DRC)12
Laurent-Desire Kabila would play an important role in the following years. He 
gathered support from neighboring countries, Angola in particular, and advanced through 
the East and West Kasais, leading Mobutu to flee the country and the capital Kinshasa to 
fall. Kabila initially placed Rwandan and Tutsi in important key positions in the 
government. In fact, even the chief of staff post was occupied by a Rwandan army 
officer. However, the relationship between them soon deteriorated, prompting the 
president to expel all foreign forces from Congolese territory. Angola, Zimbabwe and 
Namibia came in support of the president and so began the Second Congo War.
Also known as the Third World War, the Second Congo War initiated in 1998 can 
hardly be considered a civil war. Congo was divided in three parts: 1. Kabila had 
Kinshasa and the south part of the territory from the Atlantic to the southern parts of the 
Kasais and Katanga, maintaining control over oil and mineral resources; 2. The north 
including Equateur (Mobutu’s former Province) was controlled by the Mouvement de
11 Thomas Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality (London ; New York: Zed Books, 2007).
p.2
12 Congo’s name has changed many times. After independence from Belgium, the Belgian Congo became 
the Republic o f  Congo. In 1965, though, the name was once again changed to the Democratic Republic o f  
Congo, until 1971, when Mobutu named the country Republic o f  Zaire. At that time, city names were also 
changed such as Leopoldsville (Kinshasa), Stanlayville (Kisangani), Elisabethville (Lubumbashi), and 
Coquihatville (Mbandaka). Finally after Kabila was in power in 2003, Zaire became once again the 
Democratic Republic o f  Congo.
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Liberation du Congo (MLC) [Congo Liberation Movement] backed by Uganda; 3. And 
finally the East was held by Rwandan backed Congolese rebels from the Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Democratic (RCD) [Congolese Rally for Democracy] and comprised 
the former Kivu, and parts of Katanga, the Kasais and O rientale.13
Following increasing pressure from the international community a ceasefire 
agreement was signed in Lusaka, 1999. The agreement fell short of its objective and with 
the assassination of Kabila and the emergence of his son Joseph Kabila as a new leader, 
hopes to an effective agreement increased. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue with the 
different warring parts was formed, having served as a platform of negotiation between 
the different groups during the Sun City process in 2001 and Pretoria, later the same year. 
Agreements with Rwanda and other foreign forces were accomplished and in exchange 
for the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of Rwandan militia forces, 
Rwanda left the DRC accompanied by the forces of other countries.
However, one should not consider the international involvement of Rwanda and 
other regional states as the sole cause o f the First and Second Congo Wars, the Rwandan 
genocide was just the catalyst for the continued violence that has taken place since then.14 
The conflict in Congo is multi-layered and effortless explanations are deemed to be over- 
simplistic. Autessere argues that dominant narratives that focuses on the illegal 
exploitation of minerals as the cause o f violence, sexual violence as the main 
consequence and the extension of the Congolese state authority as a solution to the 
problem have in fact contributed to the deterioration to the situation o f Congo during the
13 Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality, p.6
14 Gerard Prunier, Africa'S World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide and the Making o f  a Continental 
Catastrophe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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transition period (2003-2006).15 Her argument is that grassroots rivalries over land, 
corruption, controversial civil-military relations and the influence of external powers 
have all contributed to the violence in the Congo during and after the wars.
It seems indeed that the “resource curse” is a popular explanation for Congo’s 
demise. The simplicity of the logic, though, may hinder domestic aspects that are of 
outmost importance to understand the events that took place in 1996 and 1998 and which 
resulted in the escalation o f violence committed by various armed groups, national and 
international, against the civilian population. The understanding of these complex aspects 
of the Congolese context is imperative to the design of adequate strategies of protection, 
including those regarding women and girls from sexual violence.
During the war, 81% of the Eastern population was obliged to flee the country 
and more than one third had been abducted for at least a week.16 The presence of foreign 
forces, in particular foreign militia, aligned to Mobutu’s elitist government led the 
indigenous population to organize themselves as well. That was the origins of the Mai 
Mai, which comprise different indigenous combatant groups originally dedicated to 
protecting the native population from the attacks of foreign bands.
The Mai Mai, which in Swahili means “water water”, became numerous and 
powerful, particularly over the 1990’s with 10 to 25 thousand soldiers that joined forces 
with Kabila in the 1996/97 conflict against Mobutu.17 They maintain a confusing 
relationship with the local population until nowadays. Although originally formed to
15 Severine Autesserre, "Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and Their Unintended 
Consequences " African Affairs 111, no. 443 (2012).
16 Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality, p. 10
17 Jocelyn Kelly, "Rape in War: Motives o f  Militia in the Drc," in Special Report (Washington D. C.:
United States Institute o f  Peace, June, 2010). p. 4
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protect the local villages, with the deterioration o f economic conditions over the war, 
they soon started to loot them too.18 As explained by a military observer in the Walikale 
territory “Many Mai Mai know nothing but to combat, and so they try to integrate them 
into the national army. They protect the people, but also attack them, it is a paradoxical 
relationship.” 19 In fact, some Mai Mai groups are also involved in massive rapes and 
other human rights violations, one of the reasons why they are also included in the peace 
negotiation process and the following DDR approach to be integrated into the national 
army.20
As this brief description of the Congolese context shows, there are foreign and 
international factors accounting for the wars as much as macro and micro dynamics that 
contributed to spur violence locally. Although the peace settlement had momentarily 
solved the international and macro-level dynamics with the disengagement of the 
neighboring countries from the Congolese conflict, the sub-national and micro-dynamics 
continued to take place with the alleged backing of bordering states and the constant 
attack and looting of villages, especially in the eastern part of Congo. The continued 
failure of the international community to address conflict mediation at this local level 
partially explains the unrelenting violence that continues to take place in the DRC.21
These micro and macro dynamics influence and feed each other. Although the 
peace process has formally brought an end to the conflict, the influence of external
18 Severine Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure o f  International 
Peacebuilding, Cambridge Studies in International Relations (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010). p.7
19 Interview carried out with military observer deployed in the Walikale territory on February, 2012.
20 On an interesting account o f  motivations and reasons for committing sexual violence against the 
population, USIP has conducted a number o f  interviews with members o f  two different Mai Mai groups.
For a report on the research results, see: Kelly, "Rape in War: Motives o f  Militia in the Drc.".
21 Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure o f  International Peacebuilding.
p.8
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powers in the DRC continues affecting thus the local levels of violence. Rwanda in 
particular is accused by several local organizations and experts of illegally supporting 
militia groups as a way to continue benefitting from Congo resources and influencing 
Congolese politics in regards to the Tutsi minority with Rwandan ancestry. As an 
illustration, in November 2012, a “new” militia group - the M23 - had taken over the city 
of Goma in North Kivu increasing the levels o f insecurity and uncertainty regarding the 
future of Congo as a unified state.22
Amongst civil society representatives accusations of Rwandan intervention in the 
DRC were numerous. “The conflict keeps going, the weapons multiply, it is obvious that 
there is someone behind it. Where are they [rebels] getting the weapons from? The 
international community needs to speak to Rwanda and they need to be out of here.”23 In 
another instance, the interviewee questioned: “This is a Rwandan occupation, and 
everybody knows, why the silence?”24
Amongst women’s group, Rwanda was accused of using sexual violence in the 
DRC, as a strategy of occupation. “It is an act of humiliation and of destruction. They 
introduce weapons, objects and sand in the women, they transmit AIDS. It is a form of
22 As o f March 2013, the group left the city o f Goma and other key cities that were occupied and his leader 
turned him self in to the ICC. It is argued that the group was weakened when divided in two as they fought 
against each other. As o f  March, rebels were on the run or had turned themselves to UN peacekeepers. For 
an account o f  M-23 invasion o f  Goma. See: Anjan Sundaram, "That Other War," Foreign Policy, 
November 20th 2012. For more recent information see: Malcom Webb, "Congo’s M23 Rebels on the Run," 
AI Jazeera, March 18,2013.
23 Interview carried out with representative from the local organization Caucus de Femme Congolaise in 
Bukavu, February, 2012.
24 Interview carried out with representative from the Panzi hospital in Bukavu, February, 2012.
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genocide and a strategy of occupation by the foreign forces to annex the DRC, explore its 
resources and exterminate the local population.” 25
M23 is not the only group though, fighting continues amongst several armed 
groups, both Congolese, including the Mai Mai and from neighboring countries such as 
the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), acting especially in the 
Kivus and the Lord Resistant Army (LRA) in the Orientale Province, just to cite some. 
Although some of these groups still fight for the domination of different territories, 
especially in the East, some of them have lost force, consisting in groups of bandits who 
promote looting and banditry, sometimes by extremely violent actions, including mass 
rapes.
Despite that, the top-down conflict resolution implemented by the United Nations 
and other involved organizations and diplomatic efforts have allowed the country to 
experience relative calm in the Western part of the country, where democratic elections in 
2006 and 2011, elected Joseph Kabila as President of the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
By no means a strong and democratic state has been established in the Congo tough. 
Besides unable to control the immense Congolese territory, various irregularities were 
noted on election day, such as missing ballots and voter registration; and prior to the 
elections, constitutional amendments have allegedly changed electoral rules in favor of 
Kabila “in blatant violation of democratic principles” .26
The reality thus is that the DRC is in the limbo between a conflict and post 
conflict state, with armed groups moving around, shifting motivations and alliances,
25 Interview carried out with representative from the local organization Caucus de Femme Congolaise in 
Bukavu, February, 2012.
26 Mvemba Phezo Dizolele and Pascal Kalume Kambale, "The Drc’s Crumbling Legitimacy," Journal o f  
Democracy 23 no. 3 (2012). p .l 10
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many of them using sexual violence and other forms of abuse as a weapon of war and a 
way to undermine the enemy’s ability to fight by raping men, women and children.
The security sector in the DRC
The security sector in the DRC is in deep need of reform. Both the police and the 
armed forces have been continuously implicated in pillages and abuses against the 
civilian population. The common assumption emphasizes that the main reason for the 
recurrence of these acts is the low salaries and living conditions of Congolese security 
forces.27 However, this one dimensional explanation may be too simplistic, leaving aside 
important contextual factors that are important to understand Congolese security forces 
behavior associated with rampant human rights violations (including sexual violence)28, 
illegal exploitation of natural resources, deteriorated civil-military relations, and low 
quality service.
In varied occasions during the field work in the DRC uniformed personnel’s low 
salary was pointed to as an important factor explaining the opportunity cost of security 
forces personnel involved with illegal activities.29 The average salary o f the police and 
military is between 45 to 70 dollars as was informed by many of the interviewees on the
27 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Ola Olsson, "Feeding the Horse: Unofficial Economic Activities within the 
Police Force in the Democratic Republic o f  the Congo," African Security 4, no. 4 (2011). p.224
28According to a Harvard Humanitarian Initiative research. 52% o f victims o f  rape that were taken to Panzi 
hospital described their perpetrator as armed combatant .including Congolese uniformed personnel; while 
42% were identified as “assailants”. The research strongly suggests though that the pattern o f violence 
indicates that this group is also mostly comprised o f  armed combatants. See: Harvard Humanitarian 
Initiative, '"Now, the World without Me': An Investigation o f  Sexual Violence in Eastern o f  the Democratic 
Republic o f  Congo," (Cambridge: OXFAM International; Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, April, 2010).
29 Different actors on the ground, including MONUSCO high rank civilians, military and police 
representatives from Kinshasa and elsewhere shared concern regarding personnel low salaries and delayed 
payments, attributing it as an important explanation for their involvement in criminal activities.
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field.30 Although, it is certainly true that the reported amount is not enough to establish 
acceptable standards of living for the personnel and their families, explanations focused 
on a deteriorated payment structure for security agents should be accompanied by 
considerations on the background facts on the security sector in the DRC.
Congo has never had a military force with adequate functioning standards as 
envisioned by the West. Even before independence, Congo’s force, the “Force Publique,” 
[Public Force] was formed by Belgian officers and native soldiers with the objective of 
refraining any resistance to the exploitation of the country by the metropolis.31 In fact, it 
was not until the end of the colonization period that Congolese nationals would start to be 
trained as commissioned officers. Consequently, when the sudden independence came, 
the recently created Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC) [Congolese National Army] 
would soon be dragged into a mutiny.
The expulsion of more than 1,000 European officers from the army and the 
concession of officers’ rank to Congolese non-commissioned officers did not improve the 
situation, and when Mobutu and his kleptocratic state came into power the same pattern 
of exploitation was established. The leader would privilege a few divisions, often from 
the same ethnic group that he pertained to, exporting to the now Congolese Armed Force 
(from the French Forces Armees Congolaise - FAC) the same model he used to rule the 
country: a small privileged group that received most of the resources, creating thus 
division and tensions within the army.32 After the 1990’s the situation of the armed forces
30 Information gathered through a series o f  interviewees with different actors on the ground that have 
repeatedly repeated the low salaries as one explanatory factor for continued violence by Congolese forces.
31 Colin Robinson, "Army Reconstruction in the Democratic Republic o f  the Congo 2003-2009," Small 
Wars & Insurgencies 23, no. 3 (2012). p. 475
32 Ibid. p.477
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would deteriorate even more as they were left to forage on its own when Mobutu 
considered his position could be threatened by a strong national army.
Congolese forces also presented -  and still do -  very low quality, having been 
“saved” by foreign support that came in their help during the 1970’s against Angola’s 
incursions (Morocco, France and Belgium) and in the 1990’s against Rwanda (Angola, 
Zimbabwe and Namibia). It is thus in this context that the process of Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) took place after the signing of the Global and 
All-inclusive Agreement in 2002 that put a formal end to the conflict in the DRC. It was 
then decided that the new military force, the French Forces Armees de la Republique 
Democratic du Congo -  FARDC) [Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic o f Congo], 
would be formed by warring factions including the former FAC, Congolese Rally for 
Democracy, Movement for the Liberation of Congo, Ituri militias and Mai Mai. Later, in 
2009, an accelerated process of integration also allowed members of the National 
Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), highly implicated in human rights 
violation, to be part of the national military forces.33
The inclusion of the warring parties was done through the “brassage” process, 
consisting in the re-grouping of disarmed fighters, 45-day training at different 
orientations centers and the creation of 18 brigades to defend Congolese territory.34 Most 
critics to the process refer to the incipient training, delayed brigade formations and the 
issuance of ranks to militia men that have abused and looted the population for years as
33 The CNDP is a political armed militia established by Laurent Nkunda. Nkunda and his rebel force are 
accused o f  having swept through from the northeast and occupying the city o f  Bukavu in an episode that 
passed to history as “the killing o f  Bukavu”. The destruction path caused by Nkunda earned him an arrest 
warrant from the International Criminal Court, brought about in 2009 in Rwanda.
34 It is also important to add that since Mobutu’s reign and still nowadays, Congolese government prefers 
bilateral agreements with donors willing to support the national armed forces, resulting in different 
countries being responsible for different training centers, without a unified method and doctrine.
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one of the main factors that explains the continued levels o f violence in the country.35 
Moreover, it is arguable that the formation of new brigades to break down old loyalties 
and establish a unified chain of command was achieved. Baaz and Stem argue that 
mostly they remain responsive to their former belligerent leaders creating thus a 
dysfunctional accountability and command structure.36
While the armed forces of Congo have never had an ethos directed towards 
national security or of protection, the re-integration of combatants into society through 
their inclusion in the armed forces, and occasionally in the police, has been the object of 
criticism by various observers and counted as one of MONUSCO’s main failures. The 
involvement of these groups with sexual violence prior and after the DDR process further 
fuels the discussion.
Indeed, considerations regarding MONUSCO’s role in the pacification process of 
the DRC varied according to different actors, particularly amongst different local and 
international civil society organizations, but critics would focus on the organization’s 
involvement in the DDR. Most were aware o f MONUSCO’s role in supporting the 
security situation and argued that without the fortified UN presence, the country would 
quickly revert to generalized chaos.37 Some though, would directly blame the
35 Interviews with local civil society organizations showed that these were particularly critical o f  DDR 
process and how it promoted the institutionalization o f  violence against civilians through the integration o f  
combatants into the armed forces.
36 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stem, "The Complexity o f  Violence: A Critical Analysis o f  Sexual 
Violence in the Democratic Republic o f  Congo (Drc)," in SID A Working Paper on Gender based Violence 
(Uppsala, Sweden: SID A, 2010).p. 17.
37 Interviewed civil society organizations included two major international organizations, International 
Committee o f  the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders; local organizations included the Reseau Action 
Femme ( a network conformed by several grassroots organizations dedicated to different aspects o f  women 
empowerment), the Comite National Femme et Developpement (another network o f  organizations 
throughout all Congolese territory that work to advance a gender approach in the society) and Caucus de 
Femme Congolaises du Sud Kivu (an organization that attempts to advance women’s rights and 
empowerment in South Kivu).
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organization for the continued levels of violence due to its direct involvement in the DDR 
process that resulted in unprepared and unwilling state force that often harasses those 
they should protect, and their inability to act and stop massacres, that often happen not far 
away from peacekeepers’ military bases.38 A representative from a local civil society 
organization explains “In order to have them join the army, they promote them, increase 
their ranks. What they are doing is giving state authority to criminals”.39 Along the same 
lines, an employee from Doctors without Borders highlighted the problem of having 
militia men without resources as an official state authority “Problem is that they let them 
join the military with the same fictitious rank they had when part of the militia and with 
no money, they blatantly attack the population.”40
Others though, would blame MONUSCO’s contradictory mandate of protecting 
the population and supporting a week government and its inadequate security forces. 
“MONUSCO has the mandate to protect civilians and support local government. That 
then becomes, MONUSCO observes and the government supposedly protects. It doesn’t 
work. In the end, the government does not protect and MONUSCO does not interfere. 
MONUSCO is a spectator, it is the civil society who does it all.” 41
38 Accounts o f  UN inability to respond to attacks are various. A well-documented case is the Walikale 
massacre, when in the period o f  three days 303 men, women and children were raped in six villages within 
the Walikale territory, North Kivu. Although a UN military base was not far from the place where the 
incident took place, it was not until three days later that the UN allegedly learned about the incident. It was 
argued that the poor infra-structure for transport and communication contributed to U N ’s alienation. Since 
then, an Indian company was detached to the territory to improve the security. On the investigation o f  the 
case, see: MONUSCO and Office o f the High Commissiner for Human Rights, "Final Report o f  the Fact- 
Finding Missions o f  the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office into the Mass Rapes and Other Human 
Rights Violations Committed by a Coalition o f  Armed Groups Along the Kibua-Mpofi Axis in Walikale 
Territory, North Kivu, from 30 July to 2 August, 2010" (Kinshasa: United Nations, July, 2011).
39 Interview carried out with representative from the Caucus de Femme Congolaises du Sud Kivu in 
Bukavu, February, 2012.
40 Interview carried out with representative o f  Doctors Without Borders in Bukavu, February, 2012.
41 Interview carried out with representative from the Caucus de Femme Congolaises du Sud Kivuin 
Bukavu, February, 2012.
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Although less in the spotlight, the involvement o f Congolese police, the Police 
National Congolaise (PNC) [Congolese National Police], has also been reported. 
According to Baaz and Olsson, the predation of resources and other abuses is also found 
in the police.42 In fact, they argue that these acts are not the result of random 
undisciplined soldiers but a well-organized movement that goes all the way up into the 
hierarchy. As much as the armed forces are in deep need of reform, so is the police. 
Although at a much lesser extent, combatants were also integrated into the police formed 
by a wide range of Congolese that include former members o f the military and the newly 
integrated militia men.43
Women in the DRC
The continued presence of armed groups, particularly in the Eastern part of the 
country, the long history of political instability and the vulnerable status of the 
population, particularly women and children have facilitated the continued recurrence of 
sexual violence and attacks. In fact, over 200,000 cases of rape have been recorded in the 
DRC since 1996. The precise data is unknown since the limited access to remote areas, 
stigma and fear of victims to come forward, and lack of clinics for medical treatment, 
have impeded the appropriate data collection and it is believed that many more cases 
remain unnoticed.
The root causes o f sexual violence in the DRC are varied and cannot be 
oversimplified. While widespread and systematic violence committed by uniformed
42 Baaz and Olsson, "Feeding the Horse: Unofficial Economic Activities within the Police Force in the 
Democratic Republic o f the Congo." p.223
43 Ibid. p.226
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personnel (armed groups and government security forces) comprise the majority of cases, 
the conflict is not the only to blame. The practice is not new in the country, and is also 
connected to the inferior status o f women. Since the time of King Leopold II, sexual 
violence was practiced as a way to punish communities and teach a lesson.44 The 
inferiority of women has been an embedded feature of the indigenous social system since 
the colonial era and has persisted ever since 45
Restrained to the private sphere, as wives and mothers, Congolese women have 
always had limited access to education, being mostly involved with agricultural work, 
firewood gathering, water hauling and the conduct of informal small businesses. 
According to Puechguirbal,46 prior to the conflict there was a gap between Congolese law 
and reality in regard to gender equality. Evidence of that was the reaffirming o f the 
equality of rights between men and women and the prohibition of forced marriage to 
young girls, when customary practice indicated the opposite. Not only girls were and 
continue to be forced to marry at a very young age, women were deprived of inheritance 
at the death of the husband, and in-laws would keep the house and goods the couple had 
acquired. Activities outside the household required an authorization from the husband, 
including acquisition of passport, severely limiting their possibilities o f becoming 
independent and strengthening their social and economic status in the society.
Another paradoxical reality is the legal prohibition of polygamy and the 
customary practice. According to a representative of the Gender Affairs Office, these are
44 Muadi Mukenge, Aimee Mwadi Kady, and Caitlin Stanton, "Funding W omen's Movement against 
Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic o f Congo: 2004-2009 " (San Francisco: Globan Fund for 
Women, February, 2010). p. 10
45 Sandra W. Meditz et al., Zaire: A Country Study, 4th ed., Area Handbook Series, (Washington, D.C.: The 
Division : For sale by the Supt. o f  Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 1994).
46 Nadine Puechguirbal, "Women and War in the Democratic Republic o f the Congo," Signs 28, no. 4 
(2003). p.1272
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gender issues that persist in Congolese society and ought to be considered in all actions 
carried by the UN.47 The Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and 
Resettlement program (DDR/RR), for example, needs to consider the fact that a 
combatant may have more than one wife and each have different kids. In practice, what 
happens is that only one of the women is included in the DDR/RR program and the others 
are left behind with the children without a place to stay, further increasing their 
vulnerability.
As it is seen from this example, this was true in the pre-war period and it still is 
nowadays, putting into evidence the need of a better understanding of Congolese culture 
and customs as a way to better protect the population. A research carried out with leaders 
of local communities supports this claim 48 According to the study, women are from a 
young age socialized that men are positioned above her, and while they grow up with the 
pride of superiority women are raised accustomed to their inferiority. “Leaders implied 
that violence against women was tacitly condoned by institutionalized, male dominance 
with husbands often cited as perpetrators.”49
It is also important to note that most literature depicts Congolese women as 
victims, when their role as active participants o f the peace process should also be 
reinforced. War affect men, women and children in different ways, however, it also 
changes established gender relations by empowering women left behind. It is thus
47 Interview carried out with Gender Affairs Office representative in Eastern Democratic Republic o f  
Congo, February, 2012.
48P. Olssona and B.M. Ahlberg J.E. Trenholma, "Battles on Women’s Bodies: War, Rape and 
Traumatisation in Eastern Democratic Republic o f  Congo," G lobal Public Health 6, no. 2 (2011).
49 Ibid. p. 145
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imperative to reconsider gender relations in the post-war period so that local society does 
not return to pre-war normalcy.
The two Congo wars have affected the women in many ways: they end up bearing 
the brunt of the household, being left behind to care for the children and the elderly, 
confronting shortage of food, wood, water and health care. They often have to travel 
large distances to find resources, further exposing themselves to violence. Moreover, to 
escape violence, many run to the jungle where access to humanitarian aid, food or 
medical assistance is limited. The International Rescue Committee has reported that 
deaths in 2001 were mostly indirectly caused by the conflict as they were the result of 
malnutrion and disease due to the population’s difficulties to access resources.50
However, the war has also brought women some independence and comprised an 
important moment seized by women’s organization as a way to start changing the pattern 
of gender relations in the DRC. When they were left alone to care for themselves, they 
were able to control their own income, gaining relative independence.51 As prices of 
goods would become higher during the conflict, women would organize themselves to 
acquire goods and sell for increased prices, being able to maximize their profits.
Nevertheless, their presence in the peace process that took place was limited, 
particularly in the initial phase and confronted several challenges. The 1999 Lusaka 
Agreement did not have any women delegates and did not consider specific gender needs. 
Moreover, as the integration of women delegates was not a requirement for the Inter
50 Robert Les et al., "Mortality in Eastern Democratic Republic o f  the Congo: Results from Eleven 
Mortality Surveys," (Bukavu, Democratic Republic o f Congo: International Rescue Committee, 2001).
51 Puechguirbal, "Women and War in the Democratic Republic o f  the Congo." p.1274
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Congolese Dialogue52, it became extremely difficult for Congolese women to join the 
negotiation table.53
Parties of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue included the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), the 
Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), the political opposition, civil society, 
the Congolese Rally for Democracy/Liberation Movement (RDC/ML), the Congolese 
Rally for Democracy/National (RCD/N) and the Mai-Mai.54 The objective was to agree 
on the reunification of the Congo and on pressing matters o f post-war reconstruction, 
such as the judiciary system, the security sector, peace process, etc. It was thus important 
to include specific concerns of Congolese women, highly victimized during the conflict, 
and establish landmarks to the creation of a more equitable local society.
Being an important interested party, the women should thus be included. As 
expressed by a representative of the Caucus de Femme Congolaise, an organization that 
participated in the Dialogue, “In war, women are the first victim. There is no peace if 
women are not at peace. Peace for men is different from the peace for women. A 
sustainable peace is only accomplished if the two are considered.”55 And so, despite 
initial difficulties, with the support of UNIFEM and the Dialogue facilitator, Sir Ketumile
52 The Inter Congolese Dialogue consisted in a series o f  conversations between the warring parties, 
members o f  the Congolese government and civil society organization to draft a peace agreement between 
all parties. It was facilitated by the former president o f  Botswana, Ketumile Masire, and was opened in 
Addis Ababa. Its main contribution though occurred during the Sun City process, when parties to the 
Dialogue discussed and agreed on various issues to be included in the Global and Inclusive Agreement on 
Transition in the DR Congo signed in Pretoria, South Africa.
53 Shelly Whitman, "Women and Peace-Building in the Democratic Republic o f Congo: As Assessment o f  
Their Role in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue," AJCR 6, no. 1 (2006). p.37
54 Inter Congolese Dialogue, "Political Negotiations on the Peace Process and on Transition in the Drc: 
Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic o f  Congo" (Pretoria: December 
16, 2002).
55 Interview carried out with representative from the Caucus de Femme Congolaises du Sud Kivu in 
Bukavu, February, 2012.
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Masire, former President of Bostwana, financial support, expertise and pressure on the 
agreement parties and regional governments 40 women delegates participated in the 
negotiations. They were able to provide limited, although invaluable, contributions to 
peace efforts and include gender considerations in some of the Dialogue’s commission, 
particularly on the Humanitarian, Social and Cultural Commission, during the 2001 Sun 
City negotiations.56
Amongst contributions, specific recommendation on the need of rehabilitation 
centers for victims, establishment of a national watchdog on human rights issues, the 
review of legal instruments that discriminate women, and in the framework of the Peace 
and Reconciliation Commission, the presence of women in the National Commission for 
Truth and Reconciliation so that their specific concerns are heard and considered. 
Nonetheless, some pressing issues, including discussions on the reconfiguration o f the 
armed forces and the reform of the judiciary system were not fully discussed during the 
2001 Sun City process. Although parties reached and signed the agreement in Pretoria, 
December 2002, containing specifications on these two issues, gender issues were not 
fully considered.
This is not a complete backlash though. The participation of the female delegates 
contributed to bringing the subject to the table and reinforcing women’s movement in 
Congo. Delegates and other women activists received multiple training on gender issues 
to better participate during the process, women’s organizations increased considerably
56 On the participation o f  the female delegates in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue See: Whitman, "Women 
and Peace-Building in the Democratic Republic o f  Congo: As Assessment o f  Their Role in the Inter- 
Congolese Dialogue.", Puechguirbal, "Women and War in the Democratic Republic o f  the Congo."
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during the period and finally they were also in contact with women’s movement from 
neighboring countries, particularly Burundi, Kenya and Rwanda.57
In February 2002, women from across the DRC met with warring parties, 
government and civil society representatives to share their concerns. The product was the 
Nairobi Declaration and an Action Plan that called for an immediate cease-fire, inclusion 
of women and their concerns in all aspects of the peace process, the formation of a 
Congolese women’s caucus and the adoption o f a 30% quota for women at all levels of 
government. The document was delivered to His Excellency Ketumile Masire, facilitator 
of the Dialogue, to be included in the agenda o f the initiative.
Although the 30% quota of women in government was not included and the 
underrepresentation of women in the Congolese government continues until nowadays, 
important achievements were made. Women political participation has increased and 
women’s social movements have multiplied and gathered resources. In the 2005 
referendum on the new Constitution, women comprised 60% of voters and despite the 
limited number of candidates (and elected representatives for that matter) their 
participation in the 2006 democratic elections was massive.58 According to the Inter­
parliamentary Union, today women comprise 12.5% of all ministerial positions, 8.9% of 
Congress representatives and only 4.6% of Senate delegates.59
57 Workshops and conferences with regional women’s organization were important as it offered a forum to 
share experiences and strengthen a regional perspective. More on this topic, see Doris Mpomou, "Women’s 
Participation in Peace Negotiations: Discourse in the Democratic Republic o f  the Congo," in The 
Implementation o f  Quotas: African Experiences, Quota Report Series, ed. Julie Ballington (Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assitance, 2004).
58 Mukenge, Kady, and Stanton, "Funding W om en's Movement against Sexual Violence in the Democratic 
Republic o f  Congo: 2004-2009 ". p.8
59 Data concerning Congolese women ministerial positions is from 2010 while women position in the 
Congress and Senate are from 2010. Information can be found at: www.ipu.org. Access: 11/11/2012
270
Women’s organizations have received renewed support and have worked 
tirelessly on the promotion of women’s rights and awareness through workshops and 
trainings, the economic and political empowerment of women through the promotion of 
professional education and support to women candidates, legal and medical assistance to 
victims of rape, strengthening networks and contributing thus to the solidification of their 
movement in the country and across the region.60
It is also important to note that in 2006, a landmark bill criminalizing rape was 
passed by the government, providing thus the legal support victims need to accomplish 
justice. However, the implementation gap is still wide, “Law is good, but implementation 
gap is very big” confirmed a representative from the UN’s Gender Affairs Office.61 
Women’s vulnerable status in a war tom society, weak state authority and incapacity to 
apply the law and activate the judiciary system (when there is one) along with the 
breakdown of the community’s protection mechanisms all contribute to the escalation of 
sexual and gender based violence in conflict and post conflict situations, including the 
DRC.
While rape and other forms of sexual violence remain widespread amongst militia 
groups and even government forces, recent statistics have shown that male civilian 
perpetrators are increasing, bringing yet another challenge: avoid that rape and sexual 
violence be normalized in society. In an interview with a Sexual Violence representative 
in Eastern DRC, it was explained that the case of Province Orientale, where most
60 On the work o f  different women’s organizations in the DRC. See: Muadi Mukenge, "Funding Women's 
Movement Against Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic o f  Congo: 2004-2009 ".The analysis is 
limited to the organizations that received the financial support o f the Global Fund for Women, however it 
comprises an illustration o f  the varied work developed by these grassroots and local organizations in 
English and the impact they have at the local level.
61 Interview with representative o f  MONUSCO Gender Affairs Office was carried out in Kinshasa,
February, 2012.
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recorded cases of sexual violence are caused by civilians, is a quagmire and a sign that 
these acts may be becoming “normalized” in Congolese society.62 It was added that the 
existence of traditional mechanisms of compensation between the family and the 
perpetrator is contributing to this process.
In a visit to Bunia, located in that same province, representatives from Human 
Rights and Rule of Law sections reinforced that claim.63 They both mentioned that most 
cases in this region are committed by civilians against other civilians, in which case they 
cannot interfere since the UN has jurisdiction only in cases where combatants and 
uniformed personnel are involved. Consequently, only the cases involving armed groups, 
the national police or the armed forces benefit from their role of supporting the national 
judicial system.64 According to the Human Rights representative, the biggest problem in 
the country is corruption and the challenge to put the judicial system in place in detriment 
of financial arrangements.
The Rule o f Law representative on its part also spoke about the local mindset and 
the perception regarding Congolese women. Many times, young girls are given to marry 
in exchange of a dowry, and so changing a local practice may also present itself as an 
extra challenge. Another problem he pointed out is the lack of resources for PNC and 
FARDC. “You know what they often do? They just give them a weapon and say ‘Here is
62 Interview with representative o f  Sexual Violence Unit was carried out in Eastern Democratic Republic o f  
Congo, February, 2012.
63 Interviews with MONUSCO substantive sections in Province Oriental were carried out in Bunia,
Province Oriental, February, 2012. Besides representatives from the Human Rights and Rule o f  Law 
Sections, Civilian Affairs, STAREC, Child protection, CDU and UNPol were also present. The meeting 
was presided by the Head o f Office.
64 Although the MONUSCO cannot start judicial process, they can put pressure on local authorities and 
support investigation and trial processes. The Prosecution Supporting Cells, for example, are multi-sector 
teams, conformed by civilian, military and police experts that actively engage with the national military 
justice system to advance prosecutions o f  human rights violence cases.
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your salary, your food and your woman’. And so they use the weapon, they loot and 
rape.”65
The number of cases in Province Oriental is impressive, particularly when 
considering that most cases involve civilians and as such, the UN has no jurisdiction to 
act on victims’ behalf. However, it is the provinces of South and North Kivu where the 
greatest number of cases of sexual violence have been reported. In these places, 
perpetrators are often uniformed personnel, either belonging to armed groups or 
government forces. The UN does have jurisdiction to act in cases involving armed groups 
and it has often done so, as in the case of the Walikale massacre; however, getting the 
Congolese justice system to work is a challenge that cannot be understated.
Statistical analysis is complicated. First they do not show all actual cases and may 
in fact hide an even more abominable reality; secondly, it can misguide actions. The 
increase of recorded cases may only indicate that reporting systems are more readily 
available for victims, while a decrease in recorded cases may be a sign that women are 
less willing to come forward or fearful o f reprisals.
Despite that, collecting information and mapping cases of sexual violence in the 
DRC facilitate the provision of an adequate response based on geographical area where 
incidents happen, perpetrators’ profile, type, etc. The data provided by MONUSCO’s 
Sexual Violence Unit indicate that cases in 2008 summed up 15,314, in 2009 15,297 and 
in 2010 14,591.66 The figure below shows the breakdown of cases in 2010 for each 
province.
65 Interview with representative from MONUSCO Joint Human Rights Office was carried out in Bunia, 
February, 2012.
66 Data provided by Sexual Violence Unit by e-mail on February, 2012.
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Figure 5: Cases of rape in the DRC, 2010
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Source: Sexual Violence Unit -  MONUSCO, 2010.
There are different trends regarding the recurrence of sexual violence in the
DRC:67
Widespread and systematic: this is mostly identified in the East, particularly in the 
South Kivu Province, with frequent occurrences in North Kivu and more randomly in 
Orientale Province. It refers to those cases in which rape is deployed as a method of 
warfare by armed groups and is used to subjugate and undermine the enemy and mark 
control of territory.
Widespread and opportunistic: also mostly identified in the East, these are 
unfortunately a common feature of attacks by armed groups and ordinary civilians taking
67 The categorization and analysis on sexual violence trends were provided by the Sexual Violence Unit by 
e-mail on February, 2012.
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advantage of conflict and chaos to attack women. Interviews carried out in the three 
Eastern provinces, showed that many armed groups, foreign and national, and even the 
Congolese National Armed Force, attack and loot villages randomly, sometimes without 
a political agenda as is the case of LRA in Orientale. A side effect of these attacks is rape 
against women and young girls.
Isolated and random: encompassing a domestic criminal matter, unrelated to 
political strategy or to international peace and security, these were commonly found in 
the Western part of the country, but also in the Eastern provinces. The UN’s difficulty in 
dealing with these cases is that it is usually committed by civilians, corresponding 
exclusively to the national government the responsibility to act and push for a judicial 
response.
Sexual violence, including rape, forced prostitution, sexual mutilation and slavery 
is a particular hideous crime that has serious consequences for the whole community and 
not only for the victim. Occasionally, members of the family are forced to watch rape or 
to have sexual intercourse with their relatives leading to moral destruction and the 
erosion of the fabric of the society. Besides the public humiliation, victims are often 
exposed to sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV, and are seen as a source of 
destruction by the rest of society. Husbands and children are often traumatized too, not 
only because of public stigmatization, but also because they are often unable to defend 
their family, thus affecting men’s mental health and masculinity.
Denis Mukwege is a doctor at the Panzi hospital, one of the few centers 
specialized in gynecology and obstetrics in Bukavu, South Kivu Province. Throughout
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his life he has dedicated his life to women victim of sexual violence. In an interview with
Eve Ensler to Glamour, he says:
When rape is done in front of your family, it destroys everyone. I have 
seen men suffer who watched their wives raped; they are not mentally 
stable anymore. The children are in even worse condition. Most o f the 
time, when a woman suffers this much violence, she is not able to bear 
children afterward. Clearly these rapes are not done to satisfy any sexual 
desire but to destroy the soul. The whole family and community are 
broken.68
For that reason, specific provisions for women have been present in UN 
resolutions concerning the mission’s mandate from the beginning. Security Council 
Resolution 1291 (2000)69, for example, included as MONUC’s mandate the facilitation of 
humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, with particular attention to 
vulnerable groups including women, children and demobilized child soldiers. Resolution 
1565 (2004)70 on its part mandated MONUC with the assistance in the promotion and 
protection of human rights, with particular attention to women, children and vulnerable 
persons, including investigating human rights violations to put an end to impunity. 
Finally, resolution 1794 (2007) condemned sexual violence perpetrated by militias, 
armed groups, elements of Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), National Police (PNC) 
and any other security forces and urged UN Country team and partners “to strengthen 
prevention, protection, and response to sexual violence, including through training for the 
Congolese security forces in accordance with its mandate, and to regularly report,
68 Eve Ensler, “Women Left for Dead -  and the Man who is saving them”, Glamour, August, 2007. 
Available at: http://www.glamour.com/maeazine/2007/08/rape-in-the-congo . Accessed: 11/11/2012.
69 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1291", February 24, 2000, 
http ://www. un.org/ ga/ search/vie w d o c . asp?symbol=S/RES/1291 (2000).
70 "Resolution 1565", October 1, 2004,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1565%20%282004%29.
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including in a separate annex if necessary, on actions taken in this regard, including 
factual data and trend analyses of the problem”.71
Since then, MONUSCO has supported Congolese government efforts to combat 
sexual violence through a coordinated work of all its components. The national 
ownership of the Strategy to Combat Sexual Violence, the involvement of a broad range 
of actors, a strengthened coordination mechanism and continuous exchange of 
information are the core of the UN’s efforts. On another note, actions to improve 
women’s status and strengthen their position in Congolese society are also taken by the 
mission. These are to be analyzed in the following sections.
The analysis in this section has shown that Congo’s long history of exploitation 
and war have had an unforgiving impact on the population. From its inception, Congo has 
been exploited at the expense o f its people and has been the object of foreign 
interventions aimed at exploiting its riches and its population. At the same time though, 
Congo itself has been the scenario of micro-level and internal conflicts amongst different 
ethnic groups that further enhanced the vulnerability of its population. The lack of 
government capacity to exercise authority over its territory and the ill-trained and 
implicated armed forces are extra challenges to add to this already complex scenario 
where rule of law is practically absent.
In this context women have been and remain the biggest victims. As much as the 
Haitian case, there is a continuum of violence that has been present before the wars in 
Congo. Rather than simply a war-time atrocity, rape in the DRC is a reflection of the 
vulnerable status of women in that society. Throughout time they have been regarded as
71 "Resolution 1794", December 21, 2007,
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1794%282007%29.
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second class citizens and stripped from their rights. That is why, any protection strategy 
will only be effective if it considers this continuum of violence and addresses their 
structural vulnerability as well.
The following section will provide a rich background on the UN’s past 
intervention in the DRC and the current configuration of the peace mission present in the 
country for the analysis o f how gender was integrated in the DRC.
The UN in the DRC
As much as foreign involvement in the DRC and recurrence of violence against 
an unarmed civilian population is a constant in its history, the involvement of the UN is 
also not new in the country. During the 1960’s crisis the UN was called by the new 
Congolese government to support the country’s independence and territorial integrity. 
Interestingly, the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC)72 is considered a 
milestone in the history of UN peacekeeping “in terms of the responsibilities it had to 
assume, the size of its area of operation and the manpower involved.”73
ONUC comprised one o f the first peacekeeping missions that had an important 
civilian component and whose military strength reached a peak of 20,000 personnel.74 
Compared to past peace operations, ONUC was considerably more comprehensive and 
had a mandate that went well beyond the traditional cease-fire monitoring, including the
72 From the French Operation des Nations Unies au Congo
73 Information available at ONUC's website. “United Nations Operation in Congo,” 11/14/2012, 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onucB.htm.
74 ONUC was authorized by Resolution 143(1960). United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 143", 
July 14, 1960, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/157/3 2/IMG/NR015732.pdf?OpenElement.
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support of rule of law and the maintenance o f Congo’s territorial integrity and political 
independence.
Along the same lines, following the first and second Congo Wars, MONUSCO’s 
predecessor, MONUC, represented yet another innovation within the UN system. It had a 
specific protection of civilians mandate and a structure that fully supported that goal. As 
a result MONUSCO is an example o f strong civilian leadership and collaboration 
between components. The specific characteristics of the Congolese context require that 
the military is fully integrated into civilian work, supporting the outreach in isolated areas 
and providing security for the personnel. At the same time, the multi-dimensional threats 
posed against civilians entail that force is not the only source of security and that a 
comprehensive protection strategy is necessary. This section will thus discuss past UN 
interventions and explain the current structure that supports peace efforts
Past operations
In a first demonstration o f how grassroots conflicts could escalate into a national 
issue, from 1960 to 1963, secession movements took place in the provinces of Katanga 
and South Kasai. These provinces declared themselves independent from the rest o f the 
country and counted on the support of Belgian forces. The national government, wary of 
increasing levels of violence and the presence of foreign troops, requested the UN to 
intervene, and thus in July 1960, ONUC was established.
Although the initial mandate was to support the Congolese government to ensure 
the withdrawal of Belgian forces, the secession movements o f the provinces of Katanga 
and South Kasai prompted a mandate change and Congo’s territorial integrity and
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political independence was considered the mission’s primary goal.75 Even after national 
reunification, a reduced number of UN troops remained in the Congo at the government’s 
request and civilian aid continued in the years to come. The UN program of assistance to 
the Congo was the largest undertaken at that time and it reached a peak of up to 2,000 
civilian personnel, foreseeing the importance that civilians would eventually fulfill with 
the structure of UN peace operations.
It was not until 1999, after the Lusaka Ceasefire agreement that the UN would 
return to the country. Since then, its presence has expanded quantitatively and 
qualitatively. Following the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, the United Nations 
Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was established with the mandate of 
monitoring the ceasefire between signatories.76 However, over the years its strength and 
mandate have expanded enormously, reaching a peak of 20,000 uniformed personnel in 
2007. The revised mandate of MONUC included increasing military, police and civilian 
personnel to establish a safe environment; contribute to the improvement of the security 
conditions for humanitarian assistance access and for the voluntary return of refugees and 
internally displaced persons; support operations to disarm foreign combatants led by the 
Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC); contribute to the 
DDR program of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of Congolese 
combatants and their dependants as well as support the disarmament, demobilization,
75 ONUC’s mandate was reinforced with renewed objective and means by Resolutions 161 (1961) and 169 
(1961) that authorized “vigorous” action to prevent civil war in the Congo. See: "Resolution 161", February 
21, 1961, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTlON/GEN/NRO/171 /68/IMG/NRO17168.pdf?OpenElement; "Resolution 169", 
November 24, 1961, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/171 /76/IMG/NRO17176.pdf?OpenElement.
76 MONUC was established by Resolution 1279 (1999). See: "Resolution 1279", November 30, 1999, 
http ://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol=S/RES/1279(l 999).
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repatriation, resettlement and reintegration (DDR/RR) o f foreign armed groups; 
contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process; assist in the promotion 
and protection of human rights, with particular attention to women, children and 
vulnerable persons; investigate human rights violations and finally support a security 
sector reform.
The crisis in the Eastern part of the country received particular attention over the 
years with the re-deployment o f forces to that region and the adoption of the protection of 
civilians as the top priority in the UN’s mandate. Extending MONUC’s mandate, in June 
2010, the Security Council decided that MONUC would bear the title of UN Stabilization 
Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), in view of the new phase o f transition towards peace 
consolidation and a strong partnership with the Congolese government.77 While most of 
MONUSCO’s functions remained the same under the new name, there was a reduction of 
military personnel from areas considered secured and a re-deployment of forces to the 
East where most incidents occur. Future reconfigurations would thus be determined as 
the situation evolved on the ground, including: the completion of ongoing military 
operations in North and South Kivu as well as Orientale provinces; improved government 
capacity to protect the population effectively; and the consolidation of state authority 
throughout the territory.
The special feature of MONUSCO/MONUC is the protection of civilians mandate 
as a top priority and a mission structure that fully supports this goal. As part of challenges 
inherent to the transition from war to a lasting peace and to better protect civilians and 
address the complex situation in the DRC, the Security Council provided MONUC and
77 MONUSCO was established by resolution 1925 (2010). See: "Resolution 1925", May 28, 2010, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?synibol=S/RES/l 925(2010).
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later MONUSCO with a structure that allows a system-wide UN response. As an 
integrated peace mission, MONUSCO aims to bring together the civilian, military and 
police components to act under the leadership of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General (SRSG) in order to fulfill its integrated mandate.
There has been however “systematic shortcomings in terms of fostering the 
necessary political will and military capabilities to implement its robust mandate”.78 It is 
common that TCCs prefer not to have its forces involved with direct combat and have 
special provisions so that their actions are constrained to certain activities. 
MONUSCO/MONUC has adapted its mandate and actions on the ground to better 
address protection needs. The number o f articles and books that accounts the mission 
responsible for different massacres and accusation of inability to act holds true in many 
cases, however, it is also true that throughout time the mission has incorporated a number 
o f mechanisms to enhance its performance.
The successful implementation of this mandate is thus dependent on civil-military 
cooperation and in this regard, MONUSCO is an example and a hub of lessons learned. 
MONUSCO has created a series of joint mechanisms undertaken and carried out by all its 
components in an integrated manner. These mechanisms are supported by a UN System- 
Wide Strategy on the Protection of Civilians facilitated by MONUSCO and the UN 
Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and endorsed in January 2011. The UN system-wide strategy 
is responsible for building and implementing innovative protection mechanisms that 
include the comprehensive package of protection-related measures including Joint 
Protection Teams (JPTs), Community Liaison Assistants, amongst others that are
78 Stian Kjeksmd and Jacob Aasland Ravndal, "Emerging Lessons from the United Missions in the Drc: 
Military Contributions to Protection o f Civilians," African Security Review  20, no. 2 (2011). p. 11
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overseen by Civilian Affairs, but implemented by all components and UN agencies on the 
ground, in a clear example of cooperation between the humanitarian community and the 
mission, including its armed personnel.
MONUSCO: mandate, structure and personnel
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in the DRC is the largest UN mission in 
the world, and a clear example o f an integrated mission, in which the civilian, military 
and police components ought to coordinate its actions. The operational challenges 
presented by the geography of the country, the characteristics o f the conflict and its 
central mandate to protect civilians make this mission one of the most challenging 
nowadays. It is also illustrative o f the renewed context in which the UN establishes peace 
operations and its transformed role in the field.
The transformation in the nature and scope of modem conflicts has affected the 
UN capacity to respond. Peace operations have assumed a plethora of renewed functions 
that goes far beyond reestablishing security. In a context in which central authority is 
weak or absent and years long conflict and internal upheavals have seriously damaged a 
country’s infrastructure and social economic and political system, the UN has also 
assumed the role of laying the foundations for the state to function on its own.
That is the context found in the DRC. As a consequence, MONUSCO civilian 
section’s role to strengthen the local authority and promote capacity comprise its main 
functions. Showing that civilians in the UN no longer comply with peripheral and 
political roles only, they are in fact responsible for most of the mandated tasks of 
contemporary peacekeeping operations, with functions that range from observing 
monitoring human rights violations to reestablishing the judicial system .
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In peace operations, where its protection strategy is based on an inclusive 
conception o f security that considers both physical and structural threats to the 
population’s well-being, UN civilian staff form the backbone of military operations. As 
in other UN integrated peace operations, each civilian section is responsible for a 
different sector and sections are roughly the same as in other missions: Human Rights, 
Civilian Affairs, Child Protection, Rule of Law, Political Affairs, Gender Affairs Office, 
Sexual Violence and so on. Nonetheless, since protection of civilians is a high priority, to 
a more or lesser degree these sections are involved with joint operations with the military. 
With specific expertise and know how, they are responsible for identifying priority needs 
and adopting an integrated approach to protection beyond physical security.
MONUSCO’s police component has been in place since 2001 with the main role 
of strengthening the capacity of Congolese National Police (PNC) through the reform of 
its institutions and training of its members. Besides that, the police component also 
supports rule of law efforts, being engaged in crowd control in the main urban centers 
and in the security efforts to maintain a stable environment. The fight against sexual 
violence and against the trafficking o f Congo’s natural resources are also two important 
elements of the mandate of MONUSCO’s police in the DRC.
MONUSCO’s police component is formed by UNPol officers and Formed Police 
Units (FPU). While UNPol officers offer direct support and mentoring to the PNC in the 
framework of its institutional reform and improvement of its operational capacities, the 
FPUs complement and strengthen PNC actions, especially through the support to law and 
order and joint patrols.
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MONUSCO’s military component is the largest but also one with the toughest 
jobs. Protecting civilians in such an immense territory such as that of the DRC can be 
indeed a challenging task. The lack of infra-structure connecting the different regions, its 
geographical traits with 80% of its territory covered by jungle and volatile weather 
conditions only adds to a diversified array of challenges confronted by this component on 
the ground.
Besides having the top priority o f protecting civilians and humanitarian personnel, 
MONUSCO’s military component is also responsible for: supporting Congolese 
government to establish sustainable defense security forces, minimize armed groups 
threats and establish stability, support the consolidation of state authority over the 
territory and support DDR/RR activities and security during electoral process, besides 
protecting UN facilities and equipment. Nevertheless, often these roles may be 
contradictory, especially in regard to the support o f Congolese national armed forces 
when they are responsible for an important percentage of sexual violence (18% as of 
February 2012 in the South Kivu Province).79
In order to accomplish all these goals, MONUSCO counts on a total of seventeen 
Infantry Battalions, three Special Forces Companies, six Aviation Units, one Riverine 
Company, six Engineer Companies, several Water treatment Units, Airfield Support 
Units, four hospitals, and forty-eight military observer team sites. The absolute majority 
of the force is placed in the Eastern part of the country. As a matter of fact 95% of all 
military personnel are in the 4 Brigades MONUSCO has in the East -  North and South
79 Randi Solhjell et al., "Turning Unsc Resolution 1325 into Operational Practice: A Cross-Country Study 
on Implementing Resoltuion 1325 in Peacekeeping and Military Operations," (Oslo: Norwegian Institute o f  
International Affairs, November, 2012). p.20
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Kivu Brigades with 35% and 34% of the strength respectively, Ituri Brigade with 21%, 
the Katanga Brigade with 3% and Sector 3 with 2%. In the Western part there is only the 
Western Brigade encompassing the remaining 5% of the military personnel.
Figure 6: MONUSCO's military contingents
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Despite the strong presence, it is not enough to cover the whole area as a great 
part of Congolese territory is covered by jungle, and most roads and airport fields are 
unpaved. The lack of infrastructure combined with the difficult geography and volatile 
weather makes it even more difficult to reach remote areas. As informed by the airfield 
units interviewed during the field work, because of weather conditions, flights are
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constantly cancelled also because of the challenges for landing and taking off under 
severe weather conditions on unpaved landing airfields.80 For that reason, helicopters are 
an important asset for the mission. As a matter of fact, many remote areas can only be 
reached by helicopters, and it is common that military personnel are transported by air to 
be able to carry out foot patrols in these more isolated villages hidden in the entrails of 
the Congolese jungle. This ability is particularly important in the context of protection of 
civilian mandate. As analyzed in the following sections, MONUSCO military component 
carries out a series of joint operations with civilian teams in order to better assess security 
threats in remote areas as described above.
This section has shown that UN’s presence in the DRC has been marked by a 
strong integrated mandate present even in the first UN mission established in the country. 
Indeed, ONUC was considerably different from the kind of peace operations established 
throughout the Cold War period, and counted not only with a civilian component but also 
had tasks that resembles those that are currently part o f the UN’s mandate worldwide. At 
the same time, MONUC, the predecessor of MONUSCO, has an encompassing and 
robust mandate that from the very beginning had protection o f civilians as a top priority. 
It becomes clear that the presence of a clear protection o f civilian mandate results in a 
specific and context driven normative framework as expressed by the System-Wide 
Strategy to protect civilians in the DRC.
The existence of this normative framework and the highly publicized and extreme 
levels of violence in the country led to a context in which incorporating a gender 
perspective into the activities of all the mission’s components is not only expected but
80 Interviews with Uruguayan and Bangladeshi airfield units were carried out in Bukavu and Bunia, 
February, 2012.
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pursued by most actors on the ground. As the following section will describe the path 
towards a full incorporation of this perspective into the daily work o f MONUSCO, a 
clearer view of UN’s organizational learning will be provided. While in Haiti the lack of 
widespread understanding in regard to the importance of incorporating a gender approach 
to MINUSTAH may be the result of an almost complete silence in official documents 
that establish the mission’s mandate, in the DRC, challenges are found in multiple fronts 
from member-states’ straightforward unwillingness to the complexity o f the context 
itself.
Incorporating gender into peacekeeping: MONUSCO gender policy and the UN's 
learning process
On paper, MONUSCO has a strong gender policy substantiated by its mandate 
resolutions and supported by the Office of Gender Affairs (OGA) as the main section 
involved with the advancement o f gender issues within the mission and the Congolese 
government. Gender is considered a cross cutting issue, taken into account by all 
civilian sections and police and military components on the development of projects and 
actions on the ground. Gender focal points are thus appointed within civilian sections, 
police and military components as a ways to enhance the mission's capacity of delivery 
in gender matters. However, the amount of different mechanisms, sections, agencies and 
other organizations working on gender and sexual violence may be overwhelming and 
coordination is often a problem. It also became clear that some military contingents 
confronted serious difficulties in applying a gender approach to their actions.
Measuring the impact of MONUSCO's policy, however is very difficult. The 
organization reportedly lacks personnel to provide impact assessment after new policies
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are created and implemented. Additionally, data on levels of violence against women are 
unreliable and may hinder the truth. At the same time though, it becomes clear that the 
mission has supported national authorities to create a local normative framework and 
structure to combat sexual violence and to improve the living conditions and status of 
Congolese women.
However, challenges still remain. If a successful learning process entails an 
interdependent relationship between the organization and member states, analyzing the 
incorporation of a gender perspective in a mission that has a normative framework fully 
developed can offer valuable insights on where the limits of UN action lies.
The following section will thus provide detail information on MONUSCO's 
gender policy and describe its accomplishments and shortcomings for each o f the five 
variables: legal framework, gender balance, security sector, protection and
empowerment.
Gender policy
The Gender Office is the main coordinator for gender mainstreaming in 
MONUSCO institutions; it is mainly responsible for guaranteeing that a gender approach 
is taken under consideration at all levels within the UN and its partners and supporting 
activities in this area. The office was established in March 2002 following 
recommendations of Resolution 1325 and also ensures linkages between women's 
organizations and government institutions so that women’s participation in peace and 
post reconstruction efforts are guaranteed. At the same time, it also makes sure that their 
needs are taken into account by MONUSCO sections and other UN partners.
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For the successful promotion of gender mainstreaming within MONUSCO, the 
Gender Office works with the appointment of gender focal points within all components 
and different civilian sections. Currently, the UN Police and Correction Units, along with 
all other substantive MONUSCO sections have gender focal points. With regard to the 
military, the appointment of gender focal point is a work-in-progress. OGA is currently 
working with the office of the Force Commander to have gender focal points in all 
military units, from Brigades HQ down to the Battalion level. Particularly within the 
military they have the important role of guaranteeing that patrol routes are defined 
according to local women's needs and concerns.81
Due to Congo's territory size and complexity, particularly in the Eastern part, 
there is a central office in Kinshasa to coordinate all efforts in the DRC and another in 
Goma to coordinate efforts in the Eastern part of the country. Other field offices are 
found in different provinces, such as South Kivu and Province Orientale.
For the successful fulfillment of its role, OGA establishes an annual priority 
plan82 and works in close cooperation with other UN and local partners, promoting 
sensitization campaigns, conducting training, and defining joint strategies. These areas 
are very encompassing and symbolize how an inclusive conception of security requires 
an inclusive protection strategy. Consequently, not only do they provide training on 
gender issues for MONUSCO, UN partners and local institutions, they also support 
women's candidates in electoral processes, and attempt to strengthen local institutional
81 MONUSCO, “Spotlight on Female Peacekeeper”, 12/10/2012,
http://monusco.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=10750&ctl=Details&mid=13744&ItemlD=19376&1ang
uage=en-US.
82 The 2012 Plan o f Action has seven priority areas: 1. Protection o f  civilians, 2. Support to electoral 
process, 3. Development o f  security sector and fight against impunity, 4. Gender in DDR/RR, 5. Gender 
focal points, 6. Stabilization and Peace Consolidation, and 7. Communication Strategy
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capacity to respond to specific gender needs through a gender sensitive security sector 
reform and a strong legal system. It also focuses on an important aspect emphasized by 
Resolution 1325; the full participation o f women in peace negotiations, political talks and 
the economic life o f the state. The improvement of the system aligned to the betterment 
of women's status in Congolese society would have a positive spillover effect in its 
protection needs.
In order to assess and evaluate the progress of the mission in gender related 
issues, OGA has taken advantage of the UN System Wide Action Plan's operational 
targets - Prevention, Participation, Protection and Relief and Recovery -  as a way to 
measure the impact of its actions on the ground. Interestingly, it requires close 
cooperation with MONUSCO's uniformed personnel reinforcing the comprehensive 
character o f actions aiming to curb women's vulnerability on the ground.
Figure 7: Gender Affairs Office operational targets
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Amongst MONUSCO's main achievements in terms of advancing a gender 
policy, the inclusion of articles 14 and 15 on gender parity in the Constitution and the co­
participation in the production of the country's National Action Plan based on resolution 
1325 are most significant. The office's actions during the 2011 elections were also 
important as they advanced training on gender and elections and promoted sensitization 
and monitoring on gender based violence during elections.83
An interesting initiative, the gender affairs office originated, was to create a 
specific category for sexual and gender based violent crimes for military flash reports, so 
that they are accurately categorized in the Joint Military Analysis Center (J-MAC) 
database, facilitating data mapping and collection. This is an important step. The absence 
of a specific category for sexual and gender based violence previously caused sexual and 
gender based violent crimes to be categorized under other types of crime, such as murder 
and kidnapping.
Another section directly involved with gender affairs is the Sexual Violence Unit 
(SVU), primarily responsible for the coordination efforts to implement the National 
Strategy for the Fight against Gender Based Violence and to guarantee that the 
government is taking ownership of it. The establishment of the SVU is a direct 
consequence of Resolution 1820 that requires sexual violence to be addressed by all 
components in peace operations as a security problem.
MONUSCO's Sexual Violence Unit was created in 2009 and it became fully 
operational not only in Kinshasa but also in other field offices in Bukavu (South Kivu,
83 Information presented by MONUSCO Senior Gender Adviser, Elsie Efange Mbella at the International 
Conference “Promote Gender to Build a Lasting Peace: Reflection on the Latin American Experience”, 
Buenos Aires, April 25-26, 2012.
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Maniema and Katanga) and Goma (North Kivu and Province Orientale) throughout 2010
and 2011. Besides coordinating the implementation of the Strategy, SVU field officers
also promote training on do’s and don’ts of how to act in cases of sexual violence
amongst military observers, troops and police.
Representatives from this Unit continuously expressed their concern regarding
military capacity to appropriately deal with the victims:
(...) the military observers are important actors collecting information and 
the contingents are usually the first to reach victims. Problem is, they 
don't know how to collect information on sexual violence or how to 
question victims. They take pictures, identify victims, collect documents 
and addresses and often are not very careful keeping victims' anonymity.
They don't intend to put victims under danger, but they might end up 
doing so if their identity is not protected. This is why we have started with 
a training on do's and don'ts. When trained they understand the reasons 
and follow instructions.84
The problem is that the personnel assigned to military contingents change 
constantly and the learning curve is rather steep, since there is very limited transferred 
knowledge from one contingent to the other.
Other mechanisms of coordination to strengthen the UN's capacity to respond to 
gender specific needs were also implemented in partnership with other actors, mostly UN 
agencies. Amongst those, there is the International Security and Stabilization Strategy 
(I4S)85, that has sexual violence as one of the five main pillars; the UN system-wide 
strategy on the protection of civilians in the DRC; the Senior Management Group, that
84 Interview carried out with representative o f  MONUSCO Sexual Violence unit in Eastern Democratic 
Republic o f  Congo, February, 2012.
85 In order to support the Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan for War-Affected Areas (STAREC), the UN  
system and key partners revised the existing Stabilization strategy to align with the government priorities as 
defined in the new STAREC Plan. The I4S has the objective to support national efforts to promote a secure 
and stable environment in key conflict-affected areas o f  Eastern DRC. The five main areas covered by 
U N’s I4S are: improving security, supporting political dialogue, strengthening the state, return and re­
integration and sexual violence.
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plans operational response on identified threats to civilians at the local level, and the 
Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP), designed to provide an emergency response to areas 
considered to have major humanitarian risks, being protection one of them.
The coordination mechanisms put in place by varied civilian institutions on the 
ground have positively impacted the efforts to better address sexual violence in the DRC. 
These efforts seem to prioritize a strategic and encompassing view based on particular 
challenges encountered on the field at provincial levels. All analyzed sections and 
mechanisms have field offices to expedite and improve a UN tailored response to specific 
threats, incidents and needs.
However, the existence of numerous mechanisms with overlapping functions may 
confuse and duplicate efforts, adding an extra problem of coordination. While a UN 
System-Wide Strategy allows better coordination of existing protection mechanisms 
within the UN, the relationship is not clear between those and HAP on one side and I4S 
on another. It becomes evident that the challenges to a successful implementation of a 
gender policy lie primarily on coordination strategies and widespread understanding of 
the matter. Besides avoiding duplication by different UN bodies, the involvement of the 
national government and the implementation of initiatives that attempt to improve 
women's social, economic and political status are necessary for sustained stabilization 
efforts.
A final comment on MONUSCO's gender policy refers to the missions' 
commitment to curb inappropriate behavior. Different from expected, most complaints 
regarding sexual abuse and exploitation of locals by UN staff is directed against civilians, 
who also are in a much smaller number than military and police units. Proportionally,
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civilians are the champions in complaints regarding cases o f Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse (SEA), followed by the police and the military. However, inappropriate acts by the 
military tend to be more visible than those committed by civilians and since the military 
members have immunity, it becomes an issue between the contributing and host 
countries. In most cases, these soldiers are repatriated and the incident becomes an 
internal issue to be tried by the national military justice system in the home country. In 
the case of civilians, where control over inappropriate behavior is more difficult, they 
confront more consequences. For example, in the event of an offspring resulting from a 
sexual assault, a portion of their salary may be taken to support the child.
As shown, MONUSCO's gender policy is comprehensive and takes under 
consideration specific features of the Congolese context, such as the geography of the 
country and the widespread sexual violence. While the attention to that topic is positive, 
there needs to be careful attention not to oversimplify the implications of war as solely 
sexual violence, nor condemn it as a merely spoil of war. It is necessary that the 
continuum of violence be fully understood and that protection strategies are sufficiently 
attentive to the pre-existent vulnerable status of women.
The following sections will evaluate MONUSCO's gender policy according to the 
five previously defined variables: legal framework, gender balance, security sector, 
protection and empowerment.
Legal framework
The legal framework indicator refers to the existence of specific mandates and 
guidelines regarding protection o f civilians, particularly women and girls against sexual 
violence and how it translates into practice. One o f MONUSCO's biggest contributions is
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the presence o f a clear protection o f civilians mandate, including the protection of women 
and girls against sexual violence. The clear statement of this goal as a top priority is in 
the Security Council Resolution that specifies the mission mandate provide the normative 
framework for protection strategies and other initiatives to take place. As determined by 
Resolution 1925 (2010) that defines MONUSCO’s mandate, the mission is tasked with 
the responsibility of supporting Government efforts to fight impunity and ensure the 
protection of civilians from violations of international human rights and humanitarian 
law, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence.86
In this sense, the mission also has a UN System-Wide Strategy to Protect 
Civilians in the Democratic Republic of Congo87 and a Comprehensive Strategy to 
Combat Sexual Violence, both of which comprise important documents that frame the 
scope of actions to be undertaken on the ground. Importantly, they consider an inclusive 
concept of protection not limited to physical security.
The UN System-Wide Strategy to Protect Civilians defines the specific role of 
UN actors to better mitigate threats against Congolese population and takes into account 
the need to reconcile and integrate MONUSCO's mandate, including the support of 
FARDC operations, with the protection of civilians responsibility. It also recognizes the 
primary responsibility of the state to protect its own citizens, and adopts a protection 
concept that consider the humanitarian, security and human rights considerations as 
important dimensions of the concept.
86 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1925."
87 MONUSCO, "Un System-Wide Strategy to Protect Civilians in the Democratic Republic o f  Congo," 
(Kinshasa: United Nations, 2010).
296
The Strategy to Combat Sexual Violence was initially designed by the Sexual 
Violence Unit in April 2009 under the name of Comprehensive Strategy to Combat 
Sexual Violence. Nonetheless, it was important that local ownership was accomplished 
so that in the future the Congolese government could implement it on its own. 
Consequently, in November 2009, the national government endorsed the UN's strategy. 
The Strategy to Combat Sexual Violence is now under the auspices of Congolese national 
authorities in partnership with the UN.88
The Strategy encompasses important aspects of the different types o f response 
needed by victims of sexual violence, spanning from improving the security forces and 
the overall situation on the ground to legal, medical and even financial assistance to 
victims. The collection of data is also a component o f the Strategy and will not only 
provide reliable data on cases, but will impact assessment and generation of more 
accurate policies strategies. Most importantly, each o f its five components are co-chaired 
by a UN and a government partner ensuring that local ownership is accomplished and 
local capacity to respond is enhanced.89
The existence of a strong legal framework and structure to guarantee that gender 
is considered as a cross-cutting issue led to an important fact: gender is fully integrated in 
MONUSCO's military planning and analysis. The enormous amount of sexual violence 
cases could not be ignored in the DRC and the UN has replicated on the ground a
88 Republique Democratique du Congo, "Strategic Nationale De La Lutte Contre Les Violences Basees Sur 
Le Genre."
89 The five components are: 1. Fighting impunity, led by the Ministry o f  Justice and UN Joint Human 
Rights Office; 2. Protection and Prevention, led by the Ministry o f  Social Affairs and Human Rights and 
UN High Commissioner o f  Refugee (UNHCR); 3. Multi-Sector Assistance, led by the Ministry o f  Health 
and UNICEF; 4. Security Sector Reform, led by the Ministry o f Defense and MONUSCO's Section of 
Security Sector Development; 5. Collection and Mapping: led by the Ministry of Gender and the UN  
Population Fund. The role o f the MONUSCO's SVU role is to coordinate all efforts amongst implementing 
partners. See Appendix on the National Strategy on the Fight Against Gender Based Violence.
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structure able to firmly establish the importance of Women, Peace and Security 
resolutions within the mission. In fact, the design of policies and operational activities all 
take gender under consideration and attempt to foster the full incorporation o f the 
differential impact of peacekeeping activities on women, men, girls and boys as well as 
advance equal rights and reverse gender-based discrimination in all aspects of the post­
conflict and peace-building processes.90
Gender balance
The Gender Balance indicator refers to female representation amongst uniformed 
personnel and the role they carry out. It also refers to the existence of affirmative policies 
to include more women amongst personnel (uniformed and civilian), and in decision­
making positions within the mission. Unfortunately data on civilian personnel 
disaggregated by sex is not available and thus an analysis of the civilian component could 
not be included. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the presence of women as head 
of the two main sections related to gender issues is ensured. Both the Office of Gender 
Affairs Office and the Sexual Violence Unit are headed by women. Moreover, the Rule 
of Law Special Representative of the secretary General is also headed by a woman. In 
regard to uniformed personnel, however, there is still a lot to improve, particularly within 
the military contingents.
90 Elsie Effange-Mbella, DPKO Mission in the DRC: Evolution o f  the Gender Mandate, Presentation by 
MONUSCO Senior Gender Adviser at the International Conference “Promoting Gender to accomplish 
Peace: Reflecting on the Latin American experience,” Buenos Aires, 26-28 April 2012.
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While within the military the participation o f women reaches only 2.5%, the 
participation of women is considerably higher in the police component reaching 10%.91 
Mostly, they are sent as UNPols by member states, although they also comprise an 
important number within FPUs due to the presence of a female FPU from Bangladesh. 
Indeed, an analysis of the incorporation of women in police and military institutions show 
that women have been allowed to join the police before the military and are carrying out 
functions more similar to those carried out by their male counterparts. That does not 
mean that they are not victims of discriminatory behavior. Although, interviews carried 
out in the DRC did not indicated the recurrence of discrimination, interviews carried out 
with female police officers in Brazil, that have participated in more than one 
peacekeeping mission, indicated that they are usually the object o f discriminatory 
practices, mostly related to a male superior, or they become the center o f the attention, 
particularly if they are single.92
91 DPKO statistics as o f  October 2012. Available at: Department o f  Peacekeeping operations, “Troop and 
Police Contributors,” 12/10/2012,
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml.
92 Interviews carried out with Brazilian UNPol were performed under RESDAL's projects “Improving and 
Sharing a Latin American gender approach to build peace: the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
1325 and 1820”; “Women in the Armed and Police forces in Latin America and the Caribbean: a gender 
approach to peace operations.” Field work in Brazil was performed throughout 2008 and 2009 in Brazil and 
in July, 2012. Interviews included women in the military and in the police who had participated in peace 
operations and main Brazilian institutions related to the participation o f Brazilian personnel in UN peace 
missions, including: peacekeeping training center, Ministry o f  Defense, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, and 
COTER (Comando de Opera95es Terrestres).
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Table 9: Police Contribution disaggregated by sex, as of October 2012
Police Contribution Male Female Total % o f Women
Individual Police 209 39 248 15.73%
FPU 957 90 1047 8.60%
TOTAL 1166 129 1295 9.96%
Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012.
T able 10: M ilitary  con trib u tions d isaggregated  by  sex as o f  O ctober :
Military contribution Male Female Total % of Women
Military observers 665 23 688 3.34%
Military troops 16641 425 17066 2.49%
TOTAL 17306 448 17754 2.52%
Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012
Military contributions are divided into military observers and military troops. 
Military observers are assigned to individual missions. They are usually placed in small 
team sites often located in red area zones. Members of these teams are often o f different 
nationalities. They are unarmed and their main function is to gather intelligence on the 
movement and activities of armed groups, and displacement of the population. As a 
result, a good relationship between them and the local population and strong 
communication skills are necessary. In areas coded as red or extremely volatile, they 
must go with a military escort provided by troop contributing countries in their specific 
area of operation. As informed by one of the military observers interviewed, they usually 
stay for a period of 12 months -  although that may vary from one country to another -  
and initiate in a red zone, being later transferred to calmer places either a green or yellow 
zone.
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The participation of women as military observers is extremely important since 
they could facilitate the contact with local women and serve as an important bridge 
between the local women and the mission.93 As Captain Caroline Obame, military 
observer from Cameroon, argues in an interview with MONUSCO: “The Congolese 
women we meet are often hesitant to speak to outsiders. When they meet female 
patrolling officers, even if they are still uncertain, they will be more likely to speak. I 
have spoken to victims of sexual violence and there is still a lot of stigma they face from 
their husbands and in their communities.”94 Nonetheless, military observers must have a 
minimum rank and receive adequate military training. Most countries have only recently 
allowed women to enter the military academy in various branches, including combat and 
command. For that reason, the number o f military women that comply with the 
requirements to participate in peace operations as observers is very low.
Female participation amongst military observers reaches only 3.34%. Moreover, 
only 12, out of 48 military observer contributing countries send women. Amongst those, 
the United States, Zambia, Bolivia and Cameroon present the highest proportional 
percentage with 33%, 25%, and 20% respectively (Bolivia and Cameroon with 20% 
each). In absolute terms, Malaysia, South Africa and Zambia with a contribution o f 3 
female military observers each are the top contributing countries. Interestingly, the top 
military observer contributing countries - India (62 observers), Pakistan (52 observers),
93 The necessity for more female blue helmets is a question o f  gender equality, which sets an example to the 
Congolese population that MONUSCO is here to support. However, UN documents also point out to the 
fact that victims o f  sexual violence, may be more responsive to other women.




and Tunisia (31 observers) - present low female representation. India sends only 2 
women, comprising 3.2% and both Pakistan and Tunisia, do not send any.
Table 11: Military observers contributions as of October, 2012
Country Male Female Total % of Women
Algeria 5 0 5 0%
Bangladesh 34 0 34 0%
Belgium 3 0 3 0%
Benin 8 0 8 0%
Bolivia 8 2 10 20.00%
Bosnia and Hezergovina 5 0 5 0%
Burkina Faso 7 0 7 0%
Cameroon 4 1 5 20%
Canada 7 0 7 0%
China 16 0 16 0%
Czeck Republic 3 0 3 0%
Egypt 26 0 26 0%
France 5 0 5 0%
Ghana 22 2 24 8.33%
India 60 2 62 3.23%
Indonesia 17 0 17 0%
Ireland 3 0 3 0%
Jordan 26 0 26 0%
Kenya 22 2 24 8.33%
Malawi 7 1 8 12.50%
Malaysia 14 3 17 17.65%
Mali 17 0 17 0%
Mongolia 2 0 2 0%
Morocco 6 0 6 0%
Nepal 22 0 22 0%
Niger 13 2 15 13.33%
Nigeria 22 1 23 4.35%
Norway 1 0 1 0%
Pakistan 52 0 52 0%
Paraguay 17 0 17 0%
Peru 7 0 7 0%
Poland 2 0 2 0%
Romania 21 0 21 0%
Russian Federation 27 0 27 0%
Senegal 22 0 22 0%
Serbia 2 0 2 0%
South Africa 12 3 15 20%
Sri Lanka 4 0 4 0%
Sweden 5 0 5 0%
Switzerland 3 0 3 0%
Tanzania 2 0 2 0%
Tunisia 31 0 31 0%
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Table 11: Continued
Country Male Female Total % of Women
Ukraine 15 0 15 0%
United Kingdom 4 0 4 0%
United States 2 1 3 33.33%
Uruguay 37 0 37 0%
Yemen 6 0 6 0%
Zambia 9 3 12 25%
TOTAL 665 23 688 3.34%
Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012
Troop contributions comprise the bulk of UN peacekeepers. They are the ones 
responsible for the daily routine military activities, such as patrols, checkpoints and 
escorts, in addition to the planning and execution of special operations and strategies to 
combat armed groups and protect the civilian population. This is the area where the full 
incorporation of women has been the slowest. Primarily because it depends on states 
willingness to adopt national policies that allow the participation of women in their 
military. However, it is also important to analyze the role women carry out on the field. 
The absolute majority of military women sent to peace operations comply with 
“professional” or “logistics” duties, being confined to the barracks and they have very 
limited, if any, contact with the population.
In regard to vetting procedures for inadequate behavior, it tends to be easier 
amongst troops since they are usually confined within the base and are not allowed to 
leave the barracks unless accompanied by officers or in groups to special events where 
their participation is authorized, these include for example national medal parades, 
peacekeeping day festivities and MONUSCO house, where some contingents take their
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soldiers over the weekend for entertainment.95 However, they are also the ones that have 
the most visibility. Consequently, although inappropriate behaviors amongst troop 
contributors are the lowest, these can harm the UN image the most.
Female participation amongst troop contributing countries reaches only 2.5%. The 
low participation is due to the fact that the biggest troop contributing countries -  Pakistan 
(3,698 troops), India (3,694 troops) and Bangladesh (2,520) -  either do not have any 
women in the case of Pakistan and India, or have very few in the case of Bangladesh (6). 
In contrast, some countries present a much larger female representation, highlighted in 
the case of South Africa with a total contribution of 268 military women that represent 
22.7% of its total troop contribution.
This positive South African female participation reflects the kind of national 
policies implemented at home. Unfortunately, the South African battalion could not be 
interviewed during the field work. However, amongst civilians involved with gender 
efforts, the contingent was mentioned as an example of gender mainstreaming policy. It 
also important to mention that South Africans speak Swahili, an important asset to get 
closer to the population as some of the Congolese people speak that language 
Nonetheless, interviews with a civil society organization emphasized that the UN had 
problems in the past with South Africa military involved with prostitution and other 
abuses.96
95 These are just some o f  the locations that peacekeepers are allowed to go. During the field work, most 
contingents would emphasize that soldiers are not allowed to leave unless to one o f  those events. The 
MONUSCO house is a UN establishment, usually within the field headquarter where UN staff, including 
civilians, police and military personnel can get together and entertain.
96 Interview carried out with an important international civil society organization in Eastern Democratic 
Republic o f Congo, February, 2012.
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Ghana also presents a good female representation amongst its troops with 37 
military women (8%) of its total contribution o f 462 military personnel. The field work 
indicated that currently, Ghana women do not have many constraints to join the military 
in that country. Although most of the interviewed personnel were in “professional” 
positions, the commander emphasized that there are combatants and that they perform the 
same duties as their male counterparts.
Table 12: Military troops contribution as of October, 2012
Country Male Female Total % of Women
Bangladesh 2514 6 2520 0.24%
Belgium 20 1 21 4.76%
Benin 438 12 450 2.67%
China 206 12 218 5.50%
Egypt 1000 0 1000 0%
Ghana 425 37 462 8.01%
Guatemala 145 5 150 3.33%
India 3694 0 3694 0%
Indonesia 175 0 175 0%
Jordan 216 4 220 1.82%
Morocco 831 0 831 0%
Nepal 1005 19 1024 1.86%
Pakistan 3798 0 3698 0%
Serbia 4 2 6 33.33%
South Africa 911 268 1179 22.73%
Ukraine 154 0 154 0%
Uruguay 1105 59 1164 5.07%
TOTAL 16641 425 17066 2.49%
Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012.
Police contributions are divided in UNPols and FPUs. UNPols are sent in 
individual missions, just like the military observers. They are placed in varied positions 
all over the territory of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Interviews with UNPols were 
mostly carried out in Goma, where they were directly involved with the construction o f a 
training center for the PNC and with one UNPol involved with a Prosecution Supporting
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Cell, responsible for assisting the national government to prosecute Congolese uniformed 
personnel perpetrators.
The participation of women amongst UNPols reached 15.7%, well above that of 
military observers. The top UNPol contributing countries are Cote d’Ivoire (35 UNPols), 
Chad (28 UNPols), Benin (26 UNPols) and Burkina Faso (26 UNPols), all of which 
present an important female representation with 34.3%, 21.4% and 11.5% (both Benin 
and Burkina Faso) respectively. Djibouti and Central African Republic also present an 
important proportional female participation -  66.7% and 42.86% - although their overall 
contribution is relatively low, with totals of 3 and 7 respectively.
Table 13: Individual Police Contribution as of October, 2012
Country Male Female Total % of Women
Belgium 1 0 1 0%
Benin 23 3 26 11.54%
Burkina Faso 23 3 26 11.54%
Canada 2 1 3 33.33%
Central African Republic 4 3 7 42.86%
Chad 22 6 28 21.43%
Cote d'Ivoire 23 12 35 34.29%
Djibouti 1 2 3 66.67%
Egypt 4 0 4 0%
France 9 0 9 0%
Guinea 19 4 23 17.39%
Jordan 7 0 7 0%
Madagascar 17 1 18 5.56%
Sweden 5 1 6 16.67%
Senegal 18 2 20 10%
Togo 9 0 9 0%
Turkey 13 1 14 7.14%
Ukraine 5 0 5 0%
Yemen 4 0 4 0%
TOTAL 209 39 248 15.73%
Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012.
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Finally, only four countries contribute with FPUs, these are Bangladesh, Egypt, 
India and Senegal. Female representation amongst these reached 8.6%. Bangladesh 
contributed the highest percent of women with 19.3%, followed by Senegal with 10% 
female representation. As in Haiti, one of Bangladesh's FPU in the DRC is a female FPU, 
where the majority of the personnel are women (75 out of 124), including the post of 
commander and its staff. Male personnel tend to be of the non-commissioned corp. A 
visit to Bangladesh's female FPU in Kinshasa was carried out during the field work, and 
although they were still receiving training (after 3 months of their arrival), it was 
emphasized that they would be soon deployed and develop similar duties as those carried 
out by other FPU units, including protection of UN facilities and crowd control.
Table 14: Formed Police Unit Contribution as of October, 2012
Country Male Female Total % of Women
Bangladesh 313 75 388 19.33%
Egypt 140 0 140 0%
India 265 5 270 1.85%
Senegal 239 10 249 4.02%
TOTAL 957 90 1047 8.60%
Source: DPKO Statistics, 2012.
Although all contingents, military and police, receive induction training on the 
field regarding gender and sexual violence, there is still room for improvement. In some 
field offices, Gender Affairs and Sexual Violence representatives talked about the 
existence o f training programs developed with the military component to improve their 
know-how on gender mainstreaming and gender analysis as well as expertise on how to
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deal with sexual violence victims.97 However, they also pointed out the lack of civilian 
personnel that could enhance outreach and continue efforts to refine response 98
At the same time, the lack of facilities to receive women in some military bases is 
worrisome. Although some of them do not have women in the military, they should be 
prepared to receive female UN civilian staff if  a joint action is taken. In these cases, the 
inability of placing female Community Liaison Assistants (CLA)99 that have an important 
role in communicating with local women in some places, especially in the eastern side of 
the country can seriously undermine actions.
The military component is usually the first one to arrive after attacks and have a 
primary role during these first hours. They should know how to deal with victims, first by 
being able to provide immediate care and then have references for specialized medical 
centers. Investigations should comply with victim confidentiality in order to protect them. 
Moreover, they should use the standardized template and forms to report cases to 
facilitate data collection and mapping.
However in interviews with MONUSCO in substantive sections of South Kivu 
province, it was revealed that the military component not only was unaware of the 
confidentiality policy, ultimately putting victims in danger, they would also conclude that
97 Interviews carried out with representatives from the Gender Affairs Office and Sexual Violence Unit in 
Kinshasa, Bukavu, Goma and Bunia, February 2012.
98 The lack o f  civilian experts in UN peace operations in general is worrisome. As an illustration, the 
Sexual Violence Unit has only one person, responsible for the provinces o f  South Kivu, Maniema and 
Katanga and another for North Kivu and Province Orientale. A third officer coordinates the Units efforts in 
the Eastern part o f the country. These regions are where most cases of sexual violence are encountered and 
it becomes evident that although those are dedicated professionals, they lack resources and personnel for a 
successful fulfillment o f  the Unit's mandate.
99 As it will be explained in the following section CLA's are local people that work as translators for the 
military personnel. Their role however, is not only to support communication between the military and 
civilian personnel, but also to promote confidence building between the local population and UN blue 
helmets.
308
no sexual violence had happened if for example victims and perpetrators lived under the 
same roof. Rape and other forms o f violence would not be considered as such if 
committed by another family member. As one interviewee stated: “There are many cases 
that the population search for us and say they were raped. But when we arrive there, they 
all live together, it is the husband. So there is no rape.”100
This example illustrates the need for increased training in gender and sexual 
violence for the military component. It was also evident that different contingents had 
different perspectives regarding gender roles, sexual violence and the role of civilian and 
uniformed women that can affect the kind o f responses they provide for victims. This 
makes the guidelines on specific actions to be undertaken extremely important. The 
guidelines then need to be included in training so that a pattern of response is established.
Security sector
As defined by the UN, security sector is: “a broad term often used to describe the 
structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and 
oversight of security in a country.”101 These include defense, law enforcement, 
corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for the justice system, 
border management, customs and civil emergencies. Actors that play a role in the 
security sector include ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. For the 
purpose of this dissertation, only the initiatives related to the improvement o f the justice 
system, rule of law and police institutions are taken into account.
100 Interview carried out with a senior military officer deployed in the Eastern Democratic Republic o f  
Congo, February, 2012.
101 United Nations Secretary General, "Report o f  the Secretary General on Securing Peace and 
Development: The Role o f the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector Reform."
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Security Sector reform is a necessary step towards the strengthening of 
accountability, effectiveness and respect for human rights and rule of law in a society.102 
MONUSCO's efforts in this area can be divided in three main components: 1. Improving 
victim's access to Justice; 2. Curtailing impunity; and 3. Structuring the PNC and 
FARDC through the development of joint actions, monitoring of actions and DDR/RR 
program. Unfortunately, though, MONUSCO's ability to improve Congolese justice 
system responsiveness is limited, since the mission only has jurisdiction over military 
justice.
“Access to Justice” Program is mainly concerned about fighting impunity for 
sexual violence, and developing new, appropriate mechanisms for reparations with 
increased victim and Government participation. The program, overseen and implemented 
by the Human Rights section, is a multi-disciplinary office that covers varied issues 
regarding human rights. It is one of the biggest and most interlinked sections within 
MONUSCO.103 The Access to Justice Program also attempts to reinforce women’s 
capacity and position within Congolese society in order to improve their status and 
decrease their vulnerable condition. As a matter of fact, the difficulty in prosecuting and 
accomplishing justice was one of the main topics discussed in all interviews. Regretfully 
though, representatives from Kinshasa and Goma emphasized the difficulties to 
accomplish justice in any case as corruption and impunity rein in the Congolese judiciary 
system.
102 Ibid.
103 Interviews carried out with representatives from MONUSCO Joint Human Rights Section were carried 
out in Kinshasa, Goma and Bunia, February, 2012.
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Quite complementary to the work undertaken by the Human Rights section, the 
Rule of Law section focuses on the Congolese Legal system, including military justice 
with the aim of building a strong justice system in the DRC. An interesting mechanism 
under Rule of Law and which has a direct impact on sexual violence trials are the 
Prosecution Supporting Cells (PSCs). Following a decade long of insecurity and patterns 
of incidents that signaled an institutionalized impunity, Resolution I960104 stressed the 
importance o f fighting impunity and improving the capacity to respond to human rights 
violations. In this context, the PSCs were created under the MONUSCO Rule of Law 
section in order to support national efforts to prosecute perpetrators of human rights 
violations.105
The Walikale massacre trials illustrate their work in dealing with sexual violence. 
In order to support Congolese authorities, in this particular case, PSC fact finding teams 
carried out a reconnaissance mission for places where the court could be established and 
the trial done, evaluated the security situation, provided technical expertise, and in 
conjunction with Human Rights provided transport for victims.
Finally, in regard to the strengthening of the police and armed forces capabilities, 
both MONUSCO's military and police components perform a series of actions with the 
PNC and FARDC, opening the opportunity to provide mentoring on joint actions and 
patrols as well as monitoring. The support to the establishment of training centers and
104 United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1960", December 16, 2010, http://daccess-dds- 
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N 10/698/34/PDF/N1069834,pdf?OpenElement.
105 They are entitled to two major forms o f  support to the local authorities: 1. through technical advice in all 
procedures, from the investigation to the trial; and 2. through material and logistical support, through the 
provision o f  vehicles, transportation and even security. This work is coordinated with UN-agencies and 
MONUSCO components that can adequately provide the logistic support needed. Their support is provided 
according to requests coming from the Congolese authorities; however they are entitled to suggest cases as 
well.
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training modules are overseen by the UNPol, most focused on improving local 
capacity.106 As part of MONUSCO conditionality policy, the military component can 
only participate in joint operations with the FARDC if they do not have a record of 
human rights violations. At the same time, it is well known that a great percentage of 
sexual violence perpetrators are members of FARDC. Part o f the military component’s 
role is to monitor members of FARDC and report misbehaviors.
In partnership with the Ministry of Defense, the military component occasionally 
participates in training and sensitization campaigns. Handbooks and training manuals on 
the subject of sexual violence have been distributed to the local forces; however, “the 
actual implementation of these codes would mean fundamental changes to the army 
structure, the political, economic and social situation within the military and in the 
country more broadly.”107 As explained earlier, the Congolese military (and police for 
that matter) is widely unprepared and more importantly it lacks an ethos o f protection. 
Having entered the military through the brassage process or previously, personnel are 
part of a military structure that previously promoted looting and attacks as a form of 
survival and which has parallel commands and confusing loyalties. The new policies, 
regulations and handbooks encompasses not only appropriate behavior and guidelines on 
how to act, they also represent a different mindset that cannot be fully comprehended in a 
single day.
The military, in conjunction with MONUSCO's DDR/RR section, is also 
responsible for overseeing the government led process of developing an effective security
106 A visit to a training center financially supported by Canada and overseen by UN Police was undertaken 
during the field work in Goma, Democratic Republic o f  Congo.
107 Solhjell et al., "Turning Unsc Resolution 1325 into Operational Practice: A Cross-Country Study on 
Implementing Resoltuion 1325 in Peacekeeping and Military Operations." p.25
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sector to assure that the state will provide its population with a safe environment, rule of 
law, and good governance. While their mandate is to monitor and support government 
actions, they also provide sensitization and training for Congolese defense and security 
forces as a way to promote gender mainstreaming, improve their capacity to respond to 
SGBV and prevent recurrence o f SGBV.
It is usually within and/or nearby the military bases that DDR/RR camps are 
based as they are in constant contact with various armed groups. Military personnel are 
thus the first to encounter combatants willing to join the DDR program. It is thus 
important that they are also aware of a gender perspective in DDR/RR and that they 
include female officers who can support outreach to women combatants, as well as wives 
and children of male combatants.108
DDR/RR is an important instance where promoting a gender approach is 
extremely necessary. After arms are handed over and conflict settled, violence against 
women tends to increase. DDR programs need to incorporate a gender perspective that 
also demobilizes masculinities. During conflicts, gender relations within a society tends 
to change, while a masculine role may become important to protect the community, the 
family and its goods, women also have a differentiated role as they may have to flee, be 
subjected to different forms of violence, and have intensified previous domestic 
responsibilities as they become responsible for securing food, shelter and protecting 
themselves and immediate family. Consequently not only must DDR programs consider
108 U N ’s Standard Operation Procedures on Gender and DDR focuses on the negotiation process when the 
parameters o f  the DDR process to take place are defined. It aims to contribute that women and girl ex­
combatants, women working in support functions to armed groups and forces, wives and dependents as 
well as members o f the receiving community are informed and included in shaping any peace accord and 
related DDR plans. For more information on this particular subject, see: United Nations Development Fund 
for Women, "Standard Operations Procedures on Gender and Ddr" (2004).
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these differentiated gender relations during war, there is yet another challenge. As DDR 
program advances and weapons are collected up and conflict settled, rehabilitation needs 
to focus not only on economic aspects o f the community life but on the psychological 
consequences of demobilization and disarmament. Often, rates of domestic violence 
increase after war.109 “Demobilizing masculinities” though is not an easy task and 
requires a deep understanding of the issue and the local culture. As previously mentioned 
earlier, the DDR program carried out with MONUSCO's support lacks a gender 
perspective. Although the families of combatants are included, not all of his “wives” and 
children may be included, as they tend to have more than one women. Moreover, the 
DDR program for female combatants is very limited.110
Protection
The Protection indicator is mostly concerned with actions undertaken by the 
police and military component to protect women and girls from gender based violence. 
As previously analyzed in this chapter, MONUSCO's protection strategy is 
comprehensive and considers the economic, political and social vulnerabilities of women, 
besides those mostly related to the physical threats they are subjected to. MONUSCO has 
specific protection mechanisms that have been cited in various documents, including the 
Analytical Inventory on Peacekeeping practices,111 an effective lessons learned inventory, 
to be exported to other missions. The accomplishments o f the mission include military
109 United Nations, "Gender Perspectives on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," (2001). p.2
110 However, actors on the field agreed that a limited number o f female combatants exist in the DRC. The 
main gender concern, would be with the “abandoned” wives and children, not included in the DDR  
program that are left behind without a house a ways to survive.
111 United Nations Department o f  Peacekeeping Operations, "Addressing Conflict Related Sexual Violence: 
An Analytical Inventory o f  Peacekeeping Practice."
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patrols and escorts and the establishment of joint mechanisms with the civilian 
component to enhance the mission's capacity to address women's structural 
vulnerabilities.
The main o f these mechanisms are the so called Joint Protection Teams (JPTs). 
These are planned by the Civilian Affairs section, but carried out as a multi-sectoral team 
that aims to assess and identify the primary protection needs and threats to the security of 
local population; they are a promising tool that can improve UN's overall capacity to 
respond to these context driven needs of the local population. Moreover, they can also 
improve the relationship between UN civilians and military and the local population, 
bring diverse civilian expertise to inaccessible areas and provide a tailored response to 
the population's needs.
JPTs are implemented in all DRC territories and add to the presence of varied 
MONUSCO sections, such as Civilian Affairs, Child Protection, Human Rights, Sexual 
Violence and others, along with the police and military components and other UN 
agencies, such as UNHCR, UNICEF, etc. More importantly, though, after a thorough 
assessment of the situation, a specific response is planned, being thus a pro-active and 
preventive mechanism paramount to protection of civilians.
In a context of widespread sexual violence, JPTs can activate mechanisms of 
coordination between local women's organizations and the military, resulting in 
improved patrols in the market and at firewood and water recollection places, 
establishment o f temporary and mobile military operating bases in close-by areas and 
escorts to women. At the same time, bringing women to the spotlight o f the protection
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planning strategy empowers them and is key for improving their overall vulnerable 
status.
Another important mechanism where the military component has an important 
participation is the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM). While JPTs are designed to assess 
primary protection needs, JAMs are concerned with the overall situation o f a particular 
place. It consists of a general evaluation of the humanitarian, protection, development, 
human rights and/or social political situation of a specific area and as JPTs, provides a 
tailored response. JAMs are put in place more frequently than JPTs and may support the 
overall situation of local women by addressing their needs. Same as JPTs, these are also a 
pro-active and preventive response mechanism.
The Joint Investigating Team (JIT) is also an important mechanism that the 
military component can take part in, but usually as experts under MONUSCO's 
leadership, rather than part o f a military contingent. JITs are designed to support the 
Congolese Justice system to conduct investigations on alleged human rights violations, 
including sexual and gender based violence allegedly committed in remote and 
inaccessible areas. In this case, military contingents can support logistics, with 
transportation and security. Different from JPTs and JAMs, JITs are a post facto response 
that intends to improve the judiciary and ultimately fight impunity.
Finally, the military can also take part in Joint Monitoring Teams (JMTs), 
established in support of MONUSCO's strategy to restore state authority by deploying 
PNC units, government and Justice delegates to stabilized zones in eastern provinces 
after disengagement of armed groups. These are primarily focused on police capabilities 
and are overseen by UNPol and civilian observers, but may have the military component
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taking part to support logistics and security. Indirectly, by improving the Congolese 
government’s authority in Congolese territory, the overall situation o f the civilian 
population, as well as women and girls vulnerability to sexual and gender based violence, 
is decreased.
However, in any of these mechanisms, it is paramount that personnel with 
expertise in sexual violence and/or gender be included in order to be able to identify and 
assess specific needs. Engaging local women and women's organizations with JPTs' 
activities is also a necessary condition to better evaluate protection needs. Moreover, the 
presence of women in these teams may facilitate the contact with possible victims, 
supporting the information data collection as well as formulation of a perpetrator profile. 
This improves the capacity to plan a security response.
These initiatives comprise important innovations in the traditional ways the 
military operate. This information was provided by the office of the Force Commander 
and very limited military personnel on the ground seemed to be aware o f the 
initiatives.112 Interviews with the different military contingents113 showed general 
awareness regarding the importance of JPTs, although these were not brought up as an 
important part of their protection mandate. JPTs were usually discussed after the topic 
was brought up by interviewers and interpreted as a civilian activity to which the military 
component offered mere protection. Joint Assessment Missions, Joint Investigation 
Teams and Joint Monitoring Teams, were never brought up by any of the military
112 Data provided by the MONUSCO's military component gender focal point during presentation at the 
International Conference “Promoting Gender to Build a Lasting Peace: Reflections on the Latin American 
Experience” carried out in Buenos Aires, April, 2012. See:RESDAL, “International Conference,” 
03/22/2013, www.resdal.org.
113 Interviews carried out with the military included contingents from Bangladesh, Egypt, Ghana, 
Guatemala, India, Morocco, Pakistan and Uruguay deployed in different parts of the country.
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contingents interviewed. However, high ranking civilian personnel commented that a 
possible explanation was that low ranking soldiers may be unaware o f the specific names 
of these activities.114
Although this may indicate only unawareness regarding the proper names of these 
operations, it may also be a sign that the central role of the joint effort between civilians 
and military to protect civilians may be overshadowed. It is imperative that the military 
component see themselves as an integral and central part of each of these mechanisms, 
particularly JPTs, rather than just “escorts.” An important analysis would be to evaluate, 
by rank and function of military personnel sent along with civilians in these different 
mechanisms, what they understand their role to be.
Other important actions carried out by MONUSCO military component include: 
foot patrols in market areas, long-term patrols, establishment of Temporary Operating 
Bases (TOB), Mobile Operating Bases (MOB) and Company Operating Bases (COB) in 
sexual violence affected areas, and emergency cells. The interviews with the different 
military contingents showed varied response to these specific protection mechanisms. 
The following actions were observed:
- Patrols: Although all interviewed contingents are engaged with patrols, some are 
less eager to proceed with foot patrols in areas not accessible by vehicle. However, it is in 
these remote areas, where women confront higher risks of being attacked, far from main 
roads and in the forest or jungle. Interviews with contingents from North Kivu (India, 
Uruguay) and Ituri (Bangladesh, Guatemala) Brigades had a very positive response, 
reaffirming the necessity to perform foot patrols in areas inaccessible by vehicle. In the
114 Interview carried out with high rank civilian personnel in Kinshasa, February, 2012.
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case of the Indian Battalion in North Kivu, some of these patrols were planned according 
to previous contact with local women's organizations.
In Province Orientale, due to characteristics o f the terrain, widely covered by the 
jungle, long-term patrols ought to be carried out. In some cases they go by vehicles, 
camping during the night on the way, until reaching the final destination where a 
perimeter is set and foot patrols are done in that particular area. In other cases, a 
helicopter drops soldiers on the ground where they patrol for a few hours. Both 
Bangladesh and Guatemala carried out patrols of this sort in their areas of responsibility.
- Establishment of COBs, TOBs and MOBs. All interviewed contingents in the 
East (Pakistan, Egypt, Uruguay, India, Bangladesh, Morocco and Guatemala) had COBs 
and TOBs established in more isolated areas. The main objective of having these bases 
established is to cover a wider area, showing MONUSCO's presence and supporting the 
government's efforts to control the territory.
As a matter of fact some of these are established in quite stark environments and 
are cut out of the rest of the contingent. An example is the Uruguayan COB in Kimua, 
reachable only by helicopter. Living conditions in these COBs and TOBs vary. As 
informed by the Mission Support representative, due to budget constrains a few TOBs 
intended to be established for only a few months became COBs without much 
amelioration.115 Currently, the policy is to not open any more TOBs unless another one is 
closed, putting into evidence the budgetary limits of the peace mission.
- Emergency Cells: these are envisioned to provide victims of sexual violence 
with an emergency response that includes medical and psychological care along with an
115 Interview carried out with MONUSCO M ission Support representative in Kinshasa, February, 2012.
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investigation in less than 72 hours. Although, at the time of the field work, they were still 
not in place, conversations with South Kivu Brigade were already in place to start 
implementing them in that region. We could not verify if the initiative was also being 
discussed in other regions, or if currently they are already in place in South Kivu and/or 
elsewhere.
An important component of the protection strategy is the relationship with the 
local population and the capacity to respond to their needs in a timely manner. Amongst 
the civilian components and UN agencies, the contact with local leaders and the 
development actions with national institutions is common ground. Nonetheless, the 
military component's engagement with the local population, despite their primary 
protection role is still limited. Some initiatives aiming to improve this relationship are 
being put in place.
The scope of engagement between the military and local population will depend 
on the tasks of each unit, resources available and language barriers.116 It is often common 
that the population in rural areas does not speak French and translators of Lingala and 
Swahili, the largest spoken languages in the DRC are relatively rare. Occasionally, 
contact is established with the chief of a village and maybe his wife to determine the 
main needs of the villagers. However, each battalion has very large areas of responsibility 
and a constant presence and steady communication is a challenge.
One of the main instruments put in place to establish a connection with the local 
population is the placement of Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs) in military bases. 
CLAs are local staff with the double function o f serving as translators and as a bridge
116 Solhjell et al., "Turning Unsc Resolution 1325 into Operational Practice: A Cross-Country Study on 
Implementing Resoltuion 1325 in Peacekeeping and Military Operations." p.22
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between the local population and the military component. All CLAs can speak English, 
French and the local language. Living within the military compound, they are responsible 
for collecting information with the local population to support the military component 
efforts to identify protection needs. Due to security reasons, they are never placed in the 
same city or region where they come from.
Another important channel of communication between the military and the 
civilian population is the Community Alert Network (CAN). These refer to electronic and 
telephone communications placed within communities and serve as an early warning 
system or hot line. However, in an interview with military contingents it was suggested 
that CAN often confronts challenges of implementation due to conditions in the field, 
such as limited to no electricity and know how to manage the system amongst locals.117 
Moreover, there is also a certain lack of willingness to fulfill this role on the part of the 
population who tend to be afraid of assuming a more active role for fear of being 
repressed.
In regard to communication with local women's organizations, the only military 
contingent to mention frequent contact with the local women's organization was the 
Indian contingent, particularly those settled in the COB located in the Walikale territory. 
The initiative took place after the Walikale massacre, when MONUSCO was heavily 
criticized when a nearby COB did not respond to an attack until a few days later. As 
informed by the Indian COB commander of that particular area, weekly meetings with 
the women's organization are carried out as well as market patrols and escorts for the 
local women are provided upon request.
117 Interview with senior officers from Indian Battalion was carried out in Goma, February, 2012.
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Several MONUSCO sections have confirmed the difficulty in working with some 
contingents, particularly the Pakistan contingent, that not only avoids talking to local 
women, but also with UN women staff. As a matter of fact, it was confirmed in more than 
one interview that women (civilian or military) are not allowed to stay in any of their 
bases. This may undermine the possibility of having UN female personnel, or local 
female translators participate as CLAs in JPTs, JAMs, or in any other joint activities that 
they may have to carry out. Moreover, by refusing to talk to local women's organizations 
about their protection needs, protecting them may become an even more challenging task.
The existence of these initiatives shows that the protection of civilian mandate 
generated a series of actions towards improving UN capacity to respond to threats against 
the local population. In addition, the difficult context confronted by Congolese women, 
has led the mission to create specific mechanism for their protection, such as the market 
patrols and special escorts. However, the extent to which these initiatives are actually 
implemented by the different military contingents is a different story. Interviews with 
different civil society organizations and humanitarian actors, including UN agencies, 
reinforced the existence of differences between each contingent, some being more prone 
than others to act and use the authorized means to protect the population. Allegations that 
UN peacekeepers did not act in a timely manner in various incidents proved indeed to be 
true, including in the recent takeover o f Goma by the rebel group M2 3. While there are 
mechanisms that put into practice the UN's normative focus on the protection of the 
individual, not all military contingents put them in place. In fact, one interviewed 
contingent commanders affirmed that before taking an order from the UN he awaits a
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response from his capital, indicating that in some instances the UN still struggles in a 
state dominated world.
Empowerment:
Empowerment refers to initiatives undertaken by all mission components with the 
objective of strengthening women's social, economic and political status in the society. 
Different MONUSCO sections have been involved in activities that directly impact the 
empowerment of women within Congolese society. The financial support provided by 
different sections and components to women's organizations, the training and protection 
of female candidates during elections and support to the implementation of a 1325 Plan 
of Action can be highlighted.
UN agencies and sections are often involved with the financial support of 
grassroot organizations, government institutions and individuals involved with the fight 
of women's rights and the improvement of their status in the society. Besides the Human 
Rights section compensation program to victims of sexual violence, OGA maintains 
partnerships with various women's organizations and the Ministry of Women's and 
Children's Affairs aiming to strengthen women's economic and social conditions.
At the forefront of these actions is the support and training of female candidates 
for elections. An increased presence of women in Congolese politics will facilitate a top- 
down approach, thus facilitating gender mainstreaming and the implementation of a 
political agenda that is responsive to women's needs. Pressure to change discriminatory 
Congolese law is also undertaken aiming to elevate the society from the intrinsic 
obstacles for the full development of social and gender equity.
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Also worth mentioning is the training o f PNC and FARDC members on gender 
related issues and the pressure for the implementation of an Action Plan that would 
contribute to the inclusion and full participation of Congolese women in the armed and 
police forces of the country. Their full participation would represent an important 
accomplishment in terms of empowerment since military and police institutions tend to 
be the last bastions to open their doors to women and allow equal participation between 
men and women.
Likewise, the military component is involved with empowerment initiatives. 
Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and Civil-Military Activities, commonly known as CIMIC 
are an important way through which the military component can communicate with the 
local population and support women’s empowerment to reduce risks of expose to all 
types o f violence. While QIPs allow the military component to propose projects that can 
be rapidly implemented (3 months) with a small budget (up to 25,000 USD) to support 
the local community in varied ways, CIMIC provides activities with the local community 
such as soccer matches and distribution of food, water and other supplies.
The implementation of QIPs and CIMIC activities has a double objective. They 
can improve the life conditions of local population through the implementation o f these 
small projects within the area of responsibility o f each military contingent, alternatively, 
they support efforts to win the hearts and minds o f the population, building a more 
trustful relationship between the military and the population.
It was interesting to observe that there are not many QIP and CIMIC activities 
being carried out in the DRC. Distribution o f fuel and firewood could, for example, 
decrease women's exposure to attack by being alone in the woods. At the same time, the
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construction of women’s shelters, female latrines and placement of self-efficient stoves 
would all enhance women's security. Moreover, projects dedicated to building self- 
sustainable small businesses in charge o f local women could also be an important way of 
strengthening women's status in the society thus decreasing their vulnerability.
These are just some of the various examples in which the military can contribute 
to local women's security and status. However, we did not observe many of these actions 
taking place. In a few cases, such as in Province Orientale, application to QIPs was 
denied. For example, every Guatemalan contingent attempts to leave behind something 
they built for the population;118 however, we were informed that their last QIP application 
had been denied. Consequently, their support to population resorted to CIMIC activities 
all funded by their home country.
Alternatively, the Pakistani contingent was involved with the remodeling of a 
school which contributed to the education of several Congolese boys and girls as a result 
of QIP. At the same time, Uruguayan personnel commented that they frequently (every 
day) provide food to different organizations in the city of Goma, including a shelter for 
handicapped boys and a school for young boys and girls. In previous years they 
supported a shelter for abused girls.
The context in the DRC, where troops are daily involved with security activities 
explains why they are not as involved in CIMIC activities as military contingents in other 
missions, such as MINUSTAH, where CIMIC has become a central part of their role. 
Although, these contribute to establishing an improved relationship with the local 
population, other initiatives, such as the contact with community leaders and women's
118 Interview with Guatemalan personnel, including commander, commissioned and non-commissioned 
officers and troops were carried out, in Dungu, February, 2012.
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organizations may enhance this relationship, building trust and improving their capacity 
to respond to the specific threats confronted by the local population within their area of 
responsibility.
The analysis of MONUSCO's gender policy and how a gender perspective is 
incorporated into the work of all its components indicates that the existence of a context 
marked by extreme high levels of sexual violence. This has influenced the creation of a 
normative framework that offers a blueprint for an adequate protection strategy. Progress, 
however is slow and in a few areas MONUSCO has been confronted with serious 
implementation challenges. The most easily recognizable are the difficulties encountered 
by some o f the military contingents to incorporate a gender perspective. Not only do they 
purposely not have any women in their military, they have different conceptions of what 
sexual crimes consist of and tend to be wary of training. That of course, is not a general 
trend and was present only in a few contingents.
Having a “support national authority” mandate, although extremely important, 
can be problematic. Accomplishing national ownership of projects so that the local 
government acquires the necessary capabilities to sustain peace efforts on its own is 
necessary; however, when institutions are corrupt and involved with human rights 
violations, it becomes a central obstacle for a successful protection strategy. This is 
particularly true in the case of the national military, highly implicated in rape cases in the 
DRC. Not only may joint operations with the FARDC bring MONUSCO a negative 
image, but working with the Congolese military justice system to accomplish prosecution 
can also be challenging. Moreover, as previously mentioned, MONUSCO does not have 
the mandate to interfere in the case of sexual crimes committed by civilians. These
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however are the kind of crimes in ascent and there is a lack of initiatives as to how the 
mission can further contribute in this area.
Finally, there is the problem of a lack of resources in general. It is clear that the 
mission indeed has an encompassing and thorough approach to the problem of sexual 
violence and has attempted to implement different policies in all of the five indicators. 
However, there is only so much the UN can do with limited staff, reduced uniformed 
personnel and scarce resources to further support national efforts to pacify the country 
and protect its people.
Conclusions
The protection of civilian mandate dictates that the needs of individuals should be 
the mission's highest priority and as a consequence, MONUSCO's efforts are centralized 
towards identifying and responding to these needs in cooperation with government 
institutions and humanitarian actors, including the UN agencies and civil society 
organizations. The analysis showed that MONUSCO has indeed accomplished a number 
of important benchmarks in terms of incorporating a gender perspective into the daily 
work of its staff and most importantly into the planning, execution and evaluation of 
protection operations, often carried out jointly by the military and the civilian 
components.
As much as pre-deployment training helps any commander and its soldiers to go 
through situations in which the lives of civilians are under threat, the truth is that in such 
a context driven environment, sometimes they have to leam on the spot and have a pro­
active attitude in order best attend those in need. That is not always easy; as General 
Cammaert pointed out when talking about his own experience in the DRC as a
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commander, “The majority of the troops were physically and mentally insufficiently 
prepared to implement the mandate of protection of civilians, including sexual violence, 
and had insufficient knowledge of the Rules o f Engagement.”119
That was true in 2005 when he was a commander and is still true. Years after the 
first mandated operations to protect civilians, including from sexual violence, the UN and 
the international community in general still struggle to grasp this renewed context in 
which the physical and psychological damage directed towards the population is a central 
feature. In the light of uncertainty, and the need to act, the UN has come up with 
innovative actions that contribute to improving the organization's capacity to adequately 
respond to this complex and multi-layered context.
As seen, the implementation of these actions varies from contingent to contingent 
and from area to area. Complicating factors related to the volatile environment where 
troops operate, along with ill-trained personnel, impose further challenges to a successful 
learning process. Still, a clear mandate for the protection of civilians generated a 
normative framework and practices that aimed to place the individual lives of each 
Congolese as the mission's top priority. As such, the mission is a hub o f lessons learned 
that can be exported to other missions. The problem has been approached in a 
comprehensive manner that attempted to increase security by strengthening the 
economic, administrative and judicial capacity of Congolese state. Most importantly, 
joint actions between all components have been generated.
119 General Patrick Cammaert, “The practical Implications o f  a Gender Perspective in Peacekeeping 
operations”, Lecture delivered at the International Conference Promoting Gender to Build a Lasting Peace: 
Reflecting on the Latin American Experience, Buenos Aires, 25th-26th April, 2012. See: RESDAL, 
“International Conference,” 03/22/2013, www.resdal.org.ar.
In this context, considerations regarding gender equality, economic empowerment 
of women, and an environment free from sexual violence, aim to generate initiatives to 
improve the functionality of the government, the judicial system and the inclusion of 
women's voices in the peace process. In this regard, the UN has achieved very limited 
results. By one side it lacks resources and experts, by another, the persistent of patriarchic 




PROMOTING GENDER TO BUILD PEACE: A SUCCESSFUL LEARNING 
PROCESS?
The incorporation of a gender approach to peace operations is part of a learning 
process initiated since the 90's when the international security environment changed 
abruptly. As individuals living within the states became targets and the main victims of 
wars, UN peacekeeping practices passed through a transformation and incorporated a 
series of actions whose scope went well beyond the traditional ceasefire monitoring and 
incorporated efforts to strengthen the state and its institutions (e.g. judicial system, police, 
rule of law, etc) as a way to protect the population and promote international peace and 
security. Along these lines, the incorporation of a gender approach was the result of a 
number of factors, among which the disproportionate impact of war on women and 
children and the use of sexual violence as weapon of war comprise the central reasons for 
this increasing concern.
Nonetheless, as it was shown in Chapter Three, the UN's strategy to combat 
sexual violence and the organization's normative and legal framework to pursue a gender 
approach in a peace operations setting established a strong link between the improvement 
of women's lives and peace. While this logic is perfectly plausible, it implies an 
underlying reasoning that assumes that “fixing” gender relations in accordance with a 
Western cultural pattern will result in peace. Evidence of this are the numerous UN 
documents that repeatedly establish this relationship and the UN strategy to approach the 
problem. As the analysis of UN resolutions on Women, Peace and Security showed, the
330
UN's strategy to combat sexual violence is comprehensive and considers war-time 
violence as a continuum of violence resultant from the previous status and vulnerability 
held by women in these societies. The implementation of broad gender approaches that 
attempts to not only provide protection against physical violence but also promote 
women's empowerment and the reform of state's institutions illustrate this concern.
While advances have been made, major obstacles remain. In terms of 
accomplishments, the elaboration of a strong normative framework based on Security 
Council resolutions, and supporting documents, such as the Analytical Inventory on the 
military role to combat sexual violence and the guidelines to incorporate a gender 
approach to peace operations by the police, are by themselves noteworthy successes. 
Indeed, as suggested by the case studies, it is only after some form of legal base and 
normative framework exist that specific tasks to promote gender approaches are passed 
on to the different missions' components. Furthermore, these documents established 
important monitoring and implementing mechanisms and benchmarks to evaluate the 
organization's progress on the issue. Among those are the goal of 10% female uniformed 
personnel in the field, the reports of the Secretary General on the advancement of these 
resolutions, the “naming and shaming” strategy to prosecute perpetrators and shame 
countries that do not hold them accountable and the establishment of an “infra-structure” 
(Gender and Sexual Violence Units) to support gender mainstreaming in operations. As a 
matter of fact, the appointment of senior gender advisers in the field and at headquarters 
levels was central to increase the understanding o f gender issues within different missions 
and to the establishment of gender sensitive actions by the different missions' 
components.
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At the same time, however, the case studies showed major implementation gaps 
on the specific issues that, from the beginning, comprised the main puzzle of this 
dissertation. The implementation gap remained wide on those issues that depended more 
on member state’s compliance, such as gender balance and protection. In both case 
studies, it was evident that member states are still far from reaching an ideal gender 
balance among uniformed personnel. Nonetheless, what is worse is the fact that national 
identity and culture played an important role in determining how actions on the ground 
were carried out. The multiple complaints among female personnel (from different 
components) in regard to some of the contingents’ behavior toward women were 
worrisome, especially in the light of unanimous endorsement o f UN resolutions on 
Women, Peace and Security.
What do these challenges say about the UN's organizational learning and its 
ability to act as an agent of norms disseminator? The reality in the field and the 
mandates' scope remain disconnected. The likelihood that the UN mandates will become 
a reality is low. The question of whether setting high aspirational goals contributes to 
norm diffusion, even at a slow pace, cannot be answered conclusively in this dissertation. 
Nonetheless, important evidence supports this claim, including the generation of local 
instruments to better protect women and girls (such as local laws and government 
strategies); women's empowerment, particularly in the political domain, an area where 
missions have been very active; and finally an improved understanding among member 
states of the operational need to have both more female uniformed personnel and more 
economic assistance dedicated to combat sexual violence.
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The analysis of the case studies also identified some elements that, when present, 
would either facilitate or impede learning. For example, it became clear that in the 
presence of specific mandates to protect civilians and combat sexual violence, better 
protection strategies are adopted and more detailed tasks are issued to the military 
component. Nonetheless, the study of the specific case of Congo showed that even 
though a strong gender normative framework was in place its protection strategies 
constantly failed, as is illustrated by the increasing levels of violence in the country. 
Success was stymied by three complicating factors. They are: the presence o f an ongoing 
and complex conflict, the geo-political environment of the country, and intrinsic 
obstacles to reaching the population.
Overall the analysis showed that gender approaches to peace operations are a 
Western based idea that is difficult to implement due to the distinct political and cultural 
reality in the majority of the member states. Nonetheless, it was successfully put in the 
international agenda and will remain so in future years. As a consequence, despite the 
slow pace, the UN has been an agent of dissemination. This conclusion not only supports 
the UN's specific role in disseminating a gender approach to its member states, but most 
importantly, it also shows that institutions can indeed serve as agents o f norms 
dissemination by influencing member states to adopt new norms that are at odds with 
their traditional practices.
In order to further discuss the contributions of this dissertation, this chapter will 
be divided into three main sections. The first compares the results from the two case 
studies It evaluates whether the implementation gaps found in field missions were 
hampering the learning process and defines which elements can be considered learning
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enablers which should be disseminated to other missions. The second section discusses 
the UN's role as an agent of dissemination and will evaluate its success in promoting 
gender approaches to member states participating in these missions. The third section 
discusses the contributions of this dissertation's conclusions to the study of institutions in 
general, particularly their role in generating and disseminating norms to member states.
Lessons from the field
The learning model used in this dissertation attempted to show the dynamic 
process through which new norms are created and incorporated within organizations, and 
specifically how gender norms were incorporated into the scope of peacekeeping 
practices by the UN. As previously discussed in Chapter 2, an important part o f the 
learning process refers to disseminating these norms throughout the UN's different 
bodies, agencies, and institutions and to its member states. The analysis o f the case 
studies was paramount to determining the areas where the UN learning process confronts 
major difficulties.
As expected it is the distant political and cultural reality o f member states and 
host nations themselves that posed the greatest obstacle to a successful learning process. 
This is particularly true in the specific areas where UN's mandate was carried out by 
member state’s troops or through their direct contribution. In other cases, it became clear 
that, despite the push for the reform of local institutions to incorporate gender 
approaches, local security forces remained ill-trained and/or maintained a patriarchic 
structure.
However, a few advances were achieved, some lessons were learned, and there is 
evidence of slow norm diffusion. In particular, observations included the development of
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local legal mechanisms to protect women and girls, the political empowerment of 
women, the recognition within some contingents o f the operational requirement to 
include uniformed women in their ranks, and the need to address women's needs in the 
field.
These indicators are the basis for a comparison of the accomplishments and 
shortcomings of the two case studies in this section. From this evidence conclusions are 
drawn regarding the best practices for successful gender mandate implementation and 
improved ways to promote organizational learning.
Legal framework
In this regard the analysis showed a major difference between the two case studies 
with differing impact in the field. The Haitian case is marked by the constant absence of 
protection of civilian mandates to combat sexual violence which led to the absence of 
gender considerations in the mission's planning. In fact, it was not until the earthquake 
and the massive displacement of the Haitian population to IDP camps that resolutions 
acknowledged the need to protect civilians in those areas, including women and girls, 
who were increasingly becoming victims of sexual violence. The inclusion of this issue in 
the mandate led to the incorporation of specific tasks for each of MINUSTAH's 
components to address this issue more effectively. For example, the military was tasked 
with patrols within some of the most dangerous IDP camps, the police created a mobile 
team that operated within the camps, and the Gender Unit worked closely with 
government institutions and police to improve the commissariat’s ability to receive 
victims, e.g. creation of separate spaces to receive victims.
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However, as previously discussed, sexual violence is a constant in Haiti's history. 
Civil society organizations and scholarly analysis point out to the recurrence of sexual 
violence as a form of political oppression when women were targeted due to their, or 
their relatives' political affiliation. Moreover, as mentioned on different occasions by 
members of the Gender Unit gang, rapes still occurs in the country and comprise vestiges 
o f the high levels of violence committed by those paramilitary and militia groups created 
by governmental authorities to protect their power.1 Although the areas where they 
operate have been pacified, gang activities and occasional sexual violence occurs, often 
related to the initiation of new gang members or to their other activities. Consequently, 
although the inclusion of protection mandates to MINUSTAH has produced positive 
results and generated specific tasks to address sexual violence, it perpetuated a single- 
minded view of this crime in Haitian society as a bi-product o f the earthquake, rather than 
the continued societal violence that existed before January 2010.
By contrast, the case of Congo shows a different picture. Sexual violence has 
been widely recognized as a central feature of the conflict and thus it is always included 
in MONUSCO's mandate. As a result, specific strategies to protect civilians and combat 
sexual violence have been generated and each of MONUSCO's components has specific 
tasks aimed at protecting women and girls from sexual violence. Besides the mission's 
initiatives there are also complementary plans o f action in cooperation with UN agencies 
and other organs of the international community, such as the Humanitarian Action Plan 
and the Protection Cluster along with the I4S Plan for the Stabilization in the DRC that 
also contemplates efforts to combat sexual violence.
1 Interviews with representatives from MINUSTAH's Gender Unit carried out in Port-au-Prince, September 
2012 .
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Paradoxically though, despite the presence of a strong legal and normative basis 
to address the problem in the DRC the situation has not improved and, in fact, it 
worsened with the systematic resurgence of different armed groups that openly attack the 
population and usurp the country's resources. In fact, the DRC case is further 
complicated by the persistence of the ongoing conflict, the lack of strong local leadership 
and inability to reinforce state authority throughout its territory, and the inaccessibility of 
population segments living in isolated areas, often only accessible by helicopters. While 
these do not offer a full explanation as to why the situation in the Congo has not 
improved, despite the implementation o f a normative framework and corrective action, 
they do explain the contextual complexity. They also show that further attention and 
robust action on the part of the international community is required.2
Gender balance
Gender balance is one of those areas that is very dependent on member state’s 
national policies and their political willingness to adopt resolutions' provisions, 
particularly among uniformed personnel. The civilian personnel hired to staff peace 
missions are selected by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Even 
though the exact gender balance in the two missions for the civilian component could not 
be assessed, the number is relatively low. An inability to support accompanying family 
members was cited by some interviewees as an important factor that explained the
2 On March 28th, 2013 the Security Council approved yet another resolution as a ways to improve the 
security situation in the DRC. Resolution 2098 created a specialized “intervention brigade” in an attempt to 
“neutralize and disarm the notorious 23 March Movement (M23), as well as other Congolese rebels and 
foreign armed groups in strife-riven eastern Democratic Republic o f  Congo.” See: Department o f  Public 
Information, “Intervention Brigade Authorized as Security Council grants mandate renewal for United 
Nation Mission in Congo,” 04/17/2013, https://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/scl0964.doc.htm.
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decreased number of women in the civilian component. Nonetheless, in both missions, 
women led the major civilian sections dedicated to improving these missions' response to 
gender specific needs (i.e., Gender Unit in Haiti and Gender Affairs Office and Sexual 
Violence in the DRC). Moreover, in the DRC, the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General for Rule of Law was a woman.
Since UNSCR1325 gender balance among uniformed personnel has improved in 
both missions. The approval of the resolution by the Security Council and the initiatives 
generated by the organization, such as the creation of gender units, and the inclusion of 
guidelines and training modules have influenced member states to send more female 
uniformed personnel to peace missions. However, the military remains the main 
challenge, especially because increasing the number of female military depends on 
member state’s national policies and their willingness to change them. Currently 2.45% 
of the military and 10% of the police force are women among MINUSTAH uniformed 
personnel; and 2.52% of the military and 9.96% of the police are women in MONUSCO.
As was previously suggested, the presence o f women in the field reflects national 
policies of member states. The late incorporation of women in the military and their 
complete absence in some specialty fields, particular combatant positions, explains why -  
until now - they have low ranking and remain restricted from some tasks, such as security 
patrols and escorts that would allow them to have direct contact with the population. In 
both UN missions, military women were mostly confined to the barracks of the military 
based on their specific military branch and specialty. In the case of the Congo, interviews 
indicated that within the South African and Ghana Battalion there were combatant 
women in patrols, however, the contingents present in the areas where most rape cases
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are recorded (North and South Kivu and Province Oriental) have a very limited number 
of female personnel (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Morocco).
Interviews with female uniformed personnel and some male personnel indicated 
that they agreed with the idea that the presence of female personnel facilitates contact 
with the local population and may serve as a role model to the local society. Almost all 
accounts included observations that they attracted a lot of attention among the local 
population and that could serve as an example used by local women to enhance their own 
empowerment.
Security sector
In both missions, the bulk of action towards improving the security sector refer to 
strengthening local capabilities, particularly national security and military forces and the 
justice system. Because Haiti does not have a military force, efforts are focused on the 
police, while in the DRC both the military and the police capabilities are tackled. It is 
also important to note that there is increased attention towards providing gender training 
for police and military in the two countries, with varying results. Haiti is considered 
more successful in this regard because it has a special UNPol team dedicated only to that 
matter. Nonetheless, in the DRC there is increased attention on the military due to the 
elevated number o f rape cases that have been perpetrated by them. In fact, as the UN 
supported DDR processes that incorporated subjects responsible for serious violations of 
human rights into the Congolese military, the UN is also considered responsible for the 
current gruesome condition of Congolese forces. Unfortunately about half of the reported 
cases in South Kivu were allegedly committed by members o f the Congolese military.
In regard to strengthening the local justice system, interviews in Haiti and in the 
DRC showed that deployed civilian personnel tend to think that cultural features hamper 
the efficacy and liability o f local systems and impunity remains common place. Local 
mechanisms of mediation between community leaders and families were cited in the two 
countries as factors that contribute to low prosecution rates. It is common practice that 
agreements between the family of the victim and the perpetrator are settled, usually 
incurring in financial compensation. The main concern is that by having these informal 
mechanisms, the formal legal pathways are under-utilized and continue to be perceived as 
untrustworthy by victims. Other factors also affect these systems, such as corruption and 
a lack of functioning local justice system. This is one o f UN's major challenges, not only 
in regard to improving its responsiveness to sexual violence, but to enhancing its 
performance in peace building and post-reconstruction. The UN lacks civilian capabilities 
and resources to send experts to support the re-habilitation of local institutions, a step that 
is necessary for the full recovery of any society.
Part of building a sound justice system is having the necessary legal framework. 
Many of these countries have inadequate laws prohibiting violence against women, 
including rape. In fact, laws criminalizing rape were not passed in Haiti until 2005 in 
Haiti and in the Democratic Republic of Congo until 2006. The UN missions, particularly 
its gender offices, actively participate in the efforts to improve national laws related to 
sex discrimination, gender equality and violence against women. However, in both cases 
the hard work of grassroots organizations, UN agencies that work separately from the 
mission, and, in particular, UNIFEM (now UN-Women) were key players in addressing 
the deficient legal system. A recent project to reform Haitian penal code and tighten the
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law on sexual violence was sent to the parliament. Among the provisions, the 
criminalization of marital rape and facilitating measures for prosecution, such as the 
abolition of the need of a medical certificate, are important measures that will improve 
domestic response to sexual violence.3
Protection
Protection was yet another area in which the UN's organizational learning and its 
capacity to disseminate norms was tested. These aspects are heavily dependent on 
member states willingness to comply with UN guidelines and best practices for protecting 
local women from sexual violence. This indicator was highly correlated to impediments 
of member state culture.. The analysis of the two cases revealed that contingents in both 
the DRC and Haiti were charged with serious allegation of sex discrimination. This is 
problematic because some of the DRC contingents are deployed to areas o f high levels of 
sexual violence, as is the case of the Pakistani contingent in South Kivu and the 
Moroccan contingent in Province Oriental.
The field work showed that contingents in general have a limited understanding of 
their role in protecting women and girls. Despite clear UN guidance directing 
communicate with local women's organizations for the purpose of gathering first-hand 
information on their need to provide patrols and escorts in dangerous areas, the military 
contingents argue that UN policy strictly forbids their interaction with local women. UN 
policy forbids sexual contact between troops and locals. The military interpretation that 
routine interaction is forbidden undermines the development of more effective protection
3 For more information on the recent Haitian law project, see: Ansel Hertz, “Haiti moves to tighten laws on 
sexual violence,” Global Issues, 04/15/2013, http://www.globalissues.org/news/2013/03/Q7/16030.
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strategies. Some contingents, such as the Indian and Latin Americans, affirmed that they 
interact with locals, although only the Indian contingent confirmed having a close 
relationship with local women's organization. Specifically they have established an 
effective relationship in the Walikale territory, the site of, where previous massacres.
Allegations against contingents included their refusal to speak to women, even 
UN staff, or to host them in their base during joint activities. As previously shown in the 
Congolese case, joint operations between civilians and military often include female 
civilian participants. Interviewees stated that they were restricted from the base which 
contradicts the military function of protecting civilian and UN personnel. Female military 
personnel from other contingents also complained that they were excluded from 
participating in joint patrols because the Pakistani contingent forbade them from entering 
their base.
The interviews showed a differentiated attitude towards the female researchers in 
the team. The research team was comprised o f two female interviewers and one male. 
Some military contingents would not shake hands with women interviewers and would 
only speak with the male interviewer. These impressions were confirmed by interviews 
with different civilian sections in both missions. In the most extreme cases sexual 
exploitation and abuse against the population were viewed as normal.
Consequently, although great lessons learned could be observed in the DRC, an 
example of which are the escorts and patrols of the Joint Protection Teams, these actions 
are of varying impact due to the prevalence of these attitude. The strong influence of 
attitude as an obstruction to norm diffusion works at cross purpose to the UN “Women, 
Peace and Security” resolutions. These resolutions prescribe addressing gender relations
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as a way to accomplish peace, but have little if any enforcement mechanisms for 
appropriate gender relations in troop-contributing countries. The question of whether 
these high aspirational goals support the dissemination of norms to, and acceptance by, 
member states cannot be fully answered although there is evidence of positive effects in 
some countries. Further research of the military contingents that originate from countries 
with ingrained cultural attitudes against gender equality is needed to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the UN as an agent of norm dissemination.
In Haiti, protective actions are undertaken by both the military and the police, 
however it is the predominantly the police component that works with cases of sexual 
violence. They primarily focus on the IDP camps. Although it is well known among 
members of the Gender Unit staff that sexual violence is widespread, their attempt to 
expand police activities beyond IDP camps have not yet been successful. The military, 
from troops to leadership, has a very limited understanding o f the nature of the problem 
in Haiti. They associate sexual violence with the lack of security in the camps and, thus, 
praise the military’s security enforcement within the camps as instrumental to reducing. 
However, equally important were the military efforts to stabilize and pacify the 
neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince. This was instrumental in reducing sexual violence, yet 
the military seems to be unaware its importance.
A final comment on this topic is necessary. Interviews with contingents from 
some nationalities showed that, despite the UN's provision that peacekeepers are 
deployed on a voluntary basis, some contingents affirmed that they are ordered and 
deployed abroad. Among those military contingents interviewed, battalions from Jordan,
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India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan were ordered. This is another factor to consider as 
influencing peacekeepers' performance.
Empowerment
In both missions, the gender office is involved with actions toward women's 
empowerment in all domains, from compensation for victims to support during electoral 
campaigns to female candidacy opportunities. This last domain has seen the highest level 
of success as exemplified in by increased participation o f women in elections both as 
voters and as candidates. Joint work with the military component to protect women 
candidates, who are often targeted, was performed in both cases.
However, the different reality in the two countries led to varying degrees of 
involvement by the different missions' components in actions toward women's 
empowerment. In Haiti, as the country becomes more stable and the mission enters the 
consolidation phase, political volatility and fragile democracy are the main threats to 
reversing women's gains. Interestingly, since the security situation has improved in the 
country, all components - including the military - have worked with social and economic 
projects to promote women's empowerment. Battalions have implemented Quick Impact 
Projects (QIPs) that benefit local women, by both improving the mission's image and 
their contact with the population and by promoting women's empowerment.
The volatile environment in the DRC creates further challenges which have 
stymied reducing sexual violence and increasing the social and economic conditions of 
women. As a consequence, MONUSCO civilian sections finance the activities of 
women's organizations and support government efforts to implement UNSCR1325. 
Mechanisms of compensation to victims of violence have been put in place and a few
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QIPs focus on women's specific needs, such as the construction of latrines, maternity 
facilities, etc. One of MONUSCO's biggest contribution, in partnership with other UN 
agencies, especially UN-Women, is the generation of a strong civil society and a space 
for women's voices.
This analysis highlighted the UN's main accomplishments and challenges for the 
future. The comparative analysis specified areas in which the UN's organizational 
learning process has been more successful and which factors contributed or hampered 
that process. As expected the UN's attempt to incorporate a gender approach faced major 
difficulties of norms dissemination to member states. This is illustrated by the difficulty 
of implementing gender mandates that are being carried out by culturally diverse troops. 
There is another differentiated cultural .matter that affects actions and is important to 
address. Different organizational cultures, such as those of humanitarian personnel, UN 
civilian staff, and the military each have unique ethos, norms and behavioral approaches 
to problems. Yet the problems they face require joint solutions. Healthy civil-military 
relations are a necessary condition for the implementation o f these mandates.
The two countries showed different realities in that regard. Because Haiti is 
stabilized through military action, the military troops are increasingly involved with 
humanitarian activities, which is a source of friction with the humanitarian community. In 
the DRC, the relationship between the military and civilians is generally positive. 
However their relative unawareness of each other's unique institutional cultures caused 
occasional friction, particularly when dealing with information sharing. An area that 
worked well was the coordination mechanisms to incorporate gender approaches in the 
military work. At the higher level, such as heads of civilian units, force commanders, and
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the component's gender focal point leader, the relationship was extremely positive 
characterized by frequent meetings.
The comparative analysis of the case studies has shown that despite the 
shortcomings, there are important accomplishments that should not be taken for granted. 
In particular, the generation of a space where gender themes are discussed and action 
towards promoting gender equality are increasingly becoming a priority (at least at the 
missions' leadership level). Despite difficulties in changing traditional patriarchic 
features in host nations, the continued weakness of domestic institutions, and member 
state’s unwillingness to implement certain changes themselves, it is important to 
recognize the accomplishments. Important steps have been taken toward recognizing 
gender issues as central when addressing conflict roots and establishing the foundation of 
a lasting peace.
The analysis, however, did point out important elements that are necessary for 
successful implementation of a gender mandate. It identified the major obstacles for the 
UN's renewed policy focused on the individual, its attempt to improve protection of 
women and girls, and to identify and address their needs. The contextual analysis of the 
cases shows that indeed war violence is a continuation of previously existing unbalanced 
gender relations in these countries that were exacerbated by instability and conflict. In 
both countries, the status of women and the state's capacity and willingness to protect 
their rights were extremely limited. Moreover, there was a prevailing inferior social status 
of women that further increased their vulnerability and decreased their access to basic 
economic opportunities. This reality shows that indeed “fixing” gender relations is an 
essential step to re-building societies. Thus the UN has adopted an appropriate strategy
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that focuses on the root causes of wartime violence against women and establishes the 
conditions for ensuring those gains are not reversed in the aftermath of war.
Nonetheless, the political and social reality of member states entrusted with the 
responsibility of carrying out these mandates is the foremost obstacle to improving local 
gender relations. As shown, the different domestic reality of member states was 
influential and shaped the action of troops in the field. There is another potentially 
harmful effect. The UN troops serve as a role model to local societies. One of the main 
justifications for incorporating more female uniformed personnel was that their inclusion 
would serve as a role model. They would exemplify a different reality, one in which 
women could pursue the same career paths as men, including the military. What are the 
harmful effects of deploying contingents whose gender views reflect the same problems 
that these policies are supposed to address? If the UN is working with the notion that 
these norms generated at headquarters and perfected through lessons learned from the 
field can be disseminated to host nations and member states, then it should also consider 
the possibility that by having these contingents in these areas, rather than fixing, they 
may be reinforcing those same prevailing patriarchic features the organization is trying to 
change. Their actions are at cross-purposes with their intention and stated policy 
objectives.
The UN's problem of generating member state support in terms of troops, 
financial contributions, and equipment are not new. However, better assessment of the 
cultural background of troop-contributing countries should be conducted before 
deploying troops to sensitive areas where the impact of war on women and girls is 
particularly harsh. The UN should place a higher priority on assigning troops that
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exemplify the gender norms that the UN intends to diffuse to target countries. This is a 
difficult but necessary task.
To conclude this section, indicators are identified that can be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the UN in implementing a gender approach in its peacekeeping practices 
and disseminating gender norms.
Table 15: Analytical indicators for assessing the UN's implementation capacity in 
the field
Strategy component Indicators
Legal framework Presence o f gender sensitive mandates with specific protection 
provisions.
Gender balance Female personnel comprise at least 10% o f uniformed personnel and 
30% o f civilian personnel. Military women in patrols and police 
women in constant contact with victims and involved in all efforts to 
address sexual violence. Civilian, women in decision-making 
positions.
Security sector Generation o f local legislation regarding sex discrimination and other 
forms o f sexual and gender-based violence and the criminalization o f  
rape. Gender training for local security and defense forces and 
initiatives to increase the number and contribution o f women in these 
institutions. Initiatives to improve the justice system.
Protection Consultation with local women's organizations and participation o f  
women, uniformed and civilian, in assessment missions to both 
identify protection needs and the impact o f  war on women.
Empowerment Increased number o f women participating in elections as voters and 
candidates. Improved economic and social indicators disaggregated 
by sex. Initiatives to improve the status and benefits o f  women 
undertaken by all components.
These indicators comprise a useful method to assess the UN's ability to 
implement a gender approach to peace operations and to point out the specific areas in
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which the organization's efforts have experienced the most difficulties. At the same time, 
given that gender is a hard case, the analysis will identify the UN's deficiencies in 
promoting norm dissemination to other countries as well as within its own organization.
The following section explores the final stage of organizational learning - 
dissemination. This assessment will provide insight regarding the UN's effectiveness in 
influencing member states to implement national policy that reflects the UN’s new 
gender norms. Is the UN an effective role model for member nations?
The UN as an agent of dissemination
The learning model proposed in this dissertation attempts to assess whether or not 
organizational learning can take place when member states have not yet learned 
themselves and serve as an agent of norms and practice dissemination. This focus was 
derived from the main puzzle o f this dissertation, that is, the fact that the UN has linked a 
lasting peace with “normalized” gender relation and proposed a comprehensive strategy 
aimed at improving women's status, state capacity, and the security environment. The 
focus on gender relations seems plausible, however it entails certain cultural features that 
are still not acceptable among member states. The question is whether the UN could “fix” 
gender relations in host nations when member states, whose troops are responsible for 
carrying out mandates in the field, originate from a domestic societal context in which 
gender equality does not exist.
In this regard, the analysis of the case studies showed that the UN's gender 
approach is adequate since there seemed indeed to exist previous unbalanced gender 
relations that contributed to the increasing levels of sexual violence during wartime, in 
the case of the DRC, and during political disturbances, in the case of Haiti. Despite the
349
differences in scale and applied tactics, women were targets in both countries as a result 
o f a strategic thinking that aimed to either punish them for political views or, in the 
complex case of Congo, undermine opponent’s will to fight, distress local society, and 
exterminate a particular ethnicity.
The difference in the degree in which violence has been used is the result o f the 
particular context in each country, the level of conflict instability, and the international 
community’s scale of success establishing a lasting peace. As the security environment 
improves and political disruptions decrease in Haiti, the cause of violence against women 
has become less of a tactic and more opportunistic. This clarifies the root of the problem 
as being Haitian women’s structural inferior status in the society. In Congo, as armed 
conflict continues so does the violence against women. Rape and other forms of sexual 
violence may be accepted and normalized in their society.
The field work identified the UN’s difficulty in norm dissemination in both host 
nations and member states. This is shown by the limited impact of its policies on 
national institutions and the slow pace at which member states have taken in adopting the 
provisions of “Women, Peace and Security” resolutions. However, the successful actions, 
pointed out in the previous section, should not be underestimated. Creating domestic laws 
to establish and protect women's rights, eradicate violence and sex discrimination, 
strengthen the role of women's organizations, and create a space in the political arena for 
women are significant. These are important advances that may contribute to further 
disseminate the new norms and practices regarding gender. They also may have spillover 
effects in other areas, such as reform of host nation’s security sector, institutional
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improvement of women's physical and structural vulnerability (and thus decreased levels 
of violence against them), and lay the foundation for lasting peace.
The case studies show that a member state’s inability to comply with certain 
provisions does affect UN actions in the field, particularly in regard to protection 
strategies that can be seriously undermined with contingents that are not prepared to deal 
with this problem or that are unwilling to incorporate gender approaches to their actions. 
In these cases, the main problems are: 1. Inability to adequately communicate with local 
women's organizations or local women as a way to better understand their protection 
needs; 2. Failure to adequately prosecute these crimes and protect victims, as exemplified 
by improper interrogation methods and reporting procedures that reveal victims' 
identities and endanger them; 3. Ignorance in regard to the nature of the crime itself as 
illustrated in an interview with one o f the interviewed battalions commander who 
affirmed that sexual violence committed within the family is not a crime; 4. Difficulties 
derived from some of the battalions' unwillingness to host female personnel which 
hinders joint protection strategies and effective communications with local community; 5. 
Misbehavior and involvement in cases of sexual exploitation, abuse, and violence, 
including rape.
Despite the adverse effects resultant from troop contributing countries inability to 
adopt a gender approach, it is important to note that the abovementioned problems are not 
ignored by the civilian sections responsible for improving the UN's response to sexual 
violence and for incorporating gender approaches throughout all UN actions. In fact, 
interviews with members of the Gender Unit in Haiti, the Gender Affairs Office, the
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Sexual Violence Unit in Congo, and other civilian sections in the two countries show that 
they are aware of these problems and are addressing them.
For example, the Sexual Violence Unit in Bukavu, DRC, was aware o f recurrent 
inadequate interrogation procedures in the South Kivu area and created a training course 
for military contingents. The simple and straightforward language, “Do’s and Don’ts” 
format, provided guidelines for how to deal with a victim of sexual violence. The UN 
staff responsible for that course commented that the military responded very well to the 
instruction and became more involved with the unit. Their relationship improved 
considerably because they understood the importance of their role. For example, after a 
recent massacre in Walikale, a Mobile Operating Base was established, continuous 
patrols were conducted, and weekly meetings with local women's organizations were 
organized. Another example is in Haiti. Contingents continued to display a lack of 
understanding in regard to gender issues. In response the Gender Unit worked closely 
with the military component gender focal point to promulgate a force commander 
directive that all contingents must appoint a gender focal point at the battalion and/or 
company level. Further, these liaisons should participate in a specific three-day training 
on gender which would enable them to disseminate the information to the rest of the 
contingent.
These initiatives illustrate that even though member states do not adopt UN 
provisions which may hamper efforts, the infrastructure put in place as a result of 
“Women, Peace and Security” resolutions has a positive impact. An example is the 
appointment of gender advisers and emplacement of sexual violence units which have the 
effect of circumventing member states' non-compliance. Most importantly, these efforts
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identify another instance through which institutions can promote norms dissemination to 
member states. The constant repetition of contingent deployment and readministration of 
appropriate gender sensitive training to the troops diffuses these norms to the member 
states. This is a result of the continuous replacement of military and law enforcement 
contingents. Once their six, nine or twelve month tours end they return home and new 
personnel take their place in the contingents. However, that also means that the learning 
curve is rather steep due the constant replacement of troops in the field.
Although this study does not provide enough evidence to conclusively trace the 
ways through which gender norms and practices are adopted by member states, it 
provides important insight on norm dissemination and confirms that some diffusion takes 
place. Future research and long-term analysis is necessary to adequately assess the UN's 
ability to act as an agent of norm and practice dissemination in the gender domain. 
Assessing the hard case of gender in the UN is an important step toward evaluating an 
institution’s ability to promote norm dissemination and their efficacy.
The analysis carried out in this dissertation, however, also contributed to identify 
factors that contribute to the dissemination of norms by motivating member states to 
adopt these changes. In the specific case of gender in peace operations, the use of peace 
operations as a foreign policy pillar led some states to incorporate provisions o f “ 
Women, Peace, and Security” resolutions in their national policies.
Figure 9, below, shows that contributions to peace operations have increasingly 
switched from developed countries to developing states over time. International 
organizations are usually the arena of choice through which these states attempt to 
propagate their national interests and participate in international politics architecture.
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Figure 8: Contributions to peace operations by region
Year 2000
■ A s ia  (34%)
1  Africa (23.9%)
W estern Europe (18.1%)
Eastern Europe (9.4%)
B Oceania (8.6%)
I  North America (3.9%)
■  Latin America and the Caribbean (2.1%)
In 2000, out of 1,000 effectives in peace operations:
- 340 came from Asian countries
- 240 from Africa
-180 from Western Europe
- 90 from Eastern Europe
- 90 from Oceania
- 40 from North America
- 20 from Latin America and the Caribbean
Year 2009
■  Asia (46.7%)
Kf Africa (34.1%)
W estern Europe (8.8%)
Latin America and the Caribbean (6.9%) 
S  Eastern Europe (2.7%)
■  Oceania (0.5%)
■  North America (0.3%)
In 2009, those 1,000 effectives would be sorted as follows:
- 468 from Asia
- 341 from Africa
- 88 from Western Europe
- 69 from Latin America and the Caribbean
- 26 from Eastern Europe
- 5 from Oceania
- 3 from North America
Source: RESDAL, 2009.
An important factor to be considered in regard to these developing states is that 
most have passed through the processes of political, economic, and social upheavals 
themselves. This gives them a comparative advantage when acting in the other conflict 
and post-conflicts scenarios. In some cases, this experience is reflected in specific tactical 
capabilities that create a safe and secure environment through a comprehensive approach 
to security. This approach includes development projects as key to achieving long-term 
stability and building relationships o f trust with the local population that facilitate overall 
goal accomplishment. This is the case of Latin American countries. Brazil, in particular,
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has a special interest in showing its capabilities in peace operations as a way of 
strengthening its pledge for a more active role in the international security agenda and to 
support its pursuit of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
Not all countries that have increased contribution have the same motivation and 
commitment to the UN’s principles and norms, as say Brazil and South Africa, too. In 
some cases, an increased contribution to peace operations reflects a need to employ 
national armed forces and take advantage of an extra source of income. In these cases, 
countries have limited incentives to comply with UN provisions. As the case studies 
further showed, some contingents order personnel to participate in peace operations, 
rather than sending them on a voluntary basis. This was the case with all Asian and 
Middle Eastern contingents interviewed (Bangladesh, India, Jordan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
and Morocco). The result may be an elevated number of troops that do not comply with 
minimum training standards and often misunderstand some of the norms the UN attempts 
to foster in host nations.
While this may be true in some instances, as was shown in the case studies, some 
of these countries are taking important steps toward incorporating UN norms into their 
own practices as a way to enhance their international image. Bangladesh and India, for 
example, have created all female FPUs. The Sri Lanka battalion in Haiti will incorporate 
female military in its next contingents based on what they learned regarding the 
operational needs of female uniformed personnel through the interaction with gender 
specialists in the field. These examples show that in some instances, the UN's role as an 
agent of norms and practices dissemination has worked and contributes to improve its 
own response in the field. It depicts a cycle of learning.
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As the analysis has shown, there is evidence that the UN serves as an agent of 
dissemination to member states, although evidence does not support drawing a definitive 
conclusion. Regions and countries that use the UN as a platform to actively participate in 
international politics have a stronger incentive to comply with UN norms. An example is 
the advancement of gender norms in Latin American countries.
Since 2000, Latin American participation in peacekeeping operations has 
increased by nearly 1,000 percent. Unlike troops from other large contributing countries, 
Latin American troops present an open institutional culture recognized as an important 
asset to work in an environment such as that in the DRC or Haiti. Moreover, the “Latin- 
American way of doing peacekeeping” seems to emphasize two important actions that are 
at the core of modem peacekeeping operations: close contact with the population and 
development of projects aimed at enhancing local capacity.
Latin American participation in peace operations has a long history. A few 
countries have participated since the first UN missions, namely Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay, and have accumulated almost 60 years of experience. These Latin American 
countries have adapted to the new international demands in line with the transformation 
of the UN's peace operations. They have created national peacekeeping training centers 
and training course with high standards to satisfy the demands of the international 
community.
Since 2008, these countries have reaffirmed at the biannual Conference of 
Defense Ministers of the Americas their intention to retain a gender perspective in peace 
operations. Individually, some Latin American countries have achieved measurable 
progress. Chile adopted a National Action Plan for RES 1325 in 2009. Others, such as
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Argentina and Uruguay, evaluate the possibilities of launching their own National Action 
Plan. In 2012, Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff announced that within five years all 
military branches of Brazilian armed forces should include women, something 
considerable unthinkable just few years ago. A diplomatic-military partnership is being 
forged between Ministries of Foreign Affairs, who are concerned with the international 
image of their countries, and Ministries o f Defense. The partnership serves to reinforce 
UN gender norms. Adequately incorporating these norms becomes a priority for those 
aiming to have a major role in the organization.
It is in this particular area that further research is needed. Separate studies 
concentrating on the mechanisms of norm dissemination and methods o f gender norms 
adoption in other regions, particularly Africa and Asia, are necessary. As Chapter Three 
showed, there are only 39 states that have adopted National Action Plans. Those that are 
developed states adopted their NAPs independently and those African states have NAPs 
as a result of receiving UN intervention. However, implemented is another matter 
altogether. Senegal, for example, adopted a NAP on its own initiative. It would be 
interesting to analyze to what extent the NAPs are, or are not, being implemented in these 
African nations. Senegal is an ideal case for such a comparison.
Another area for future research is the measuring the effect differential o f gender 
training modules between countries that do not deploy military women, such as Pakistan 
and Jordan, to countries that deploy women. Interviews with personnel that return home 
from peace operations where gender units are established and gender training is 
conducted would also be interesting as a way to assess how much information is retained 
and if there are instruments to further disseminate these norms nationally. Finally,
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focusing on which countries contribute troops when analyzing the dissemination of 
gender norms and practices may be central to understanding and explaining the impact of 
national culture on the UN’s organizational learning process.
The analysis of the specific case of the UN's organizational learning process in 
adopting a gender approach to peace operations can contribute to a general analysis of 
how institutions can lead the way in facilitating norm dissemination and influencing 
states to adopt international practices.
International organizations, norms dissemination, and organizational learning
The objective of this section is to explain the main implications of the study of 
gender in peace operations to the overall study of institutions as central actors in the 
international system, the nature of their relationship with member states, and their role as 
agents of norm dissemination and facilitators of learning.
The analysis of how the UN incorporated a gender perspective to peace operations 
highlighted three elements that are central for the study of institutions and their 
importance for international politics. First, the international organization’s culture, 
specifically the organization’s composition, purpose and relationship with its members. 
Second, the dynamics behind organizational learning and how norms and practices are 
created and disseminated through this process. Third, the international organization’s 
role in influencing states to adopt new policies.
First, the study of UN's organizational culture proved that membership 
composition affects the IO’s values, purpose, and, most importantly, its capacity to learn 
and change over time. An organization such as the UN, composed of 193 culturally 
different states is subjected to the pressures and political dynamics of each of its member
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states. These cultural and political differences present major obstacles to creating norms 
that require consensus among all members.
It then becomes clear that IOs' composition incur in differentiated challenges 
when changes in its original purposes, norms and practices are needed, as the more 
culturally diverse the organization is, the harder it will be reach a consensus. In this 
regard, the analysis of organizational learning not only clarified all five steps behind the 
dynamics of learning, but it also showed how IOs can serve as facilitators, assuming a 
leading role in disseminating norms. As a consequence, learning can be understood as a 
process that aims not only to improve IOs' capacity to adapt to changes in the 
environment in which they operate; but also their ability to generate consensus amongst 
member states about the need to change policies in accordance with new international 
challenges.
The study of the UN's organizational learning process and how gender was 
incorporated as a new practice necessary to accomplish peace underscores the importance 
of IOs as facilitators of learning and identifies the difficulties associated with this role. 
Indeed, it became clear that incorporating gender approaches to peacekeeping was the 
result of the combined efforts of the epistemic community and a few concerned member 
states. As the Secretariat assumed the leadership of this process and had major resolutions 
approved by the Security Council, it transformed wishful thinking into institutionalized 
policies, influencing member states to adopt them when acting under the organization's 
scope.
Nonetheless, gender is a hard case. It is one of those issues that is far from 
reaching consensus amongst member states. Moreover, the UN's gender norms and
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practices represent values that are mostly associated with the West and are at odds with 
the cultural reality of the majority of member states, many of who are major troop- 
contributing countries. As a result of these cultural differences it was anticipated that 
gender norm dissemination in the field and to member states would be a difficult process. 
This project supports that expected outcome but also identified instances through which 
norms dissemination occurred at the field level where first-hand experiences facilitated 
learning as well as at national level.
This realization has implications for the study of institutions. As pointed out in 
Chapter Two, this dissertation departures from an understanding of institutions as 
autonomous actors that can generate knowledge and learn on their own. The fact that 
international organizations are comprised of member states that define institutional 
purpose, design budgets, and allocate resources provides both opportunities for, and 
limitations on, IOs’ actions. While limits are obvious and related to institution’s 
dependence on member state resources and willingness to support IOs' policies, 
opportunities come from the authority, legitimacy, and reach that IOs can provide to 
norms and practices directed to the common good.
In other words, their contribution to international politics comes less from their 
capacity to act on their own and more from their ability to generate knowledge, norms 
and practices and, most importantly, from their leading role in influencing member states 
to transform policies. In this regard, the analysis of the UN's organizational learning 
process was paramount to identify the instances through which knowledge was 
transmitted from the organization to member states pointing the way through which 
organizations can further enhance their leading capacity as agents of norm dissemination.
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For future research, the mechanisms through which knowledge is transmitted 
from the organization to the member states should be emphasized. In particular, if and 
how first-hand experience and accumulated field learning is transmitted and incorporated 
at the national level. This analysis would be paramount to conclusively determine 10’ s 
influence in constructing international politics and the norms and rules to which states 
abide.
As a final word, I would like to emphasize that this research strives to view 
institutions differently. Rather than seeing them as instruments of states or actors in their 
own right, we should analyze them as facilitators and enablers o f norm creation and 
diffusion through the world. The understanding of institutions as enablers and facilitators 
indicates that the role of IOs in international politics is greater than realists would think 
though not as protagonist as institutionalists would argue. In practice, it is an important 
venue to connect different actors and form epistemic communities, who in turn create and 
transmit specialized information and knowledge designed for the common good to 
different national governments.
Conclusions
The analysis provided in the chapter summarized the UN’s main successes and 
shortcomings in implementing its learning process as well as highlighting the 
implications of this analysis to the study of institutions. Among shortcomings and 
proposed future research is a deeper analysis of the UN as an agent of gender norm 
dissemination and the mechanisms to improve channels of communication and norms 
diffusion between the organization, the field and to member states.
There are, however, other observations that need to be further evaluated. The 
analysis of the two case studies and how gender has been incorporated to peacekeeping 
practices encountered a few discrepancies. For example, despite the existence of a strong 
protection mandate where gender considerations are fully integrated into the mission's 
mandate and military planning in Congo, advances have not been noticed. In this regard, 
compared to Haiti which has experienced an improvement, the role o f individual 
personalities is noteworthy. The absence of specific guidelines on how to incorporate 
gender into MINUSTAH's work or strategies to better protect women and girls is 
problematic because personality contingent action ends when leadership change. Gender 
needs to be institutionalized in the mission mandate. Until this occurs it is imperative 
that like-minded individuals be placed in key roles to support the UN's performance in 
this regard.
Finally, the analysis showed that learning is a dynamic process in which the 
different phases happen simultaneously making it impossible to determine when a 
process has finished and learning has been successfully accomplished. In fact, successful 
learning processes may be those that are continuous and are characterized by constant 
transformation of the policies being implemented in accordance to the evolution o f the 
context in which missions are deployed.
To conclude, a positive impact in the field should not be a definitive criterion 
determining the success or failure of a learning process. While the impact of these 
policies in the field are important and should be taken into consideration, there are often 
complicating factors, such as the local culture and violence levels that may hinder the 
effects of these approaches. Long-term assessment is necessary and provides a method of
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evaluating whether these policies address the root causes of unbalanced gender relations 




The analysis showed that the United Nations has incorporated a gender approach 
to peace operations as a way to better respond to the challenges that modem day conflict 
has imposed on the international community in general. In fact, throughout time, UN 
peacekeeping operations have evolved as much as the nature of conflicts and of threats 
have changed, highlighting the UN’s capacity to adapt its practices in accordance to 
transformations in the security environment and the resulting impact for the security of 
states and its people. These adjustments, however, have not come without difficulties and 
still remain today, despite the enlargement of mandates and of peacekeeping personnel, 
particularly civilians, and the transformation of peacekeeping practice itself, the UN is 
constantly put in the spotlight for its failures in the field.
Beyond the specific topic of gender discussed in this dissertation, the UN has 
proposed a number of solutions that follows a Western recipe of success with limited 
analysis of whether or not these may work in host nations and if one solution can indeed 
fit all cases. As underlined by Paris, the UN's peace template seems to be based on the 
idea that founding Western, liberal and capitalist democracies where there barely was a 
state is the best approach to lay the foundation o f a lasting peace. He admonishes, 
however, that establishing democratic elections in places where there has not been 
previous democratic experience and promoting market liberalization “is inherently
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tumultuous, it can exacerbate social tensions and undermine the prospects of stable peace 
in the fragile conditions that typically exist in war-shattered countries.”1
This and other related “recipes of success” are habitually relayed by the UN and 
other organizations, often conditioning their support to the adoption o f policies that were 
formulated in the West and by the West. In the UN however, particularly in the field o f 
international peace and security, these Western recipes are carried out by non-Westem 
countries as most uniformed personnel come from African and Asian countries whose 
political, economic and social traditions are considerably diverse from the policies they 
are entitled to implement. Amongst civilian experts many come from the West with no 
historical memory of a post-conflict reconstruction of their own, or from countries that 
are currently passing through similar situations as host nations where they are deployed, 
but whose experience is most likely to be different from the policies they put in practice.
This is not to say that throughout time UN staff does not learn the specificities 
from the field and develop a strong sense of what should and can be implemented, but 
rather, they become pragmatic and immersed in this world. A world in which the 
mismatch between headquarters’ policies and the reality in the field is just too big to be 
implemented “by the book,” but where there is space for creativity and few innovative 
actions that attempts to strengthen local capacity and ownership. The pace of progress, 
however, is slow and not enough to compete with the constant changing and deteriorating 
conditions that are usually present in intervened societies.
As part of this discussion, this dissertation embarked in the account o f how gender 
considerations became a central piece in UN peace efforts despite the unrelenting cultural
1 Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, p.7
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diversity of its membership. While the presence of cultural chasms was Ernst Haas main 
point of contention when discussing his own model of organizational learning, in light of 
the already adopted renewed normative framework on gender approaches to peace 
operations, this dissertation attempted to assess whether or not learning could effectively 
take place without member states’ full compliance and if the organization could 
ultimately serve as an agent of dissemination.
The model proposed here predicted a five step learning process -  organizational 
dysfunctional, re-examination, minimum consensus, institutionalization and 
dissemination -  that reinforced the last phase or dissemination as the most problematic 
and one of the main factors that explains the UN’s limited impact in the field. However, it 
also showed that putting forth these policies has contributed to limited diffusion among 
member states and host nations and further research on possible long term effects should 
be carried out.
Indeed, the UN’s incorporation of gender approaches to peacekeeping was the 
direct result of continued dysfunction observed in the field. The UN’s difficulty to 
successfully carry out peace mission mandates was common place throughout the 90’s, 
however in no other situation, as those occurred in Rwanda and Bosnia, it became clearer 
that the available set of norms, practices and tools at the UN’s disposal were inadequate 
to adequately address the horrors experienced in these war-torn societies. Sexual violence 
was never before perceived as a weapon or as part of a strategic thinking underlying war 
strategies. The international community was unprepared to even understand these acts 
and thus it was not until much later that they became widely recognized as a powerful 
tactic and first propositions as to how to address them were put forth.
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The realization of the UN’s inability to act generated a process of re-examination 
in which its peace efforts passed through a transformation still in place nowadays but that 
ultimately rests on the assumption that it is no longer states’ security that matter the most 
but that of the individuals living within them. In other words, the security o f the state 
became associated with that of the individual, and thus measures to secure the state 
included actions to address individuals’ needs and vice-versa measures to protect the 
individual included efforts to strengthen the state.
The incorporation of gender approaches to peacekeeping is part of this process 
and was generated as a consequence o f increasing considerations in regard to human 
security, the incorporation of protection of civilians mandates and the increasing 
importance of women’s rights in the international agenda. It also resulted from the 
increasing efforts of civil society organizations, practitioners and scholars -  in other 
words members of the epistemic community -  concerned with the UN’s capacity to 
adequately address renewed challenges in the field, but most importantly, connoisseur of 
the reality on the ground, the specific needs of the populations and alarmed with the 
relative absence of any discussions in regards to the impact o f war on different gender 
groups, particularly women and girls.
Despite time, these discussions entered the UN through the front door. It managed 
to forge a minimum consensus and debut in the international peace and security arena 
through the adoption of a series of resolutions by the Security Council as a way to 
incorporate a gender perspective to all peace efforts and to institutionalize it as a new 
international practice.
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The appointment o f senior gender advisers in the field and at headquarters levels 
and the advancement of gender guidelines, training modules and strategies to better 
respond to the specific needs of women and girls in conflict and reconstruction settings 
were the first initiatives undertaken. Moreover, the organization also urged member states 
to incorporate a few changes, such as increasing the number of female uniformed 
personnel as a ways to both serve as a role model, but also to improve the outreach to 
local communities and potential victims. The strategy put forth was based on the concept 
of gender equality and had gender balance and gender mainstreaming as main 
components. As a result, actions aiming to improve national capabilities, promote 
women's empowerment and enhance protection were put in place.
Nonetheless, the case studies showed that while this approach is being 
implemented in the field, challenges remain, specifically in regards to the generation of 
context specific frameworks, a volatile security environment, and member states’ 
differentiated response for adopting the new gender normative. It then becomes clear that 
while the UN has already institutionalized gender as a new practice, it has confronted 
difficulties disseminating it.
This dissertation argued that while the UN has adopted gender mainstreaming as a 
central part o f peace efforts, the impact on the ground has been slow, due especially to 
member states inability or unwillingness to comply with provisions. This was indeed the 
case, as shown throughout the dissertation, however, other complicating factors also 
contributed to this limited impact. The unrelenting violent context in some of these 
countries, lack of resources and challenges to reverse patriarchic institutions and 
transform them further complicates the UN’s capacity to successfully fulfill its mandates.
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Moreover, as it was pointed out in the previous sessions, despite the slow pace and 
limited scope a few instances of dissemination could be observed and partial 
accomplishments obtained. The generation of local instruments to better protect women 
and girls and improve their social, political and economic status is an important indicator 
of success. Considering that local ownership of policies and capabilities is necessary for 
sustainable peace efforts and a lasting peace, the UN’s success in strengthening national 
legal systems, generating national policies and strategies and improving the national 
security sectors are important steps towards that goal.
However, this dissertation also highlighted the need to reinforce certain 
mechanisms as a way to improve the UN’s overall response and accelerate this learning 
process. Amongst which, I would like to cite four:
1. Strengthening feedback loops between field operations and headquarters and 
between those and member states.
The mismatch between the “bubble” and the field is symptomatic and a constant 
reality in peace practices. Even though there are sound mechanisms to inform 
headquarters of the reality in the field, documents, policies and reports seem to constantly 
ignore the intricate challenges to incorporate these policies in light o f the lack of 
resources, personnel and a reality so far from the farfetched proposed solutions. At the 
same time, it became clear that the UN has limited ways to engage states in complying 
with resolutions where learning has been most challenging. Nonetheless, the case studies 
analysis identified a few instances in which some of these proposed norms and practices 
were transmitted to member states personnel in the field, as was the case o f the Sri 
Lankan battalion increasing understanding o f the operational needs o f having female
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uniformed personnel and the decision to send a few in the next contingent’s deployment. 
Supporting feedback loops between field and member states themselves, can thus support 
an accelerated learning process.
2. Including gender mainstreaming and provisions to protect women in all missions’ 
mandates.
It became clear in Haiti’s case that the absence of specific provisions on 
protection of civilians and impact o f sexual violence contributed to the lack of specific 
and context driven strategies to better protect the Haitian population in general and 
women and girls against sexual violence in particular. Adding the topic to missions’ 
mandates is a relatively easy step that can immensely affect the kind of policies, actions 
and operations that are planned in the field. In fact, all missions that have gender 
provisions in the mandate have presented increasing efforts to address the issue, as shown 
by the case of Haiti itself, when the issue started to be included in the aftermath of the 
2010 earthquake.
3. Provide follow-up assessment analysis to all new policies implemented on the 
ground, documenting its specific accomplishments and setbacks in the light of 
community stability and women's status.
The field work carried out in Congo showed a myriad of initiatives in the East 
that are often unknown not only by the international community in general but even to 
headquarters in Kinshasa in the same country. These initiatives rise in the wake of 
unforeseen circumstances, such as the need to improve military capacity to interrogate 
victims, and do not receive follow up analysis on the specific impact that they promote in 
the field. The UN’s lack of civilian capacity is no news, however, increasing the presence
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of civilian experts in position to provide insightful analysis on UN’s own policies is 
valuable to ascertain the next steps for an improved response and phase out actions that 
have had limited impact.
4. Improve monitoring mechanisms to oversee member states troops gender training.
As much as the UN needs personnel and troops to carry out its mandates, it needs 
well-trained personnel able to successfully impact host societies. It is often the case that 
ill-trained personnel become involved in the conflict themselves, even participating in 
atrocities or silencing of them. As training is carried out by member states themselves, 
often without the UN’s supervision, it would be important to establish monitoring and 
vetting mechanisms as a way to preempt the involvement of peacekeepers with the 
mayhem in the field.
These are just some of an endless list of actions needed to improve the UN’s own 
response to the challenges present in peace operations. Despite that it is necessary to 
recognize the advances that have been made and continue working to accelerate the UN’s 
organizational learning process so that improved implementation tools are put in place 
and information sharing mechanisms allow different missions to take advantage of the 
innovative actions that are sometimes spontaneously generated as a way to curb an 
unforeseen obstacle. Altogether these actions comprise valuable efforts towards the 
improvement of the international community’s assessment and capacity to delivery when 
dealing with crimes of this nature.
This dissertation offered a nuanced analysis of the UN’s organizational learning 
process, pinpointing the many obstacles and few advances that have been accomplished 
thus far. The take away is that learning is a fluid and dynamic process where boundaries
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separating successful processes from failed ones is grey and must consider more than just 
measurable and positive impacts in the field. Improving national legal frameworks and 
strengthening the local civil society, for example, is an important advance that will lead 
to spillover effects, accelerate dissemination and lay the seeds for the successful 
implementation of UN mandates and the foundations for a lasting peace.
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1. What are your daily activities and tasks?
2. What are the most common incidents reported during patrols?
3. Do you perform joint operations with local institutions? (National Police and 
Military) How is it?
4. Do you perform joint operations with other UN military contingents? How about the 
police? How is it?
5. Do you carry out activities with UN civilian component? What activities? How is the 
relationship?
6. Do you carry out activities with UN humanitarian agencies and other organizations? 
What activities? How is the relationship?
7. What kind of CIMIC activities and Quick Impact Projects does your battalion 
develops with the local population?
8. How do you think the security situation in Haiti/DRC have changed since you 
arrived?
9. Have you encountered any cases of SGBV? Tell the story. If not, what is the 
procedure?
10. Do you think the female peacekeeper have a special role?
11. Do you receive pre-deployment training? How is it?
12. Is your participation voluntary?
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13. What is biggest challenge in participating on a peace operation? What have you 
learned?
14. Would you participate again? Why?
B) Police Component
1. What are your daily activities and tasks?
2. What are the most common incidents reported during patrols?
3. Do you perform joint operations with local institutions? (National Police and 
Military) How is it?
4. Do you perform joint operations with UN military contingents?
5. Do you carry out activities with UN civilian component? What activities? How is the 
relationship?
6. Do you carry out activities with UN humanitarian agencies and other organizations? 
What activities? How is the relationship?
8. How do you think the security situation in Haiti/DRC have changed since you 
arrived?
9. Have you encountered any cases of SGBV? Tell the story. If not, what is the 
procedure?
10. Do you think the female police have a special role?
11. Do you receive pre-deployment training? How is it?
12. Is your participation voluntary?
13. What is biggest challenge in participating on a peace operation? What have you 
learned?
14. Would you participate again? Why?
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C) Civilian Component and UN Agencies
1. What is the role o f your unit/agency?
2. What is the relationship between your unit/agency and the military component?
3. What programs do you have regarding gender and sexual violence?
4. What do you think is the perception of the local population regarding the UN?
5. What channels of communication exist between your unit/agency and the national 
government.
6. What is the nature of sexual violence in Haiti/DRC?
7. How has the situation improved or not over time?
D ) Civil Society
1. What is the main activities carried out by your organization?
2. What is the relationship if there is any between your organization and the UN?
3. What do you think of UN military component?
4. What programs do you have regarding gender and sexual violence?
5. What do you think is the perception of the local population regarding the UN?
6. What channels of communication exist between your unit/agency and the national 
government.
7. What is the nature of sexual violence in Haiti/DRC?
8. How has the situation improved or not over time?
E) Government
1. What are the channels of communication between the government and the UN? 
How is the relationship?
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2. What other organizations do you cooperate with? What kind of activities are 
developed together?
3. What do you think of UN's military component?
4. What is the nature of sexual violence in Haiti/DRC?







Argentine Aviation Unit 
Argentine Military Hospital 
Bolivian Company (BOLCOY)
Brazilian Battalions (BRABATT I and II) 
Chilean Battalion (CHIBATT)
Chilean Helicopter Unit 
Chilean-Ecuadorian Engineer Unit 
Jordanian Battalion (JORBATT)
Nepalese Battalion (NEPBATT)
Paraguayan Engineer Company (PARENCOY) 
Peruvian Company (PERCOY)
Sri Lanka Battalion (SRIBATT)
Uruguayan Battalion (URUBATT I and II) 
Uruguayan Naval Unit (URUMAR)
1.2 Others:
Force Commander 





MINUSTAH Police Commissioner 
MINUSTAH UNPol Gender Adviser 
MINUSTAH IDP camp Chief 
Gender mobile Units 
Norwegian Police Officers 
Brazilian Police Officers 
Argentine Police Officers
2.2 Formed Police Units:
Bangladesh Female Formed Police Unit 
Indian Formed Police Unit
3) Civilian component
- Special Representative o f the Secretary General
- Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General - Humanitarian Coordinator
- Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General - Security Coordinator









Joint Military Analysis Center (J-MAC)






5.1 Local civil society organizations 
Concertacion Nacional
SOFA
5.2 Intemacional civil society organizations 
Red Cross
Doctors Without Borders 




International Organization for Migration
6) Government.






Guatemalan Special Forces (GUASFOR) 
Uruguayan Battalion (URUBATT) 
Uruguayan Airfield Support Unit (URUASU) 
Uruguayan Naval Company 
Ghana Battalion (GANBATT)
Moroccan Battalion (MORBATT)
Pakistan Battalion II (PAKBATT II)
Indian Battalion IV (INDBATT IV) 
Bangladesh Battalion I (BANBATT I) 
Bangladesh Aviation Unit (BANAIR)
1.2 Others
North Kivu Brigade Commander 
South Kivu Brigade Commander 
Military Observers (various nationalities)
2) Police component
2.1 UNPols
UNPol Representatives in Bukavu 
UNPol Representatives in Goma 
UNPol Representative in Bunia 
2.1. Formed Police Units
Senegalese Formed Police Unit 
Indian Formed Police Unit 
Bangladesh Female Formed Police Unit 
Bangladesh Formed Police Unit 
Egyptian Formed Police Unit
3) Civilian component
Special Representative of the Secretary General for Rule o f Law
2.1 MONUSCO substantive sections




Prosecution Supporting Cells 
Joint Human Rights Office 
Political Affairs 
Security Sector Reform 
Mission Support 
Conduct and Discipline Unit 
Child Protection




5) Civil Society Organizations
5.1 Local civil society organizations 
Reseau Action Femme in Kinshasa 
CONAFED in Kinshasa
REFED in Goma
Caucus de femme Congolaise in Bukavu
5.2 International Civil Society Organization 
ICRC representatives in Goma
ICRC representatives sin Kinshasa 
MSF representatives in Bukavu
6) Government
- Minister of Gender, Children and Family
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3. National Strategy to Combat Sexual Violence
The mechanism of coordination for the implementation of the National Strategy is 
done at three different levels, nationally through the office in Kinshasa, regionally 
through the provincial units, and locally through a network o f partners on the field. All 
the three levels focus on five main components, each with a UN and a government 
counterpart.
1. Fighting impunity: led by the Ministry of Justice and UN Joint Human Rights 
Office, this component aims to improve access to justice for victims of Sexual Violence 
and reinforce and evaluate the judicial referral and treatment o f cases of sexual violence, 
including the collection and analysis of statistics on the judicial process.
2. Protection and Prevention: led by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Human 
Rights and UN High Commissioner of Refugee (UNHCR), this component aims to 
contribute to protection and prevention of sexual violence and work with local actors to 
improve awareness of sexual violence within communities.
3. Multi-Sector Assistance: led by the Ministry of Health and UNICEF, this 
component aims to contribute to improve national protocol on multi-sectoral assistance 
and assuring access to qualify services for victims.
4. Security Sector Reform: led by the Ministry of Defense and MONUSCO's 
Section of Security Sector Development, this component aims to sensitize elements of 
FARDC on the prevention and reduction of sexual violence.
5. Data Collection and Mapping: led by the Ministry of Gender and the UN 
Population Fund, this component aims to improve and reinforce data collection on sexual 
violence.
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Figure 9: Mechanism for the coordination of the National Strategy on the fight 
against sexual violence
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Source: MONUSCO Sexual Violence Unit, 2012.
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